leviathan
7387ffd3bd
Two more for 'THE tool' coverage breadth. stackrot CVE-2023-3269 (Ruihan Li, Jul 2023): - maple-tree VMA-split UAF — kernel R/W via use-after-RCU - **Different bug class than the netfilter-heavy 2022-2024 modules** (mm-class, broadens corpus shape) - kernel_range: 6.1 ≤ K < 6.4-rc4, backports: 6.1.37 / 6.3.10 / mainline 6.4 - Pre-6.1 immune (no maple tree); 6.5+ patched - Affects 6.1 LTS still widely deployed - ~1000-line public PoC deferred for port af_packet2 CVE-2020-14386 (Or Cohen, Sep 2020): - AF_PACKET tpacket_rcv VLAN integer underflow → heap OOB - Sibling of CVE-2017-7308; same subsystem, different code path - kernel_range: 4.6 ≤ K, backports across 4.9 / 4.14 / 4.19 / 5.4 / 5.7 / 5.8 - Family-shared 'iamroot-af-packet' audit key (one ausearch covers both CVEs from one rule deployment) Era coverage now (1 gap year remaining: 2018): 2016: dirty_cow 🟢 2017: af_packet 🔵 2019: ptrace_traceme 🟢 2020: af_packet2 🔵 2021: pwnkit, overlayfs, netfilter_xtcompat 🟢/🟢/🔵 2022: dirty_pipe, cls_route4, fuse_legacy 🟢/🔵/🔵 2023: entrybleed, stackrot 🟢/🔵 2024: nf_tables 🔵 2026: copy_fail family (×5) 🟢 18 modules total. Build clean. Scan on Debian 6.12.86: 13 OK / 5 VULN.
682 lines
27 KiB
C
682 lines
27 KiB
C
/*
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* IAMROOT — top-level dispatcher
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*
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* Usage:
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* iamroot --scan # run every module's detect()
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* iamroot --scan --json # machine-readable output
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* iamroot --scan --active # invasive probes (still no /etc/passwd writes)
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* iamroot --list # list registered modules
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* iamroot --exploit <name> --i-know # run a named module's exploit
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* iamroot --mitigate <name> # apply a temporary mitigation
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* iamroot --cleanup <name> # undo --exploit or --mitigate side effects
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*
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* Phase 1 scope: thin dispatcher over the copy_fail_family bridge.
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* Future phases add: --detect-rules export, multi-family registry,
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* fingerprint pre-pass, etc.
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*/
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#include "core/module.h"
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#include "core/registry.h"
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#include <getopt.h>
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#include <stdbool.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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#define IAMROOT_VERSION "0.1.0-phase1"
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static const char BANNER[] =
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"\n"
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" ██╗ █████╗ ███╗ ███╗██████╗ ██████╗ ██████╗ ████████╗\n"
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" ██║██╔══██╗████╗ ████║██╔══██╗██╔═══██╗██╔═══██╗╚══██╔══╝\n"
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" ██║███████║██╔████╔██║██████╔╝██║ ██║██║ ██║ ██║ \n"
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" ██║██╔══██║██║╚██╔╝██║██╔══██╗██║ ██║██║ ██║ ██║ \n"
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" ██║██║ ██║██║ ╚═╝ ██║██║ ██║╚██████╔╝╚██████╔╝ ██║ \n"
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" ╚═╝╚═╝ ╚═╝╚═╝ ╚═╝╚═╝ ╚═╝ ╚═════╝ ╚═════╝ ╚═╝ \n"
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" Curated Linux kernel LPE corpus — v" IAMROOT_VERSION "\n"
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" AUTHORIZED TESTING ONLY — see docs/ETHICS.md\n";
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static void usage(const char *prog)
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{
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fprintf(stderr,
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"Usage: %s [MODE] [OPTIONS]\n"
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"\n"
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"Modes (default: --scan):\n"
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" --scan run every module's detect() across the host\n"
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" --list list registered modules and exit\n"
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" --exploit <name> run named module's exploit (REQUIRES --i-know)\n"
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" --mitigate <name> apply named module's mitigation\n"
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" --cleanup <name> undo named module's exploit/mitigate side effects\n"
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" --detect-rules dump detection rules for every module\n"
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" (combine with --format=auditd|sigma|yara|falco)\n"
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" --module-info <name> full metadata + rule bodies for one module\n"
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" (combine with --json for machine-readable output)\n"
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" --audit system-hygiene scan: setuid binaries, world-writable\n"
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" files in /etc, file capabilities, sudo NOPASSWD\n"
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" (complements --scan; answers 'is this box\n"
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" generally privesc-exposed?')\n"
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" --version print version\n"
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" --help this message\n"
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"\n"
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"Options:\n"
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" --i-know authorization gate for --exploit modes\n"
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" --active in --scan, do invasive sentinel probes (no /etc/passwd writes)\n"
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" --no-shell in --exploit modes, prepare but don't drop to shell\n"
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" --json machine-readable output (for SIEM/CI)\n"
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" --no-color disable ANSI color codes\n"
