modules: migrate remaining 22 modules to ctx->host fingerprint
Completes the host-fingerprint refactor that started in c00c3b4. Every
module now consults the shared ctx->host (populated once at startup
by core/host.c) instead of re-doing uname / geteuid / /etc/os-release
parsing / fork+unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER) probes per detect().
Migrations applied per module (mechanical, no exploit logic touched):
1. #include "../../core/host.h" inside each module's #ifdef __linux__.
2. kernel_version_current(&v) -> ctx->host->kernel (with the
v -> v-> arrow-vs-dot fix for all later usage). Drops ~20 redundant
uname() calls across the corpus.
3. geteuid() == 0 (the 'already root, nothing to escalate' gate) ->
bool is_root = ctx->host ? ctx->host->is_root : (geteuid() == 0);
This is the key change that lets the unit test suite construct
non-root fingerprints regardless of the test process's actual euid.
4. Per-detect fork+unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER) probe helpers (named
can_unshare_userns / can_unshare_userns_mount across the corpus)
are removed wholesale; their call sites now consult
ctx->host->unprivileged_userns_allowed, which was probed once at
startup. Removes ~10 per-scan fork()s.
Modules touched by this commit (22):
Batch A (7): dirty_pipe, dirty_cow, ptrace_traceme, pwnkit,
cgroup_release_agent, overlayfs_setuid, and entrybleed
(no migration target — KPTI gate stays as direct sysfs
read; documented as 'no applicable pattern').
Batch B (7): nf_tables, cls_route4, netfilter_xtcompat, af_packet,
af_packet2, af_unix_gc, fuse_legacy.
Batch C (8): stackrot, nft_set_uaf, nft_fwd_dup, nft_payload,
sudo_samedit, sequoia, sudoedit_editor, vmwgfx.
Combined with the 4 modules already migrated (dirtydecrypt, fragnesia,
pack2theroot, overlayfs) and the 5-module copy_fail_family bridge,
the entire registered corpus now goes through ctx->host. The 4
'fork+unshare per detect()' helpers that existed across nf_tables,
cls_route4, netfilter_xtcompat, af_packet, af_packet2, fuse_legacy,
nft_set_uaf, nft_fwd_dup, nft_payload, sequoia,
cgroup_release_agent, and overlayfs_setuid are now gone — replaced by
the single startup probe in core/host.c.
Verification:
- Linux (docker gcc:latest + libglib2.0-dev): full clean build links
31 modules; tests/test_detect.c: 8/8 pass.
- macOS (local): full clean build links 31 modules (Mach-O, 172KB);
test suite reports skipped as designed on non-Linux.
Subsequent commits can add more EXPECT_DETECT cases in
tests/test_detect.c — the host-fingerprint paths in every module are
now uniformly testable via synthetic struct skeletonkey_host instances.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
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#ifdef __linux__
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#include "../../core/kernel_range.h"
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#include "../../core/host.h"
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <fcntl.h>
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#include <pwd.h>
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@@ -66,32 +67,37 @@ static const struct kernel_range ptrace_traceme_range = {
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static skeletonkey_result_t ptrace_traceme_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
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{
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struct kernel_version v;
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if (!kernel_version_current(&v)) {
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fprintf(stderr, "[!] ptrace_traceme: could not parse kernel version\n");
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/* Consult the shared host fingerprint instead of calling
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* kernel_version_current() ourselves — populated once at startup
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* and identical across every module's detect(). */
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const struct kernel_version *v = ctx->host ? &ctx->host->kernel : NULL;
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if (!v || v->major == 0) {
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if (!ctx->json)
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fprintf(stderr, "[!] ptrace_traceme: host fingerprint missing kernel "
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"version — bailing\n");
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return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
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}
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/* Bug existed since ptrace's inception (early 2.x); anything
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* pre-LTS-backport is vulnerable. Anything < 4.4 in our range
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* model defaults to vulnerable since no entry covers it. */
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if (v.major < 4 || (v.major == 4 && v.minor < 4)) {
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if (v->major < 4 || (v->major == 4 && v->minor < 4)) {
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if (!ctx->json) {
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fprintf(stderr, "[!] ptrace_traceme: ancient kernel %s — assume VULNERABLE\n",
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v.release);
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v->release);
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}
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return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
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}
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bool patched = kernel_range_is_patched(&ptrace_traceme_range, &v);
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bool patched = kernel_range_is_patched(&ptrace_traceme_range, v);
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if (patched) {
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if (!ctx->json) {
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fprintf(stderr, "[+] ptrace_traceme: kernel %s is patched\n", v.release);
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fprintf(stderr, "[+] ptrace_traceme: kernel %s is patched\n", v->release);
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}
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return SKELETONKEY_OK;
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}
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if (!ctx->json) {
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fprintf(stderr, "[!] ptrace_traceme: kernel %s in vulnerable range\n", v.release);
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fprintf(stderr, "[!] ptrace_traceme: kernel %s in vulnerable range\n", v->release);
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fprintf(stderr, "[i] ptrace_traceme: no exotic preconditions — works on default config "
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"(no user_ns required)\n");
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}
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@@ -186,7 +192,10 @@ static skeletonkey_result_t ptrace_traceme_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx
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fprintf(stderr, "[-] ptrace_traceme: detect() says not vulnerable; refusing\n");
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return pre;
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}
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if (geteuid() == 0) {
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/* Consult ctx->host->is_root so unit tests can construct a
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* non-root fingerprint regardless of the test process's real euid. */
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bool is_root = ctx->host ? ctx->host->is_root : (geteuid() == 0);
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if (is_root) {
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fprintf(stderr, "[i] ptrace_traceme: already root\n");
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return SKELETONKEY_OK;
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}
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