9 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
leviathan	66cca39a55	release v0.9.2: dirtydecrypt verified on mainline 6.19.7 (22 → 28) ... Verifies CVE-2026-31635 dirtydecrypt's OK path on a kernel that predates the bug: 'kernel predates the rxgk RESPONSE-handling code added in 7.0' — match. Confirms detect() doesn't false-positive on older 6.x kernels. Attempted fragnesia (CVE-2026-46300) but mainline 7.0.5 .debs depend on libssl3t64 / libelf1t64 (t64-transition libs from Ubuntu 24.04+ / Debian 13+). No Parallels-supported Vagrant box ships those yet — dpkg --force-depends leaves the kernel package in iHR state with no /boot/vmlinuz. Marked manual: true with rationale. Verifier infrastructure: pin-mainline now uses dpkg --force-depends as a fallback so partial-install state can at least be inspected.	2026-05-24 00:03:35 -04:00
leviathan	8ac041a295	release v0.9.1: VM verification sweep 22 → 27 ... Five more CVEs empirically confirmed end-to-end against real Linux VMs: - CVE-2019-14287 sudo_runas_neg1 (Ubuntu 18.04 + sudoers grant) - CVE-2020-29661 tioscpgrp (Ubuntu 20.04 pinned to 5.4.0-26) - CVE-2024-26581 nft_pipapo (Ubuntu 22.04 + mainline 5.15.5) - CVE-2025-32463 sudo_chwoot (Ubuntu 22.04 + sudo 1.9.16p1 from source) - CVE-2025-6019 udisks_libblockdev (Debian 12 + udisks2 + polkit rule) Required real plumbing work: - Per-module provisioner hook (tools/verify-vm/provisioners/<module>.sh) - Two-phase provision in verify.sh (prep → reboot if needed → verify) fixes silent-fail where new kernel installed but VM never rebooted - GRUB_DEFAULT pinning in both pin-kernel and pin-mainline blocks (kernel downgrades like 5.4.0-169 → 5.4.0-26 now actually boot the target) - Old-mainline URL fallback in pin-mainline (≤ 4.15 debs at /v$KVER/ not /amd64/) mutagen_astronomy marked manual: true — mainline 4.14.70 kernel-panics on Ubuntu 18.04's rootfs ('Failed to execute /init (error -8)' — kernel config mismatch). Genuinely needs a CentOS 6 / Debian 7 image.	2026-05-23 23:35:02 -04:00
leviathan	270ddc1681	verify-vm: per-module provisioner hook + old-mainline URL fallback ... Adds tools/verify-vm/provisioners/<module>.sh hook so per-module setup (build vulnerable sudo from source, drop polkit allow rule, add sudoers grant) lives in checked-in scripts rather than manual VM steps. Vagrantfile runs the script as root before build-and-verify if it exists. Also fixes mainline kernel fetch to fall back from /v${KVER}/amd64/ to /v${KVER}/ for old kernels (≤ ~4.15) where debs aren't under the amd64 subdir, and accepts both 'linux-image-' (old) and 'linux-image-unsigned-' (new) deb names. Wires up 4 previously-deferred targets to expect VULNERABLE: - sudo_chwoot: builds sudo 1.9.16p1 from upstream into /usr/local - udisks_libblockdev: installs udisks2 + polkit rule for vagrant user - mutagen_astronomy: pins mainline 4.14.70 (one below the .71 fix) - sudo_runas_neg1: adds (ALL,!root) sudoers grant	2026-05-23 22:36:02 -04:00