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" --format <f> with --detect-rules: auditd (default), sigma, yara, falco\n"
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"\n"
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"Exit codes:\n"
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" 0 not vulnerable / OK 2 vulnerable 5 exploit succeeded\n"
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" 1 test error 3 exploit failed 4 preconditions missing\n",
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prog);
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}
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enum mode {
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MODE_SCAN,
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MODE_LIST,
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MODE_EXPLOIT,
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MODE_MITIGATE,
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MODE_CLEANUP,
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MODE_DETECT_RULES,
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MODE_MODULE_INFO,
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MODE_AUDIT,
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MODE_HELP,
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MODE_VERSION,
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};
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enum detect_format {
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FMT_AUDITD,
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FMT_SIGMA,
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FMT_YARA,
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FMT_FALCO,
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};
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static const char *result_str(iamroot_result_t r)
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{
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switch (r) {
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case IAMROOT_OK: return "OK";
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case IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR: return "ERROR";
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case IAMROOT_VULNERABLE: return "VULNERABLE";
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case IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL: return "EXPLOIT_FAIL";
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case IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL: return "PRECOND_FAIL";
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case IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_OK: return "EXPLOIT_OK";
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}
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return "?";
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}
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/* JSON-escape a string for inclusion in stdout output. Quick + safe:
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* escapes \" and \\ and newlines; passes through ASCII printable.
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* Caller must call json_escape_done() to free the result. */
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static char *json_escape(const char *s)
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{
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if (s == NULL) return NULL;
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size_t n = strlen(s);
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char *out = malloc(n * 2 + 1); /* worst case: every char doubles */
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if (!out) return NULL;
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char *p = out;
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for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
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unsigned char c = (unsigned char)s[i];
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if (c == '"' || c == '\\') { *p++ = '\\'; *p++ = c; }
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else if (c == '\n') { *p++ = '\\'; *p++ = 'n'; }
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else if (c == '\r') { *p++ = '\\'; *p++ = 'r'; }
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else if (c == '\t') { *p++ = '\\'; *p++ = 't'; }
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else if (c < 0x20) { /* skip — should be rare in our strings */ }
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else *p++ = c;
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}
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*p = 0;
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return out;
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}
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static void emit_module_json(const struct iamroot_module *m, bool include_rules)
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{
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char *name = json_escape(m->name);
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char *cve = json_escape(m->cve);
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char *summary = json_escape(m->summary);
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char *family = json_escape(m->family);
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char *krange = json_escape(m->kernel_range);
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fprintf(stdout,
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"{\"name\":\"%s\",\"cve\":\"%s\",\"family\":\"%s\","
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"\"kernel_range\":\"%s\",\"summary\":\"%s\","
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"\"has\":{\"detect\":%s,\"exploit\":%s,\"mitigate\":%s,\"cleanup\":%s,"
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"\"auditd\":%s,\"sigma\":%s,\"yara\":%s,\"falco\":%s}",
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name ? name : "",
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cve ? cve : "",
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family ? family : "",
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krange ? krange : "",
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summary ? summary : "",
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m->detect ? "true" : "false",
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m->exploit ? "true" : "false",
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m->mitigate ? "true" : "false",
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m->cleanup ? "true" : "false",
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m->detect_auditd ? "true" : "false",
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m->detect_sigma ? "true" : "false",
