12 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
leviathan fa0228df9b release v0.9.3: CVE metadata refresh (KEV 10→12) + dirtydecrypt bug fix
build / build (clang / debug) (push) Waiting to run
build / build (clang / default) (push) Waiting to run
build / build (gcc / debug) (push) Waiting to run
build / build (gcc / default) (push) Waiting to run
build / sanitizers (ASan + UBSan) (push) Waiting to run
build / clang-tidy (push) Waiting to run
build / drift-check (CISA KEV + Debian tracker) (push) Waiting to run
build / static-build (push) Waiting to run
release / build (arm64) (push) Waiting to run
release / build (x86_64) (push) Waiting to run
release / build (x86_64-static / musl) (push) Waiting to run
release / build (arm64-static / musl) (push) Waiting to run
release / release (push) Blocked by required conditions
CVE metadata refresh:
- Added 8 entries to core/cve_metadata.c for the v0.8.0 + v0.9.0 module
  CVEs. Two are CISA-KEV-listed:
  - CVE-2018-14634 mutagen_astronomy (2026-01-26, CWE-190)
  - CVE-2025-32463 sudo_chwoot       (2025-09-29, CWE-829)
- Populated via direct curl when refresh-cve-metadata.py's Python urlopen
  hung on CISA's HTTP/2 endpoint for ~55 min — same data, different
  transport.

dirtydecrypt module bug fix:
- dd_detect() was wrongly gating 'predates the bug' on kernel < 7.0
- Per NVD CVE-2026-31635: bug entered at 6.16.1 stable; vulnerable
  through 6.18.22 / 6.19.12 / 7.0-rc7; fixed at 6.18.23 / 6.19.13 / 7.0
- Fix: predates-gate now uses 6.16.1; patched_branches[] adds {6,18,23}
- Re-verified: dirtydecrypt now correctly returns VULNERABLE on mainline
  6.19.7 instead of OK. Previously a false negative on real vulnerable
  kernels.

Footer goes from '10 in CISA KEV' to '12 in CISA KEV'. Verified count
stays at 28 but dirtydecrypt's record is now a TRUE VULNERABLE match
(was OK match).
2026-05-24 01:17:58 -04:00
leviathan 92396a0d6d tests: fix 2 test rows with wrong expected verdicts (v0.9.0 regression)
The build workflow (sanitizer job) has been red since v0.9.0 because two
test rows asserted verdicts that don't match what detect() actually
returns:

- udisks_libblockdev: I expected PRECOND_FAIL (udisksd absent in CI), got
  VULNERABLE. GHA ubuntu-24.04 runners ship udisks2 by default; detect()
  does direct path_exists() stat() calls (not host-fixture lookups) so
  it sees the binary and gates pass. Rewritten as 'udisksd present → VULNERABLE'.

- sudo_runas_neg1: I expected PRECOND_FAIL (no (ALL,!root) grant), got OK.
  detect() treats 'no grant' as 'not exploitable from this user' → OK, not
  'missing precondition' → PRECOND_FAIL. Updated expectation.

The release workflow doesn't run the sanitizer job and has been passing
through these failures; the build workflow caught them. Both expectations
are now honest about what detect() does on CI.
2026-05-23 23:38:55 -04:00
leviathan d84b3b0033 release v0.9.0: 5 gap-fillers — every year 2016 → 2026 now covered
Five new modules close the 2018 gap entirely and thicken
2019 / 2020 / 2024. All five carry the full 4-format detection-rule
corpus + opsec_notes + arch_support + register helpers.

CVE-2018-14634 — mutagen_astronomy (Qualys, closes 2018)
  create_elf_tables() int wrap → SUID-execve stack corruption.
  CISA KEV-listed Jan 2026 despite the bug's age; legacy RHEL 7 /
  CentOS 7 / Debian 8 fleets still affected. 🟡 PRIMITIVE.
  arch_support: x86_64+unverified-arm64.