leviathan	d84b3b0033	release v0.9.0: 5 gap-fillers — every year 2016 → 2026 now covered ... Five new modules close the 2018 gap entirely and thicken 2019 / 2020 / 2024. All five carry the full 4-format detection-rule corpus + opsec_notes + arch_support + register helpers. CVE-2018-14634 — mutagen_astronomy (Qualys, closes 2018) create_elf_tables() int wrap → SUID-execve stack corruption. CISA KEV-listed Jan 2026 despite the bug's age; legacy RHEL 7 / CentOS 7 / Debian 8 fleets still affected. 🟡 PRIMITIVE. arch_support: x86_64+unverified-arm64. CVE-2019-14287 — sudo_runas_neg1 (Joe Vennix) sudo -u#-1 → uid_t underflow → root despite (ALL,!root) blacklist. Pure userspace logic bug; the famous Apple Information Security finding. detect() looks for a (ALL,!root) grant in sudo -ln output; PRECOND_FAIL when no such grant exists for the invoking user. arch_support: any (4 -> 5 userspace 'any' modules). CVE-2020-29661 — tioscpgrp (Jann Horn / Project Zero) TTY TIOCSPGRP ioctl race on PTY pairs → struct pid UAF in kmalloc-256. Affects everything through Linux 5.9.13. 🟡 PRIMITIVE (race-driver + msg_msg groom). Public PoCs from grsecurity / spender + Maxime Peterlin. CVE-2024-50264 — vsock_uaf (a13xp0p0v / Pwnie Award 2025 winner) AF_VSOCK connect-race UAF in kmalloc-96. Pwn2Own 2024 + Pwnie 2025 winner. Reachable as plain unprivileged user (no userns required — unusual). Two public exploit paths: @v4bel+@qwerty kernelCTF (BPF JIT spray + SLUBStick) and Alexander Popov / PT SWARM (msg_msg). 🟡 PRIMITIVE. CVE-2024-26581 — nft_pipapo (Notselwyn II, 'Flipping Pages') nft_set_pipapo destroy-race UAF. Sibling to nf_tables (CVE-2024-1086) from the same Notselwyn paper. Distinct bug in the pipapo set substrate. Same family signature. 🟡 PRIMITIVE. Plumbing changes: core/registry.h + registry_all.c — 5 new register declarations + calls. Makefile — 5 new MUT/SRN/TIO/VSK/PIP module groups in MODULE_OBJS. tests/test_detect.c — 7 new test rows covering the new modules (above-fix OK, predates-the-bug OK, sudo-no-grant PRECOND_FAIL). tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml — verifier entries for all 5 with honest 'expect_detect' values based on what Vagrant boxes can realistically reach (mutagen_astronomy gets OK on stock 18.04 since 4.15.0-213 is post-fix; sudo_runas_neg1 gets PRECOND_FAIL because no (ALL,!root) grant on default vagrant user; tioscpgrp + nft_pipapo VULNERABLE with kernel pins; vsock_uaf flagged manual because vsock module rarely available on CI runners). tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py — added curl fallback for the CISA KEV CSV fetch (urlopen times out intermittently against CISA's HTTP/2 endpoint). Corpus growth across v0.8.0 + v0.9.0: v0.7.1 v0.8.0 v0.9.0 Modules 31 34 39 Distinct CVEs 26 29 34 KEV-listed 10 10 11 (mutagen_astronomy) arch 'any' 4 6 7 (sudo_runas_neg1) Years 2016-2026: 10/11 10/11 **11/11** Year-by-year coverage: 2016: 1 2017: 1 2018: 1 2019: 2 2020: 2 2021: 5 2022: 5 2023: 8 2024: 3 2025: 2 2026: 4 CVE-2018 gap → CLOSED. Every year from 2016 through 2026 now has at least one module. Surfaces updated: - README.md: badge → 22 VM-verified / 34, Status section refreshed - docs/index.html: hero eyebrow + footer → v0.9.0, hero tagline 'every year 2016 → 2026', stats chips → 39 / 22 / 11 / 151 - docs/RELEASE_NOTES.md: v0.9.0 entry added on top with year coverage matrix + per-module breakdown; v0.8.0 + v0.7.1 entries preserved below - docs/og.svg + og.png: regenerated with new numbers + 'Every year 2016 → 2026' tagline CVE metadata refresh (tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py) deferred to follow-up — CISA KEV CSV + NVD CVE API were timing out during the v0.9.0 push window. The 5 new CVEs will return NULL from cve_metadata_lookup() until the refresh runs (—module-info simply skips the WEAKNESS/THREAT INTEL header for them; no functional impact). Re-run 'tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py' when network cooperates. Tests: macOS local 33/33 kernel_range pass; detect-test stubs (88 total) build clean; ASan/UBSan + clang-tidy CI jobs still green from the v0.7.x setup.	2026-05-23 22:15:44 -04:00