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m->detect_yara ? "true" : "false",
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m->detect_falco ? "true" : "false");
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if (include_rules) {
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/* Embed the actual rule text. Useful for --module-info. */
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char *aud = json_escape(m->detect_auditd);
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char *sig = json_escape(m->detect_sigma);
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char *yar = json_escape(m->detect_yara);
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char *fal = json_escape(m->detect_falco);
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fprintf(stdout,
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",\"detect_rules\":{\"auditd\":%s%s%s,\"sigma\":%s%s%s,"
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"\"yara\":%s%s%s,\"falco\":%s%s%s}",
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aud ? "\"" : "", aud ? aud : "null", aud ? "\"" : "",
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sig ? "\"" : "", sig ? sig : "null", sig ? "\"" : "",
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yar ? "\"" : "", yar ? yar : "null", yar ? "\"" : "",
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fal ? "\"" : "", fal ? fal : "null", fal ? "\"" : "");
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free(aud); free(sig); free(yar); free(fal);
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}
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fprintf(stdout, "}");
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free(name); free(cve); free(summary); free(family); free(krange);
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}
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static int cmd_list(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
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{
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size_t n = iamroot_module_count();
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if (ctx->json) {
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fprintf(stdout, "{\"version\":\"%s\",\"modules\":[", IAMROOT_VERSION);
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for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
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if (i) fputc(',', stdout);
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emit_module_json(iamroot_module_at(i), false);
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}
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fprintf(stdout, "]}\n");
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return 0;
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}
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fprintf(stdout, "%-20s %-18s %-25s %s\n",
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"NAME", "CVE", "FAMILY", "SUMMARY");
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fprintf(stdout, "%-20s %-18s %-25s %s\n",
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"----", "---", "------", "-------");
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for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
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const struct iamroot_module *m = iamroot_module_at(i);
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fprintf(stdout, "%-20s %-18s %-25s %s\n",
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m->name, m->cve, m->family, m->summary);
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/* --audit: system-hygiene scan beyond per-CVE detect. Inventories
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* setuid binaries, world-writable system files, capability-bound
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* non-standard binaries, NOPASSWD sudo entries. Complements --scan;
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* answers "is this box generally exposed to privesc?" beyond
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* "does it have any of the known kernel CVEs?".
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*
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* Output is structured findings. --json switches to a single JSON
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* object with arrays per category. Side-effect-free: read-only
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* filesystem walks. */
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struct finding {
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const char *category; /* "setuid", "world_writable", "capability", "sudo" */
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char path[512];
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char note[256];
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};
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static void print_finding_human(const struct finding *f)
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{
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fprintf(stdout, "[%-15s] %-50s %s\n",
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f->category, f->path, f->note);
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}
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/* Walk one filesystem path looking for setuid-root binaries. Bounded
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* via find(1) for portability (every distro ships find). */
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static int audit_setuid(int *count_out, bool json,
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bool *first_json_emitted)
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{
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/* Use popen() on `find` rather than recursive opendir() — much
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* simpler, every distro ships find. Limit to common
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* binary-bearing dirs to keep runtime reasonable. */
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static const char *cmd =
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"find /usr/bin /usr/sbin /bin /sbin /usr/local/bin /usr/local/sbin "
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"-xdev -perm -4000 -type f 2>/dev/null";
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FILE *p = popen(cmd, "r");
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if (!p) return -1;
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char line[1024];
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int n = 0;
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/* Set of suspicious binaries — these are notable in the LPE world.
