Files
SKELETONKEY/tools/verify-vm
leviathan d84b3b0033 release v0.9.0: 5 gap-fillers — every year 2016 → 2026 now covered
Five new modules close the 2018 gap entirely and thicken
2019 / 2020 / 2024. All five carry the full 4-format detection-rule
corpus + opsec_notes + arch_support + register helpers.

CVE-2018-14634 — mutagen_astronomy (Qualys, closes 2018)
  create_elf_tables() int wrap → SUID-execve stack corruption.
  CISA KEV-listed Jan 2026 despite the bug's age; legacy RHEL 7 /
  CentOS 7 / Debian 8 fleets still affected. 🟡 PRIMITIVE.
  arch_support: x86_64+unverified-arm64.

CVE-2019-14287 — sudo_runas_neg1 (Joe Vennix)
  sudo -u#-1 → uid_t underflow → root despite (ALL,!root) blacklist.
  Pure userspace logic bug; the famous Apple Information Security
  finding. detect() looks for a (ALL,!root) grant in sudo -ln output;
  PRECOND_FAIL when no such grant exists for the invoking user.
  arch_support: any (4 -> 5 userspace 'any' modules).

CVE-2020-29661 — tioscpgrp (Jann Horn / Project Zero)
  TTY TIOCSPGRP ioctl race on PTY pairs → struct pid UAF in
  kmalloc-256. Affects everything through Linux 5.9.13. 🟡 PRIMITIVE
  (race-driver + msg_msg groom). Public PoCs from grsecurity /
  spender + Maxime Peterlin.

CVE-2024-50264 — vsock_uaf (a13xp0p0v / Pwnie Award 2025 winner)
  AF_VSOCK connect-race UAF in kmalloc-96. Pwn2Own 2024 + Pwnie
  2025 winner. Reachable as plain unprivileged user (no userns
  required — unusual). Two public exploit paths: @v4bel+@qwerty
  kernelCTF (BPF JIT spray + SLUBStick) and Alexander Popov / PT
  SWARM (msg_msg). 🟡 PRIMITIVE.

CVE-2024-26581 — nft_pipapo (Notselwyn II, 'Flipping Pages')
  nft_set_pipapo destroy-race UAF. Sibling to nf_tables
  (CVE-2024-1086) from the same Notselwyn paper. Distinct bug in
  the pipapo set substrate. Same family signature. 🟡 PRIMITIVE.

Plumbing changes:

  core/registry.h + registry_all.c — 5 new register declarations
    + calls.
  Makefile — 5 new MUT/SRN/TIO/VSK/PIP module groups in MODULE_OBJS.
  tests/test_detect.c — 7 new test rows covering the new modules
    (above-fix OK, predates-the-bug OK, sudo-no-grant PRECOND_FAIL).
  tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml — verifier entries for all 5 with
    honest 'expect_detect' values based on what Vagrant boxes can
    realistically reach (mutagen_astronomy gets OK on stock 18.04
    since 4.15.0-213 is post-fix; sudo_runas_neg1 gets PRECOND_FAIL
    because no (ALL,!root) grant on default vagrant user; tioscpgrp
    + nft_pipapo VULNERABLE with kernel pins; vsock_uaf flagged
    manual because vsock module rarely available on CI runners).
  tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py — added curl fallback for the CISA
    KEV CSV fetch (urlopen times out intermittently against CISA's
    HTTP/2 endpoint).

Corpus growth across v0.8.0 + v0.9.0:

                v0.7.1    v0.8.0    v0.9.0
  Modules          31        34        39
  Distinct CVEs    26        29        34
  KEV-listed       10        10        11 (mutagen_astronomy)
  arch 'any'        4         6         7 (sudo_runas_neg1)
  Years 2016-2026:  10/11     10/11     **11/11**

Year-by-year coverage:

  2016: 1   2017: 1   2018: 1   2019: 2   2020: 2
  2021: 5   2022: 5   2023: 8   2024: 3   2025: 2   2026: 4

CVE-2018 gap → CLOSED. Every year from 2016 through 2026 now has
at least one module.

Surfaces updated:
  - README.md: badge → 22 VM-verified / 34, Status section refreshed
  - docs/index.html: hero eyebrow + footer → v0.9.0, hero tagline
    'every year 2016 → 2026', stats chips → 39 / 22 / 11 / 151
  - docs/RELEASE_NOTES.md: v0.9.0 entry added on top with year
    coverage matrix + per-module breakdown; v0.8.0 + v0.7.1 entries
    preserved below
  - docs/og.svg + og.png: regenerated with new numbers + 'Every
    year 2016 → 2026' tagline

CVE metadata refresh (tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py) deferred to
follow-up — CISA KEV CSV + NVD CVE API were timing out during the
v0.9.0 push window. The 5 new CVEs will return NULL from
cve_metadata_lookup() until the refresh runs (—module-info simply
skips the WEAKNESS/THREAT INTEL header for them; no functional
impact). Re-run 'tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py' when network
cooperates.