leviathan	312e7d89b5	verify-vm: kernel.ubuntu.com mainline integration — 22 modules verified ... Unblocks the 4 previously-PIN_FAIL modules by adding a fallback path to kernel.ubuntu.com/mainline/ for any kernel no longer in apt. Adds 4 more matches to the verified_on table for a total of 22 modules confirmed against real Linux VMs: af_unix_gc ubuntu2204 + mainline 5.15.5 match nf_tables ubuntu2204 + mainline 5.15.5 match nft_set_uaf ubuntu2204 + mainline 5.15.5 match stackrot ubuntu2204 + mainline 6.1.10 match Mechanism: tools/verify-vm/Vagrantfile — new 'pin-mainline-<X.Y.Z>' shell provisioner. Fetches the directory index at https://kernel.ubuntu.com/mainline/v<X.Y.Z>/amd64/, parses out the 4 canonical .deb filenames (linux-headers _all, linux-headers -generic _amd64, linux-image-unsigned -generic _amd64, linux-modules -generic _amd64; skips lowlatency), downloads them, runs 'dpkg -i' + 'update-grub', and prints a reboot hint. Mainline package version like '5.15.5-051505' sorts ABOVE Ubuntu's stock '5.15.0-91' in debian-version-compare (numeric 51505 > 91), so update-grub puts it at the top of the boot menu and the next 'vagrant reload' lands on it automatically. uname then reports '5.15.5-051505-generic' which our parser sees as 5.15.5 → in our kernel_range table's vulnerable window → empirical VULNERABLE. tools/verify-vm/verify.sh — new SKK_VM_MAINLINE_VERSION env passed to the Vagrantfile. Reload trigger now also fires when uname doesn't match the mainline target. tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml — new 'mainline_version' field on the 4 PIN_FAIL targets. kernel_pkg is left empty; mainline_version drives the fetch. Picked 5.15.5 (Nov 2021) for the 5.15-line CVEs and 6.1.10 (Feb 2023) for stackrot — both below every relevant backport. Final sweep status (22 of 26 CVEs): ✓ MATCHES (22): pwnkit, cgroup_release_agent, netfilter_xtcompat, fuse_legacy, nft_fwd_dup, entrybleed, overlayfs, overlayfs_setuid, sudoedit_editor, ptrace_traceme, sudo_samedit, af_packet, pack2theroot, cls_route4, nft_payload, af_packet2, sequoia, dirty_pipe, nf_tables, af_unix_gc, nft_set_uaf, stackrot 🚫 NOT VERIFIED (4 — flagged in targets.yaml with rationale): vmwgfx — VMware-guest only; no public Vagrant box covers it dirtydecrypt — needs Linux 7.0; not shipping as any distro kernel fragnesia — needs Linux 7.0; same dirty_cow — needs ≤ 4.4 kernel; older than every supported Vagrant box (would need a custom image) copy_fail_family entries verified indirectly via the shared infrastructure tests in the kernel_range unit-test harness. The 22 records are baked into core/verifications.c and surface in --list (VFY ✓ column), --module-info (--- verified on --- section), --explain (VERIFIED ON section), and JSON output (verified_on array). 22/26 CVEs is the new trust signal; with the mainline fetch path production-ready, additional pin targets can be added to targets.yaml without code changes.	2026-05-23 17:35:13 -04:00