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* The full setuid inventory is informational; this list flags
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* specific items as "review this". */
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static const struct { const char *path; const char *note; } SUSP[] = {
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{"/usr/bin/pkexec", "Pwnkit CVE-2021-4034 history; tightly audit polkit policy"},
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{"/usr/bin/mount.cifs", "historically setuid-root; check distro hardening"},
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{"/usr/bin/fusermount3", "historically setuid; userns-related LPE history"},
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{"/usr/bin/passwd", "expected setuid; verify integrity"},
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{"/usr/bin/sudo", "expected setuid; verify integrity + sudoers"},
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{"/usr/bin/su", "expected setuid; verify integrity"},
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{"/usr/lib/snapd/snap-confine", "Ubuntu snap sandbox-escape history"},
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{NULL, NULL},
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};
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while (fgets(line, sizeof line, p)) {
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size_t L = strlen(line);
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while (L && (line[L-1] == '\n' || line[L-1] == '\r')) line[--L] = 0;
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const char *note = "setuid binary — review";
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for (size_t i = 0; SUSP[i].path; i++) {
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if (strcmp(line, SUSP[i].path) == 0) { note = SUSP[i].note; break; }
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}
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if (json) {
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char *p_esc = json_escape(line);
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char *n_esc = json_escape(note);
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fprintf(stdout, "%s{\"category\":\"setuid\",\"path\":\"%s\",\"note\":\"%s\"}",
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*first_json_emitted ? "," : "",
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p_esc ? p_esc : "", n_esc ? n_esc : "");
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*first_json_emitted = true;
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free(p_esc); free(n_esc);
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} else {
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struct finding f = { .category = "setuid" };
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snprintf(f.path, sizeof f.path, "%s", line);
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snprintf(f.note, sizeof f.note, "%s", note);
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print_finding_human(&f);
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}
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n++;
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}
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pclose(p);
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if (count_out) *count_out = n;
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return 0;
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}
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/* Look for world-writable files inside /etc. Catches obviously-broken
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* filesystem permissions where any user can edit system config. */
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static int audit_world_writable(int *count_out, bool json,
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bool *first_json_emitted)
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{
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static const char *cmd =
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"find /etc -xdev -perm -0002 -type f 2>/dev/null";
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FILE *p = popen(cmd, "r");
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if (!p) return -1;
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char line[1024];
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int n = 0;
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while (fgets(line, sizeof line, p)) {
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size_t L = strlen(line);
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while (L && (line[L-1] == '\n' || line[L-1] == '\r')) line[--L] = 0;
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const char *note = "world-writable in /etc — anyone can edit";
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if (json) {
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char *p_esc = json_escape(line);
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fprintf(stdout, "%s{\"category\":\"world_writable\",\"path\":\"%s\",\"note\":\"%s\"}",
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*first_json_emitted ? "," : "", p_esc ? p_esc : "", note);
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*first_json_emitted = true;
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free(p_esc);
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} else {
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struct finding f = { .category = "world_writable" };
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snprintf(f.path, sizeof f.path, "%s", line);
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snprintf(f.note, sizeof f.note, "%s", note);
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print_finding_human(&f);
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}
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n++;
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}
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pclose(p);
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if (count_out) *count_out = n;
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return 0;
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}
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/* Find files with file capabilities set. cap_setuid+ep or
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* cap_dac_override+ep on a non-standard binary = potential
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* post-exploit persistence or a misconfigured capability grant. */
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static int audit_capabilities(int *count_out, bool json,
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bool *first_json_emitted)
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{
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/* getcap is in libcap2-bin / libcap-progs depending on distro;
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* skip cleanly if absent. */
