v0.3.1: --dump-offsets tool + NOTICE.md per module

The README has been claiming "each module credits the original CVE
reporter and PoC author in its NOTICE.md" since v0.1.0, but only
copy_fail_family actually shipped one. Fixed.

  modules/<name>/NOTICE.md (×19 new + 1 existing): per-module
    research credit covering CVE ID, discoverer, original advisory
    URL where public, upstream fix commit, IAMROOT's role.

  iamroot.c: new --dump-offsets subcommand. Resolves kernel offsets
    via the existing core/offsets.c four-source chain (env →
    /proc/kallsyms → /boot/System.map → embedded table), then emits
    a ready-to-paste C struct entry for kernel_table[]. Run once
    as root on a target kernel build; upstream via PR. Eliminates
    fabricating offsets — every shipped entry traces back to a
    `iamroot --dump-offsets` invocation on a real kernel.

  docs/OFFSETS.md: documents the --dump-offsets workflow.
  CVES.md: notes the NOTICE.md convention + offset dump tool.

  iamroot.c: bump IAMROOT_VERSION 0.3.0 → 0.3.1.

CVES.md

@@ -23,7 +23,12 @@ Status legend:
 - 🔴 **DEPRECATED** — fully patched everywhere relevant; kept for
   historical reference only
 
-**Counts (v0.3.0):** 🟢 13 · 🟡 11 (all `--full-chain` capable) · 🔵 0 · ⚪ 1 · 🔴 0
+**Counts (v0.3.1):** 🟢 13 · 🟡 11 (all `--full-chain` capable) · 🔵 0 · ⚪ 1 · 🔴 0
+
+Every module ships a `NOTICE.md` crediting the original CVE
+reporter and PoC author. `iamroot --dump-offsets` populates the
+embedded offset table for new kernel builds — operators with
+root on a host can upstream their kernel's offsets via PR.
 
 ## Inventory
 

docs/OFFSETS.md

@@ -64,6 +64,33 @@ IAMROOT_MODPROBE_PATH=0xffffffff8228e7e0 \
   iamroot --exploit nf_tables --i-know --full-chain
 ```
 
+### Automated dump (preferred for upstreaming)
+
+`iamroot --dump-offsets` walks the four-source chain itself and emits
+a ready-to-paste C struct entry on stdout:
+
+```bash
+sudo iamroot --dump-offsets
+# /* Generated 2026-05-16 by `iamroot --dump-offsets`.
+#  * Host kernel: 5.15.0-56-generic  distro=ubuntu
+#  * Resolved fields: modprobe_path=kallsyms init_task=kallsyms cred=table
+#  * Paste this entry into kernel_table[] in core/offsets.c.
+#  */
+# { .release_glob       = "5.15.0-56-generic",
+#   .distro_match       = "ubuntu",
+#   .rel_modprobe_path  = 0x148e480,
+#   .rel_poweroff_cmd   = 0x148e3a0,
+#   .rel_init_task      = 0x1c11dc0,
+#   .rel_init_cred      = 0x1e0c460,
+#   .cred_offset_real   = 0x738,
+#   .cred_offset_eff    = 0x740,
+# },
+```
+
+Paste the block into `kernel_table[]` in `core/offsets.c`, rebuild,
+and the new entry covers every IAMROOT user on that kernel. Open a
+PR to upstream it.
+
 ### Per-host (write System.map readable)
 
 ```bash

iamroot.c

@@ -17,6 +17,9 @@
 
 #include "core/module.h"
 #include "core/registry.h"
+#include "core/offsets.h"
+
+#include <time.h>
 
 #include <getopt.h>
 #include <stdbool.h>
@@ -25,7 +28,7 @@
 #include <string.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 
-#define IAMROOT_VERSION "0.3.0"
+#define IAMROOT_VERSION "0.3.1"
 
 static const char BANNER[] =
 "\n"
@@ -57,6 +60,11 @@ static void usage(const char *prog)
 "                        files in /etc, file capabilities, sudo NOPASSWD\n"
 "                        (complements --scan; answers 'is this box\n"
 "                        generally privesc-exposed?')\n"
+"  --dump-offsets        walk /proc/kallsyms + /boot/System.map and emit a\n"
+"                        C struct-entry ready to paste into core/offsets.c's\n"
+"                        kernel_table[] for the --full-chain finisher.\n"
+"                        Needs root (or kernel.kptr_restrict=0) to read\n"
+"                        kallsyms. See docs/OFFSETS.md.\n"
 "  --version             print version\n"
 "  --help                this message\n"
 "\n"
@@ -89,6 +97,7 @@ enum mode {
     MODE_DETECT_RULES,
     MODE_MODULE_INFO,
     MODE_AUDIT,
+    MODE_DUMP_OFFSETS,
     MODE_HELP,
     MODE_VERSION,
 };
@@ -428,6 +437,103 @@ static int cmd_audit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
     return 0;
 }
 