leviathan	2c131df1bf	verify-vm sweep complete: 18 modules confirmed across 5 Linux distros ... Full sweep results: MATCHES (18 — empirically confirmed in real Linux VMs): pwnkit ubuntu2004 5.4.0-169 VULNERABLE cgroup_release_agent debian11 5.10.0-27 VULNERABLE netfilter_xtcompat debian11 5.10.0-27 VULNERABLE fuse_legacy debian11 5.10.0-27 VULNERABLE nft_fwd_dup debian11 5.10.0-27 VULNERABLE entrybleed ubuntu2204 5.15.0-91 VULNERABLE overlayfs ubuntu2004 5.4.0-169 VULNERABLE overlayfs_setuid ubuntu2204 5.15.0-91 VULNERABLE sudoedit_editor ubuntu2204 5.15.0-91 PRECOND_FAIL (no sudoers grant) ptrace_traceme ubuntu1804 4.15.0-213 VULNERABLE sudo_samedit ubuntu1804 4.15.0-213 VULNERABLE af_packet ubuntu1804 4.15.0-213 OK (4.15 is post-fix) pack2theroot debian12 6.1.0-17 PRECOND_FAIL (no PackageKit installed) cls_route4 ubuntu2004 5.15.0-43 VULNERABLE nft_payload ubuntu2004 5.15.0-43 VULNERABLE af_packet2 ubuntu2004 5.4.0-26 VULNERABLE sequoia ubuntu2004 5.4.0-26 VULNERABLE dirty_pipe ubuntu2204 5.15.0-91 OK (silently backported) PIN_FAIL (4 — targeted HWE kernels no longer in apt; needs kernel.ubuntu.com mainline integration, deferred): nf_tables wanted ubuntu2204 + 5.15.0-43-generic af_unix_gc wanted ubuntu2204 + 5.15.0-43-generic stackrot wanted ubuntu2204 + 6.1.0-13-generic nft_set_uaf wanted ubuntu2204 + 5.19.0-32-generic MANUAL / SPECIAL TARGETS (5 — flagged in targets.yaml): vmwgfx — VMware-guest only; no Vagrant box covers it dirtydecrypt — needs Linux 7.0 (not shipping yet) fragnesia — needs Linux 7.0 (not shipping yet) dirty_cow — needs <= 4.4 (older than every supported Vagrant box) copy_fail family — multi-module family verification deferred Several findings the active-probe path surfaced vs version-only checks: - dirty_pipe (ubuntu2204): version-only check would say VULNERABLE (kernel 5.15.0 < 5.15.25 backport in our table), but Ubuntu has silently backported the fix into the -91 patch level. --active probe correctly identified the primitive as blocked → OK. - af_packet (ubuntu1804): the bug was fixed in 4.10.6 mainline + 4.9.18 backport. Ubuntu 18.04's stock 4.15.0 is post-fix — detect() correctly returns OK. The targets.yaml entry was originally wrong; fixed now. - sudoedit_editor: version-wise the host is vulnerable (sudo 1.9.9), but the bug requires an actual sudoedit grant in /etc/sudoers — and the default Vagrant user has none. detect() correctly returns PRECOND_FAIL ('vuln version present, no grant to abuse'). Same as one of our unit tests. - pack2theroot: needs an active PackageKit daemon on the system bus. Debian 12's generic cloud image is server-oriented and omits PackageKit. detect() correctly returns PRECOND_FAIL. Provisioning PackageKit in a follow-up Vagrant step would unblock the VULNERABLE path verification. Plumbing fixes that landed in the sweep: - core/nft_compat.h — NFTA_CHAIN_FLAGS (kernel 5.7) + NFTA_CHAIN_ID (5.13). Without these, nft_fwd_dup fails to compile against Ubuntu 18.04's 4.15-era nf_tables uapi, which blocked the entire skeletonkey binary from building on that box and prevented verification of ptrace_traceme / sudo_samedit / af_packet. - tools/verify-vm/Vagrantfile — 'privileged: false' on the build-and-verify provisioner. Vagrant's default runs as root; pack2theroot's detect() short-circuits with 'already root — nothing to do' when running as uid 0, which would invalidate every euid-aware module's verification. - tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml — corrected expectations for af_packet (stock 18.04 4.15 is post-fix), pack2theroot (no PackageKit on server cloud image), sudoedit_editor (no sudoers grant), and dirty_pipe (silent Ubuntu backport). - tools/refresh-verifications.py — dedup key changed from (module, vm_box, host_kernel, expect_detect) to (module, vm_box, host_kernel). When an expectation is corrected mid-sweep, the new record cleanly supersedes the old one instead of accumulating. The verifier loop is now production-ready and the trust signal in --list / --module-info / --explain reflects 18 modules confirmed against real Linux. Next-step bucket: - kernel.ubuntu.com mainline integration → unblock 4 PIN_FAIL pins. - Optional PackageKit provisioner on debian12 → unblock pack2theroot VULNERABLE path.	2026-05-23 16:29:50 -04:00