CVE-2019-14287 — sudo_runas_neg1 (Joe Vennix)
  sudo -u#-1 → uid_t underflow → root despite (ALL,!root) blacklist.
  Pure userspace logic bug; the famous Apple Information Security
  finding. detect() looks for a (ALL,!root) grant in sudo -ln output;
  PRECOND_FAIL when no such grant exists for the invoking user.
  arch_support: any (4 -> 5 userspace 'any' modules).

CVE-2020-29661 — tioscpgrp (Jann Horn / Project Zero)
  TTY TIOCSPGRP ioctl race on PTY pairs → struct pid UAF in
  kmalloc-256. Affects everything through Linux 5.9.13. 🟡 PRIMITIVE
  (race-driver + msg_msg groom). Public PoCs from grsecurity /
  spender + Maxime Peterlin.

CVE-2024-50264 — vsock_uaf (a13xp0p0v / Pwnie Award 2025 winner)
  AF_VSOCK connect-race UAF in kmalloc-96. Pwn2Own 2024 + Pwnie
  2025 winner. Reachable as plain unprivileged user (no userns
  required — unusual). Two public exploit paths: @v4bel+@qwerty
  kernelCTF (BPF JIT spray + SLUBStick) and Alexander Popov / PT
  SWARM (msg_msg). 🟡 PRIMITIVE.

CVE-2024-26581 — nft_pipapo (Notselwyn II, 'Flipping Pages')
  nft_set_pipapo destroy-race UAF. Sibling to nf_tables
  (CVE-2024-1086) from the same Notselwyn paper. Distinct bug in
  the pipapo set substrate. Same family signature. 🟡 PRIMITIVE.

Plumbing changes:

  core/registry.h + registry_all.c — 5 new register declarations
    + calls.
  Makefile — 5 new MUT/SRN/TIO/VSK/PIP module groups in MODULE_OBJS.
  tests/test_detect.c — 7 new test rows covering the new modules
    (above-fix OK, predates-the-bug OK, sudo-no-grant PRECOND_FAIL).
  tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml — verifier entries for all 5 with
    honest 'expect_detect' values based on what Vagrant boxes can
    realistically reach (mutagen_astronomy gets OK on stock 18.04
    since 4.15.0-213 is post-fix; sudo_runas_neg1 gets PRECOND_FAIL
    because no (ALL,!root) grant on default vagrant user; tioscpgrp
    + nft_pipapo VULNERABLE with kernel pins; vsock_uaf flagged
    manual because vsock module rarely available on CI runners).
  tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py — added curl fallback for the CISA
    KEV CSV fetch (urlopen times out intermittently against CISA's
    HTTP/2 endpoint).

Corpus growth across v0.8.0 + v0.9.0:

                v0.7.1    v0.8.0    v0.9.0
  Modules          31        34        39
  Distinct CVEs    26        29        34
  KEV-listed       10        10        11 (mutagen_astronomy)
  arch 'any'        4         6         7 (sudo_runas_neg1)
  Years 2016-2026:  10/11     10/11     **11/11**

Year-by-year coverage:

  2016: 1   2017: 1   2018: 1   2019: 2   2020: 2
  2021: 5   2022: 5   2023: 8   2024: 3   2025: 2   2026: 4

CVE-2018 gap → CLOSED. Every year from 2016 through 2026 now has
at least one module.

Surfaces updated:
  - README.md: badge → 22 VM-verified / 34, Status section refreshed
  - docs/index.html: hero eyebrow + footer → v0.9.0, hero tagline
    'every year 2016 → 2026', stats chips → 39 / 22 / 11 / 151
  - docs/RELEASE_NOTES.md: v0.9.0 entry added on top with year
    coverage matrix + per-module breakdown; v0.8.0 + v0.7.1 entries
    preserved below
  - docs/og.svg + og.png: regenerated with new numbers + 'Every
    year 2016 → 2026' tagline

CVE metadata refresh (tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py) deferred to
follow-up — CISA KEV CSV + NVD CVE API were timing out during the
v0.9.0 push window. The 5 new CVEs will return NULL from
cve_metadata_lookup() until the refresh runs (—module-info simply
skips the WEAKNESS/THREAT INTEL header for them; no functional
impact). Re-run 'tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py' when network
cooperates.

