modules: per-module OPSEC notes — telemetry footprint per exploit
Adds .opsec_notes to every module's struct skeletonkey_module
(31 entries across 26 module files). One paragraph per exploit
describing the runtime footprint a defender/SOC would see:
- file artifacts created/modified (exact paths from source)
- syscall observables (the unshare / socket / setsockopt /
splice / msgsnd patterns the embedded detection rules look for)
- dmesg signatures (silent on success vs KASAN oops on miss)
- network activity (loopback-only vs none)
- persistence side-effects (/etc/passwd modification, dropped
setuid binaries, backdoors)
- cleanup behaviour (callback present? what it restores?)
Each note is grounded in the module's source code + its existing
auditd/sigma/yara/falco detection rules — the OPSEC notes are
literally the inverse of those rules (the rules describe what to
look for; the notes describe what the exploit triggers).
Three intelligence agents researched the modules in parallel,
reading source + MODULE.md, then their proposals were embedded
verbatim via tools/inject_opsec.py (one-shot script, not retained).
Where surfaced:
- --module-info <name>: '--- opsec notes ---' section between
detect-rules summary and the embedded auditd/sigma rule bodies.
- --module-info / --scan --json: 'opsec_notes' top-level string.
Audience uses:
- Red team: see what footprint each exploit leaves so they pick
chains that match the host's telemetry posture.
- Blue team: the notes mirror the existing detection rules from the
attacker side — easy diff to find gaps in their SIEM coverage.
- Researchers: per-exploit footprint catalog for technique analysis.
copy_fail_family gets one shared note across all 5 register entries
(copy_fail, copy_fail_gcm, dirty_frag_esp, dirty_frag_esp6,
dirty_frag_rxrpc) since they share exploit infrastructure.
Verification:
- macOS local: clean build, --module-info nf_tables shows full
opsec section + CWE + ATT&CK + KEV row from previous commit.
- Linux (docker gcc:latest): 33 + 54 = 87 passes, 0 fails.
Next: --explain mode (uses these notes + the triage metadata to
render a single 'why is this verdict, what would patch fix it, and
what would the SOC see' page per module).
This commit is contained in:
@@ -247,6 +247,7 @@ const struct skeletonkey_module copy_fail_module = {
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.detect_sigma = copy_fail_family_sigma,
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.detect_yara = copy_fail_family_yara,
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.detect_falco = copy_fail_family_falco,
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.opsec_notes = "Family-shared infrastructure (copy_fail, copy_fail_gcm, dirty_frag_esp/esp6, dirty_frag_rxrpc): all exploit a page-cache write primitive against /etc/passwd (UID flip to all-zeros) or install a persistent backdoor. Audit-visible via socket(AF_ALG) (a0=38), setsockopt(XFRM), AF_UNIX setup. Detection rules watch /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, /etc/sudoers, /usr/bin/su for non-root writes. Family mitigation blacklists algif_aead/esp4/esp6/rxrpc and sets apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=1. Cleanup evicts /etc/passwd from page cache and reverts mitigation conf.",
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};
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/* ----- copy_fail_gcm (variant, no CVE) ----- */
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@@ -279,6 +280,7 @@ const struct skeletonkey_module copy_fail_gcm_module = {
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.detect_sigma = copy_fail_family_sigma,
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.detect_yara = copy_fail_family_yara,
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.detect_falco = copy_fail_family_falco,
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.opsec_notes = "Family-shared infrastructure (copy_fail, copy_fail_gcm, dirty_frag_esp/esp6, dirty_frag_rxrpc): all exploit a page-cache write primitive against /etc/passwd (UID flip to all-zeros) or install a persistent backdoor. Audit-visible via socket(AF_ALG) (a0=38), setsockopt(XFRM), AF_UNIX setup. Detection rules watch /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, /etc/sudoers, /usr/bin/su for non-root writes. Family mitigation blacklists algif_aead/esp4/esp6/rxrpc and sets apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=1. Cleanup evicts /etc/passwd from page cache and reverts mitigation conf.",
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};
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/* ----- dirty_frag_esp (CVE-2026-43284 v4) ----- */
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@@ -311,6 +313,7 @@ const struct skeletonkey_module dirty_frag_esp_module = {
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.detect_sigma = copy_fail_family_sigma,
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.detect_yara = copy_fail_family_yara,
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.detect_falco = copy_fail_family_falco,
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.opsec_notes = "Family-shared infrastructure (copy_fail, copy_fail_gcm, dirty_frag_esp/esp6, dirty_frag_rxrpc): all exploit a page-cache write primitive against /etc/passwd (UID flip to all-zeros) or install a persistent backdoor. Audit-visible via socket(AF_ALG) (a0=38), setsockopt(XFRM), AF_UNIX setup. Detection rules watch /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, /etc/sudoers, /usr/bin/su for non-root writes. Family mitigation blacklists algif_aead/esp4/esp6/rxrpc and sets apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=1. Cleanup evicts /etc/passwd from page cache and reverts mitigation conf.",
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};
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/* ----- dirty_frag_esp6 (CVE-2026-43284 v6) ----- */
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@@ -343,6 +346,7 @@ const struct skeletonkey_module dirty_frag_esp6_module = {
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.detect_sigma = copy_fail_family_sigma,
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.detect_yara = copy_fail_family_yara,
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.detect_falco = copy_fail_family_falco,
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.opsec_notes = "Family-shared infrastructure (copy_fail, copy_fail_gcm, dirty_frag_esp/esp6, dirty_frag_rxrpc): all exploit a page-cache write primitive against /etc/passwd (UID flip to all-zeros) or install a persistent backdoor. Audit-visible via socket(AF_ALG) (a0=38), setsockopt(XFRM), AF_UNIX setup. Detection rules watch /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, /etc/sudoers, /usr/bin/su for non-root writes. Family mitigation blacklists algif_aead/esp4/esp6/rxrpc and sets apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=1. Cleanup evicts /etc/passwd from page cache and reverts mitigation conf.",
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};
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/* ----- dirty_frag_rxrpc (CVE-2026-43500) ----- */
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@@ -375,6 +379,7 @@ const struct skeletonkey_module dirty_frag_rxrpc_module = {
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.detect_sigma = copy_fail_family_sigma,
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.detect_yara = copy_fail_family_yara,
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.detect_falco = copy_fail_family_falco,
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.opsec_notes = "Family-shared infrastructure (copy_fail, copy_fail_gcm, dirty_frag_esp/esp6, dirty_frag_rxrpc): all exploit a page-cache write primitive against /etc/passwd (UID flip to all-zeros) or install a persistent backdoor. Audit-visible via socket(AF_ALG) (a0=38), setsockopt(XFRM), AF_UNIX setup. Detection rules watch /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, /etc/sudoers, /usr/bin/su for non-root writes. Family mitigation blacklists algif_aead/esp4/esp6/rxrpc and sets apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=1. Cleanup evicts /etc/passwd from page cache and reverts mitigation conf.",
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};
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/* ----- Family registration ----- */
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