wagglewunguswoo

.secure-delete/sfill.1

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+.\" This definition swiped from the gcc(1) man page
+.de Sp
+.if n .sp
+.if t .sp 0.4
+..
+.TH SFILL 1
+
+.SH NAME
+sfill \- secure free disk and inode space wiper (secure_deletion toolkit)
+
+.SH SYNOPSIS
+.B sfill [-f] [-i] [-I] [-l] [-l] [-v] [-z] directory/mountpoint
+
+.SH DESCRIPTION
+.I sfill
+is designed to delete data which lies on available diskspace on mediums
+in a secure manner which can not be recovered by thiefs, law enforcement
+or other threats.
+The wipe algorythm is based on the paper "Secure Deletion of Data from
+Magnetic and Solid-State Memory" presented at the 6th Usenix Security
+Symposium by Peter Gutmann, one of the leading civilian cryptographers.
+.PP
+The
+.I secure data deletion
+process of sfill goes like this:
+.PP
+.TP
+.B *
+1 pass with 0xff
+.TP
+.B * 
+5 random passes. /dev/urandom is used for a secure RNG if available.
+.TP
+.B * 
+27 passes with special values defined by Peter Gutmann.
+.TP
+.B * 
+5 random passes. /dev/urandom is used for a secure RNG if available.
+.PP
+afterwards as many temporary files as possible are generated to wipe the
+free inode space. After no more temporary files can be created, they are
+removed and sfill is finnished.
+.PP
+
+.SH COMMANDLINE OPTIONS
+.PP
+.TP
+.B \-f
+fast (and insecure mode): no /dev/urandom, no synchronize mode.
+.TP
+.B \-i
+wipe only free inode space, not free disk space
+.TP
+.B \-I
+wipe only free disk space, not free inode space
+.TP
+.B \-l 
+lessens the security. Only two passes are written: one mode with 0xff
+and a final mode with random values.
+.TP
+.B \-l
+-l for a second time lessons the security even more: only one random pass
+is written.
+.TP
+.B \-v
+verbose mode
+.TP
+.B \-z
+wipes the last write with zeros instead of random data
+.PP
+.PP
+.B directory/mountpoint
+this is the location of the file created in your filesystem. It should
+lie on the partition you want to write.
+.PP
+
+.SH LIMITATIONS
+.TP
+.B FILESYSTEM INTELLIGENCE
+Most filesystems (ext2, ffs, etc.) have several features included to enhance
+performance, which will result in that sfill might not receive all available
+free space. Sad but true. Nothing can be done about that ...
+.TP
+.B NFS
+Beware of NFS. You can't ensure you really completely wiped your data
+from the remote disks. (especially because of caching)
+.TP
+.B Raid
+Raid Systems use stripped disks and have got large caches. It's hard to wipe
+them.
+.TP
+.B swap
+Some of your data might have a copy in your swapspace.
+.I sswap
+is available for this task.
+
+.PP
+.SH BUGS 
+No bugs. There was never a bug in the secure_deletion package (in contrast
+to my other tools, whew, good luck ;-)
+Send me any that you find.  Patches are nice too :)
+
+.SH AUTHOR
+.Sp
+van Hauser / THC
+.I <vh@thc.org>
+
+.SH DISTRIBUTION
+The newest version of the
+.I secure_deletion package
+can be obtained from 
+.I http://www.thc.org
+.Sp
+.I sfill
+and the
+.I secure_deletion package
+is (C) 1997-2003 by van Hauser / THC (vh@thc.org)
+.Sp
+This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+the Free Software Foundation; Version 2.
+.Sp
+This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+General Public License for more details.
+
+.SH SEE ALSO
+.I srm
+(1),
+.I sswap
+(1),
+.I smem
+(1)