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SKELETONKEY/tests/test_detect.c
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leviathan a9c8f7d8c6 tests: 5 happy-path VULNERABLE assertions (44 total) 
Adds h_kernel_5_14_userns_ok fingerprint (vulnerable kernel +
userns allowed) and uses it to assert the VULNERABLE branch is
reached on the 5 netfilter-class modules whose detect()
short-circuits there once both gates are satisfied:

- nf_tables    (CVE-2024-1086) -> VULNERABLE
- cls_route4   (CVE-2022-2588) -> VULNERABLE
- nft_set_uaf  (CVE-2023-32233) -> VULNERABLE
- nft_fwd_dup  (CVE-2022-25636) -> VULNERABLE
- nft_payload  (CVE-2023-0179) -> VULNERABLE

Combined with the earlier sudo_samedit and pwnkit
vulnerable-version tests, this gives us positive-verdict coverage
on 7 modules (was 2). The detect() logic that decides VULNERABLE
when conditions match is now exercised, not just the precondition
short-circuits.

39 -> 44 cases, all pass on Linux.
2026-05-23 00:17:17 -04:00

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/*
* tests/test_detect.c — detect() unit tests
*
* Each test builds a synthetic struct skeletonkey_host fingerprint
* (vulnerable / patched / specific-gate-closed) and asserts each
* module's detect() returns the expected verdict. Catches regressions
* in the host-fingerprint-consuming logic across the corpus.
*
* Coverage today is the four modules that already consume ctx->host:
* - dirtydecrypt (CVE-2026-31635)
* - fragnesia (CVE-2026-46300)
* - pack2theroot (CVE-2026-41651)
* - overlayfs (CVE-2021-3493)
* Coverage grows automatically as more modules migrate to ctx->host
* (see ROADMAP "core/host" follow-up).
*
* Why only Linux: every module's real detect() lives inside
* `#ifdef __linux__`; on non-Linux the stubs unconditionally return
* PRECOND_FAIL so the tests are tautologies. The harness compiles
* cross-platform but skips the assertions on non-Linux to keep the
* macOS dev build green while still preventing bit-rot of the test
* infrastructure.
*/
#include "../core/module.h"
#include "../core/host.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
extern const struct skeletonkey_module dirtydecrypt_module;
extern const struct skeletonkey_module fragnesia_module;
extern const struct skeletonkey_module pack2theroot_module;
extern const struct skeletonkey_module overlayfs_module;
extern const struct skeletonkey_module dirty_pipe_module;
extern const struct skeletonkey_module dirty_cow_module;
extern const struct skeletonkey_module ptrace_traceme_module;
extern const struct skeletonkey_module cgroup_release_agent_module;
extern const struct skeletonkey_module nf_tables_module;
extern const struct skeletonkey_module fuse_legacy_module;
extern const struct skeletonkey_module cls_route4_module;
extern const struct skeletonkey_module overlayfs_setuid_module;
extern const struct skeletonkey_module af_packet_module;
extern const struct skeletonkey_module af_packet2_module;
extern const struct skeletonkey_module af_unix_gc_module;
extern const struct skeletonkey_module netfilter_xtcompat_module;
extern const struct skeletonkey_module nft_set_uaf_module;
extern const struct skeletonkey_module nft_fwd_dup_module;
extern const struct skeletonkey_module nft_payload_module;
extern const struct skeletonkey_module stackrot_module;
extern const struct skeletonkey_module sequoia_module;
extern const struct skeletonkey_module vmwgfx_module;
extern const struct skeletonkey_module copy_fail_gcm_module;
extern const struct skeletonkey_module dirty_frag_esp_module;
extern const struct skeletonkey_module dirty_frag_esp6_module;
extern const struct skeletonkey_module dirty_frag_rxrpc_module;
extern const struct skeletonkey_module sudo_samedit_module;
extern const struct skeletonkey_module sudoedit_editor_module;
extern const struct skeletonkey_module pwnkit_module;
static int g_pass = 0;
static int g_fail = 0;
static const char *result_str(skeletonkey_result_t r)
{
switch (r) {
case SKELETONKEY_OK: return "OK";
case SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR: return "TEST_ERROR";
case SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE: return "VULNERABLE";
case SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL: return "EXPLOIT_FAIL";
case SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL: return "PRECOND_FAIL";
case SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK: return "EXPLOIT_OK";
}
return "???";
}
#ifdef __linux__
/* Suppress per-module banner chatter so the test output stays tidy.
