Closes the gap between 'detect() compiles and passes unit tests' and
'exploit() actually works on a real vulnerable kernel'. One-time
setup + one command per module to verify against a known-vulnerable
guest, with results emitted as JSON verification records.
Files:
setup.sh — one-shot bootstrap. Installs Vagrant via brew if
missing, installs vagrant-parallels plugin, pre-
downloads 5 base boxes (~5 GB):
generic/ubuntu1804 (4.15.0)
generic/ubuntu2004 (5.4.0 + HWE)
generic/ubuntu2204 (5.15.0 + HWE)
generic/debian11 (5.10.0)
generic/debian12 (6.1.0)
Idempotent; can pass --boxes subset.
Vagrantfile — single parameterized config driven by SKK_VM_*
env vars. Provisioners: build-deps install,
kernel pin (apt + snapshot.debian.org fallback),
build-and-verify (kept run='never' so verify.sh
invokes explicitly after reboot if pin'd).
targets.yaml — module → (box, kernel_pkg, kernel_version,
expect_detect, notes) mapping for all 26 modules.
3 marked manual: true (vmwgfx needs VMware guest;
dirtydecrypt + fragnesia need Linux 7.0 not yet
shipping as distro kernel).
verify.sh — entrypoint. 'verify.sh <module>' provisions if
needed, pins kernel + reboots if needed, runs
'skeletonkey --explain --active' inside the VM,
parses VERDICT, compares to expect_detect, emits
JSON verification record. --list shows the full
target matrix. --keep / --destroy lifecycle flags.
README.md — workflow + extending the targets table.
Design notes:
- Pure bash + awk targets.yaml parsing — no PyYAML dep (macOS Python
is PEP-668 'externally managed' and refuses pip --user installs).
- Sources of vulnerable kernel packages: stock distro kernels where
they're below the fix backport, otherwise pinned via apt with
snapshot.debian.org as last-resort fallback (the Debian apt
snapshot archive is the canonical source for historical kernel .deb
packages).
- Repo mounted at /vagrant via rsync (not 9p — vagrant-parallels'
9p is finicky on macOS Sequoia per the plugin issue tracker).
- VM lifecycle defaults to suspend-after-verify so the next run
resumes in ~5s instead of cold-booting.
- kernel pin reboots are handled by checking 'uname -r' after the
pin provisioner and triggering 'vagrant reload' if mismatched.
Verification records (JSON on stdout per run) are intended to feed a
per-module verified_on[] table in a follow-up commit — that's the
'permanent trust artifact' angle from the earlier roadmap discussion.
Smoke tests (no VM actually spun up):
- 'verify.sh --list': renders the 26-module matrix correctly.
- 'verify.sh nf_tables': dispatches to generic/ubuntu2204 + kernel
5.15.0-43 + expect=VULNERABLE; fails cleanly at 'vagrant: command
not found' (expected — user runs setup.sh first).
- 'verify.sh vmwgfx': errors with 'is marked manual: true' + note.
.gitignore: tools/verify-vm/{logs,.vagrant}/ excluded.
Usage:
./tools/verify-vm/setup.sh # one time, ~5 min
./tools/verify-vm/verify.sh nf_tables # ~5 min first run, ~1 min after
./tools/verify-vm/verify.sh --list # show all targets
4.5 KiB
SKELETONKEY VM verification
Auto-provisions a Parallels Desktop VM with a known-vulnerable kernel,
runs skeletonkey --explain <module> --active inside it, and emits a
verification record. Closes the loop between "detect() compiles & passes
unit tests" and "exploit() actually works on a real vulnerable kernel."
One-time setup
./tools/verify-vm/setup.sh
That installs (if missing): Vagrant via Homebrew, the vagrant-parallels
plugin, and pre-downloads ~5 GB of base boxes (Ubuntu 18.04/20.04/22.04
- Debian 11/12). Idempotent — re-run any time.
To skip boxes you don't need (save disk):
./tools/verify-vm/setup.sh ubuntu2004 debian11 # only those two
Verify a single module
./tools/verify-vm/verify.sh nf_tables
What that does:
- Reads
tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml: findsnf_tables→ boxgeneric/ubuntu2204+ kernel pinlinux-image-5.15.0-43-generic. vagrant up skk-nf_tables(provisions on first call, resumes on subsequent).- Installs the pinned vulnerable kernel via
apt, reboots. - Mounts the local repo at
/vagrant, runsmake, then runsskeletonkey --explain nf_tables --active. - Parses the
VERDICT:line, compares againstexpect_detectfrom targets.yaml, emits a JSON verification record on stdout. - Suspends the VM (
vagrant suspend) — instant resume next run.
Lifecycle flags:
./tools/verify-vm/verify.sh nf_tables --keep # leave VM running; ssh in to inspect
./tools/verify-vm/verify.sh nf_tables --destroy # full teardown after run
List every target
./tools/verify-vm/verify.sh --list
Shows the (module, box, target kernel, expected verdict, notes) matrix
for all 26 modules. Three are flagged manual: true because no
public Vagrant box covers them:
vmwgfx— only reachable on VMware guests; needs a vSphere/Fusion VM not Parallels.dirtydecrypt,fragnesia— only present in Linux 7.0+ which isn't shipping as a distro kernel yet.
For those, verification needs a hand-built or special-distro VM.
Verification records
verify.sh emits JSON on stdout after each run. Example:
{
"module": "nf_tables",
"verified_at": "2026-05-23T17:42:11Z",
"host_kernel": "5.15.0-43-generic",
"host_distro": "Ubuntu 22.04.5 LTS",
"vm_box": "generic/ubuntu2204",
"expect_detect": "VULNERABLE",
"actual_detect": "VULNERABLE",
"status": "match",
"log": "tools/verify-vm/logs/verify-nf_tables-20260523-174211.log"
}
status: match means detect() returned what we expected on a known-
vulnerable kernel. Anything else (MISMATCH, status code != 0) means
either:
- The kernel pin didn't take (check
host_kernelagainstkernel_versionin targets.yaml). - The exploit's preconditions aren't met in the default Vagrant image (e.g. apparmor blocks unprivileged userns; need to adjust the Vagrantfile provisioner).
- The detect() logic is wrong for this kernel/distro combo (a real bug — fix it).
Records are intended to feed a per-module verified_on[] table (next
project step) so --list can show a ✓ verified <date> column.
How it routes module → box
Mapping lives in tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml. Each entry has:
box— whichboxes/template (e.g.ubuntu2204)kernel_pkg— apt package name to install if the stock kernel is patched (omit / empty if stock is already vulnerable)kernel_version— whatuname -rshould report after installexpect_detect—VULNERABLE|OK|PRECOND_FAILnotes— short rationale; comments in the file have the full context
Adding a new module is one block in targets.yaml. The verifier picks it up automatically.
Files
tools/verify-vm/
├── README.md this file
├── setup.sh one-time bootstrap (Vagrant, plugin, box cache)
├── verify.sh per-module verifier
├── Vagrantfile parameterized VM config (driven by SKK_VM_* env vars)
├── targets.yaml module → box mapping with rationale
└── logs/ per-verification stdout/stderr capture
Why Vagrant + Parallels
You already have Parallels Desktop. vagrant-parallels gives a
scriptable per-VM config + a curated public box library + idempotent
vagrant up/provision/reload/suspend lifecycle. The Vagrantfile is
parameterized via env vars so a single file drives every target.
Alternative providers (Lima, Multipass) would also work; Vagrant was chosen for ergonomic continuity with the existing Parallels install.