leviathan
9593d90385
Breaking change. Tool name, binary name, function/type names,
constant names, env vars, header guards, file paths, and GitHub
repo URL all rebrand IAMROOT → SKELETONKEY.
Changes:
- All "IAMROOT" → "SKELETONKEY" (constants, env vars, enum
values, docs, comments)
- All "iamroot" → "skeletonkey" (functions, types, paths, CLI)
- iamroot.c → skeletonkey.c
- modules/*/iamroot_modules.{c,h} → modules/*/skeletonkey_modules.{c,h}
- tools/iamroot-fleet-scan.sh → tools/skeletonkey-fleet-scan.sh
- Binary "iamroot" → "skeletonkey"
- GitHub URL KaraZajac/IAMROOT → KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY
- .gitignore now expects build output named "skeletonkey"
- /tmp/iamroot-* tmpfiles → /tmp/skeletonkey-*
- Env vars IAMROOT_MODPROBE_PATH etc. → SKELETONKEY_*
New ASCII skeleton-key banner (horizontal key icon + ANSI Shadow
SKELETONKEY block letters) replaces the IAMROOT banner in
skeletonkey.c and README.md.
VERSION: 0.3.1 → 0.4.0 (breaking).
Build clean on Debian 6.12.86. `skeletonkey --version` → 0.4.0.
All 24 modules still register; no functional code changes — pure
rename + banner refresh.
27 lines
1.2 KiB
Plaintext
27 lines
1.2 KiB
Plaintext
# Dirty Pipe (CVE-2022-0847) — auditd detection rules
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#
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# Detects the Dirty Pipe primitive pattern: a process splice()s a file
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# into a pipe, then write()s to that pipe. The kernel bug allows the
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# write to land in the page cache of the original file.
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#
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# False-positive surface: legitimate splice-then-write is rare in
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# userspace; most uses of splice are file-to-file (e.g. cp via sendfile).
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# Tuning may be needed in environments using nginx/HAProxy/etc.
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#
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# Drop these into /etc/audit/rules.d/ and reload auditd.
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# Watch /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, /etc/sudoers, /etc/sudoers.d/* for
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# any modification by non-root — the Dirty Pipe payload typically
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# overwrites these to gain root.
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-w /etc/passwd -p wa -k skeletonkey-dirty-pipe
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-w /etc/shadow -p wa -k skeletonkey-dirty-pipe
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-w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k skeletonkey-dirty-pipe
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-w /etc/sudoers.d -p wa -k skeletonkey-dirty-pipe
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# Watch every splice() syscall — combined with the file watches above
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# this catches the canonical exploit shape. (High volume on servers
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# using nginx/HAProxy; consider scoping with -F gid!=33 -F gid!=99 to
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# exclude web servers.)
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-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S splice -k skeletonkey-dirty-pipe-splice
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-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S splice -k skeletonkey-dirty-pipe-splice
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