Closes the gap between 'detect() compiles and passes unit tests' and
'exploit() actually works on a real vulnerable kernel'. One-time
setup + one command per module to verify against a known-vulnerable
guest, with results emitted as JSON verification records.
Files:
setup.sh — one-shot bootstrap. Installs Vagrant via brew if
missing, installs vagrant-parallels plugin, pre-
downloads 5 base boxes (~5 GB):
generic/ubuntu1804 (4.15.0)
generic/ubuntu2004 (5.4.0 + HWE)
generic/ubuntu2204 (5.15.0 + HWE)
generic/debian11 (5.10.0)
generic/debian12 (6.1.0)
Idempotent; can pass --boxes subset.
Vagrantfile — single parameterized config driven by SKK_VM_*
env vars. Provisioners: build-deps install,
kernel pin (apt + snapshot.debian.org fallback),
build-and-verify (kept run='never' so verify.sh
invokes explicitly after reboot if pin'd).
targets.yaml — module → (box, kernel_pkg, kernel_version,
expect_detect, notes) mapping for all 26 modules.
3 marked manual: true (vmwgfx needs VMware guest;
dirtydecrypt + fragnesia need Linux 7.0 not yet
shipping as distro kernel).
verify.sh — entrypoint. 'verify.sh <module>' provisions if
needed, pins kernel + reboots if needed, runs
'skeletonkey --explain --active' inside the VM,
parses VERDICT, compares to expect_detect, emits
JSON verification record. --list shows the full
target matrix. --keep / --destroy lifecycle flags.
README.md — workflow + extending the targets table.
Design notes:
- Pure bash + awk targets.yaml parsing — no PyYAML dep (macOS Python
is PEP-668 'externally managed' and refuses pip --user installs).
- Sources of vulnerable kernel packages: stock distro kernels where
they're below the fix backport, otherwise pinned via apt with
snapshot.debian.org as last-resort fallback (the Debian apt
snapshot archive is the canonical source for historical kernel .deb
packages).
- Repo mounted at /vagrant via rsync (not 9p — vagrant-parallels'
9p is finicky on macOS Sequoia per the plugin issue tracker).
- VM lifecycle defaults to suspend-after-verify so the next run
resumes in ~5s instead of cold-booting.
- kernel pin reboots are handled by checking 'uname -r' after the
pin provisioner and triggering 'vagrant reload' if mismatched.
Verification records (JSON on stdout per run) are intended to feed a
per-module verified_on[] table in a follow-up commit — that's the
'permanent trust artifact' angle from the earlier roadmap discussion.
Smoke tests (no VM actually spun up):
- 'verify.sh --list': renders the 26-module matrix correctly.
- 'verify.sh nf_tables': dispatches to generic/ubuntu2204 + kernel
5.15.0-43 + expect=VULNERABLE; fails cleanly at 'vagrant: command
not found' (expected — user runs setup.sh first).
- 'verify.sh vmwgfx': errors with 'is marked manual: true' + note.
.gitignore: tools/verify-vm/{logs,.vagrant}/ excluded.
Usage:
./tools/verify-vm/setup.sh # one time, ~5 min
./tools/verify-vm/verify.sh nf_tables # ~5 min first run, ~1 min after
./tools/verify-vm/verify.sh --list # show all targets
A few release-binary artifacts slipped into the previous commit
(skeletonkey-x86_64-static + .sha256). Untrack them and pre-emptively
extend the ignore list to cover every release-asset filename pattern
the workflow + manual uploads can produce.
Mirrors the /skeletonkey rule. The test binary slipped into the prior
commit; this removes it from tracking. Local binary on disk is kept
(it's a build artifact).
Three-agent rigorous review of the dirtydecrypt + fragnesia ports plus
repo-wide doc consistency, followed by a full Linux build verification.
dirtydecrypt (NOTICE + detection rules):
- NOTICE.md: removed an unsupported "Zellic co-founder" detail and a
fabricated disclosure-date narrative; tightened phrasing of the
Zellic + V12 credit; noted that upstream poc.c carries no
author/license header of its own.
- Embedded auditd + sigma rules and detect/sigma.yml broadened to
cover every binary in dd_targets[] (added /usr/bin/mount,
/usr/bin/passwd, /usr/bin/chsh) and added the b32 splice rule, so
the embedded ruleset matches the on-disk reference and the carrier
list the exploit actually targets.
- Exploit primitive verified byte-for-byte against the V12 PoC
(tiny_elf[] identical, all rxgk/XDR/fire/pagecache_write logic
token-identical). docker gcc:latest compile of the Linux path:
COMPILE_OK, zero warnings.
fragnesia: review found no defects. Exploit primitive byte-identical
to the V12 PoC (shell_elf[] 192 bytes identical, AF_ALG GCM keystream
table + userns/netns/XFRM + receiver/sender/run_trigger_pair all
faithful). The deliberate omissions (ANSI TUI, CLI arg parsing) drop
nothing exploit-critical. docker gcc:latest compile: COMPILE_OK; full
project build links into a working skeletonkey ELF and --list shows
the module registered correctly.
Repo docs (README.md / CVES.md / ROADMAP.md):
- Chose to keep "28 verified" as the headline; the two ported
modules are represented as a separate clearly-labelled tier
("ported-but-unverified") that is explicitly excluded from the
28-module verified counts. README + CVES.md + ROADMAP.md now tell
one consistent story.
- Filled a pre-existing documentation gap: sudo_samedit, sequoia,
sudoedit_editor, vmwgfx were registered + built but absent from
CVES.md's inventory + operations tables. Added rows synthesized
from each module's .cve / .summary / .kernel_range fields.
- ROADMAP Phase 8 "7 🟡 PRIMITIVE modules" → "14"; added a "Landed
since v0.1.0" group; moved vmwgfx out of the stale carry-overs.
docs site (docs/index.html):
- Stat box "28 / total modules" → "28 / verified modules" (the 14+14
breakdown now sums to the headline consistently).
- Terminal example "scanning 28 modules" → "scanning 30 modules"
(was factually wrong — the binary literally prints module_count()
which is 30).
- Status line: updated to mention the 2 ported-but-unverified
modules and mirror the README phrasing.
- docs/LAUNCH.md left as a dated v0.5.0 launch snapshot.
Build verification: `docker run gcc:latest make clean && make` —
links into a 30-module skeletonkey ELF on Linux. macOS dev box still
hits the pre-existing dirty_pipe header gap; unchanged.
.gitignore: added /skeletonkey to exclude the top-level build
artifact (the existing modules/*/skeletonkey only covered per-module
binaries; the root one was getting picked up by `git add -A`).
leviathan