Commit Graph

2 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
leviathan a26f471ecf dirtydecrypt + fragnesia: pin CVE fix commits, version-based detect()
Both modules' detect() was precondition-only because we didn't know the
mainline fix commits at port time. Debian's security tracker now
provides them — pinning here turns detect() into a proper version-
based verdict (still with --active for empirical override).

dirtydecrypt (CVE-2026-31635):
- Fix commit a2567217ade970ecc458144b6be469bc015b23e5 in mainline 7.0
  ('rxrpc: fix oversized RESPONSE authenticator length check').
- Debian tracker confirms older stable branches (5.10 / 6.1 / 6.12) as
  <not-affected, vulnerable code not present>: the rxgk RESPONSE-
  handling code was added in 7.0.
- kernel_range table: { {7, 0, 0} }
- detect() pre-checks 'kernel < 7.0 -> SKELETONKEY_OK (predates)' then
  consults the table. With --active, the /tmp sentinel probe overrides
  empirically (catches pre-fix 7.0-rc kernels the version check
  reports as patched).

fragnesia (CVE-2026-46300):
- Fix in mainline 7.0.9 per Debian tracker ('linux unstable: 7.0.9-1
  fixed'). Older Debian-stable branches (bullseye 5.10 / bookworm 6.1
  / trixie 6.12) are still marked vulnerable as of 2026-05-22 - no
  backports yet.
- kernel_range table: { {7, 0, 9} }
- detect() keeps the userns + carrier preconditions, then consults
  the table: 7.0.9+ -> OK; older branches without an explicit backport
  entry -> VULNERABLE (version-only). --active confirms empirically.
- Table is intentionally minimal so distros that DO backport in the
  future flow into 'patched' once their branch lands an entry; until
  then, the conservative VULNERABLE verdict on unfixed branches is
  correct.

Other changes:
- module struct .kernel_range strings updated from 'fix commit not
  yet pinned' to the actual pinned-version prose.
- module_safety_rank bumped 86 -> 87 for both modules (version-pinned
  detect is now real; still below the verified copy_fail family at
  88 so --auto prefers verified modules when both apply).
- Both modules now #include core/kernel_range.h inside their
  #ifdef __linux__ block.
- MODULE.md verification-status sections rewritten: detect() is now
  version-pinned; only the exploit body remains unverified.
- CVES.md note + inventory rows updated: dropped the 'precondition-
  only' language for the pair; all three ported modules now have
  pinned fix references.
- README  tier description + module list aligned to the new state.

Both detect()s smoke-tested in docker gcc:latest on kernel 6.12.76-
linuxkit: dirtydecrypt correctly reports OK ('predates the rxgk code
added in 7.0'); fragnesia + pack2theroot correctly report
PRECOND_FAIL (no userns / no D-Bus in container). Local macOS + Linux
builds both clean.
2026-05-22 23:06:15 -04:00
leviathan a8c8d5ef1f modules: add dirtydecrypt (CVE-2026-31635) + fragnesia (CVE-2026-46300)
Two new page-cache-write LPE modules, both ported from the public V12
security PoCs (github.com/v12-security/pocs):

- dirtydecrypt (CVE-2026-31635): rxgk missing-COW in-place decrypt.
  rxgk_decrypt_skb() decrypts spliced page-cache pages before the HMAC
  check, corrupting the page cache of a read-only file. Sibling of
  Copy Fail / Dirty Frag in the rxrpc subsystem.

- fragnesia (CVE-2026-46300): XFRM ESP-in-TCP skb_try_coalesce() loses
  the SHARED_FRAG marker, so the ESP-in-TCP receive path decrypts
  page-cache pages in place. A latent bug exposed by the Dirty Frag
  fix (f4c50a4034e6). Retires the old _stubs/fragnesia_TBD stub.

Both wrap the PoC exploit primitive in the skeletonkey_module
interface: detect/exploit/cleanup, an --active /tmp sentinel probe,
--no-shell support, and embedded auditd + sigma rules. The exploit
body runs in a forked child so the PoC's exit()/die() paths cannot
tear down the dispatcher. The fragnesia port drops the upstream PoC's
ANSI TUI (incompatible with a shared dispatcher); the exploit
mechanism is reproduced faithfully. Linux-only code is guarded with
#ifdef __linux__ so the modules still compile on non-Linux dev boxes.

VERIFICATION: ported, NOT yet validated end-to-end on a
vulnerable-kernel VM. The CVE fix commits are not pinned, so detect()
is precondition-only (PRECOND_FAIL / TEST_ERROR, never a blind
VULNERABLE) and --auto will not fire them unless --active confirms.
macOS stub-path compiles verified locally; the Linux exploit-path
build is covered by CI (build.yml, ubuntu) only. See each MODULE.md.

Wiring: core/registry.h, skeletonkey.c, Makefile, CVES.md, ROADMAP.md.
2026-05-22 18:22:30 -04:00