leviathan	48d5f15828	verify-vm sweep: 13 modules confirmed end-to-end + Vagrant fixes ... Sweep results across 3 phases: Phase 1 (no-pin, cached boxes) — 4/5 match: entrybleed ubuntu2204 5.15.0-91-generic match overlayfs ubuntu2004 5.4.0-169-generic match overlayfs_setuid ubuntu2204 5.15.0-91-generic match nft_fwd_dup debian11 5.10.0-27-amd64 match sudoedit_editor ubuntu2204 MISMATCH (no sudoers grant — expected-fix below) Phase 2 (new boxes ubuntu1804 + debian12) — 0/4 match: ptrace_traceme \ sudo_samedit \ all FAILED to build: nft_fwd_dup needs af_packet / NFTA_CHAIN_FLAGS (kernel 5.7), not in 4.15 uapi pack2theroot / pack2theroot also hit 'already root' early-exit (running as root via vagrant provision's default privileged shell) Phase 3 (kernel-pinned) — 4/8 match: cls_route4 ubuntu2004 + 5.15.0-43 HWE match nft_payload ubuntu2004 + 5.15.0-43 HWE match af_packet2 ubuntu2004 + 5.4.0-26 (still in apt!) match sequoia ubuntu2004 + 5.4.0-26 match nf_tables, af_unix_gc, stackrot, nft_set_uaf — PIN_FAIL (target kernels not in apt; need kernel.ubuntu.com mainline integration — deferred) Total: 13 modules verified end-to-end against real Linux VMs, covering kernels 5.4 / 5.10 / 5.15 / 5.4-HWE / 5.15-HWE across Ubuntu 18.04/20.04/22.04 + Debian 11/12. Three fixes for the next retry pass: 1. core/nft_compat.h — added NFTA_CHAIN_FLAGS (kernel 5.7) and NFTA_CHAIN_ID (kernel 5.13). Without these, nft_fwd_dup fails to compile on Ubuntu 18.04's 4.15-era nf_tables uapi, which blocks the entire skeletonkey build (and thus blocks ALL verifications on that box). 2. tools/verify-vm/Vagrantfile — build-and-verify provisioner now runs unprivileged (privileged: false) so detect()s that gate on 'are you already root?' don't short-circuit. pack2theroot's 'already root — nothing to do' was the motivating case; logging 'id' upfront will make this easier to diagnose next time. 3. tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml — sudoedit_editor's expectation updated from VULNERABLE to PRECOND_FAIL. Ubuntu 22.04 ships sudo 1.9.9 (vulnerable version), but the default 'vagrant' user has no sudoedit grant in /etc/sudoers, so detect() correctly short-circuits ('vuln version present, no grant to abuse'). Provisioning a grant before verifying would re-open the VULNERABLE path; deferred. Next: re-sweep the 5 failed modules (ptrace_traceme, sudo_samedit, af_packet, pack2theroot, sudoedit_editor) and pull the 4 PIN_FAIL ones into a 'requires mainline kernel' bucket in targets.yaml.	2026-05-23 16:22:10 -04:00
leviathan	67d091dd37	verified_on table — 5 modules empirically confirmed in real VMs ... Closes the loop opened by tools/verify-vm/: every JSON verification record now persists into docs/VERIFICATIONS.jsonl, gets folded into the embedded core/verifications.c lookup table, and surfaces in --list / --module-info / --explain / --scan --json. New: docs/VERIFICATIONS.jsonl Append-only store. One JSON record per verify.sh run. Records carry module, ISO timestamp, host_kernel, host_distro, vm_box, expected vs actual verdict, and match status. 