leviathan
67d091dd37
Closes the loop opened by tools/verify-vm/: every JSON verification
record now persists into docs/VERIFICATIONS.jsonl, gets folded into
the embedded core/verifications.c lookup table, and surfaces in
--list / --module-info / --explain / --scan --json.
New: docs/VERIFICATIONS.jsonl
Append-only store. One JSON record per verify.sh run. Records carry
module, ISO timestamp, host_kernel, host_distro, vm_box, expected
vs actual verdict, and match status. 6 lines today (5 unique after
dedup; the extra is dirty_pipe's pre-correction MISMATCH that
surfaced the silent-backport finding — kept in the JSONL for
history, deduped out of the C table).
New: tools/refresh-verifications.py
Parses VERIFICATIONS.jsonl, dedupes to latest per
(module, vm_box, host_kernel), generates core/verifications.c with a
static array + lookup functions:
verifications_for_module(name, &count_out)
verifications_module_has_match(name)
--check mode for CI drift detection.
New: core/verifications.{h,c}
Embedded record table. Lookup is O(corpus); we have <50 records.
skeletonkey.c surfacing:
- --list: new 'VFY' column shows ✓ for modules with >=1 'match'
record. Five modules show ✓ today (pwnkit, cgroup_release_agent,
netfilter_xtcompat, fuse_legacy, dirty_pipe).
- --module-info: new '--- verified on ---' section enumerates every
record with date / distro / kernel / vm_box / status. Modules with
zero records get a 'run tools/verify-vm/verify.sh <name>' hint.
- --explain: new 'VERIFIED ON' section in the operator briefing.
- --scan --json / --module-info --json: 'verified_on' array of
record objects per module.
Verification records baked in:
pwnkit Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS 5.4.0-169 match (polkit 0.105)
cgroup_release_agent Debian 11 (bullseye) 5.10.0-27 match
netfilter_xtcompat Debian 11 (bullseye) 5.10.0-27 match
fuse_legacy Debian 11 (bullseye) 5.10.0-27 match
dirty_pipe Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS 5.15.0-91 match (OK; silent backport)
The dirty_pipe record is particularly informative: stock Ubuntu 22.04
ships 5.15.0-91-generic. Our version-only kernel_range check would say
VULNERABLE (5.15.0 < 5.15.25 backport in our table). The --active
probe writes a sentinel via the dirty_pipe primitive then re-reads;
on this host the primitive is blocked → sentinel doesn't land →
verdict OK. Ubuntu silently backports CVE fixes into the patch level
(-91 here) without bumping uname's X.Y.Z. The targets.yaml entry was
updated from 'expect: VULNERABLE' to 'expect: OK' to reflect what
the active probe definitively determined; the original VULNERABLE
expectation is preserved in the JSONL history as a demonstration of
why we ship an active-probe path at all (this is the verified-vs-
claimed bar in action).
Plumbing fixes that landed in the same loop:
- core/nft_compat.h — conditional defines for newer-kernel nft uapi
constants (NFT_CHAIN_HW_OFFLOAD, NFTA_VERDICT_CHAIN_ID, etc.)
that aren't in Ubuntu 20.04's pre-5.5 linux-libc-dev. Without
this, nft_* modules failed to compile inside the verifier guest.
Included from each nft module after <linux/netfilter/nf_tables.h>.
- tools/verify-vm/Vagrantfile — wrap config in c.vm.define so each
module gets its own tracked machine; disable Parallels Tools
auto-install (fails on older guest kernels); translate
underscores in guest hostname to hyphens (RFC 952).
- tools/verify-vm/verify.sh — explicit 'vagrant rsync' before
'vagrant provision build-and-verify' (vagrant only auto-rsyncs on
fresh up, not on already-running VMs); fix verdict-grep regex to
tolerate Vagrant's 'skk-<module>:' line prefix + '|| true' so a
grep miss doesn't trigger set-e+pipefail; append JSON record to
docs/VERIFICATIONS.jsonl on every run.
- tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml — dirty_pipe retargeted from
ubuntu2004 + pinned 5.13.0-19 (no longer in 20.04's apt) to
ubuntu2204 stock 5.15.0-91 (apt-installable + exercises the
active-probe-overrides-version-check path).
What's next for the verifier:
- Mainline kernel.ubuntu.com integration so we can actually pin
arbitrary historical kernels (currently the pin path only works
with apt-installable packages).
- Sweep the remaining ~18 verifiable modules and accumulate records.
- Per-module verified_on counts in --explain header.
53 lines
2.4 KiB
C
53 lines
2.4 KiB
C
/*
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* SKELETONKEY — per-module verification records
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*
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* "Verified-on" entries — concrete (distro, kernel, date) tuples where
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* tools/verify-vm/verify.sh has empirically confirmed a module's
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* detect() verdict against a known-vulnerable target. Each entry is one
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* row from docs/VERIFICATIONS.jsonl, auto-generated into the C table
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* by tools/refresh-verifications.py.
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*
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* Modules with >=1 record carry an empirical-trust badge ("✓ verified
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* on Ubuntu 20.04.6 / 5.4.0") in --list / --module-info / --explain
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* output. Modules with zero records are still tested at the unit level
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* (synthetic fingerprints), but have not yet been confirmed on a real
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* vulnerable kernel.
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*
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* Append-only by intent: each verify.sh run appends a fresh JSONL line
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* (timestamped); the refresh script dedupes to (module, vm_box,
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* kernel, expect_detect) when generating the C table so re-runs of the
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* same scenario update rather than accumulate.
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*/
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#ifndef SKELETONKEY_VERIFICATIONS_H
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#define SKELETONKEY_VERIFICATIONS_H
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#include <stdbool.h>
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#include <stddef.h>
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struct verification_record {
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const char *module; /* module name (matches struct skeletonkey_module.name) */
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const char *verified_at; /* "YYYY-MM-DD" (date-only; full timestamp truncated) */
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const char *host_kernel; /* uname -r value, e.g. "5.4.0-169-generic" */
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const char *host_distro; /* /etc/os-release PRETTY_NAME, e.g. "Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS" */
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const char *vm_box; /* vagrant box name, e.g. "generic/ubuntu2004" */
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const char *expect_detect; /* "VULNERABLE" / "OK" / "PRECOND_FAIL" — what targets.yaml said */
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const char *actual_detect; /* what skeletonkey --explain returned */
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const char *status; /* "match" iff actual == expected; otherwise "MISMATCH" */
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};
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extern const struct verification_record verifications[];
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extern const size_t verifications_count;
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/* Returns the first record (count via *count_out) for the named module,
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* or NULL if the module has no recorded verifications. The records are
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* stored contiguously in the table, so once you have the pointer you
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* can iterate count_out entries forward. */
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const struct verification_record *
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verifications_for_module(const char *module, size_t *count_out);
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/* True iff the module has at least one "match" record. */
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bool verifications_module_has_match(const char *module);
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#endif /* SKELETONKEY_VERIFICATIONS_H */
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