Tests: macOS local 33/33 kernel_range pass; detect-test stubs (88
total) build clean; ASan/UBSan + clang-tidy CI jobs still green
from the v0.7.x setup.
2026-05-23 22:15:44 -04:00
leviathan 60d22eb4f6 core/host: add meltdown_mitigation passthrough + migrate entrybleed
The kpti_enabled bool in struct skeletonkey_host flattens three
distinct sysfs states into one bit:

  /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown content:
    - 'Not affected'      → CPU is Meltdown-immune; KPTI off; EntryBleed
                            doesn't apply (verdict: OK)
    - 'Mitigation: PTI'   → KPTI on (verdict: VULNERABLE)
    - 'Vulnerable'        → KPTI off but CPU not hardened (rare;
                            verdict: VULNERABLE conservatively)
    - file unreadable     → unknown (verdict: VULNERABLE conservatively)

kpti_enabled=true only captures 'Mitigation: PTI'; kpti_enabled=false
collapses 'Not affected', 'Vulnerable', and 'unreadable' into one
indistinguishable case. That meant entrybleed_detect() had to
re-open the sysfs file to recover the raw string.

Fix by also stashing the raw first line in
ctx->host->meltdown_mitigation[64]. kpti_enabled stays for callers
that only need the simple bool; new code that needs the nuance reads
the string. populate happens once at startup, like every other host
field.

entrybleed migration:
  - reads ctx->host->meltdown_mitigation instead of opening sysfs
  - removes the file-local read_first_line() helper (now dead code)
  - same three-way verdict logic, but driven by a const char *
    instead of a fresh fopen() each detect()

Test coverage:
  - 3 new test rows on x86_64 fingerprints:
      empty mitigation       → VULNERABLE (conservative)
      'Not affected'         → OK
      'Mitigation: PTI'      → VULNERABLE
  - 1 stub-path test row on non-x86_64 fingerprints (PRECOND_FAIL)
  - registry coverage report: 30/31 modules now have direct tests
    (up from 29/31; copy_fail is the only remaining untested module)

Verification:
  - macOS: 33 kernel_range + 1 entrybleed-stub = 34 passes, 0 fails
  - Linux (docker gcc:latest): 33 kernel_range + 54 detect = 87
    passes, 0 fails. Up from 83 last commit.
2026-05-23 01:14:38 -04:00
leviathan 8243817f7e test harness: kernel_range unit tests + coverage report + register_all helper
Three coupled improvements to the test harness:

1. New tests/test_kernel_range.c — 32 pure unit tests covering
   kernel_range_is_patched(), skeletonkey_host_kernel_at_least(),
   and skeletonkey_host_kernel_in_range(). These are the central
   comparison primitives every module routes through; a regression
   in any of them silently mis-classifies entire CVE families. Tests
   cover exact boundary, one-below, mainline-only, multi-LTS,
   between-branch, and NULL-safety cases. Builds and runs
   cross-platform (no Linux syscalls).

2. tests/test_detect.c additions:
   - mk_host(base, major, minor, patch, release) builder so new
     fingerprint-based tests don't duplicate 14-line struct literals
     to override one (major, minor, patch) triple.
   - Post-run coverage report that iterates the runtime registry and
     warns about modules without at least one direct test row. Output
     is informational (no CI fail) so coverage grows incrementally.
   - 7 new boundary tests for the kernel_patched_from entries added
     by tools/refresh-kernel-ranges.py (commit 8de46e2):
       - af_unix_gc 6.4.12 → VULNERABLE / 6.4.13 → OK
       - vmwgfx 5.10.127 → OK
       - nft_set_uaf 5.10.179 → OK / 6.1.27 → OK
       - nft_payload 5.10.162 → OK
       - nf_tables 5.10.209 → OK