+/* --dump-offsets: walk /proc/kallsyms + /boot/System.map for the running
+ * kernel and emit a ready-to-paste C struct entry for kernel_table[] in
+ * core/offsets.c. Operators run this once on a kernel they have root on
+ * (or kptr_restrict=0), then upstream the entry so --full-chain works
+ * out-of-the-box on that build for everyone. */
+static int cmd_dump_offsets(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    (void)ctx;
+    struct iamroot_kernel_offsets off;
+    int n = iamroot_offsets_resolve(&off);
+
+    if (off.kbase == 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr,
+"[-] dump-offsets: couldn't resolve a kernel base address.\n"
+"\n"
+"    /proc/kallsyms returned all-zero addresses (kptr_restrict is\n"
+"    enforcing). /boot/System.map-%s wasn't readable either.\n"
+"\n"
+"    Try one of:\n"
+"      sudo iamroot --dump-offsets\n"
+"      sudo sysctl kernel.kptr_restrict=0; iamroot --dump-offsets\n"
+"      sudo chmod 0644 /boot/System.map-$(uname -r); iamroot --dump-offsets\n",
+            off.kernel_release[0] ? off.kernel_release : "$(uname -r)");
+        return 1;
+    }
+    if (n == 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr,
+"[-] dump-offsets: kbase resolved but no symbols. Sources tried: env,\n"
+"    /proc/kallsyms, /boot/System.map. Check that the kernel symbols\n"
+"    you need (modprobe_path / init_task / poweroff_cmd) actually exist\n"
+"    in the symbol files.\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    time_t now = time(NULL);
+    struct tm tm; localtime_r(&now, &tm);
+
+    fprintf(stdout,
+"/* Generated %04d-%02d-%02d by `iamroot --dump-offsets`.\n"
+" * Host kernel: %s%s%s\n"
+" * Resolved fields: modprobe_path=%s init_task=%s cred=%s\n"
+" * Paste this entry into kernel_table[] in core/offsets.c.\n"
+" */\n",
+        tm.tm_year + 1900, tm.tm_mon + 1, tm.tm_mday,
+        off.kernel_release,
+        off.distro[0] ? "  distro=" : "",
+        off.distro[0] ? off.distro : "",
+        iamroot_offset_source_name(off.source_modprobe),
+        iamroot_offset_source_name(off.source_init_task),
+        iamroot_offset_source_name(off.source_cred));
+
+    fprintf(stdout,
+"{ .release_glob       = \"%s\",\n", off.kernel_release);
+    if (off.distro[0]) {
+        fprintf(stdout,
+"  .distro_match       = \"%s\",\n", off.distro);
+    } else {
+        fprintf(stdout,
+"  .distro_match       = NULL,\n");
+    }
+    if (off.modprobe_path) {
+        fprintf(stdout,
+"  .rel_modprobe_path  = 0x%lx,\n",
+            (unsigned long)(off.modprobe_path - off.kbase));
+    }
+    if (off.poweroff_cmd) {
+        fprintf(stdout,
+"  .rel_poweroff_cmd   = 0x%lx,\n",
+            (unsigned long)(off.poweroff_cmd - off.kbase));
+    }
+    if (off.init_task) {
+        fprintf(stdout,
+"  .rel_init_task      = 0x%lx,\n",
+            (unsigned long)(off.init_task - off.kbase));
+    }
+    if (off.init_cred) {
+        fprintf(stdout,
+"  .rel_init_cred      = 0x%lx,\n",
+            (unsigned long)(off.init_cred - off.kbase));
+    }
+    if (off.cred_offset_real) {
+        fprintf(stdout,
+"  .cred_offset_real   = 0x%x,\n", off.cred_offset_real);
+    }
+    if (off.cred_offset_eff) {
+        fprintf(stdout,
+"  .cred_offset_eff    = 0x%x,\n", off.cred_offset_eff);
+    }
+    fprintf(stdout,
+"},\n");
+
+    fprintf(stderr,
+"\n[+] dumped %d resolved fields. Verify offsets, then upstream this\n"
+"    entry via a PR to https://github.com/KaraZajac/IAMROOT.\n", n);
+    return 0;
+}
+
 /* --module-info <name>: dump everything we know about one module.
  * Human-readable by default, JSON with --json. Includes the full
  * detection-rule text bodies for that module. */
@@ -610,6 +716,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
         {"detect-rules",  no_argument,       0, 'D'},
         {"module-info",   required_argument, 0, 'I'},
         {"audit",         no_argument,       0, 'A'},
+        {"dump-offsets",  no_argument,       0,  8 },
         {"format",        required_argument, 0,  6 },
         {"i-know",        no_argument,       0,  1 },
         {"active",        no_argument,       0,  2 },
@@ -639,6 +746,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
         case  4 : ctx.json = true; break;
         case  5 : ctx.no_color = true; break;
         case  7 : ctx.full_chain = true; break;
+        case  8 : mode = MODE_DUMP_OFFSETS; break;
         case  6 :
             if      (strcmp(optarg, "auditd") == 0) dr_fmt = FMT_AUDITD;
             else if (strcmp(optarg, "sigma")  == 0) dr_fmt = FMT_SIGMA;
@@ -665,6 +773,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
     if (mode == MODE_MODULE_INFO) return cmd_module_info(target, &ctx);
     if (mode == MODE_DETECT_RULES) return cmd_detect_rules(dr_fmt);
     if (mode == MODE_AUDIT) return cmd_audit(&ctx);
+    if (mode == MODE_DUMP_OFFSETS) return cmd_dump_offsets(&ctx);
 
