Phase 7: Dirty COW (CVE-2016-5195) FULL module — old-systems coverage
The iconic 2016 LPE. Fills the 10-year coverage gap (now spanning
2016 → 2026): RHEL 6/7, Ubuntu 14.04, Ubuntu 16.04, embedded boxes,
IoT — many still in production with kernels predating the 4.9 fix.
- modules/dirty_cow_cve_2016_5195/iamroot_modules.{c,h}:
- kernel_range: backport thresholds for 2.6 / 3.2 / 3.10 / 3.12 /
3.16 / 3.18 / 4.4 / 4.7 / 4.8 / mainline 4.9
- dirty_cow_write(): Phil-Oester-style two-thread race
- mmap /etc/passwd MAP_PRIVATE (writes go COW)
- writer thread: pwrite to /proc/self/mem at COW page offset
- madviser thread: madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) to drop COW copy
- poll-read /etc/passwd via separate fd to check if payload landed
- 3-second timeout (race usually wins in ms on vulnerable kernels)
- dirty_cow_exploit(): getpwuid → find_passwd_uid_field → race
→ execlp(su)
- dirty_cow_cleanup(): POSIX_FADV_DONTNEED + drop_caches
- Auditd rule: /proc/self/mem writes + madvise MADV_DONTNEED
- Sigma rule: non-root /proc/self/mem open → high
- Makefile: -lpthread added to LDFLAGS for the binary link.
- iamroot.c + core/registry.h wired.
- CVES.md row added with detailed status; legend updated.
Verified end-to-end on kctf-mgr (6.12.86 — patched):
iamroot --scan → 'dirty_cow: kernel is patched' (OK)
iamroot --exploit dirty_cow --i-know
→ 'detect() says not vulnerable; refusing'
Module count = 12.
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@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ Status legend:
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| CVE-2024-1086 | nf_tables — `nft_verdict_init` cross-cache UAF | LPE (kernel arbitrary R/W via slab UAF) | mainline 6.8-rc1 (Jan 2024) | `nf_tables` | 🔵 | Detect-only. Branch-backport ranges checked (6.7.2 / 6.6.13 / 6.1.74 / 5.15.149 / 5.10.210 / 5.4.269). Also checks unprivileged user_ns clone availability (the exploit's trigger gate) — reports PRECOND_FAIL if userns is locked down even when the kernel is vulnerable. Full Notselwyn-style exploit is the next nf_tables commit. |
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| CVE-2021-3493 | Ubuntu overlayfs userns file-capability injection | LPE (host root via file caps in userns-mounted overlayfs) | Ubuntu USN-4915-1 (Apr 2021) | `overlayfs` | 🔵 | Detect-only. **Ubuntu-specific** (vanilla upstream didn't enable userns-overlayfs-mount until 5.11). Detect: parses /etc/os-release for ID=ubuntu, checks unprivileged_userns_clone sysctl, AND with `--active` actually attempts the userns+overlayfs mount as a fork-isolated probe. Reports OK on non-Ubuntu, PRECOND_FAIL if userns locked down. Ships auditd rules covering mount(overlay) + setxattr(security.capability). |
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| CVE-2022-2588 | net/sched cls_route4 handle-zero dead UAF | LPE (kernel UAF in cls_route4 filter remove) | mainline 5.20 / 5.19.7 (Aug 2022) | `cls_route4` | 🔵 | Detect-only. Branch-backport thresholds: 5.4.213 / 5.10.143 / 5.15.69 / 5.18.18 / 5.19.7. Bug exists since 2.6.39 — very wide surface. Detect also probes user_ns+net_ns clone availability; locked-down hosts report PRECOND_FAIL. Full exploit (kylebot-style: tc filter add+rm + spray + cred overwrite) follows. |
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| CVE-2016-5195 | Dirty COW — COW race via /proc/self/mem + madvise | LPE (page-cache write into root-owned files) | mainline 4.9 (Oct 2016) | `dirty_cow` | 🟢 | Full detect + exploit + cleanup. **Old-systems coverage** — affects RHEL 6/7 (3.10 baseline), Ubuntu 14.04 (3.13), Ubuntu 16.04 (4.4), embedded boxes, IoT. Phil-Oester-style two-thread race: writer thread via `/proc/self/mem` vs madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) thread. Targets /etc/passwd UID flip + `su`. Ships auditd watch on /proc/self/mem + sigma rule for non-root mem-open. Pthread-linked. |
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| CVE-TBD | Fragnesia (ESP shared-frag in-place encrypt) | LPE (page-cache write) | mainline TBD | `_stubs/fragnesia_TBD` | ⚪ | Stub. Per `findings/audit_leak_write_modprobe_backups_2026-05-16.md`, requires CAP_NET_ADMIN in userns netns — may or may not be in-scope depending on target environment. |
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## Operations supported per module
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