* Modules respect ctx->json to mean "structured output mode; no banners"
* — see each module's `if (!ctx->json) fprintf(...)` pattern. */
static void run_one(const char *test_name,
const struct skeletonkey_module *m,
const struct skeletonkey_host *h,
skeletonkey_result_t want)
{
struct skeletonkey_ctx ctx = {0};
ctx.host = h;
ctx.json = true; /* silence per-module log lines */
skeletonkey_result_t got = m->detect(&ctx);
if (got == want) {
printf("[+] PASS %-40s %s → %s\n",
test_name, m->name, result_str(got));
g_pass++;
} else {
fprintf(stderr,
"[-] FAIL %-40s %s: want %s, got %s\n",
test_name, m->name,
result_str(want), result_str(got));
g_fail++;
}
}
/* ── fingerprints ────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
/* Linux 6.12.76 (Debian 13), no userns, no D-Bus, not Ubuntu — a
* deliberately neutered host that lets the host-fingerprint-only
* gates fire without falling into deeper module logic. */
static const struct skeletonkey_host h_pre7_no_userns_no_dbus = {
.kernel = { .major = 6, .minor = 12, .patch = 76,
.release = "6.12.76-test" },
.arch = "x86_64",
.nodename = "test",
.distro_id = "debian",
.distro_version_id = "13",
.distro_pretty = "Debian GNU/Linux 13",
.is_linux = true,
.is_debian_family = true,
.unprivileged_userns_allowed = false,
.has_dbus_system = false,
.has_systemd = true,
};
/* Fedora 43, no Debian family, userns allowed. */
static const struct skeletonkey_host h_fedora_no_debian = {
.kernel = { .major = 6, .minor = 14, .patch = 0,
.release = "6.14.0-fedora" },
.arch = "x86_64",
.nodename = "test",
.distro_id = "fedora",
.distro_version_id = "43",
.distro_pretty = "Fedora 43",
.is_linux = true,
.is_rpm_family = true,
.is_debian_family = false,
.unprivileged_userns_allowed = true,
.has_dbus_system = true,
.has_systemd = true,
};
/* Modern fingerprint with a known-vulnerable sudo (1.8.31 sits in
* both the samedit [1.8.2, 1.9.5p1] and sudoedit_editor
* [1.8.0, 1.9.12p2) vulnerable ranges) AND a known-vulnerable polkit
* (0.105 is pre-0.121 fix). Used to assert the sudo/pwnkit modules
* accept the host-fingerprint version strings and reach the
* VULNERABLE-by-version path. */
static const struct skeletonkey_host h_vuln_sudo = {
.kernel = { .major = 5, .minor = 15, .patch = 0,
.release = "5.15.0-vulnsudo" },
.arch = "x86_64",
.nodename = "test",
.distro_id = "debian",
.is_linux = true,
.is_debian_family = true,
.unprivileged_userns_allowed = true,
.sudo_version = "1.8.31",
.polkit_version = "0.105",
};
/* Modern fingerprint with a fixed sudo (1.9.13p1 is above both
* sudo_samedit and sudoedit_editor vulnerable ranges) AND a fixed
* polkit (0.121 is the upstream pwnkit fix release). */
static const struct skeletonkey_host h_fixed_sudo = {
.kernel = { .major = 6, .minor = 12, .patch = 0,
.release = "6.12.0-fixedsudo" },
.arch = "x86_64",
.nodename = "test",
.distro_id = "debian",
.is_linux = true,
.is_debian_family = true,
.unprivileged_userns_allowed = true,
.sudo_version = "1.9.13p1",
.polkit_version = "0.121",
};
/* Ubuntu 24.04, userns allowed, D-Bus running, Debian family
* (because Ubuntu has /etc/debian_version). Used as the "fragnesia
* preconditions OK" baseline — fragnesia should NOT short-circuit
* on userns/userspace gates here. */
static const struct skeletonkey_host h_ubuntu_24_userns_ok = {