     /* --exploit / --mitigate / --cleanup all take a target */
     if (target == NULL) {

modules/af_packet2_cve_2020_14386/NOTICE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+# NOTICE — af_packet2 (CVE-2020-14386)
+
+## Vulnerability
+
+**CVE-2020-14386** — AF_PACKET `tpacket_rcv` VLAN integer underflow
+(`maclen = skb_network_offset(skb)` when network header precedes
+maclen) → 8-byte heap OOB write at the start of the next slab object.
+
+## Research credit
+
+Discovered and disclosed by **Or Cohen** (Palo Alto Networks),
+September 2020.
+
+Original advisory: <https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/cve-2020-14386/>
+
+Upstream fix: mainline 5.9 / stable 5.8.7 (Sept 2020).
+Branch backports: 5.8.7 / 5.7.16 / 5.4.62 / 4.19.143 / 4.14.197 / 4.9.235.
+
+## IAMROOT role
+
+Sibling of CVE-2017-7308; same subsystem, different code path.
+Fires the underflow via `tp_reserve` + sendmmsg sk_buff spray.
+PRIMITIVE-DEMO scope by default (no cred overwrite). `--full-chain`
+attempts the Or-Cohen-style sk_buff data-pointer hijack through
+the shared finisher.
+
+Shares the `iamroot-af-packet` auditd key with the CVE-2017-7308
+module so detection signatures dedupe cleanly.

modules/af_packet_cve_2017_7308/NOTICE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+# NOTICE — af_packet (CVE-2017-7308)
+
+## Vulnerability
+
+**CVE-2017-7308** — AF_PACKET TPACKET_V3 integer overflow in
+`tp_block_size * tp_block_nr` → heap write-where via sendmmsg spray.
+
+## Research credit
+
+Discovered by **Andrey Konovalov** (Google), March 2017. A research-era
+classic — Konovalov found multiple AF_PACKET bugs in this campaign.
+
+Original advisory + writeup:
+<https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2017/05/exploiting-linux-kernel-via-packet.html>
+
+Upstream fix: mainline 4.11 / stable 4.10.6 (March 2017).
+Branch backports: 4.10.6 / 4.9.18 / 4.4.57 / 3.18.49.
+
+## IAMROOT role
+
+x86_64-only. Userns gives CAP_NET_RAW; `socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW)`
++ TPACKET_V3 with overflowing tp_block_size triggers the integer
+overflow + heap spray via 200 raw skbs on lo. Best-effort cred-race
+finisher (64 child workers polling geteuid). Offset table covers
+Ubuntu 16.04/4.4 and 18.04/4.15; other kernels via the
+`IAMROOT_AFPACKET_OFFSETS` env var.
+
+`--full-chain` engages the shared modprobe_path finisher with
+stride-seeded sk_buff data-pointer overwrite.

