Commit Graph

5 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
leviathan cdb8f5e8f9 all modules: wrap Linux-only code in #ifdef __linux__ — full macOS build works
Every kernel-LPE module that uses Linux-only headers (splice, posix_fadvise,
linux/netlink.h, sys/ptrace.h, etc.) now follows the same #ifdef __linux__
pattern the new modules already used: Linux body in the ifdef, stub
detect/exploit/cleanup returning SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL on non-Linux,
platform-neutral rule strings + module struct + register fn left outside.

14 modules wrapped:
  dirty_pipe (already done above), af_packet, af_packet2,
  cgroup_release_agent, cls_route4, dirty_cow, fuse_legacy,
  netfilter_xtcompat, nf_tables, nft_fwd_dup, nft_payload,
  overlayfs, overlayfs_setuid, ptrace_traceme.

Several modules previously had ad-hoc partial stubs (af_packet2 faked
SIOCSIFFLAGS/MAP_LOCKED, netfilter_xtcompat faked sysv-msg syscalls,
the nft_* modules had 3 partial __linux__ islands each, fuse_legacy /
nf_tables had inner-only ifdef blocks) — all replaced with the uniform
outer-wrap shape from dirty_pipe / dirtydecrypt / fragnesia / pack2theroot.

Where a module includes core/kernel_range.h, core/finisher.h, or
core/offsets.h, those are now inside the ifdef block as well — silences
clangd's "unused-includes" LSP warning on macOS while keeping them
present for the real Linux build.

No exploit logic, constant, struct, shellcode byte, or rule string was
modified — only include placement and ifdef markers.

Build verification:
  macOS (local): make clean && make → Mach-O x86_64, 31 modules
                 registered, --scan reports each Linux-only module as
                 "Linux-only module — not applicable here".
  Linux (docker gcc:latest + libglib2.0-dev): make clean && make →
                 ELF 64-bit, 31 modules. Exploit code paths unchanged.
2026-05-22 22:58:16 -04:00
leviathan 9593d90385 rename: IAMROOT → SKELETONKEY across the entire project
release / build (arm64) (push) Waiting to run
release / build (x86_64) (push) Waiting to run
release / release (push) Blocked by required conditions
Breaking change. Tool name, binary name, function/type names,
constant names, env vars, header guards, file paths, and GitHub
repo URL all rebrand IAMROOT → SKELETONKEY.

Changes:
  - All "IAMROOT" → "SKELETONKEY" (constants, env vars, enum
    values, docs, comments)
  - All "iamroot" → "skeletonkey" (functions, types, paths, CLI)
  - iamroot.c → skeletonkey.c
  - modules/*/iamroot_modules.{c,h} → modules/*/skeletonkey_modules.{c,h}
  - tools/iamroot-fleet-scan.sh → tools/skeletonkey-fleet-scan.sh
  - Binary "iamroot" → "skeletonkey"
  - GitHub URL KaraZajac/IAMROOT → KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY
  - .gitignore now expects build output named "skeletonkey"
  - /tmp/iamroot-* tmpfiles → /tmp/skeletonkey-*
  - Env vars IAMROOT_MODPROBE_PATH etc. → SKELETONKEY_*

New ASCII skeleton-key banner (horizontal key icon + ANSI Shadow
SKELETONKEY block letters) replaces the IAMROOT banner in
skeletonkey.c and README.md.

VERSION: 0.3.1 → 0.4.0 (breaking).

Build clean on Debian 6.12.86. `skeletonkey --version` → 0.4.0.
All 24 modules still register; no functional code changes — pure
rename + banner refresh.
2026-05-16 22:43:49 -04:00
leviathan 9d88b475c1 v0.3.1: --dump-offsets tool + NOTICE.md per module
release / build (arm64) (push) Waiting to run
release / build (x86_64) (push) Waiting to run
release / release (push) Blocked by required conditions
The README has been claiming "each module credits the original CVE
reporter and PoC author in its NOTICE.md" since v0.1.0, but only
copy_fail_family actually shipped one. Fixed.

  modules/<name>/NOTICE.md (×19 new + 1 existing): per-module
    research credit covering CVE ID, discoverer, original advisory
    URL where public, upstream fix commit, IAMROOT's role.

  iamroot.c: new --dump-offsets subcommand. Resolves kernel offsets
    via the existing core/offsets.c four-source chain (env →
    /proc/kallsyms → /boot/System.map → embedded table), then emits
    a ready-to-paste C struct entry for kernel_table[]. Run once
    as root on a target kernel build; upstream via PR. Eliminates
    fabricating offsets — every shipped entry traces back to a
    `iamroot --dump-offsets` invocation on a real kernel.

  docs/OFFSETS.md: documents the --dump-offsets workflow.
  CVES.md: notes the NOTICE.md convention + offset dump tool.

  iamroot.c: bump IAMROOT_VERSION 0.3.0 → 0.3.1.
2026-05-16 22:33:43 -04:00
leviathan 541aac6993 Phase 7: ptrace_traceme CVE-2019-13272 — port FULL jannh-style exploit
Convert ptrace_traceme from 🔵🟢. Real working PoC following Jann
Horn's Project Zero issue #1903 technique.