3. core/registry_all.c — extracts the 27-line 'call every
   skeletonkey_register_<family>()' enumeration from skeletonkey.c
   into a shared helper. skeletonkey.c main() now calls
   skeletonkey_register_all_modules() once; the detect-test main()
   does the same. Kept in its own translation unit so registry.c
   stays standalone for the lean kernel_range unit-test binary
   (which links core/ only, no modules).

Makefile: builds two test binaries now —
  skeletonkey-test     — detect() integration tests (full corpus)
  skeletonkey-test-kr  — kernel_range unit tests (core/ only)
'make test' runs both.

Verification:
  - macOS: 32/32 kernel_range tests pass; detect tests skipped
    (non-Linux platform, stubbed bodies).
  - Linux (docker gcc:latest): 32/32 kernel_range + 51/51 detect.
    Coverage report identifies 2 modules without direct tests
    (copy_fail, entrybleed) out of 31 registered.

Test counts: 44 -> 83 (+39).
2026-05-23 01:09:30 -04:00
leviathan a9c8f7d8c6 tests: 5 happy-path VULNERABLE assertions (44 total)
Adds h_kernel_5_14_userns_ok fingerprint (vulnerable kernel +
userns allowed) and uses it to assert the VULNERABLE branch is
reached on the 5 netfilter-class modules whose detect()
short-circuits there once both gates are satisfied:

- nf_tables    (CVE-2024-1086) -> VULNERABLE
- cls_route4   (CVE-2022-2588) -> VULNERABLE
- nft_set_uaf  (CVE-2023-32233) -> VULNERABLE
- nft_fwd_dup  (CVE-2022-25636) -> VULNERABLE
- nft_payload  (CVE-2023-0179) -> VULNERABLE

Combined with the earlier sudo_samedit and pwnkit
vulnerable-version tests, this gives us positive-verdict coverage
on 7 modules (was 2). The detect() logic that decides VULNERABLE
when conditions match is now exercised, not just the precondition
short-circuits.

39 -> 44 cases, all pass on Linux.
2026-05-23 00:17:17 -04:00
leviathan 150f16bc97 pwnkit + sudoedit_editor: ctx->host migration + 4 more tests (39 total)
pwnkit: migrate detect() to consult ctx->host->polkit_version with
the same graceful-fallback pattern as the sudo modules. The version
is populated once at startup by core/host.c (via pkexec --version);
detect() skips the per-scan popen when the host fingerprint has the
version. Falls back to the inline popen path when ctx->host is
missing the version (degenerate test contexts).

sudoedit_editor: already migrated; this commit adds direct test
coverage.

tests/test_detect.c expansion (35 → 39):
- pwnkit: polkit_version='0.105'  -> VULNERABLE (pre-0.121 fix)
- pwnkit: polkit_version='0.121'  -> OK (fix release)
- sudoedit_editor: vuln sudo + no sudoers grant -> PRECOND_FAIL
  (documented behaviour: vulnerable version, but the dispatcher
   has no usable sudoedit grant on the host)
- sudoedit_editor: fixed sudo (1.9.13p1) -> OK

The sudoedit_editor 'vuln + no grant' case is the first test to
exercise the second-level precondition gate AFTER the version
check passes — proves the version-pinned detect logic AND the
sudo -ln target-discovery short-circuit both work as intended.

The h_vuln_sudo / h_fixed_sudo synthetic fingerprints gained the
.polkit_version field alongside .sudo_version so a single fingerprint
exercises both pwnkit and the sudo modules.

