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SKELETONKEY/modules/dirty_pipe_cve_2022_0847/detect/sigma.yml
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rename: IAMROOT → SKELETONKEY across the entire project
Breaking change. Tool name, binary name, function/type names,
constant names, env vars, header guards, file paths, and GitHub
repo URL all rebrand IAMROOT → SKELETONKEY.

Changes:
  - All "IAMROOT" → "SKELETONKEY" (constants, env vars, enum
    values, docs, comments)
  - All "iamroot" → "skeletonkey" (functions, types, paths, CLI)
  - iamroot.c → skeletonkey.c
  - modules/*/iamroot_modules.{c,h} → modules/*/skeletonkey_modules.{c,h}
  - tools/iamroot-fleet-scan.sh → tools/skeletonkey-fleet-scan.sh
  - Binary "iamroot" → "skeletonkey"
  - GitHub URL KaraZajac/IAMROOT → KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY
  - .gitignore now expects build output named "skeletonkey"
  - /tmp/iamroot-* tmpfiles → /tmp/skeletonkey-*
  - Env vars IAMROOT_MODPROBE_PATH etc. → SKELETONKEY_*

New ASCII skeleton-key banner (horizontal key icon + ANSI Shadow
SKELETONKEY block letters) replaces the IAMROOT banner in
skeletonkey.c and README.md.

VERSION: 0.3.1 → 0.4.0 (breaking).

Build clean on Debian 6.12.86. `skeletonkey --version` → 0.4.0.
All 24 modules still register; no functional code changes — pure
rename + banner refresh.
2026-05-16 22:43:49 -04:00

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1.2 KiB
YAML

title: Possible Dirty Pipe exploitation (CVE-2022-0847)
id: f6b13c08-skeletonkey-dirty-pipe
status: experimental
description: |
Detects file modifications to /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, /etc/sudoers,
or /etc/sudoers.d/* by a non-root process. The Dirty Pipe primitive
is a page-cache write — the on-disk file is unchanged but the running
kernel sees the modified contents. This sigma rule complements the
auditd rules in detect/auditd.rules.
references:
- https://dirtypipe.cm4all.com/
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0847
author: SKELETONKEY
date: 2026/05/16
logsource:
product: linux
service: auditd
detection:
modification:
type: 'PATH'
name|startswith:
- '/etc/passwd'
- '/etc/shadow'
- '/etc/sudoers'
nametype:
- 'CREATE'
- 'NORMAL'
not_root:
auid|expression: '!= 0'
condition: modification and not_root
falsepositives:
- Legitimate package upgrades (`apt`, `dnf`, `dpkg`) — these run as
root so auid=0 excludes them
- Manual edits via `vipw`, `passwd`, etc. — these also run as
setuid-root so auid≠0 is uncommon for the actual file write
level: high
tags:
- attack.privilege_escalation
- attack.t1068
- cve.2022.0847