Breaking change. Tool name, binary name, function/type names,
constant names, env vars, header guards, file paths, and GitHub
repo URL all rebrand IAMROOT → SKELETONKEY.
Changes:
- All "IAMROOT" → "SKELETONKEY" (constants, env vars, enum
values, docs, comments)
- All "iamroot" → "skeletonkey" (functions, types, paths, CLI)
- iamroot.c → skeletonkey.c
- modules/*/iamroot_modules.{c,h} → modules/*/skeletonkey_modules.{c,h}
- tools/iamroot-fleet-scan.sh → tools/skeletonkey-fleet-scan.sh
- Binary "iamroot" → "skeletonkey"
- GitHub URL KaraZajac/IAMROOT → KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY
- .gitignore now expects build output named "skeletonkey"
- /tmp/iamroot-* tmpfiles → /tmp/skeletonkey-*
- Env vars IAMROOT_MODPROBE_PATH etc. → SKELETONKEY_*
New ASCII skeleton-key banner (horizontal key icon + ANSI Shadow
SKELETONKEY block letters) replaces the IAMROOT banner in
skeletonkey.c and README.md.
VERSION: 0.3.1 → 0.4.0 (breaking).
Build clean on Debian 6.12.86. `skeletonkey --version` → 0.4.0.
All 24 modules still register; no functional code changes — pure
rename + banner refresh.
918 B
NOTICE — overlayfs (CVE-2021-3493)
Vulnerability
CVE-2021-3493 — Ubuntu overlayfs userns file-capability injection → host root via setcap'd binaries in a userns-mounted overlay.
Research credit
Reported by Vasily Kulikov, April 2021. Ubuntu-specific because upstream didn't enable unprivileged userns-overlayfs-mount until 5.11.
Advisory: USN-4915-1 / USN-4916-1 (Canonical, April 2021).
Public PoC: vsh-style userns + overlayfs + xattr injection chain.
SKELETONKEY role
Detect parses /etc/os-release for ID=ubuntu, checks
unprivileged_userns_clone sysctl, and with --active performs the
mount as a fork-isolated probe. The full exploit performs the
userns+overlayfs mount, plants a setcap'd carrier binary in the
upper layer, and execs it from the unprivileged side to obtain root
on the host. Ships auditd rules covering mount(overlay) and
setxattr(security.capability).