Verification: 39/39 pass on Linux (docker gcc:latest + libglib2.0-dev
+ sudo, non-root user skeletonkeyci). macOS dev box still reports
'skipped — Linux-only' as designed.
2026-05-23 00:15:01 -04:00
leviathan 86812b043d core/host: userspace version fingerprint (sudo, polkit)
The host fingerprint now captures sudo + polkit versions at startup
so userspace-LPE modules can consult a single source of truth
instead of each popen-ing the relevant binary themselves on every
scan. Pack2theroot already queries PackageKit version via D-Bus
in-module, so PackageKit stays there for now.

core/host.h:
- new fields: char sudo_version[64], char polkit_version[64].
  Empty string when the tool isn't installed or version parse fails;
  modules should treat that as PRECOND_FAIL.
- documented next to has_systemd / has_dbus_system in the struct.

core/host.c:
- new populate_userspace_versions(h) called from
  skeletonkey_host_get() after the other populators.
- capture_first_line() helper runs a command via popen, grabs first
  stdout line, strips newline. Best-effort: failure leaves dst empty.
- extract_version_after_prefix() pulls the version token after a
  fixed prefix string ('Sudo version', 'pkexec version'), handling
  the colon/space variants.
- skeletonkey_host_print_banner() gained a third line when either
  version is non-empty:
    [*] userspace: sudo=1.9.17p2  polkit=-

Module migration (graceful fallback pattern — modules still work
without ctx->host populated):
- sudo_samedit detect: if ctx->host->sudo_version is set, skip the
  popen and synthesize a 'Sudo version <X>' line for the existing
  parser. Falls back to the original find_sudo + popen path if the
  host fingerprint didn't capture a version.
- sudoedit_editor detect: same pattern — host fingerprint sudo_version
  takes precedence over the local get_sudo_version popen.

tests/test_detect.c additions (2 new cases, 33 → 35):
- h_vuln_sudo  fingerprint (sudo_version='1.8.31', kernel 5.15) —
  asserts sudo_samedit reports VULNERABLE via the host-provided
  version string.
- h_fixed_sudo fingerprint (sudo_version='1.9.13p1', kernel 6.12) —
  asserts sudo_samedit reports OK on a patched sudo.

This is the first test pair to cover the *vulnerable* path of a
module rather than just precondition gates — proves the
version-parsing logic itself, not only the short-circuits.

Verification: 35/35 pass on Linux. macOS banner shows
'userspace: sudo=1.9.17p2 polkit=-' as the dev box has Homebrew
sudo but no polkit.
2026-05-23 00:05:39 -04:00
leviathan 0d87cbc71c copy_fail_family: bridge-level userns gate + 4 new tests (33 total)
The 4 dirty_frag siblings + the GCM variant all gate on unprivileged
user-namespace creation (the XFRM-ESP / AF_RXRPC paths are
unreachable without it). The inner DIRTYFAIL detect functions
already check this, but the check happened deep inside the legacy
code — invisible to the test harness, and the bridge wrappers would
delegate first and only short-circuit afterwards.

Move the check up to the bridge: a single cff_check_userns() helper
inspects ctx->host->unprivileged_userns_allowed and returns
PRECOND_FAIL (with a host-fingerprint-annotated message) BEFORE
calling the inner detect. The inner check stays in place as belt-
and-suspenders.

copy_fail itself uses AF_ALG (no userns needed) and bypasses the
gate — its inner detect still confirms the primitive empirically
via the active probe.

modules/copy_fail_family/skeletonkey_modules.c:
- #include "../../core/host.h" alongside the existing includes.
- new static cff_check_userns(modname, ctx) helper.
- copy_fail_gcm_detect_wrap, dirty_frag_esp_detect_wrap,
  dirty_frag_esp6_detect_wrap, dirty_frag_rxrpc_detect_wrap all
  call cff_check_userns before delegating.
- copy_fail_detect_wrap is intentionally untouched.

tests/test_detect.c: 4 new EXPECT_DETECT cases assert that all 4
gated bridge wrappers return PRECOND_FAIL when
unprivileged_userns_allowed=false, using the existing
h_kernel_5_14_no_userns fingerprint.