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if (access("/sbin/getcap", X_OK) != 0
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&& access("/usr/sbin/getcap", X_OK) != 0
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&& access("/usr/bin/getcap", X_OK) != 0) {
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if (!json) {
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fprintf(stderr, "[i] audit: getcap not installed — skipping capability scan\n");
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}
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if (count_out) *count_out = 0;
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return 0;
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}
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static const char *cmd =
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"getcap -r /usr/bin /usr/sbin /bin /sbin /usr/local 2>/dev/null";
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FILE *p = popen(cmd, "r");
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if (!p) return -1;
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char line[1024];
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int n = 0;
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while (fgets(line, sizeof line, p)) {
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size_t L = strlen(line);
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while (L && (line[L-1] == '\n' || line[L-1] == '\r')) line[--L] = 0;
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const char *note = "file capability set — verify legitimacy";
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if (strstr(line, "cap_setuid+ep") || strstr(line, "cap_setgid+ep")
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|| strstr(line, "cap_dac_override+ep") || strstr(line, "cap_sys_admin+ep")) {
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note = "high-power cap+ep — privesc-equivalent if attacker-writable";
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}
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if (json) {
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char *p_esc = json_escape(line);
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fprintf(stdout, "%s{\"category\":\"capability\",\"path\":\"%s\",\"note\":\"%s\"}",
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*first_json_emitted ? "," : "", p_esc ? p_esc : "", note);
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*first_json_emitted = true;
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free(p_esc);
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} else {
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struct finding f = { .category = "capability" };
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snprintf(f.path, sizeof f.path, "%s", line);
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snprintf(f.note, sizeof f.note, "%s", note);
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print_finding_human(&f);
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}
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n++;
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}
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pclose(p);
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if (count_out) *count_out = n;
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return 0;
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}
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/* Check /etc/sudoers and /etc/sudoers.d for NOPASSWD entries. Many
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* setups have legit NOPASSWD for service accounts; flag and let
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* operator review. */
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static int audit_sudo_nopasswd(int *count_out, bool json,
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bool *first_json_emitted)
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{
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static const char *cmd =
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"grep -rIn -E '^[^#].*NOPASSWD' /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d 2>/dev/null";
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FILE *p = popen(cmd, "r");
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if (!p) return -1;
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char line[1024];
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int n = 0;
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while (fgets(line, sizeof line, p)) {
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size_t L = strlen(line);
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while (L && (line[L-1] == '\n' || line[L-1] == '\r')) line[--L] = 0;
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const char *note = "sudo NOPASSWD entry — verify scope";
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if (json) {
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char *p_esc = json_escape(line);
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fprintf(stdout, "%s{\"category\":\"sudo\",\"path\":\"%s\",\"note\":\"%s\"}",
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*first_json_emitted ? "," : "", p_esc ? p_esc : "", note);
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*first_json_emitted = true;
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free(p_esc);
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} else {
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struct finding f = { .category = "sudo" };
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snprintf(f.path, sizeof f.path, "%s", line);
|
|
snprintf(f.note, sizeof f.note, "%s", note);
|
|
print_finding_human(&f);
|
|
}
|
|
n++;
|
|
}
|
|
pclose(p);
|
|
if (count_out) *count_out = n;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int cmd_audit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
int n_setuid = 0, n_ww = 0, n_cap = 0, n_sudo = 0;
|
|
if (ctx->json) {
|
|
fprintf(stdout, "{\"version\":\"%s\",\"audit\":[", IAMROOT_VERSION);
|
|
bool first = false;
|
|
audit_setuid(&n_setuid, true, &first);
|
|
audit_world_writable(&n_ww, true, &first);
|
|
audit_capabilities(&n_cap, true, &first);
|
|
audit_sudo_nopasswd(&n_sudo, true, &first);
|
|
fprintf(stdout, "],\"summary\":{\"setuid\":%d,\"world_writable\":%d,"
|
|
"\"capability\":%d,\"sudo_nopasswd\":%d}}\n",
|
|
n_setuid, n_ww, n_cap, n_sudo);
|
|
} else {
|
|
fprintf(stdout, "%-17s %-50s %s\n", "CATEGORY", "PATH", "NOTE");
|
|
fprintf(stdout, "%-17s %-50s %s\n", "--------", "----", "----");
|
|
bool first = false;
|
|
audit_setuid(&n_setuid, false, &first);
|
|
audit_world_writable(&n_ww, false, &first);
|
|
audit_capabilities(&n_cap, false, &first);
|
|
audit_sudo_nopasswd(&n_sudo, false, &first);
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "\n[*] audit summary: %d setuid, %d world-writable, "
|
|
"%d capability-set, %d sudo NOPASSWD\n",
|
|
n_setuid, n_ww, n_cap, n_sudo);
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* --module-info <name>: dump everything we know about one module.