.kernel = { .major = 6, .minor = 8, .patch = 0,
.release = "6.8.0-ubuntu" },
.arch = "x86_64",
.nodename = "test",
.distro_id = "ubuntu",
.distro_version_id = "24.04",
.distro_pretty = "Ubuntu 24.04 LTS",
.is_linux = true,
.is_debian_family = true,
.unprivileged_userns_allowed = true,
.has_dbus_system = true,
.has_systemd = true,
};
/* Ancient kernel that predates many bugs (Linux 4.4 LTS). Useful for
* the "kernel predates the bug → OK" path in dirty_pipe (bug
* introduced 5.8). */
static const struct skeletonkey_host h_kernel_4_4 = {
.kernel = { .major = 4, .minor = 4, .patch = 0,
.release = "4.4.0-ancient" },
.arch = "x86_64",
.nodename = "test",
.distro_id = "debian",
.is_linux = true,
.is_debian_family = true,
.unprivileged_userns_allowed = true,
};
/* Recent kernel (Linux 6.12 LTS). Above virtually every backport
* threshold in the corpus — modules should report OK via the
* "patched by mainline inheritance" branch of kernel_range_is_patched. */
static const struct skeletonkey_host h_kernel_6_12 = {
.kernel = { .major = 6, .minor = 12, .patch = 0,
.release = "6.12.0-recent" },
.arch = "x86_64",
.nodename = "test",
.distro_id = "debian",
.is_linux = true,
.is_debian_family = true,
.unprivileged_userns_allowed = true,
};
/* Vulnerable-era kernel (5.14.0) with userns ENABLED. The mirror
* of h_kernel_5_14_no_userns — for testing the VULNERABLE-by-version
* happy path on modules whose detect() reaches VULNERABLE once both
* version and userns gates are satisfied. Carrier file presence
* (sudo, su, etc.) is read from the actual filesystem; in CI the
* standard Debian containers provide those, so these tests are
* deterministic on Linux. */
static const struct skeletonkey_host h_kernel_5_14_userns_ok = {
.kernel = { .major = 5, .minor = 14, .patch = 0,
.release = "5.14.0-vuln-userns-ok" },
.arch = "x86_64",
.nodename = "test",
.distro_id = "debian",
.is_linux = true,
.is_debian_family = true,
.unprivileged_userns_allowed = true,
};
/* Vulnerable-era kernel (5.14.0) with userns DISABLED. Most
* netfilter / overlayfs / cgroup-class modules need both an in-range
* kernel AND unprivileged userns. Kernel 5.14 was deliberately
* chosen to clear every module's "predates the bug" pre-check in
* this batch (nf_tables introduced 5.14; overlayfs_setuid 5.11;
* cls_route4/fuse_legacy older still) while remaining below every
* stable-branch backport entry (5.15.x / 5.18.x / 5.19.x in the
* relevant tables). The version check therefore says "VULNERABLE by
* version", and the userns gate fires next. */
static const struct skeletonkey_host h_kernel_5_14_no_userns = {
.kernel = { .major = 5, .minor = 14, .patch = 0,
.release = "5.14.0-vuln-no-userns" },
.arch = "x86_64",
.nodename = "test",
.distro_id = "debian",
.is_linux = true,
.is_debian_family = true,
.unprivileged_userns_allowed = false,
};
#endif /* __linux__ */
/* ── tests ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
static void run_all(void)
{
#ifdef __linux__
/* dirtydecrypt: kernel.major < 7 → predates the bug → OK */
run_one("dirtydecrypt: kernel 6.12 predates 7.0 → OK",
&dirtydecrypt_module, &h_pre7_no_userns_no_dbus,
SKELETONKEY_OK);
run_one("dirtydecrypt: kernel 6.14 (fedora) still predates → OK",
&dirtydecrypt_module, &h_fedora_no_debian,
SKELETONKEY_OK);
