leviathan
1552a3bfcb
- core/kernel_range.{c,h}: branch-aware patched-version comparison.
Every future module needs 'is the host kernel in the affected
range?'; centralized here. Models stable-branch backports
(e.g. 5.10.102, 5.15.25) so a 5.15.20 host correctly reports
VULNERABLE while a 5.15.50 host reports OK.
- modules/dirty_pipe_cve_2022_0847/ (promoted out of _stubs):
- iamroot_modules.{c,h}: dirty_pipe module exposing detect() that
parses /proc/version and compares against the four known patched
branches (5.10.102, 5.15.25, 5.16.11, 5.17+ inherited). Returns
IAMROOT_OK / IAMROOT_VULNERABLE / IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR with stderr
hints in human-readable scan mode.
- exploit() returns IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL with a 'not yet
implemented' message; landing the actual exploit needs Phase 1.5
extraction of passwd/su helpers into core/.
- detect/auditd.rules: splice() syscall + passwd/shadow file watches
- detect/sigma.yml: non-root modification of /etc/passwd|shadow|sudoers
- iamroot.c main() calls iamroot_register_dirty_pipe() alongside
the copy_fail_family registration.
- Makefile gains the dirty_pipe family as a separate object set.
Verified end-to-end on kctf-mgr (kernel 6.12.86): build clean, 6
modules in --list, --scan correctly reports dirty_pipe as patched,
JSON output ingest-ready.
27 lines
1.2 KiB
Plaintext
27 lines
1.2 KiB
Plaintext
# Dirty Pipe (CVE-2022-0847) — auditd detection rules
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#
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# Detects the Dirty Pipe primitive pattern: a process splice()s a file
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# into a pipe, then write()s to that pipe. The kernel bug allows the
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# write to land in the page cache of the original file.
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#
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# False-positive surface: legitimate splice-then-write is rare in
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# userspace; most uses of splice are file-to-file (e.g. cp via sendfile).
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# Tuning may be needed in environments using nginx/HAProxy/etc.
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#
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# Drop these into /etc/audit/rules.d/ and reload auditd.
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# Watch /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, /etc/sudoers, /etc/sudoers.d/* for
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# any modification by non-root — the Dirty Pipe payload typically
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# overwrites these to gain root.
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-w /etc/passwd -p wa -k iamroot-dirty-pipe
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-w /etc/shadow -p wa -k iamroot-dirty-pipe
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-w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k iamroot-dirty-pipe
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-w /etc/sudoers.d -p wa -k iamroot-dirty-pipe
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# Watch every splice() syscall — combined with the file watches above
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# this catches the canonical exploit shape. (High volume on servers
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# using nginx/HAProxy; consider scoping with -F gid!=33 -F gid!=99 to
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# exclude web servers.)
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-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S splice -k iamroot-dirty-pipe-splice
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-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S splice -k iamroot-dirty-pipe-splice
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