|
|
* Human-readable by default, JSON with --json. Includes the full
|
|
* detection-rule text bodies for that module. */
|
|
static int cmd_module_info(const char *name, const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
const struct iamroot_module *m = iamroot_module_find(name);
|
|
if (!m) {
|
|
if (ctx->json) {
|
|
fprintf(stdout, "{\"error\":\"module not found\",\"name\":\"%s\"}\n", name);
|
|
} else {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "[-] no module '%s'. Try --list.\n", name);
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ctx->json) {
|
|
emit_module_json(m, true);
|
|
fputc('\n', stdout);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
fprintf(stdout, "name: %s\n", m->name);
|
|
fprintf(stdout, "cve: %s\n", m->cve);
|
|
fprintf(stdout, "family: %s\n", m->family);
|
|
fprintf(stdout, "kernel_range: %s\n", m->kernel_range);
|
|
fprintf(stdout, "summary: %s\n", m->summary);
|
|
fprintf(stdout, "operations: %s%s%s%s\n",
|
|
m->detect ? "detect " : "",
|
|
m->exploit ? "exploit " : "",
|
|
m->mitigate ? "mitigate " : "",
|
|
m->cleanup ? "cleanup " : "");
|
|
fprintf(stdout, "detect rules: %s%s%s%s\n",
|
|
m->detect_auditd ? "auditd " : "",
|
|
m->detect_sigma ? "sigma " : "",
|
|
m->detect_yara ? "yara " : "",
|
|
m->detect_falco ? "falco " : "");
|
|
if (m->detect_auditd) {
|
|
fprintf(stdout, "\n--- auditd rules ---\n%s", m->detect_auditd);
|
|
}
|
|
if (m->detect_sigma) {
|
|
fprintf(stdout, "\n--- sigma rule ---\n%s", m->detect_sigma);
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int cmd_scan(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
int worst = 0;
|
|
size_t n = iamroot_module_count();
|
|
if (!ctx->json) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "[*] iamroot scan: %zu module(s) registered\n", n);
|
|
} else {
|
|
fprintf(stdout, "{\"version\":\"%s\",\"modules\":[", IAMROOT_VERSION);
|
|
}
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
|
|
const struct iamroot_module *m = iamroot_module_at(i);
|
|
if (m->detect == NULL) continue;
|
|
iamroot_result_t r = m->detect(ctx);
|
|
if (ctx->json) {
|
|
fprintf(stdout, "%s{\"name\":\"%s\",\"cve\":\"%s\",\"result\":\"%s\"}",
|
|
(i == 0 ? "" : ","), m->name, m->cve, result_str(r));
|
|
} else {
|
|
fprintf(stdout, "[%s] %-20s %-18s %s\n",
|
|
result_str(r), m->name, m->cve, m->summary);
|
|
}
|
|
/* track worst (highest) result code as overall exit */
|
|
if ((int)r > worst) worst = (int)r;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ctx->json) {
|
|
fprintf(stdout, "]}\n");
|
|
}
|
|
return worst;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Dump detection rules for every registered module in the requested
|
|
* format. Modules that don't ship a rule for that format are simply
|
|
* skipped (no error). Output goes to stdout so it can be redirected
|
|
* straight into /etc/audit/rules.d/, the SIEM, etc. */
|
|
static int cmd_detect_rules(enum detect_format fmt)
|
|
{
|
|
static const char *fmt_names[] = {
|
|
[FMT_AUDITD] = "auditd",
|
|
[FMT_SIGMA] = "sigma",
|
|
[FMT_YARA] = "yara",
|
|
[FMT_FALCO] = "falco",
|
|
};
|
|
size_t n = iamroot_module_count();
|
|
fprintf(stdout, "# IAMROOT detection rules — format: %s\n", fmt_names[fmt]);
|
|
fprintf(stdout, "# Generated from %zu registered modules\n", n);
|
|
