Five more CVEs empirically confirmed end-to-end against real Linux VMs:
- CVE-2019-14287 sudo_runas_neg1 (Ubuntu 18.04 + sudoers grant)
- CVE-2020-29661 tioscpgrp (Ubuntu 20.04 pinned to 5.4.0-26)
- CVE-2024-26581 nft_pipapo (Ubuntu 22.04 + mainline 5.15.5)
- CVE-2025-32463 sudo_chwoot (Ubuntu 22.04 + sudo 1.9.16p1 from source)
- CVE-2025-6019 udisks_libblockdev (Debian 12 + udisks2 + polkit rule)
Required real plumbing work:
- Per-module provisioner hook (tools/verify-vm/provisioners/<module>.sh)
- Two-phase provision in verify.sh (prep → reboot if needed → verify)
fixes silent-fail where new kernel installed but VM never rebooted
- GRUB_DEFAULT pinning in both pin-kernel and pin-mainline blocks
(kernel downgrades like 5.4.0-169 → 5.4.0-26 now actually boot the target)
- Old-mainline URL fallback in pin-mainline (≤ 4.15 debs at /v$KVER/ not /amd64/)
mutagen_astronomy marked manual: true — mainline 4.14.70 kernel-panics on
Ubuntu 18.04's rootfs ('Failed to execute /init (error -8)' — kernel config
mismatch). Genuinely needs a CentOS 6 / Debian 7 image.
SKELETONKEY VM verification
Auto-provisions a Parallels Desktop VM with a known-vulnerable kernel,
runs skeletonkey --explain <module> --active inside it, and emits a
verification record. Closes the loop between "detect() compiles & passes
unit tests" and "exploit() actually works on a real vulnerable kernel."
One-time setup
./tools/verify-vm/setup.sh
That installs (if missing): Vagrant via Homebrew, the vagrant-parallels
plugin, and pre-downloads ~5 GB of base boxes (Ubuntu 18.04/20.04/22.04
- Debian 11/12). Idempotent — re-run any time.
To skip boxes you don't need (save disk):
./tools/verify-vm/setup.sh ubuntu2004 debian11 # only those two
Verify a single module
./tools/verify-vm/verify.sh nf_tables
What that does:
- Reads
tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml: findsnf_tables→ boxgeneric/ubuntu2204+ kernel pinlinux-image-5.15.0-43-generic. vagrant up skk-nf_tables(provisions on first call, resumes on subsequent).- Installs the pinned vulnerable kernel via
apt, reboots. - Mounts the local repo at
/vagrant, runsmake, then runsskeletonkey --explain nf_tables --active. - Parses the
VERDICT:line, compares againstexpect_detectfrom targets.yaml, emits a JSON verification record on stdout. - Suspends the VM (
vagrant suspend) — instant resume next run.
Lifecycle flags:
./tools/verify-vm/verify.sh nf_tables --keep # leave VM running; ssh in to inspect
./tools/verify-vm/verify.sh nf_tables --destroy # full teardown after run
List every target
./tools/verify-vm/verify.sh --list
Shows the (module, box, target kernel, expected verdict, notes) matrix
for all 26 modules. Three are flagged manual: true because no
public Vagrant box covers them:
vmwgfx— only reachable on VMware guests; needs a vSphere/Fusion VM not Parallels.dirtydecrypt,fragnesia— only present in Linux 7.0+ which isn't shipping as a distro kernel yet.
For those, verification needs a hand-built or special-distro VM.
Verification records
verify.sh emits JSON on stdout after each run. Example:
{
"module": "nf_tables",
"verified_at": "2026-05-23T17:42:11Z",
"host_kernel": "5.15.0-43-generic",
"host_distro": "Ubuntu 22.04.5 LTS",
"vm_box": "generic/ubuntu2204",
"expect_detect": "VULNERABLE",
"actual_detect": "VULNERABLE",
"status": "match",
"log": "tools/verify-vm/logs/verify-nf_tables-20260523-174211.log"
}
status: match means detect() returned what we expected on a known-
vulnerable kernel. Anything else (MISMATCH, status code != 0) means
either:
- The kernel pin didn't take (check
host_kernelagainstkernel_versionin targets.yaml). - The exploit's preconditions aren't met in the default Vagrant image (e.g. apparmor blocks unprivileged userns; need to adjust the Vagrantfile provisioner).
- The detect() logic is wrong for this kernel/distro combo (a real bug — fix it).
Records are intended to feed a per-module verified_on[] table (next
project step) so --list can show a ✓ verified <date> column.
How it routes module → box
Mapping lives in tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml. Each entry has:
box— whichboxes/template (e.g.ubuntu2204)kernel_pkg— apt package name to install if the stock kernel is patched (omit / empty if stock is already vulnerable)kernel_version— whatuname -rshould report after installexpect_detect—VULNERABLE|OK|PRECOND_FAILnotes— short rationale; comments in the file have the full context
Adding a new module is one block in targets.yaml. The verifier picks it up automatically.
Files
tools/verify-vm/
├── README.md this file
├── setup.sh one-time bootstrap (Vagrant, plugin, box cache)
├── verify.sh per-module verifier
├── Vagrantfile parameterized VM config (driven by SKK_VM_* env vars)
├── targets.yaml module → box mapping with rationale
└── logs/ per-verification stdout/stderr capture
Why Vagrant + Parallels
You already have Parallels Desktop. vagrant-parallels gives a
scriptable per-VM config + a curated public box library + idempotent
vagrant up/provision/reload/suspend lifecycle. The Vagrantfile is
parameterized via env vars so a single file drives every target.
Alternative providers (Lima, Multipass) would also work; Vagrant was chosen for ergonomic continuity with the existing Parallels install.