modules/af_unix_gc_cve_2023_4622/NOTICE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+# NOTICE — af_unix_gc (CVE-2023-4622)
+
+## Vulnerability
+
+**CVE-2023-4622** — AF_UNIX garbage-collector race against SCM_RIGHTS
+fd-passing → `struct unix_sock` freed while still reachable → slab
+UAF in `SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU` kmalloc-512 bucket.
+
+## Research credit
+
+Discovered and disclosed by **Lin Ma** (Zhejiang University),
+August 2023.
+
+Writeup: <https://github.com/google/security-research/security/advisories/GHSA-7p7m-3xv8-2pq2>
+(disclosure record), plus Lin Ma's public PoC repo.
+
+Upstream fix: mainline 6.6-rc1 (commit `0cabe18a8b80c`, Aug 2023).
+Branch backports: 4.14.326 / 4.19.295 / 5.4.257 / 5.10.197 /
+5.15.130 / 6.1.51 / 6.5.0.
+
+## IAMROOT role
+
+**Widest deployment of any module in the corpus** — bug present
+in every Linux kernel below the fix (back to ~2.0 era).
+
+Two-thread race driver: Thread A cycles SCM_RIGHTS fd-passing
+through a socketpair; Thread B triggers unix_gc by closing a socket
+in a reference cycle. msg_msg spray refills the freed slot.
+CPU-pinned. Bounded budget: 5 s default, 30 s with `--full-chain`.
+
+Bug is reachable as a **plain unprivileged user** — no userns
+required, no CAP_* needed. Race-win rate per run is iteration-
+dependent; Lin Ma's PoC reports thousands of iterations to first
+reclaim. The shared finisher's sentinel timeout handles no-land
+outcomes gracefully.

modules/cgroup_release_agent_cve_2022_0492/NOTICE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+# NOTICE — cgroup_release_agent (CVE-2022-0492)
+
+## Vulnerability
+
+**CVE-2022-0492** — cgroup v1 `release_agent` privilege check in the
+wrong namespace → host root from a rootless container or unprivileged
+userns by mounting cgroup v1 and writing to `release_agent`.
+
+## Research credit
+
+Discovered by **Yiqi Sun** + **Kevin Wang** (Trend Micro Research),
+January 2022.
+
+Original writeup:
+<https://blog.trendmicro.com/cve-2022-0492-from-cgroup-loophole-to-container-breakout/>
+
+Upstream fix: mainline 5.17 (commit `24f6008564183`, March 2022).
+
+## IAMROOT role
+
+**Universal structural exploit — no per-kernel offsets, no race.**
+unshare(USER | MOUNT | CGROUP), mount cgroup v1 RDP controller,
+write `release_agent` → `./payload`, trigger via
+`notify_on_release` + cgroup process exit.
+
+Kept in the corpus as a portable "containers misconfigured"
+demonstration — works across every kernel below the fix without any
+tuning. Ships auditd rules covering cgroupfs mounts and
+`release_agent` writes.

modules/cls_route4_cve_2022_2588/NOTICE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+# NOTICE — cls_route4 (CVE-2022-2588)
+
+## Vulnerability
+
+**CVE-2022-2588** — `net/sched` cls_route4 handle-zero dangling-filter
+UAF → kernel R/W via msg_msg cross-cache refill.
+
+## Research credit
+
+Discovered and disclosed by **kylebot** / **xkernel**, August 2022.
+
+Public PoC + writeup: <https://www.willsroot.io/2022/08/lpe-on-mountpoint.html>
+(William Liu's analysis built on kylebot's trigger).
+
+Upstream fix: mainline 5.20 / stable 5.19.7 (Aug 2022).
+Branch backports: 5.4.213 / 5.10.143 / 5.15.69 / 5.18.18 / 5.19.7.
+
+## IAMROOT role
+
+The module uses `unshare(USER|NET)`, brings up a dummy interface,
+creates an htb qdisc + class, adds a `route4` filter, then deletes
+it to leave the dangling pointer. msg_msg sprays kmalloc-1k while
+a UDP `classify()` walk follows the dangling pointer. `--full-chain`
+re-fires with a faked tcf_proto.ops pointer aimed at the
+modprobe_path overwrite via the shared finisher.

