CVE metadata refresh:
- Added 8 entries to core/cve_metadata.c for the v0.8.0 + v0.9.0 module
CVEs. Two are CISA-KEV-listed:
- CVE-2018-14634 mutagen_astronomy (2026-01-26, CWE-190)
- CVE-2025-32463 sudo_chwoot (2025-09-29, CWE-829)
- Populated via direct curl when refresh-cve-metadata.py's Python urlopen
hung on CISA's HTTP/2 endpoint for ~55 min — same data, different
transport.
dirtydecrypt module bug fix:
- dd_detect() was wrongly gating 'predates the bug' on kernel < 7.0
- Per NVD CVE-2026-31635: bug entered at 6.16.1 stable; vulnerable
through 6.18.22 / 6.19.12 / 7.0-rc7; fixed at 6.18.23 / 6.19.13 / 7.0
- Fix: predates-gate now uses 6.16.1; patched_branches[] adds {6,18,23}
- Re-verified: dirtydecrypt now correctly returns VULNERABLE on mainline
6.19.7 instead of OK. Previously a false negative on real vulnerable
kernels.
Footer goes from '10 in CISA KEV' to '12 in CISA KEV'. Verified count
stays at 28 but dirtydecrypt's record is now a TRUE VULNERABLE match
(was OK match).
SKELETONKEY VM verification
Auto-provisions a Parallels Desktop VM with a known-vulnerable kernel,
runs skeletonkey --explain <module> --active inside it, and emits a
verification record. Closes the loop between "detect() compiles & passes
unit tests" and "exploit() actually works on a real vulnerable kernel."
One-time setup
./tools/verify-vm/setup.sh
That installs (if missing): Vagrant via Homebrew, the vagrant-parallels
plugin, and pre-downloads ~5 GB of base boxes (Ubuntu 18.04/20.04/22.04
- Debian 11/12). Idempotent — re-run any time.
To skip boxes you don't need (save disk):
./tools/verify-vm/setup.sh ubuntu2004 debian11 # only those two
Verify a single module
./tools/verify-vm/verify.sh nf_tables
What that does:
- Reads
tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml: findsnf_tables→ boxgeneric/ubuntu2204+ kernel pinlinux-image-5.15.0-43-generic. vagrant up skk-nf_tables(provisions on first call, resumes on subsequent).- Installs the pinned vulnerable kernel via
apt, reboots. - Mounts the local repo at
/vagrant, runsmake, then runsskeletonkey --explain nf_tables --active. - Parses the
VERDICT:line, compares againstexpect_detectfrom targets.yaml, emits a JSON verification record on stdout. - Suspends the VM (
vagrant suspend) — instant resume next run.
Lifecycle flags:
./tools/verify-vm/verify.sh nf_tables --keep # leave VM running; ssh in to inspect
./tools/verify-vm/verify.sh nf_tables --destroy # full teardown after run
List every target
./tools/verify-vm/verify.sh --list
Shows the (module, box, target kernel, expected verdict, notes) matrix
for all 26 modules. Three are flagged manual: true because no
public Vagrant box covers them:
vmwgfx— only reachable on VMware guests; needs a vSphere/Fusion VM not Parallels.dirtydecrypt,fragnesia— only present in Linux 7.0+ which isn't shipping as a distro kernel yet.
For those, verification needs a hand-built or special-distro VM.
Verification records
verify.sh emits JSON on stdout after each run. Example:
{
"module": "nf_tables",
"verified_at": "2026-05-23T17:42:11Z",
"host_kernel": "5.15.0-43-generic",
"host_distro": "Ubuntu 22.04.5 LTS",
"vm_box": "generic/ubuntu2204",
"expect_detect": "VULNERABLE",
"actual_detect": "VULNERABLE",
"status": "match",
"log": "tools/verify-vm/logs/verify-nf_tables-20260523-174211.log"
}
status: match means detect() returned what we expected on a known-
vulnerable kernel. Anything else (MISMATCH, status code != 0) means
either:
- The kernel pin didn't take (check
host_kernelagainstkernel_versionin targets.yaml). - The exploit's preconditions aren't met in the default Vagrant image (e.g. apparmor blocks unprivileged userns; need to adjust the Vagrantfile provisioner).
- The detect() logic is wrong for this kernel/distro combo (a real bug — fix it).
Records are intended to feed a per-module verified_on[] table (next
project step) so --list can show a ✓ verified <date> column.
How it routes module → box
Mapping lives in tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml. Each entry has:
box— whichboxes/template (e.g.ubuntu2204)kernel_pkg— apt package name to install if the stock kernel is patched (omit / empty if stock is already vulnerable)kernel_version— whatuname -rshould report after installexpect_detect—VULNERABLE|OK|PRECOND_FAILnotes— short rationale; comments in the file have the full context
Adding a new module is one block in targets.yaml. The verifier picks it up automatically.
Files
tools/verify-vm/
├── README.md this file
├── setup.sh one-time bootstrap (Vagrant, plugin, box cache)
├── verify.sh per-module verifier
├── Vagrantfile parameterized VM config (driven by SKK_VM_* env vars)
├── targets.yaml module → box mapping with rationale
└── logs/ per-verification stdout/stderr capture
Why Vagrant + Parallels
You already have Parallels Desktop. vagrant-parallels gives a
scriptable per-VM config + a curated public box library + idempotent
vagrant up/provision/reload/suspend lifecycle. The Vagrantfile is
parameterized via env vars so a single file drives every target.
Alternative providers (Lima, Multipass) would also work; Vagrant was chosen for ergonomic continuity with the existing Parallels install.