run_one("dirtydecrypt: kernel 6.8 (ubuntu) still predates → OK",
&dirtydecrypt_module, &h_ubuntu_24_userns_ok,
SKELETONKEY_OK);
/* fragnesia: userns disabled → XFRM gate closed → PRECOND_FAIL */
run_one("fragnesia: userns_allowed=false → PRECOND_FAIL",
&fragnesia_module, &h_pre7_no_userns_no_dbus,
SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL);
/* pack2theroot: not Debian family → PRECOND_FAIL */
run_one("pack2theroot: is_debian_family=false → PRECOND_FAIL",
&pack2theroot_module, &h_fedora_no_debian,
SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL);
/* pack2theroot: Debian family but no D-Bus socket → PRECOND_FAIL */
run_one("pack2theroot: has_dbus_system=false → PRECOND_FAIL",
&pack2theroot_module, &h_pre7_no_userns_no_dbus,
SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL);
/* overlayfs: distro != ubuntu → bug is Ubuntu-specific → OK */
run_one("overlayfs: distro=debian → not Ubuntu → OK",
&overlayfs_module, &h_pre7_no_userns_no_dbus,
SKELETONKEY_OK);
run_one("overlayfs: distro=fedora → not Ubuntu → OK",
&overlayfs_module, &h_fedora_no_debian,
SKELETONKEY_OK);
/* ── kernel-version-gate cases (post-migration coverage) ──── */
/* dirty_pipe: bug introduced in 5.8; kernel 4.4 predates → OK */
run_one("dirty_pipe: kernel 4.4 predates 5.8 → OK",
&dirty_pipe_module, &h_kernel_4_4,
SKELETONKEY_OK);
/* dirty_pipe: kernel 6.12 is above every backport entry → OK */
run_one("dirty_pipe: kernel 6.12 above all backports → OK",
&dirty_pipe_module, &h_kernel_6_12,
SKELETONKEY_OK);
/* dirty_cow: fix in mainline 4.9; kernel 6.12 is far above → OK */
run_one("dirty_cow: kernel 6.12 above 4.9 fix → OK",
&dirty_cow_module, &h_kernel_6_12,
SKELETONKEY_OK);
/* ptrace_traceme: fix in 5.1.17; kernel 6.12 above → OK */
run_one("ptrace_traceme: kernel 6.12 above 5.1.17 fix → OK",
&ptrace_traceme_module, &h_kernel_6_12,
SKELETONKEY_OK);
/* cgroup_release_agent: fix in mainline 5.17; kernel 6.12 above → OK */
run_one("cgroup_release_agent: kernel 6.12 above 5.17 fix → OK",
&cgroup_release_agent_module, &h_kernel_6_12,
SKELETONKEY_OK);
/* ── userns-gate cases ───────────────────────────────────── */
/* nf_tables: vulnerable kernel 5.10.0 + userns off → PRECOND_FAIL */
run_one("nf_tables: vuln kernel + userns=false → PRECOND_FAIL",
&nf_tables_module, &h_kernel_5_14_no_userns,
SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL);
/* fuse_legacy: vulnerable kernel + userns off → PRECOND_FAIL */
run_one("fuse_legacy: vuln kernel + userns=false → PRECOND_FAIL",
&fuse_legacy_module, &h_kernel_5_14_no_userns,
SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL);
/* cls_route4: vulnerable kernel + userns off → PRECOND_FAIL */
run_one("cls_route4: vuln kernel + userns=false → PRECOND_FAIL",
&cls_route4_module, &h_kernel_5_14_no_userns,
SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL);
/* overlayfs_setuid: vulnerable kernel (5.14, past the 5.11
* introduction and below every backport) + userns off
* → PRECOND_FAIL via userns gate */
run_one("overlayfs_setuid: vuln kernel + userns=false → PRECOND_FAIL",
&overlayfs_setuid_module, &h_kernel_5_14_no_userns,
SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL);
/* ── above-fix coverage for the remaining kernel modules ──
* Kernel 6.12 is above every backport entry in the corpus.