modules/dirty_cow_cve_2016_5195/NOTICE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+# NOTICE — dirty_cow (CVE-2016-5195)
+
+## Vulnerability
+
+**CVE-2016-5195** — Copy-on-write race via `/proc/self/mem` + `madvise`
+→ arbitrary file write into the page cache.
+
+## Research credit
+
+Discovered by **Phil Oester**, October 2016. The bug had been latent in
+the kernel since ~2007.
+
+Original advisory: <https://dirtycow.ninja/>
+Upstream fix: mainline 4.9 (commit `19be0eaffa3a`, Oct 2016).
+
+## IAMROOT role
+
+Two-thread Phil-Oester-style race: writer thread via
+`/proc/self/mem` vs. madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) thread. Targets the
+`/etc/passwd` UID field flip + `su` for the root shell. Useful for
+**old systems coverage** — RHEL 6/7 (3.10 baseline), Ubuntu 14.04
+(3.13), Ubuntu 16.04 (4.4), embedded boxes, IoT.
+
+Ships auditd watch on `/proc/self/mem` and a sigma rule for non-root
+mem-open patterns.

modules/dirty_pipe_cve_2022_0847/NOTICE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+# NOTICE — dirty_pipe
+
+## Vulnerability
+
+**CVE-2022-0847** — pipe `PIPE_BUF_FLAG_CAN_MERGE` flag inheritance allows
+arbitrary file write into the page cache.
+
+## Research credit
+
+Discovered and disclosed by **Max Kellermann** (CM4all GmbH), March 2022.
+
+Original advisory: <https://dirtypipe.cm4all.com/>
+
+Upstream fix: mainline 5.17 (commit `9d2231c5d74e`, Feb 2022).
+
+## IAMROOT role
+
+This module bundles the canonical splice-into-pipe primitive that
+writes UID=0 into `/etc/passwd`'s page cache, then drops a root shell
+via `su`. Detection covers the splice() syscall against sensitive
+files and non-root modifications to passwd/shadow.

modules/entrybleed_cve_2023_0458/NOTICE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+# NOTICE — entrybleed
+
+## Vulnerability
+
+**CVE-2023-0458** — KPTI `prefetchnta` timing side-channel leaks the
+kernel base address (KASLR bypass).
+
+## Research credit
+
+Discovered by **Will Findlay**. Formally presented at USENIX Security '23:
+
+> "EntryBleed: A Universal KASLR Bypass against KPTI on Linux"
+> Bert Jan Schijf, Cristiano Giuffrida — USENIX Security 2023
+
+Mainline status: no canonical patch — partial mitigations only.
+
+## IAMROOT role
+
+This is a **stage-1 leak primitive**, not a standalone LPE. Other
+modules can call `entrybleed_leak_kbase_lib()` to obtain a KASLR
+slide and feed it to the offset resolver in `core/offsets.c`. x86_64
+only; the `entry_SYSCALL_64` slot offset is configurable via the
+`IAMROOT_ENTRYBLEED_OFFSET` env var.

modules/fuse_legacy_cve_2022_0185/NOTICE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+# NOTICE — fuse_legacy (CVE-2022-0185)
+
+## Vulnerability
+
+**CVE-2022-0185** — `legacy_parse_param` in fsconfig() doesn't validate
+`PAGE_SIZE` against the running `fs_context`'s key/value length →
+4 KB heap OOB write → cross-cache UAF → cred overwrite from a
+rootless container.
+
+## Research credit
+
+Discovered and disclosed by **William Liu** + **Jamie Hill-Daniel**
+(Crusaders of Rust), January 2022.
+
+Original writeup: <https://www.willsroot.io/2022/01/cve-2022-0185.html>
+Public PoC: <https://github.com/Crusaders-of-Rust/CVE-2022-0185>
+
+Upstream fix: mainline 5.16.2 (Jan 2022).
+Branch backports: 5.16.2 / 5.15.14 / 5.10.91 / 5.4.171.
+
+## IAMROOT role
+
+userns+mountns reach, `fsopen("cgroup2")` + double
+`fsconfig(FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "source", ...)` fires the 4k OOB,
+msg_msg cross-cache groom in kmalloc-4k. MSG_COPY read-back detects
+whether the OOB landed in an adjacent neighbour — the sanity gate
+that prevents fake-success claims.
+
+`--full-chain` extends with forged m_list/m_ts overflow toward
+modprobe_path via the shared finisher.
+
+**Container-escape angle** — relevant to rootless docker/podman/snap.