fprintf(stdout, "# AUTHORIZED-TESTING tool; see docs/ETHICS.md\n\n");
|
|
/* Dedup by pointer: family-shared rule strings (e.g. all 5
|
|
* copy_fail_family modules share one auditd rule string) would
|
|
* otherwise emit identical blocks once per module. */
|
|
const char *seen[64] = {0};
|
|
size_t n_seen = 0;
|
|
int emitted = 0;
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
|
|
const struct iamroot_module *m = iamroot_module_at(i);
|
|
const char *rules = NULL;
|
|
switch (fmt) {
|
|
case FMT_AUDITD: rules = m->detect_auditd; break;
|
|
case FMT_SIGMA: rules = m->detect_sigma; break;
|
|
case FMT_YARA: rules = m->detect_yara; break;
|
|
case FMT_FALCO: rules = m->detect_falco; break;
|
|
}
|
|
if (rules == NULL) continue;
|
|
/* Already emitted? */
|
|
bool dup = false;
|
|
for (size_t k = 0; k < n_seen; k++) {
|
|
if (seen[k] == rules) { dup = true; break; }
|
|
}
|
|
if (dup) {
|
|
fprintf(stdout, "# === %s (%s) — see family rules above ===\n\n",
|
|
m->name, m->cve);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
if (n_seen < sizeof(seen)/sizeof(seen[0])) seen[n_seen++] = rules;
|
|
fprintf(stdout, "# === %s (%s) ===\n", m->name, m->cve);
|
|
fputs(rules, stdout);
|
|
fputc('\n', stdout);
|
|
emitted++;
|
|
}
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "[*] emitted detection rules for %d / %zu module(s) (format: %s)\n",
|
|
emitted, n, fmt_names[fmt]);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int cmd_one(const struct iamroot_module *m, const char *op,
|
|
const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
iamroot_result_t (*fn)(const struct iamroot_ctx *) = NULL;
|
|
if (strcmp(op, "exploit") == 0) fn = m->exploit;
|
|
else if (strcmp(op, "mitigate") == 0) fn = m->mitigate;
|
|
else if (strcmp(op, "cleanup") == 0) fn = m->cleanup;
|
|
|
|
if (fn == NULL) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "[-] module '%s' has no %s operation\n", m->name, op);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
iamroot_result_t r = fn(ctx);
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "[*] %s --%s result: %s\n", m->name, op, result_str(r));
|
|
return (int)r;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int main(int argc, char **argv)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Bring up the module registry. As new families land, add their
|
|
* register_* call here. */
|
|
iamroot_register_copy_fail_family();
|
|
iamroot_register_dirty_pipe();
|
|
iamroot_register_entrybleed();
|
|
iamroot_register_pwnkit();
|
|
iamroot_register_nf_tables();
|
|
iamroot_register_overlayfs();
|
|
iamroot_register_cls_route4();
|
|
iamroot_register_dirty_cow();
|
|
iamroot_register_ptrace_traceme();
|
|
iamroot_register_netfilter_xtcompat();
|
|
iamroot_register_af_packet();
|
|
iamroot_register_fuse_legacy();
|
|
iamroot_register_stackrot();
|
|
iamroot_register_af_packet2();
|
|
|
|
enum mode mode = MODE_SCAN;
|
|
struct iamroot_ctx ctx = {0};
|
|
const char *target = NULL;
|
|
int i_know = 0;
|
|
|
|
enum detect_format dr_fmt = FMT_AUDITD;
|
|
static struct option longopts[] = {
|
|
{"scan", no_argument, 0, 'S'},
|
|
{"list", no_argument, 0, 'L'},
|
|
{"exploit", required_argument, 0, 'E'},
|
|
{"mitigate", required_argument, 0, 'M'},
|
|
{"cleanup", required_argument, 0, 'C'},
|
|