Tests: macOS local 33/33 kernel_range pass; detect-test stubs (88
total) build clean; ASan/UBSan + clang-tidy CI jobs still green
from the v0.7.x setup.
2026-05-23 22:15:44 -04:00
..

SKELETONKEY VM verification

Auto-provisions a Parallels Desktop VM with a known-vulnerable kernel, runs skeletonkey --explain <module> --active inside it, and emits a verification record. Closes the loop between "detect() compiles & passes unit tests" and "exploit() actually works on a real vulnerable kernel."

One-time setup

./tools/verify-vm/setup.sh

That installs (if missing): Vagrant via Homebrew, the vagrant-parallels plugin, and pre-downloads ~5 GB of base boxes (Ubuntu 18.04/20.04/22.04

  • Debian 11/12). Idempotent — re-run any time.

To skip boxes you don't need (save disk):

./tools/verify-vm/setup.sh ubuntu2004 debian11   # only those two

Verify a single module

./tools/verify-vm/verify.sh nf_tables

What that does:

  1. Reads tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml: finds nf_tables → box generic/ubuntu2204 + kernel pin linux-image-5.15.0-43-generic.
  2. vagrant up skk-nf_tables (provisions on first call, resumes on subsequent).
  3. Installs the pinned vulnerable kernel via apt, reboots.
  4. Mounts the local repo at /vagrant, runs make, then runs skeletonkey --explain nf_tables --active.
  5. Parses the VERDICT: line, compares against expect_detect from targets.yaml, emits a JSON verification record on stdout.
  6. Suspends the VM (vagrant suspend) — instant resume next run.

Lifecycle flags:

./tools/verify-vm/verify.sh nf_tables --keep      # leave VM running; ssh in to inspect
./tools/verify-vm/verify.sh nf_tables --destroy   # full teardown after run

List every target

./tools/verify-vm/verify.sh --list

Shows the (module, box, target kernel, expected verdict, notes) matrix for all 26 modules. Three are flagged manual: true because no public Vagrant box covers them:

  • vmwgfx — only reachable on VMware guests; needs a vSphere/Fusion VM not Parallels.
  • dirtydecrypt, fragnesia — only present in Linux 7.0+ which isn't shipping as a distro kernel yet.

For those, verification needs a hand-built or special-distro VM.

Verification records

verify.sh emits JSON on stdout after each run. Example:

{
  "module":        "nf_tables",
  "verified_at":   "2026-05-23T17:42:11Z",
  "host_kernel":   "5.15.0-43-generic",
  "host_distro":   "Ubuntu 22.04.5 LTS",
  "vm_box":        "generic/ubuntu2204",
  "expect_detect": "VULNERABLE",
  "actual_detect": "VULNERABLE",
  "status":        "match",
  "log":           "tools/verify-vm/logs/verify-nf_tables-20260523-174211.log"
}

status: match means detect() returned what we expected on a known- vulnerable kernel. Anything else (MISMATCH, status code != 0) means either:

  • The kernel pin didn't take (check host_kernel against kernel_version in targets.yaml).
  • The exploit's preconditions aren't met in the default Vagrant image (e.g. apparmor blocks unprivileged userns; need to adjust the Vagrantfile provisioner).
  • The detect() logic is wrong for this kernel/distro combo (a real bug — fix it).

Records are intended to feed a per-module verified_on[] table (next project step) so --list can show a ✓ verified <date> column.

How it routes module → box

Mapping lives in tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml. Each entry has:

  • box — which boxes/ template (e.g. ubuntu2204)
  • kernel_pkg — apt package name to install if the stock kernel is patched (omit / empty if stock is already vulnerable)
  • kernel_version — what uname -r should report after install
  • expect_detectVULNERABLE | OK | PRECOND_FAIL
  • notes — short rationale; comments in the file have the full context

Adding a new module is one block in targets.yaml. The verifier picks it up automatically.

Files

tools/verify-vm/
├── README.md       this file
├── setup.sh        one-time bootstrap (Vagrant, plugin, box cache)
├── verify.sh       per-module verifier
├── Vagrantfile     parameterized VM config (driven by SKK_VM_* env vars)
├── targets.yaml    module → box mapping with rationale
└── logs/           per-verification stdout/stderr capture

Why Vagrant + Parallels

You already have Parallels Desktop. vagrant-parallels gives a scriptable per-VM config + a curated public box library + idempotent vagrant up/provision/reload/suspend lifecycle. The Vagrantfile is parameterized via env vars so a single file drives every target.

Alternative providers (Lima, Multipass) would also work; Vagrant was chosen for ergonomic continuity with the existing Parallels install.