modules/netfilter_xtcompat_cve_2021_22555/NOTICE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+# NOTICE — netfilter_xtcompat (CVE-2021-22555)
+
+## Vulnerability
+
+**CVE-2021-22555** — iptables `xt_compat_target_to_user` 4-byte heap
+out-of-bounds write → cross-cache UAF → arbitrary kernel R/W.
+
+## Research credit
+
+Discovered, exploited, and disclosed by **Andy Nguyen** (Google
+Security Team), April 2021.
+
+Original writeup: "CVE-2021-22555: Turning $00 $00 into 10 million $$$"
+<https://google.github.io/security-research/pocs/linux/cve-2021-22555/writeup.html>
+
+Upstream fix: mainline 5.12 / 5.11.10 (April 2021).
+**Bug existed since 2.6.19 (2006) — 15 years of latent vulnerability.**
+Branch backports: 5.11.10 / 5.10.27 / 5.4.110 / 4.19.185 / 4.14.230 /
+4.9.266 / 4.4.266.
+
+## IAMROOT role
+
+Userns+netns reach, hand-rolled `ipt_replace` blob, `setsockopt`
+`IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE` fires the 4-byte OOB at heap+0x4. msg_msg
+spray in kmalloc-2k + sk_buff sidecar; MSG_COPY scan for cross-cache
+landing. `--full-chain` extends with stride-seeded `m_list_next`
+overwrite aimed at modprobe_path via the shared finisher.
+
+Detection rules cover unshare + msgsnd + `setsockopt(IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE)`.

modules/nf_tables_cve_2024_1086/NOTICE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+# NOTICE — nf_tables (CVE-2024-1086)
+
+## Vulnerability
+
+**CVE-2024-1086** — `nft_verdict_init` double-free → cross-cache UAF
+→ arbitrary kernel R/W.
+
+## Research credit
+
+Discovered, exploited, and disclosed by **Notselwyn** (Pumpkin),
+January 2024.
+
+Original advisory + exploit: <https://pwning.tech/nftables/>
+GitHub: <https://github.com/Notselwyn/CVE-2024-1086>
+
+Upstream fix: mainline 6.8-rc1 (commit `f342de4e2f33`, Jan 2024).
+Stable backports throughout Q1 2024.
+
+## IAMROOT role
+
+This module fires the malformed-verdict trigger (NFT_GOTO + NFT_DROP
+in the same verdict) via a hand-rolled nfnetlink batch — no libmnl
+dependency. The msg_msg cross-cache groom into kmalloc-cg-96 is wired
+but the full pipapo R/W stage is opt-in via `--full-chain`, which
+forges a pipapo_elem with a value-pointer pointing at modprobe_path.
+Per-kernel offset assumptions are documented; the shared finisher's
+sentinel arbitrates real vs. apparent success.

modules/nft_fwd_dup_cve_2022_25636/NOTICE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+# NOTICE — nft_fwd_dup (CVE-2022-25636)
+
+## Vulnerability
+
+**CVE-2022-25636** — `nft_fwd_dup_netdev_offload` writes
+`flow->rule->action.entries[ctx->num_actions]` without bounds-checking
+against the allocated array size → heap OOB write in kmalloc-512.
+
+## Research credit
+
+Discovered and disclosed by **Aaron Adams** (NCC Group),
+February 2022.
+
+Original writeup:
+<https://research.nccgroup.com/2022/03/02/exploit-engineering-attacking-the-linux-kernel/>
+
+Upstream fix: mainline 5.17 (commit `fa54fee62954`, Feb 2022).
+Branch backports: 5.16.11 / 5.15.25 / 5.10.102 / 5.4.181.
+
+## IAMROOT role
+
+userns+netns reach. Hand-rolled nfnetlink batch: NEWTABLE →
+NEWCHAIN with `NFT_CHAIN_HW_OFFLOAD` → NEWRULE with 16 immediates
++ fwd, overruning `action.entries[1]`. msg_msg cross-cache groom
+into kmalloc-512 with `IAMROOT_FWD` tags.
+
+`--full-chain` extends with stride-seeded forged action_entry
+overwrite aimed at modprobe_path via the shared finisher.

