Both modules' detect() was precondition-only because we didn't know the
mainline fix commits at port time. Debian's security tracker now
provides them — pinning here turns detect() into a proper version-
based verdict (still with --active for empirical override).
dirtydecrypt (CVE-2026-31635):
- Fix commit a2567217ade970ecc458144b6be469bc015b23e5 in mainline 7.0
('rxrpc: fix oversized RESPONSE authenticator length check').
- Debian tracker confirms older stable branches (5.10 / 6.1 / 6.12) as
<not-affected, vulnerable code not present>: the rxgk RESPONSE-
handling code was added in 7.0.
- kernel_range table: { {7, 0, 0} }
- detect() pre-checks 'kernel < 7.0 -> SKELETONKEY_OK (predates)' then
consults the table. With --active, the /tmp sentinel probe overrides
empirically (catches pre-fix 7.0-rc kernels the version check
reports as patched).
fragnesia (CVE-2026-46300):
- Fix in mainline 7.0.9 per Debian tracker ('linux unstable: 7.0.9-1
fixed'). Older Debian-stable branches (bullseye 5.10 / bookworm 6.1
/ trixie 6.12) are still marked vulnerable as of 2026-05-22 - no
backports yet.
- kernel_range table: { {7, 0, 9} }
- detect() keeps the userns + carrier preconditions, then consults
the table: 7.0.9+ -> OK; older branches without an explicit backport
entry -> VULNERABLE (version-only). --active confirms empirically.
- Table is intentionally minimal so distros that DO backport in the
future flow into 'patched' once their branch lands an entry; until
then, the conservative VULNERABLE verdict on unfixed branches is
correct.
Other changes:
- module struct .kernel_range strings updated from 'fix commit not
yet pinned' to the actual pinned-version prose.
- module_safety_rank bumped 86 -> 87 for both modules (version-pinned
detect is now real; still below the verified copy_fail family at
88 so --auto prefers verified modules when both apply).
- Both modules now #include core/kernel_range.h inside their
#ifdef __linux__ block.
- MODULE.md verification-status sections rewritten: detect() is now
version-pinned; only the exploit body remains unverified.
- CVES.md note + inventory rows updated: dropped the 'precondition-
only' language for the pair; all three ported modules now have
pinned fix references.
- README ⚪ tier description + module list aligned to the new state.
Both detect()s smoke-tested in docker gcc:latest on kernel 6.12.76-
linuxkit: dirtydecrypt correctly reports OK ('predates the rxgk code
added in 7.0'); fragnesia + pack2theroot correctly report
PRECOND_FAIL (no userns / no D-Bus in container). Local macOS + Linux
builds both clean.
4.2 KiB
fragnesia — CVE-2026-46300
🟡 PRIMITIVE / ported. Faithful port of the public V12 PoC into the
skeletonkey_moduleinterface. Not yet validated end-to-end on a vulnerable-kernel VM — see Verification status below.
Summary
Fragnesia ("Fragment Amnesia") is an XFRM ESP-in-TCP local privilege
escalation. skb_try_coalesce() fails to propagate the
SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG marker when moving paged fragments between socket
buffers — so the kernel forgets that a fragment is externally backed by
page-cache pages spliced in from a file. The ESP-in-TCP receive path
then decrypts in place, corrupting the page cache of a read-only file.
Fragnesia is a latent bug exposed by the Dirty Frag fix: the
candidate patch cites the Dirty Frag remediation (f4c50a4034e6) as a
commit it "fixes". It is the same page-cache-write bug class as Copy
Fail / Dirty Frag, reached through a different code path.
Primitive
- Build a 256-entry AES-GCM keystream-byte table via
AF_ALGecb(aes)— for any wanted output byte, this yields the ESP IV whose keystream byte XORs the current byte to the target. - Enter a mapped user namespace + network namespace, bring
loopback up, and install an XFRM ESP-in-TCP state
(
rfc4106(gcm(aes)),TCP_ENCAP_ESPINTCP). - A receiver accepts a loopback TCP connection and flips it to the
espintcpULP; a sendersplice()s page-cache pages of the target file into that TCP stream behind a crafted ESP prefix. - The coalesce bug makes the kernel decrypt the spliced page-cache pages in place — one chosen byte per trigger.
The exploit rewrites the first 192 bytes of a setuid-root binary
(/usr/bin/su and friends) with an ET_DYN ELF that drops privileges to
0 and execves /bin/sh.
Operations
| Op | Behaviour |
|---|---|
--scan |
Checks unprivileged-userns availability + a readable setuid carrier ≥ 4096 bytes. With --active, runs the full ESP-in-TCP primitive against a disposable /tmp file and reports VULNERABLE/OK empirically. |
--exploit … --i-know |
Forks a child that places the payload into the carrier's page cache and execs it for a root shell. --no-shell stops after the page-cache write. |
--cleanup |
Evicts the carrier from the page cache. The on-disk binary is never written. |
--detect-rules |
Emits embedded auditd + sigma rules. |
Preconditions
- Unprivileged user namespaces enabled. On Ubuntu, AppArmor blocks
this by default —
sysctl kernel.apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=0(or chain a separate bypass). This is the scoping question the old_stubs/fragnesia_TBDraised; the module ships and reportsPRECOND_FAILcleanly when the userns gate is closed. CONFIG_INET_ESPINTCPbuilt into the kernel.- A readable setuid-root binary ≥ 4096 bytes as the payload carrier.
- x86_64 (the embedded ELF payload is x86_64 shellcode).
Port notes
The upstream PoC renders a full-screen ANSI "smash frame" TUI
(draw_smash_frame + terminal scroll-region escapes). That is not
ported — it cannot coexist with a shared multi-module dispatcher.
Progress is logged with [*]/[+]/[-] prefixes, gated on --json.
The exploit mechanism itself is reproduced faithfully.
Verification status
This module is a faithful port of https://github.com/v12-security/pocs/tree/main/fragnesia, compiled into the SKELETONKEY module interface. The exploit body has not been validated end-to-end against a known-vulnerable kernel inside the SKELETONKEY CI matrix.
detect() is now version-pinned: the Fragnesia fix ships in
mainline Linux 7.0.9 (Debian tracker source-of-truth, linux unstable: 7.0.9-1 fixed). The kernel_range table marks the 7.0.x
branch patched at 7.0.9; older Debian-stable branches (5.10 / 6.1 /
6.12) are currently still vulnerable per the tracker. With --active,
the detector runs the full ESP-in-TCP primitive against a /tmp file
and reports empirically — catches stable-branch backports the version
table doesn't know about, and CONFIG_INET_ESPINTCP=n kernels where the
primitive is structurally unreachable.
Before promoting to 🟢: validate the exploit end-to-end on a
≤ 7.0.8 kernel. Extend the kernel_range table with backport
thresholds for 5.10 / 6.1 / 6.12 as distros publish them.