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SKELETONKEY/tools/verify-vm
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release v0.9.1: VM verification sweep 22 → 27
Five more CVEs empirically confirmed end-to-end against real Linux VMs:
- CVE-2019-14287 sudo_runas_neg1 (Ubuntu 18.04 + sudoers grant)
- CVE-2020-29661 tioscpgrp        (Ubuntu 20.04 pinned to 5.4.0-26)
- CVE-2024-26581 nft_pipapo       (Ubuntu 22.04 + mainline 5.15.5)
- CVE-2025-32463 sudo_chwoot      (Ubuntu 22.04 + sudo 1.9.16p1 from source)
- CVE-2025-6019  udisks_libblockdev (Debian 12 + udisks2 + polkit rule)

Required real plumbing work:
- Per-module provisioner hook (tools/verify-vm/provisioners/<module>.sh)
- Two-phase provision in verify.sh (prep → reboot if needed → verify)
  fixes silent-fail where new kernel installed but VM never rebooted
- GRUB_DEFAULT pinning in both pin-kernel and pin-mainline blocks
  (kernel downgrades like 5.4.0-169 → 5.4.0-26 now actually boot the target)
- Old-mainline URL fallback in pin-mainline (≤ 4.15 debs at /v$KVER/ not /amd64/)

mutagen_astronomy marked manual: true — mainline 4.14.70 kernel-panics on
Ubuntu 18.04's rootfs ('Failed to execute /init (error -8)' — kernel config
mismatch). Genuinely needs a CentOS 6 / Debian 7 image.
2026-05-23 23:35:02 -04:00
..

SKELETONKEY VM verification

Auto-provisions a Parallels Desktop VM with a known-vulnerable kernel, runs skeletonkey --explain <module> --active inside it, and emits a verification record. Closes the loop between "detect() compiles & passes unit tests" and "exploit() actually works on a real vulnerable kernel."

One-time setup

./tools/verify-vm/setup.sh

That installs (if missing): Vagrant via Homebrew, the vagrant-parallels plugin, and pre-downloads ~5 GB of base boxes (Ubuntu 18.04/20.04/22.04

  • Debian 11/12). Idempotent — re-run any time.

To skip boxes you don't need (save disk):

./tools/verify-vm/setup.sh ubuntu2004 debian11   # only those two

Verify a single module

./tools/verify-vm/verify.sh nf_tables

What that does:

  1. Reads tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml: finds nf_tables → box generic/ubuntu2204 + kernel pin linux-image-5.15.0-43-generic.
  2. vagrant up skk-nf_tables (provisions on first call, resumes on subsequent).
  3. Installs the pinned vulnerable kernel via apt, reboots.
  4. Mounts the local repo at /vagrant, runs make, then runs skeletonkey --explain nf_tables --active.
  5. Parses the VERDICT: line, compares against expect_detect from targets.yaml, emits a JSON verification record on stdout.
  6. Suspends the VM (vagrant suspend) — instant resume next run.

Lifecycle flags:

./tools/verify-vm/verify.sh nf_tables --keep      # leave VM running; ssh in to inspect
./tools/verify-vm/verify.sh nf_tables --destroy   # full teardown after run

List every target

./tools/verify-vm/verify.sh --list

Shows the (module, box, target kernel, expected verdict, notes) matrix for all 26 modules. Three are flagged manual: true because no public Vagrant box covers them:

  • vmwgfx — only reachable on VMware guests; needs a vSphere/Fusion VM not Parallels.
  • dirtydecrypt, fragnesia — only present in Linux 7.0+ which isn't shipping as a distro kernel yet.

For those, verification needs a hand-built or special-distro VM.

Verification records

verify.sh emits JSON on stdout after each run. Example:

{
  "module":        "nf_tables",
  "verified_at":   "2026-05-23T17:42:11Z",
  "host_kernel":   "5.15.0-43-generic",
  "host_distro":   "Ubuntu 22.04.5 LTS",
  "vm_box":        "generic/ubuntu2204",
  "expect_detect": "VULNERABLE",
  "actual_detect": "VULNERABLE",
  "status":        "match",
  "log":           "tools/verify-vm/logs/verify-nf_tables-20260523-174211.log"
}

status: match means detect() returned what we expected on a known- vulnerable kernel. Anything else (MISMATCH, status code != 0) means either:

  • The kernel pin didn't take (check host_kernel against kernel_version in targets.yaml).
  • The exploit's preconditions aren't met in the default Vagrant image (e.g. apparmor blocks unprivileged userns; need to adjust the Vagrantfile provisioner).
  • The detect() logic is wrong for this kernel/distro combo (a real bug — fix it).

Records are intended to feed a per-module verified_on[] table (next project step) so --list can show a ✓ verified <date> column.

How it routes module → box

Mapping lives in tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml. Each entry has:

  • box — which boxes/ template (e.g. ubuntu2204)
  • kernel_pkg — apt package name to install if the stock kernel is patched (omit / empty if stock is already vulnerable)
  • kernel_version — what uname -r should report after install
  • expect_detectVULNERABLE | OK | PRECOND_FAIL
  • notes — short rationale; comments in the file have the full context

Adding a new module is one block in targets.yaml. The verifier picks it up automatically.

Files

tools/verify-vm/
├── README.md       this file
├── setup.sh        one-time bootstrap (Vagrant, plugin, box cache)
├── verify.sh       per-module verifier
├── Vagrantfile     parameterized VM config (driven by SKK_VM_* env vars)
├── targets.yaml    module → box mapping with rationale
└── logs/           per-verification stdout/stderr capture

Why Vagrant + Parallels

You already have Parallels Desktop. vagrant-parallels gives a scriptable per-VM config + a curated public box library + idempotent vagrant up/provision/reload/suspend lifecycle. The Vagrantfile is parameterized via env vars so a single file drives every target.

Alternative providers (Lima, Multipass) would also work; Vagrant was chosen for ergonomic continuity with the existing Parallels install.