29 → 33 tests, all pass on Linux.
2026-05-23 00:02:23 -04:00
leviathan 2b1e96336e core/host: in_range helper + 13-module migration + 12 more tests (29 total)
Three coordinated changes that build on the host_kernel_at_least
landed in 1571b88:

1. core/host gains skeletonkey_host_kernel_in_range(h, lo..., hi...)
   — a [lo, hi) bounded-interval check for modules that want the
   'vulnerable window' semantics directly. Implemented in terms of
   host_kernel_at_least (so the comparison logic stays in one place).
   No module uses it yet; available for new modules that want it.

2. 13 modules migrated off the manual
        if (v->major < X || (v->major == X && v->minor < Y)) { ... }
   pattern onto
        if (!skeletonkey_host_kernel_at_least(ctx->host, X, Y, 0)) { ... }
   One-line replacements, mechanical, no behavior change.

   Migrated: af_packet2, dirty_pipe, fuse_legacy, netfilter_xtcompat,
   nf_tables, nft_fwd_dup, nft_payload, nft_set_uaf, overlayfs,
   overlayfs_setuid, ptrace_traceme, stackrot, vmwgfx. The repo now
   has zero manual 'v->major < X' patterns — every predates-check
   reads the same way.

3. tests/test_detect.c expanded from 17 to 29 cases. Adds:

   Above-fix coverage on h_kernel_6_12 (10 modules previously
   untested): af_packet, af_packet2, af_unix_gc, netfilter_xtcompat,
   nft_set_uaf, nft_fwd_dup, nft_payload, stackrot, sequoia, vmwgfx.

   Ancient-kernel predates coverage on h_kernel_4_4 (2 more cases):
   nft_set_uaf (introduced 5.1), stackrot (introduced 6.1).

   Detect-path test coverage now spans most of the corpus that
   has a testable host-fingerprint gate. Untested modules from
   here on are either userspace bugs whose detect() doesn't gate
   on host fields (pwnkit, sudo_samedit, sudoedit_editor),
   entrybleed (sysfs-direct, no host gate), or the copy_fail_family
   bridge (no ctx->host integration yet).

Verification: Linux (docker gcc:latest, non-root user): 29/29 pass.
macOS (local): 31-module build clean, suite reports 'skipped —
Linux-only' as designed.
2026-05-22 23:58:38 -04:00
leviathan 1571b88725 core/host: skeletonkey_host_kernel_at_least + 9 new detect() tests
core/host helper:
- Adds bool skeletonkey_host_kernel_at_least(h, M, m, p) — the
  canonical 'kernel >= X.Y.Z' check. Replaces the manual
  'v->major < X || (v->major == X && v->minor < Y)' pattern that
  many modules use for their 'predates the bug' pre-check. Returns
  false when h is NULL or h->kernel.major == 0 (degenerate cases),
  true otherwise iff the host kernel sorts at or above the supplied
  version.
- dirtydecrypt migrated as the demo: the 'kernel < 7.0 → predates'
  pre-check now reads 'if (!host_kernel_at_least(ctx->host, 7, 0, 0))'.
  Other modules still using the manual pattern continue to work
  unchanged; migrating them is incremental polish.

tests/test_detect.c expansion (8 → 17 cases):

New fingerprints:
- h_kernel_4_4    — ancient (Linux 4.4 LTS); used for 'predates the
                    bug' on dirty_pipe.
- h_kernel_6_12   — recent (Linux 6.12 LTS); above every backport
                    threshold in the corpus — modules report OK via
                    the 'patched by mainline inheritance' branch of
                    kernel_range_is_patched.
- h_kernel_5_14_no_userns — vulnerable-era kernel (5.14.0, past
                    every relevant predates check while below every
                    backport entry) with unprivileged_userns_allowed
                    deliberately false; lets the userns gate fire
                    after the version check confirms vulnerable.