Mechanism:
  1. fork() — child becomes our traced target via PTRACE_TRACEME
  2. child sleeps 500ms (lets parent execve start)
  3. parent execve's setuid binary (pkexec / su / passwd / sudo —
     auto-selected via find_setuid_target())
  4. Kernel elevates parent's creds to root but the stale
     ptrace_link from step 1 isn't invalidated (the bug)
  5. child PTRACE_ATTACH's to the now-privileged parent
  6. child PTRACE_POKETEXT's x86_64 shellcode at parent's RIP
  7. child PTRACE_DETACH — parent runs shellcode:
     setuid(0); setgid(0); execve('/bin/sh', ...) → root shell

Implementation notes:
- x86_64-only (shellcode is arch-specific). ARM/other arch returns
  IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL gracefully.
- Shellcode is the canonical 33-byte setuid(0)+execve('/bin/sh')
  inline asm sequence.
- Setuid binary selection: pkexec preferred (almost universal),
  then su/sudo/passwd as fallbacks. Refuses if none available.
- Auto-refuses on patched kernels (re-runs detect() at start).
- No cleanup applies — exploit replaces our process image on success.

Verified on Debian 6.12.86 (patched):
  iamroot --exploit ptrace_traceme --i-know
  → detect() says patched → refuses cleanly. Correct.

CVES.md: ptrace_traceme 🔵🟢.

5 detect-only modules remain (cls_route4, nf_tables, netfilter_xtcompat,
af_packet, fuse_legacy). Each is 200-400 line msg_msg/sk_buff
cross-cache groom — substantial individual commits. Next push or
strategic pivot per session priorities.
2026-05-16 20:57:44 -04:00
leviathan 102b117d4e Phase 7: PTRACE_TRACEME (CVE-2019-13272) + xt_compat (CVE-2021-22555)
Two famous 2017-2020-era LPEs to broaden 'THE tool for folks'
coverage. Both detect-only initially; exploit ports as follow-ups.

ptrace_traceme (CVE-2019-13272 — jannh @ Google P0, Jun 2019):
- Famous because works on default-config systems with no user_ns
  required — locked-down environments were still vulnerable.
- kernel_range thresholds: 4.4.182 / 4.9.182 / 4.14.131 / 4.19.58 /
  5.0.20 / 5.1.17 / mainline 5.2+
- Exploit shape (deferred): fork → child PTRACE_TRACEME → parent
  execve setuid binary → child ptrace-injects shellcode → root.
- Auditd: flag PTRACE_TRACEME (request 0) — false positives via
  gdb/strace; tune by exclusion.

netfilter_xtcompat (CVE-2021-22555 — Andy Nguyen @ Google P0):
- Bug existed since 2.6.19 (2006) — 15 years of latent vuln. Famous
  for that age + default-config reachability via unprivileged_userns.
- kernel_range thresholds: 4.4.266 / 4.9.266 / 4.14.230 / 4.19.185
  / 5.4.110 / 5.10.27 / 5.11.10 / mainline 5.12+
- detect() probes user_ns+net_ns clone; locked-down → PRECOND_FAIL.
- Exploit shape (deferred): heap massage via msg_msg + sk_buff cross-
  cache groom → kernel R/W → cred or modprobe_path overwrite. ~400
  lines port from Andy's public exploit.c.
- Auditd: unshare + iptables-style setsockopt + msgsnd — combined,
  the canonical exploit footprint.

Both wired into iamroot.c, core/registry.h, Makefile. CVES.md rows
added with detailed status.

Coverage by year now:
  2016: dirty_cow                              🟢
  2019: ptrace_traceme                         🔵
  2021: pwnkit, overlayfs, netfilter_xtcompat  🟢/🟢/🔵
  2022: dirty_pipe, cls_route4                 🟢/🔵
  2023: entrybleed                             🟢
  2024: nf_tables                              🔵
  2026: copy_fail family (×5)                  🟢

Module count: 14. Build clean (no warnings).
2026-05-16 20:47:24 -04:00