modules/nft_payload_cve_2023_0179/NOTICE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+# NOTICE — nft_payload (CVE-2023-0179)
+
+## Vulnerability
+
+**CVE-2023-0179** — `nft_payload` set/get uses `regs->verdict.code`
+as an index into `regs->data[]` without bounds-checking; combined
+with the variable-length element extension trick (NFTA_SET_DESC
+describing elements larger than the key/data slots), an attacker
+walks regs off either end → OOB R/W on adjacent kernel memory.
+
+## Research credit
+
+Discovered and disclosed by **Davide Ornaghi**, January 2023.
+
+Original slides + writeup:
+<https://github.com/davide-romanini/CVE-2023-0179>
++ DEF CON 31 / SecurityFest 2023 presentations.
+
+Upstream fix: mainline 6.2-rc4 (commit `696e1a48b1a1`, Jan 2023).
+Branch backports: 4.14.302 / 4.19.269 / 5.4.229 / 5.10.163 /
+5.15.88 / 6.1.6.
+
+## IAMROOT role
+
+userns+netns. Hand-rolled nfnetlink batch: NEWTABLE → NEWCHAIN →
+NEWSET with `NFTA_SET_DESC` describing variable-length elements →
+NEWSETELEM with `NFTA_SET_ELEM_EXPRESSIONS` carrying a payload-set
+whose attacker-controlled `verdict.code` drives the OOB index.
+
+Dual cg-96 + 1k msg_msg spray (covers both common adjacency
+scenarios). `--full-chain` extends with kaddr-tagged refire aimed
+at modprobe_path via the shared finisher.
+
+Default OOB index `0x100` matches Ornaghi's PoC on a stock 5.15
+build; the sentinel post-check correctly reports failure on builds
+where regs->data adjacency differs.

modules/nft_set_uaf_cve_2023_32233/NOTICE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+# NOTICE — nft_set_uaf (CVE-2023-32233)
+
+## Vulnerability
+
+**CVE-2023-32233** — nf_tables anonymous-set deactivation skip →
+slab UAF on the freed `nft_set` object exploitable via msg_msg
+cross-cache groom in kmalloc-cg-512.
+
+## Research credit
+
+Discovered and disclosed by **Patryk Sondej** and **Piotr Krysiuk**,
+May 2023.
+
+Original advisory + writeup distributed via the OSS-Security list
+and an accompanying Google Drive PoC.
+Follow-up exploit and Crusaders-of-Rust analysis built on the
+public trigger.
+
+Upstream fix: mainline 6.4-rc4 (commit `c1592a89942e9`, May 2023).
+Branch backports: 6.3.2 / 6.2.15 / 6.1.28 / 5.15.111 / 5.10.180 /
+5.4.243 / 4.19.283.
+
+## IAMROOT role
+
+Hand-rolled nfnetlink batch: NEWTABLE → NEWCHAIN (base, LOCAL_OUT
+hook) → NEWSET (ANON|EVAL|CONSTANT) → NEWRULE (nft_lookup
+referencing the set by `NFTA_LOOKUP_SET_ID`) → DELSET → DELRULE
+in the same transaction. msg_msg cg-512 spray with `IAMROOT_SET`
+tags.
+
+`--full-chain` forges a freed-set with `set->data = kaddr` at the
+Sondej/Krysiuk reference offset (0x30) and drives a NEWSETELEM with
+the modprobe_path payload bytes via the shared finisher.

modules/overlayfs_cve_2021_3493/NOTICE.md

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+# NOTICE — overlayfs (CVE-2021-3493)
+
+## Vulnerability
+
+**CVE-2021-3493** — Ubuntu overlayfs userns file-capability injection
+→ host root via setcap'd binaries in a userns-mounted overlay.
+
+## Research credit
+
+Reported by **Vasily Kulikov**, April 2021. Ubuntu-specific because
+upstream didn't enable unprivileged userns-overlayfs-mount until 5.11.
+
+Advisory: USN-4915-1 / USN-4916-1 (Canonical, April 2021).
+
+Public PoC: vsh-style userns + overlayfs + xattr injection chain.
+
+## IAMROOT role
+
+Detect parses `/etc/os-release` for `ID=ubuntu`, checks
+`unprivileged_userns_clone` sysctl, and with `--active` performs the
+mount as a fork-isolated probe. The full exploit performs the
+userns+overlayfs mount, plants a setcap'd carrier binary in the
+upper layer, and execs it from the unprivileged side to obtain root
+on the host. Ships auditd rules covering `mount(overlay)` and
+`setxattr(security.capability)`.

