Initial skeleton: README, CVE inventory, roadmap, ARCH, ethics + copy_fail_family module absorbed from DIRTYFAIL

2026-05-16 19:26:24 -04:00
commit cf30b249de
45 changed files with 10336 additions and 0 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+# EntryBleed — CVE-2023-0458
+
+> ⚪ **PLANNED** stub module. See [`../../ROADMAP.md`](../../ROADMAP.md)
+> Phase 3.
+
+## Summary
+
+KPTI's user-space-mapped entry trampoline is detectable via
+`prefetchnta` timing, leaking the kernel base address (defeats
+KASLR). Universal across modern x86_64 kernels with KPTI; only
+partial mitigations have shipped upstream.
+
+## Why this is here
+
+EntryBleed is **not a standalone LPE**. It's a **stage-1 leak
+primitive** that future LPE modules can call when they need a kbase.
+Bundling it as a module:
+
+1. Lets other modules `#include "core/entrybleed.h"` and call
+   `entrybleed_leak_kbase()` when they need KASLR defeat
+2. Ships defensive detection rules for prefetchnta-timing-attack
+   patterns (useful for hardened environments)
+3. Documents the technique with a clear writeup so users
+   understand what "stage-1" means in the broader chain
+
+## Empirical status on recent kernels
+
+Verified 2026-05-16: works 5/5 on lts-6.12.88 (no anti-EntryBleed
+mitigation configured). See
+`security-research/findings/audit_io_uring_2026-05-16_poc_attempt.md`
+and the EntryBleed test code at
+`SKYFALL/bugs/leak_write_modprobe_2026-05-16/exploit.c` lines ~73-150.
+
+## Upstream patches
+
+There is no single canonical patch. Partial mitigations include:
+- `CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET` (per-syscall kernel stack jitter)
+- Some KPTI hardening discussions on lkml, no merged fix as of
+  lts-6.12.88
+- The community position remains that "KASLR is best-effort,
+  not a security boundary"
+
+## Implementation plan
+
+- Lift the proven EntryBleed code from
+  `SKYFALL/bugs/leak_write_modprobe_2026-05-16/exploit.c` into
+  `module.c` here
+- Expose as both a CLI mode (`iamroot --leak-kbase`) and as a
+  library helper (`uint64_t entrybleed_leak_kbase(void)`)
+- Detection rules: timing-attack pattern flags, perf-counter
+  anomaly detection (informational — these are hard to make precise
+  without false positives)
+
+## Not started yet
+
+Phase 3.