6 lines today (5 unique after dedup; the extra is dirty_pipe's pre-correction MISMATCH that surfaced the silent-backport finding — kept in the JSONL for history, deduped out of the C table). New: tools/refresh-verifications.py Parses VERIFICATIONS.jsonl, dedupes to latest per (module, vm_box, host_kernel), generates core/verifications.c with a static array + lookup functions: verifications_for_module(name, &count_out) verifications_module_has_match(name) --check mode for CI drift detection. New: core/verifications.{h,c} Embedded record table. Lookup is O(corpus); we have <50 records. skeletonkey.c surfacing: - --list: new 'VFY' column shows ✓ for modules with >=1 'match' record. Five modules show ✓ today (pwnkit, cgroup_release_agent, netfilter_xtcompat, fuse_legacy, dirty_pipe). - --module-info: new '--- verified on ---' section enumerates every record with date / distro / kernel / vm_box / status. Modules with zero records get a 'run tools/verify-vm/verify.sh <name>' hint. - --explain: new 'VERIFIED ON' section in the operator briefing. - --scan --json / --module-info --json: 'verified_on' array of record objects per module. Verification records baked in: pwnkit Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS 5.4.0-169 match (polkit 0.105) cgroup_release_agent Debian 11 (bullseye) 5.10.0-27 match netfilter_xtcompat Debian 11 (bullseye) 5.10.0-27 match fuse_legacy Debian 11 (bullseye) 5.10.0-27 match dirty_pipe Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS 5.15.0-91 match (OK; silent backport) The dirty_pipe record is particularly informative: stock Ubuntu 22.04 ships 5.15.0-91-generic. Our version-only kernel_range check would say VULNERABLE (5.15.0 < 5.15.25 backport in our table). The --active probe writes a sentinel via the dirty_pipe primitive then re-reads; on this host the primitive is blocked → sentinel doesn't land → verdict OK. Ubuntu silently backports CVE fixes into the patch level (-91 here) without bumping uname's X.Y.Z. The targets.yaml entry was updated from 'expect: VULNERABLE' to 'expect: OK' to reflect what the active probe definitively determined; the original VULNERABLE expectation is preserved in the JSONL history as a demonstration of why we ship an active-probe path at all (this is the verified-vs- claimed bar in action). Plumbing fixes that landed in the same loop: - core/nft_compat.h — conditional defines for newer-kernel nft uapi constants (NFT_CHAIN_HW_OFFLOAD, NFTA_VERDICT_CHAIN_ID, etc.) that aren't in Ubuntu 20.04's pre-5.5 linux-libc-dev. Without this, nft_* modules failed to compile inside the verifier guest. Included from each nft module after <linux/netfilter/nf_tables.h>. - tools/verify-vm/Vagrantfile — wrap config in c.vm.define so each module gets its own tracked machine; disable Parallels Tools auto-install (fails on older guest kernels); translate underscores in guest hostname to hyphens (RFC 952). - tools/verify-vm/verify.sh — explicit 'vagrant rsync' before 'vagrant provision build-and-verify' (vagrant only auto-rsyncs on fresh up, not on already-running VMs); fix verdict-grep regex to tolerate Vagrant's 'skk-<module>:' line prefix + '|| true' so a grep miss doesn't trigger set-e+pipefail; append JSON record to docs/VERIFICATIONS.jsonl on every run. - tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml — dirty_pipe retargeted from ubuntu2004 + pinned 5.13.0-19 (no longer in 20.04's apt) to ubuntu2204 stock 5.15.0-91 (apt-installable + exercises the active-probe-overrides-version-check path). What's next for the verifier: - Mainline kernel.ubuntu.com integration so we can actually pin arbitrary historical kernels (currently the pin path only works with apt-installable packages). - Sweep the remaining ~18 verifiable modules and accumulate records. - Per-module verified_on counts in --explain header.	2026-05-23 15:46:14 -04:00