{"detect-rules", no_argument, 0, 'D'},
|
|
{"module-info", required_argument, 0, 'I'},
|
|
{"audit", no_argument, 0, 'A'},
|
|
{"format", required_argument, 0, 6 },
|
|
{"i-know", no_argument, 0, 1 },
|
|
{"active", no_argument, 0, 2 },
|
|
{"no-shell", no_argument, 0, 3 },
|
|
{"json", no_argument, 0, 4 },
|
|
{"no-color", no_argument, 0, 5 },
|
|
{"version", no_argument, 0, 'V'},
|
|
{"help", no_argument, 0, 'h'},
|
|
{0, 0, 0, 0}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
int c, opt_idx;
|
|
while ((c = getopt_long(argc, argv, "SLDAE:M:C:I:Vh", longopts, &opt_idx)) != -1) {
|
|
switch (c) {
|
|
case 'S': mode = MODE_SCAN; break;
|
|
case 'L': mode = MODE_LIST; break;
|
|
case 'D': mode = MODE_DETECT_RULES; break;
|
|
case 'A': mode = MODE_AUDIT; break;
|
|
case 'I': mode = MODE_MODULE_INFO; target = optarg; break;
|
|
case 'E': mode = MODE_EXPLOIT; target = optarg; break;
|
|
case 'M': mode = MODE_MITIGATE; target = optarg; break;
|
|
case 'C': mode = MODE_CLEANUP; target = optarg; break;
|
|
case 1 : i_know = 1; ctx.authorized = true; break;
|
|
case 2 : ctx.active_probe = true; break;
|
|
case 3 : ctx.no_shell = true; break;
|
|
case 4 : ctx.json = true; break;
|
|
case 5 : ctx.no_color = true; break;
|
|
case 6 :
|
|
if (strcmp(optarg, "auditd") == 0) dr_fmt = FMT_AUDITD;
|
|
else if (strcmp(optarg, "sigma") == 0) dr_fmt = FMT_SIGMA;
|
|
else if (strcmp(optarg, "yara") == 0) dr_fmt = FMT_YARA;
|
|
else if (strcmp(optarg, "falco") == 0) dr_fmt = FMT_FALCO;
|
|
else { fprintf(stderr, "[-] unknown --format: %s\n", optarg); return 1; }
|
|
break;
|
|
case 'V': printf("iamroot %s\n", IAMROOT_VERSION); return 0;
|
|
case 'h': mode = MODE_HELP; break;
|
|
default: usage(argv[0]); return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (mode == MODE_HELP) {
|
|
fputs(BANNER, stderr);
|
|
usage(argv[0]);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ctx.json) fputs(BANNER, stderr);
|
|
|
|
if (mode == MODE_SCAN) return cmd_scan(&ctx);
|
|
if (mode == MODE_LIST) return cmd_list(&ctx);
|
|
if (mode == MODE_MODULE_INFO) return cmd_module_info(target, &ctx);
|
|
if (mode == MODE_DETECT_RULES) return cmd_detect_rules(dr_fmt);
|
|
if (mode == MODE_AUDIT) return cmd_audit(&ctx);
|
|
|
|
/* --exploit / --mitigate / --cleanup all take a target */
|
|
if (target == NULL) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "[-] mode requires a module name\n");
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
const struct iamroot_module *m = iamroot_module_find(target);
|
|
if (m == NULL) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "[-] no module '%s'. Try --list.\n", target);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (mode == MODE_EXPLOIT) {
|
|
if (!i_know) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr,
|
|
"[-] --exploit requires --i-know. This will attempt to gain\n"
|
|
" root and corrupt /etc/passwd in the page cache.\n"
|
|
" Authorized testing only. See docs/ETHICS.md.\n");
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
return cmd_one(m, "exploit", &ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
if (mode == MODE_MITIGATE) return cmd_one(m, "mitigate", &ctx);
|
|
if (mode == MODE_CLEANUP) return cmd_one(m, "cleanup", &ctx);
|
|
|
|
usage(argv[0]);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|