This release captures the session's reliability + accuracy work
on top of v0.5.0:
- Shared host fingerprint (core/host.{h,c}): kernel/distro/userns
gates / sudo + polkit versions, populated once at startup; every
module consults ctx->host instead of doing its own probes.
- Test harness (tests/test_detect.c, make test): 44 unit tests over
mocked host fingerprints, wired into CI as a non-root step.
- --auto upgrades: auto-enables --active, per-detect 15s timeout,
fork-isolated detect + exploit so a crashing module can't tear
down the dispatcher, per-module verdict table + scan summary.
- --dry-run flag (preview without firing; --i-know not required).
- Pinned mainline fix commits for the 3 ported modules
(dirtydecrypt / fragnesia / pack2theroot) — detect() is now
version-pinned with kernel_range tables, not precondition-only.
- New modules: dirtydecrypt (CVE-2026-31635), fragnesia
(CVE-2026-46300), pack2theroot (CVE-2026-41651).
- macOS dev build works for the first time (all Linux-only code
wrapped in #ifdef __linux__).
- docs/JSON_SCHEMA.md: stable consumer contract for --scan --json.
Version bump:
- SKELETONKEY_VERSION = '0.6.0' in skeletonkey.c
- README status line updated with the v0.6.0 changelog
- docs/JSON_SCHEMA.md example refreshed
6.3 KiB
SKELETONKEY JSON output schema
skeletonkey --scan --json (and --auto --json, planned) emit a
single JSON object on stdout. All human-readable banner lines and
per-module log chatter go to stderr in JSON mode — pipes to SIEMs
and fleet aggregators get a clean machine-parseable document on
stdout while operators still see diagnostics on stderr.
This document is the contract for that JSON. SKELETONKEY treats it as a stability commitment: new fields may appear in future releases, but existing field names and value types do not change without a major-version bump.
Top-level object
{
"version": "0.6.0",
"modules": [ /* ... per-module entries ... */ ]
}
| Field | Type | Stability | Meaning |
|---|---|---|---|
version |
string | stable | The SKELETONKEY release that produced this document. Semver-ish (MAJOR.MINOR.PATCH). Consumers may use it to correlate with the corpus inventory in CVES.md. |
modules |
array | stable | One entry per registered module, emitted in the order the dispatcher's --list reports them. Length grows monotonically as new modules land. |
Per-module entry
{
"name": "dirty_pipe",
"cve": "CVE-2022-0847",
"result": "OK"
}
| Field | Type | Stability | Meaning |
|---|---|---|---|
name |
string | stable | The module's CLI identifier — what you pass to --exploit <name>. Lowercase, ASCII, _-delimited. Never changes for a given module across releases. |
cve |
string | stable | The CVE identifier (CVE-YYYY-NNNNN), or "VARIANT" for sibling variants without their own CVE (e.g. copy_fail_gcm), or "-" for primitives like entrybleed that have a CVE-less role. |
result |
string | stable | One of the result enum values below. |
result enum
| Value | Exit code | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
OK |
0 | Module's detect() ran successfully. Host is patched for this CVE, or the bug class is not applicable here (predates the introduction, wrong arch, etc.). Safe to ignore for this host. |
TEST_ERROR |
1 | detect() could not decide — the host fingerprint is missing data, the version parser failed, or an internal probe errored. Treat as "no information; check manually." |
VULNERABLE |
2 | Host is vulnerable to this CVE per the module's detect logic (version-based and/or empirical active probe). --exploit <name> --i-know will attempt to land root. |
EXPLOIT_FAIL |
3 | Only ever returned by --exploit, never by --scan. Exploit was attempted but did not land root. Diagnostic context goes to stderr. |
PRECOND_FAIL |
4 | A documented precondition is not met on this host — examples: unprivileged user namespaces disabled, AppArmor restriction on, sudo not installed, AF_RXRPC unavailable. The bug may exist on the kernel but the carrier path here is closed. |
EXPLOIT_OK |
5 | Only ever returned by --exploit / --auto. Root was achieved; for --auto mode this is the process exit code that drove the dispatcher into a root shell. |
Process exit code semantics for --scan
The process exit code is the worst (highest) result code observed across all modules. This lets a SIEM treat the binary's exit code as a single-host alert level without re-parsing JSON:
| Exit code | Interpretation |
|---|---|
| 0 | All modules OK. Host is patched for the corpus. |
| 1 | At least one module returned TEST_ERROR. Investigate. |
| 2 | At least one module returned VULNERABLE. Patch the host. |
| 4 | At least one module returned PRECOND_FAIL (and none worse). Host has reduced attack surface but is not necessarily safe. |
(Process exit codes 3 and 5 are exclusive to the --exploit /
--auto modes and never appear in --scan output.)
Example: invoking + parsing
# capture pure JSON
skeletonkey --scan --json --no-color > host-$(hostname).json 2> /dev/null
# any vulnerable modules?
jq -e '.modules[] | select(.result == "VULNERABLE") | .name' host-*.json
# fleet roll-up — modules vulnerable across the fleet, by frequency
jq -s 'map(.modules[] | select(.result == "VULNERABLE") | .name)
| flatten | group_by(.) | map({mod: .[0], count: length})
| sort_by(-.count)' host-*.json
jq -e exits non-zero when its selector matches nothing, giving the
fleet runner a per-host "any-vulnerable" boolean without parsing the
document.
Stability promises
Stable across non-major releases:
- Field names listed in the tables above (
version,modules,name,cve,result). - The
resultenum string set. New result strings cannot appear without a major version bump. - The
modulesarray containing exactly one entry per registered module. - Exit-code semantics for
--scan.
May change without notice:
- The
modulesarray length, ordering, and contents (new modules are added regularly; ordering follows registration order which is stable per release but not a contract). - Whitespace / formatting of the JSON itself (consumers MUST parse, not regex).
- Field values for
cve(a stub variant could gain a real CVE later).
May be added in future minor versions:
- New per-module fields (e.g.
family,summary,safety_rank,kernel_range). Consumers MUST ignore unknown fields. - New top-level fields (e.g.
host_fingerprint,scan_started_at,schema_version). Consumers MUST ignore unknown fields. - A
--scan --active --jsonoutput may grow per-probe verdict metadata under a newprobesub-object.
Recommended consumer pattern
import json, subprocess, sys
doc = json.loads(subprocess.check_output(
["skeletonkey", "--scan", "--json", "--no-color"],
stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
))
assert doc["version"], "missing top-level version"
for mod in doc["modules"]:
assert mod["name"] and mod["cve"] and mod["result"], \
f"malformed module entry: {mod!r}"
if mod["result"] == "VULNERABLE":
print(f"{mod['name']} ({mod['cve']}): VULNERABLE", file=sys.stderr)
Ignore unknown fields. Match result against the enum, but treat
unknown strings as TEST_ERROR-equivalent (forward-compat).