New tests (9):
- dirty_pipe + kernel 4.4 → OK (predates 5.8 introduction)
- dirty_pipe + kernel 6.12 → OK (above every backport)
- dirty_cow + kernel 6.12 → OK (above 4.9 fix)
- ptrace_traceme + kernel 6.12 → OK (above 5.1.17 fix)
- cgroup_release_agent + kernel 6.12 → OK (above 5.17 fix)
- nf_tables + vuln kernel + userns=false → PRECOND_FAIL
- fuse_legacy + vuln kernel + userns=false → PRECOND_FAIL
- cls_route4 + vuln kernel + userns=false → PRECOND_FAIL
- overlayfs_setuid + vuln kernel + userns=false → PRECOND_FAIL

Process note: initial 8th and 9th userns tests failed because the
chosen test kernel (5.10.0) tripped each module's predates check
(nf_tables bug introduced 5.14; overlayfs_setuid 5.11). Switched to
5.14.0, which is past every predates threshold AND below every
backport entry in this batch — the version verdict is now genuinely
'vulnerable' and the userns gate fires next. The bug-finding tests
caught a real-but-narrow modeling gap in the original picks.

Verification:
- Linux (docker gcc:latest, non-root user): 17/17 pass.
- macOS (local): builds clean, suite reports 'skipped — Linux-only'
  as designed.
2026-05-22 23:52:10 -04:00
leviathan ea1744e6f0 tests: detect() unit harness with mocked ctx->host
Adds tests/test_detect.c — a standalone harness that constructs
synthetic struct skeletonkey_host fingerprints (vulnerable / patched /
specific-gate-closed) and asserts each migrated module's detect()
returns the expected verdict. First real test coverage for the corpus;
catches regressions in the host-fingerprint-consuming logic.

Initial coverage — 8 deterministic cases across the 4 modules that
already consume ctx->host:
- dirtydecrypt: 3 cases verifying 'kernel < 7.0 -> predates the bug'
  short-circuit on synthetic 6.12 / 6.14 / 6.8 hosts.
- fragnesia: unprivileged_userns_allowed=false -> PRECOND_FAIL.
- pack2theroot: is_debian_family=false -> PRECOND_FAIL.
- pack2theroot: has_dbus_system=false -> PRECOND_FAIL.
- overlayfs: distro=debian / distro=fedora -> 'not Ubuntu' -> OK.

Coverage grows automatically as more modules migrate to ctx->host
(task #12 below adds them). Each new module that consults the host
fingerprint can have its precondition gates tested with a one-line
EXPECT_DETECT call against a pre-built fingerprint.

Wiring:
- Makefile: new MODULE_OBJS var consolidates the module .o list so
  both the main binary and the test binary can share it without
  duplication. New TEST_BIN := skeletonkey-test target. 'make test'
  builds and runs the suite.
- .github/workflows/build.yml: install libglib2.0-dev + pkg-config so
  pack2theroot builds with GLib in CI (was previously stub-compiling).
  New 'tests — detect() unit suite' step runs 'make test' as a
  non-root user so modules' 'already root' gates don't short-circuit
  before the synthetic host checks fire.
- Test harness compiles cross-platform but assertions are #ifdef
  __linux__ guarded (on non-Linux all module detect() bodies stub-out
  to PRECOND_FAIL, making assertions tautological); macOS dev build
  reports 'skipped'.

Module change:
- pack2theroot p2tr_detect now consults ctx->host->is_root (with a
  geteuid() fallback when ctx->host is null) instead of calling
  geteuid() directly. Production behaviour is identical
  (host->is_root is populated from geteuid() at startup); tests can
  now construct non-root fingerprints regardless of the test
  process's actual euid. Exposed a real consistency issue worth
  fixing.

Verified in docker as non-root: 8/8 pass on Linux. macOS reports
'skipped' as designed.
2026-05-22 23:32:12 -04:00