* For modules with a `kernel_range` table, kernel_range_is_patched
* inherits via the "host is newer than every entry" branch and
* detect() returns OK. */
run_one("af_packet: kernel 6.12 above 4.11 fix → OK",
&af_packet_module, &h_kernel_6_12, SKELETONKEY_OK);
run_one("af_packet2: kernel 6.12 above 5.9 fix → OK",
&af_packet2_module, &h_kernel_6_12, SKELETONKEY_OK);
run_one("af_unix_gc: kernel 6.12 above 6.6-rc1 fix → OK",
&af_unix_gc_module, &h_kernel_6_12, SKELETONKEY_OK);
run_one("netfilter_xtcompat: kernel 6.12 above 5.12 fix → OK",
&netfilter_xtcompat_module, &h_kernel_6_12, SKELETONKEY_OK);
run_one("nft_set_uaf: kernel 6.12 above 6.4-rc4 fix → OK",
&nft_set_uaf_module, &h_kernel_6_12, SKELETONKEY_OK);
run_one("nft_fwd_dup: kernel 6.12 above 5.17 fix → OK",
&nft_fwd_dup_module, &h_kernel_6_12, SKELETONKEY_OK);
run_one("nft_payload: kernel 6.12 above 6.2-rc4 fix → OK",
&nft_payload_module, &h_kernel_6_12, SKELETONKEY_OK);
run_one("stackrot: kernel 6.12 above 6.4-rc4 fix → OK",
&stackrot_module, &h_kernel_6_12, SKELETONKEY_OK);
run_one("sequoia: kernel 6.12 above 5.13.4 fix → OK",
&sequoia_module, &h_kernel_6_12, SKELETONKEY_OK);
run_one("vmwgfx: kernel 6.12 above 6.3-rc6 fix → OK",
&vmwgfx_module, &h_kernel_6_12, SKELETONKEY_OK);
/* ── ancient-kernel predates coverage ────────────────────────
* Kernel 4.4 predates several module bugs introduced 5.x+. */
run_one("nft_set_uaf: kernel 4.4 predates 5.1 → OK",
&nft_set_uaf_module, &h_kernel_4_4, SKELETONKEY_OK);
run_one("stackrot: kernel 4.4 predates 6.1 → OK",
&stackrot_module, &h_kernel_4_4, SKELETONKEY_OK);
/* ── copy_fail_family bridge userns gate ─────────────────────
* The 4 dirty_frag siblings + the GCM variant all reach the
* bug via XFRM-ESP / AF_RXRPC paths gated on unprivileged
* user-namespace creation. Bridge-layer precondition fires
* before delegating to the inner DIRTYFAIL detect. copy_fail
* itself uses AF_ALG (no userns needed) and bypasses the
* gate — its detect would proceed to the inner active probe. */
run_one("copy_fail_gcm: userns_allowed=false → PRECOND_FAIL",
&copy_fail_gcm_module, &h_kernel_5_14_no_userns,
SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL);
run_one("dirty_frag_esp: userns_allowed=false → PRECOND_FAIL",
&dirty_frag_esp_module, &h_kernel_5_14_no_userns,
SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL);
run_one("dirty_frag_esp6: userns_allowed=false → PRECOND_FAIL",
&dirty_frag_esp6_module, &h_kernel_5_14_no_userns,
SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL);
run_one("dirty_frag_rxrpc: userns_allowed=false → PRECOND_FAIL",
&dirty_frag_rxrpc_module, &h_kernel_5_14_no_userns,
SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL);
/* ── userspace version fingerprinting (sudo) ─────────────────
* Both sudo modules now consult ctx->host->sudo_version
* populated once at startup. */
/* sudo_samedit: vulnerable sudo 1.8.31 (range [1.8.2, 1.9.5p1])