leviathan	554a58757e	tools/verify-vm: turnkey Vagrant + Parallels verification scaffolding ... Closes the gap between 'detect() compiles and passes unit tests' and 'exploit() actually works on a real vulnerable kernel'. One-time setup + one command per module to verify against a known-vulnerable guest, with results emitted as JSON verification records. Files: setup.sh — one-shot bootstrap. Installs Vagrant via brew if missing, installs vagrant-parallels plugin, pre- downloads 5 base boxes (~5 GB): generic/ubuntu1804 (4.15.0) generic/ubuntu2004 (5.4.0 + HWE) generic/ubuntu2204 (5.15.0 + HWE) generic/debian11 (5.10.0) generic/debian12 (6.1.0) Idempotent; can pass --boxes subset. Vagrantfile — single parameterized config driven by SKK_VM_* env vars. Provisioners: build-deps install, kernel pin (apt + snapshot.debian.org fallback), build-and-verify (kept run='never' so verify.sh invokes explicitly after reboot if pin'd). targets.yaml — module → (box, kernel_pkg, kernel_version, expect_detect, notes) mapping for all 26 modules. 3 marked manual: true (vmwgfx needs VMware guest; dirtydecrypt + fragnesia need Linux 7.0 not yet shipping as distro kernel). verify.sh — entrypoint. 'verify.sh <module>' provisions if needed, pins kernel + reboots if needed, runs 'skeletonkey --explain --active' inside the VM, parses VERDICT, compares to expect_detect, emits JSON verification record. --list shows the full target matrix. --keep / --destroy lifecycle flags. README.md — workflow + extending the targets table. Design notes: - Pure bash + awk targets.yaml parsing — no PyYAML dep (macOS Python is PEP-668 'externally managed' and refuses pip --user installs). - Sources of vulnerable kernel packages: stock distro kernels where they're below the fix backport, otherwise pinned via apt with snapshot.debian.org as last-resort fallback (the Debian apt snapshot archive is the canonical source for historical kernel .deb packages). - Repo mounted at /vagrant via rsync (not 9p — vagrant-parallels' 9p is finicky on macOS Sequoia per the plugin issue tracker). - VM lifecycle defaults to suspend-after-verify so the next run resumes in ~5s instead of cold-booting. - kernel pin reboots are handled by checking 'uname -r' after the pin provisioner and triggering 'vagrant reload' if mismatched. Verification records (JSON on stdout per run) are intended to feed a per-module verified_on[] table in a follow-up commit — that's the 'permanent trust artifact' angle from the earlier roadmap discussion. Smoke tests (no VM actually spun up): - 'verify.sh --list': renders the 26-module matrix correctly. - 'verify.sh nf_tables': dispatches to generic/ubuntu2204 + kernel 5.15.0-43 + expect=VULNERABLE; fails cleanly at 'vagrant: command not found' (expected — user runs setup.sh first). - 'verify.sh vmwgfx': errors with 'is marked manual: true' + note. .gitignore: tools/verify-vm/{logs,.vagrant}/ excluded. Usage: ./tools/verify-vm/setup.sh # one time, ~5 min ./tools/verify-vm/verify.sh nf_tables # ~5 min first run, ~1 min after ./tools/verify-vm/verify.sh --list # show all targets	2026-05-23 11:19:28 -04:00