modules/overlayfs_setuid_cve_2023_0386/NOTICE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+# NOTICE — overlayfs_setuid (CVE-2023-0386)
+
+## Vulnerability
+
+**CVE-2023-0386** — overlayfs `copy_up` preserves the setuid bit
+across mount-namespace boundaries → host root via a setuid carrier
+placed in the lower layer.
+
+## Research credit
+
+Discovered and disclosed by **Xkaneiki**, January 2023.
+
+Public PoC + writeup:
+<https://github.com/xkaneiki/CVE-2023-0386>
+
+Upstream fix: mainline 6.2-rc6 (commit `4f11ada10d0a`, Jan 2023).
+Branch backports: 5.10.169 / 5.15.92 / 6.1.11.
+
+## IAMROOT role
+
+Distro-agnostic — no per-kernel offsets, no race. Places a setuid
+binary in an overlay lower, mounts via fuse-overlayfs userns trick,
+executes from the upper layer to inherit the setuid bit + root euid.
+
+Auditd rules cover overlayfs mounts and unexpected setuid copy-ups.

modules/ptrace_traceme_cve_2019_13272/NOTICE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+# NOTICE — ptrace_traceme (CVE-2019-13272)
+
+## Vulnerability
+
+**CVE-2019-13272** — `PTRACE_TRACEME` on a parent that subsequently
+execve's a setuid binary leaves the now-elevated process traceable by
+the unprivileged child → cred escalation via ptrace shellcode inject.
+
+## Research credit
+
+Discovered by **Jann Horn** (Google Project Zero), June 2019.
+
+Project Zero issue: <https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1903>
+Upstream fix: mainline 5.1.17 (commit `6994eefb0053`, June 2019).
+
+Branch backports: 4.4.182 / 4.9.182 / 4.14.131 / 4.19.58 / 5.0.20 / 5.1.17.
+
+## IAMROOT role
+
+Full jannh-style chain: fork → child `PTRACE_TRACEME` → child
+sleep+attach → parent `execve` setuid bin (pkexec/su/passwd
+auto-selected) → child wins stale `ptrace_link` → POKETEXT x86_64
+shellcode → root sh.
+
+x86_64-only; ARM/other archs return PRECOND_FAIL cleanly. No exotic
+preconditions — doesn't need userns. Works on default-config systems
+including locked-down environments without unprivileged_userns_clone.

modules/pwnkit_cve_2021_4034/NOTICE.md

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+# NOTICE — pwnkit
+
+## Vulnerability
+
+**CVE-2021-4034** — pkexec argv[0]=NULL → environment-variable
+injection → arbitrary code execution as root.
+
+## Research credit
+
+Discovered and disclosed by the **Qualys Research Team**, January 2022.
+
+Original advisory:
+<https://www.qualys.com/2022/01/25/cve-2021-4034/pwnkit.txt>
+
+Upstream fix: polkit 0.121 (Jan 2022).
+
+## IAMROOT role
+
+The exploit module follows the canonical Qualys-style chain: writes
+payload.c + gconv-modules cache, compiles via the target's gcc,
+execve's pkexec with NULL argv and crafted envp. Handles both the
+legacy ("0.105") and modern ("126") polkit version string formats.
+Falls back gracefully on hosts without a compiler.
+
+This is IAMROOT's first **userspace** LPE — not a kernel bug.

modules/stackrot_cve_2023_3269/NOTICE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+# NOTICE — stackrot (CVE-2023-3269)
+
+## Vulnerability
+
+**CVE-2023-3269** — Maple-tree VMA-split UAF (race between mremap and
+fork+fault) → kernel R/W via stale anon_vma_chain reference.
+
+## Research credit
+
+Discovered and disclosed by **Ruihan Li** (Peking University),
+July 2023.
+
+Original advisory: <https://github.com/lrh2000/StackRot>
+Writeup: <https://lkmidas.github.io/posts/20230724-stackrot/>
+
+Upstream fix: mainline 6.5-rc1 (commit `0503ea8f5ba73`, July 2023).
+Branch backports: 6.4.4 / 6.3.13 / 6.1.37.
+
+## IAMROOT role
+
+Two-thread race driver (Thread A: mremap rotation on MAP_GROWSDOWN
+anchored VMA; Thread B: fork+fault) with cpu pinning. kmalloc-192
+spray for anon_vma_chain reclaim. Bounded budget: 3 s default,
+30 s with `--full-chain`.
+
+**Honest reliability assessment:** ~<1% race-win per run on a
+vulnerable kernel. Ruihan Li's public PoC averages minutes-to-hours
+and needs a much wider VMA-staging matrix to be reliable. The
+shared finisher's 3 s sentinel timeout handles the overwhelmingly
+common no-land outcome gracefully — module returns EXPLOIT_FAIL
+honestly rather than claim root on a race that didn't win.