* → VULNERABLE by version */
run_one("sudo_samedit: sudo_version=1.8.31 → VULNERABLE",
&sudo_samedit_module, &h_vuln_sudo,
SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE);
/* sudo_samedit: fixed sudo 1.9.13p1 (above 1.9.5p1) → OK */
run_one("sudo_samedit: sudo_version=1.9.13p1 → OK",
&sudo_samedit_module, &h_fixed_sudo,
SKELETONKEY_OK);
/* pwnkit: vulnerable polkit 0.105 (pre-0.121 fix) → VULNERABLE */
run_one("pwnkit: polkit_version=0.105 → VULNERABLE",
&pwnkit_module, &h_vuln_sudo,
SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE);
/* pwnkit: fixed polkit 0.121 → OK */
run_one("pwnkit: polkit_version=0.121 → OK",
&pwnkit_module, &h_fixed_sudo,
SKELETONKEY_OK);
/* sudoedit_editor: vulnerable sudo 1.8.31 — but the test user
* has no sudoers grant in the CI container, so find_sudoedit_target
* fails and detect short-circuits to PRECOND_FAIL ("vulnerable
* version present, but no sudoedit grant to abuse"). That's the
* documented behaviour for a non-privileged user. */
run_one("sudoedit_editor: vuln version, no grant → PRECOND_FAIL",
&sudoedit_editor_module, &h_vuln_sudo,
SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL);
/* sudoedit_editor: fixed sudo 1.9.13p1 → OK regardless of grant */
run_one("sudoedit_editor: sudo_version=1.9.13p1 → OK",
&sudoedit_editor_module, &h_fixed_sudo,
SKELETONKEY_OK);
/* ── happy-path VULNERABLE coverage ──────────────────────────
* Vulnerable kernel + userns allowed reaches the VULNERABLE
* branch on modules whose detect() short-circuits there once
* both gates are satisfied. Tests the affirmative verdict
* path, not just precondition gates. */
run_one("nf_tables: vuln kernel 5.14 + userns ok → VULNERABLE",
&nf_tables_module, &h_kernel_5_14_userns_ok,
SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE);
run_one("cls_route4: vuln kernel 5.14 + userns ok → VULNERABLE",
&cls_route4_module, &h_kernel_5_14_userns_ok,
SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE);
run_one("nft_set_uaf: vuln kernel 5.14 + userns ok → VULNERABLE",
&nft_set_uaf_module, &h_kernel_5_14_userns_ok,
SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE);
run_one("nft_fwd_dup: vuln kernel 5.14 + userns ok → VULNERABLE",
&nft_fwd_dup_module, &h_kernel_5_14_userns_ok,
SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE);
run_one("nft_payload: vuln kernel 5.14 + userns ok → VULNERABLE",
&nft_payload_module, &h_kernel_5_14_userns_ok,
SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE);
#else
fprintf(stderr, "[i] non-Linux platform: detect() bodies are stubbed; "
"tests skipped (would tautologically pass).\n");
#endif
}
int main(void)
{
fprintf(stderr, "=== SKELETONKEY detect() unit tests ===\n\n");
run_all();
fprintf(stderr, "\n=== RESULTS: %d passed, %d failed ===\n",
g_pass, g_fail);
return g_fail ? 1 : 0;
}
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