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# Architecture
## Module model
Each CVE (or tightly-related family of CVEs sharing a primitive) is
a **module** under `modules/`. A module is a self-contained
exploit + detection + metadata bundle that exports a standard
interface to the top-level dispatcher.
### Module layout
```
modules/<module_name>/
├── MODULE.md # Human-readable writeup of the bug
├── NOTICE.md # Credits to original researcher
├── kernel-range.json # Machine-readable affected kernels
├── module.c # Implements iamroot_module interface
├── module.h
├── detect/
│ ├── auditd.rules # blue team detection
│ ├── sigma.yml
│ └── yara.yara
├── src/ # exploit internals
└── tests/ # per-module tests (run in CI matrix)
```
### `iamroot_module` interface (planned, Phase 1)
```c
struct iamroot_module {
const char *name; /* "copy_fail" */
const char *cve; /* "CVE-2026-31431" */
const char *summary; /* one-line description */
/* Return 1 if host appears vulnerable, 0 if patched/immune,
* -1 if probe couldn't run. May call entrybleed_leak_kbase()
* etc. from core/ if a leak primitive is needed. */
int (*detect)(struct iamroot_host *host);
/* Run the exploit. Caller has already passed the
* authorization gate. Returns 0 on root acquired,
* nonzero on failure. */
int (*exploit)(struct iamroot_host *host, struct iamroot_opts *opts);
/* Apply a runtime mitigation for this CVE (sysctl, module
* blacklist, etc.). Returns 0 on success. NULL if no
* mitigation is offered. */
int (*mitigate)(struct iamroot_host *host);
/* Undo --exploit-backdoor or --mitigate side effects. */
int (*cleanup)(struct iamroot_host *host);
/* Affected kernel version range, distros covered, etc. */
const struct iamroot_kernel_range *ranges;
size_t n_ranges;
};
```
Modules register themselves at link time via a constructor-attribute
table. The top-level `iamroot` binary iterates the registry on each
invocation.
## Shared `core/`
Code that more than one module needs lives in `core/`:
- `core/common.c` — fingerprinting (kernel version, distro, LSM,
hardening flags), logging, error handling
- `core/apparmor_bypass.c` — Ubuntu's
`apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=1` defeat via
`change_onexec("crun")` re-exec
- `core/exploit_su.c` — once we have page-cache-write or
/etc/passwd-overwrite, this is the shared "drop to root shell"
helper
- `core/fcrypt.c` — file-encryption helpers used by multiple modules
- `core/entrybleed.c` (planned, Phase 3) — kbase leak primitive that
any module needing KASLR-defeat can call
## Top-level dispatcher
`iamroot.c` (planned, Phase 1) is the CLI entry point. Responsibilities:
1. Parse args (`--scan`, `--exploit <name>`, `--mitigate`,
`--detect-rules`, `--cleanup`, etc.)
2. Fingerprint the host
3. For `--scan`: iterate module registry, call each module's
`detect()`, emit table of results
4. For `--exploit <name>`: locate module, gate behind `--i-know`,
call its `exploit()`
5. For `--detect-rules`: walk module registry, concatenate detection
files in the requested format
## CI matrix
`.github/workflows/ci.yml` (planned, Phase 4) runs each module's
test against a matrix of distro × kernel VMs. Each test asserts:
- on a vulnerable VM: `detect()` returns 1, `exploit()` returns 0
and produces uid=0
- on a patched VM: `detect()` returns 0, `exploit()` either refuses
or fails gracefully
Failures on a previously-working matrix entry open an issue
automatically (likely cause: distro shipped a backport that broke
the module).
## Adding a new CVE
1. `git checkout -b add-cve-XXXX-NNNN`
2. `cp -r modules/_stubs/_template modules/<module_name>`
3. Fill in `MODULE.md`, `NOTICE.md`, `kernel-range.json`
4. Implement `module.c` exposing the `iamroot_module` interface
5. Ship at least one detection rule under `detect/`
6. Add tests under `tests/`
7. PR. CI runs the matrix. If it lands root on at least one
vulnerable matched VM AND fails cleanly on a patched VM, it
merges.
See `docs/module-template.md` (planned) for the per-module checklist.