Files
SKELETONKEY/core/module.h
T
leviathan e4a600fef2 module metadata: CWE + ATT&CK + CISA KEV triage from federal sources
Adds per-CVE triage annotations that turn SKELETONKEY's JSON output
into something a SIEM/CTI/threat-intel pipeline can route on, and a
KEV badge in --list so operators see at-a-glance which modules
cover actively-exploited bugs.

New tool — tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py:

  - Discovers CVEs by scanning modules/<dir>/ (no hardcoded list).
  - Fetches CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
    (https://www.cisa.gov/.../known_exploited_vulnerabilities.csv).
  - Fetches CWE classifications from NVD's CVE API 2.0
    (services.nvd.nist.gov), throttled to the anonymous
    5-req/30s limit (~3 minutes for 26 CVEs).
  - Hand-curated ATT&CK technique mapping (T1068 default; T1611 for
    container escapes, T1082 for kernel info leaks — MITRE doesn't
    publish a clean CVE→technique feed).
  - Generates three outputs:
      docs/CVE_METADATA.json   machine-readable, drift-checkable
      docs/KEV_CROSSREF.md     human-readable table
      core/cve_metadata.c      auto-generated lookup table
  - --check mode diffs the committed JSON against a fresh fetch for
    CI drift detection.

New core API — core/cve_metadata.{h,c}:

  struct cve_metadata { cve, cwe, attack_technique, attack_subtechnique,
                        in_kev, kev_date_added };
  const struct cve_metadata *cve_metadata_lookup(const char *cve);

Lookup keyed by CVE id, not module name — the metadata is properties
of the CVE (two modules covering the same bug see the same metadata).
The opsec_notes field stays on the module struct because exploit
technique varies per-module (different footprints).

Output surfacing:
  - --list: new KEV column shows ★ for KEV-listed CVEs.
  - --module-info (text): prints cwe / att&ck / 'in CISA KEV: YES (added
    YYYY-MM-DD)' between summary and operations.
  - --module-info / --scan (JSON): emits a 'triage' subobject with the
    full record, plus an 'opsec_notes' field at top level when set.

Initial snapshot:
  - 10 of 26 modules cover KEV-listed CVEs (dirty_cow, dirty_pipe,
    pwnkit, sudo_samedit, ptrace_traceme, fuse_legacy, nf_tables,
    overlayfs, overlayfs_setuid, netfilter_xtcompat).
  - 24 of 26 have NVD CWE mappings; 2 unmapped (NVD has no weakness
    record for CVE-2019-13272 and CVE-2026-46300 yet).
  - All 26 mapped to an ATT&CK technique.

Verification:
  - macOS local: 33 kernel_range + clean build, --module-info shows
    'in CISA KEV: YES (added 2024-05-30)' for nf_tables, --list KEV
    column renders.
  - Linux (docker gcc:latest): 33 + 54 = 87 passes, 0 fails.

Follow-up commits will add per-module OPSEC notes and --explain mode.
2026-05-23 10:38:01 -04:00

125 lines
5.3 KiB
C

/*
* SKELETONKEY — core module interface
*
* Every CVE module exports one or more `struct skeletonkey_module` entries
* via a registry function. The top-level dispatcher (skeletonkey.c) walks
* the global registry to implement --scan, --exploit, --mitigate, etc.
*
* This is intentionally a small interface. Modules carry the
* complexity; the dispatcher just routes.
*/
#ifndef SKELETONKEY_MODULE_H
#define SKELETONKEY_MODULE_H
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
/* Standard result codes returned by detect()/exploit()/mitigate().
*
* These map to top-level exit codes when skeletonkey is invoked with a
* single-module operation:
*
* SKELETONKEY_OK exit 0 detect: not vulnerable / clean
* SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE exit 2 detect: confirmed vulnerable
* SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL exit 4 detect: preconditions missing
* SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR exit 1 detect/exploit: error
* SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK exit 5 exploit: succeeded (root achieved)
* SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL exit 3 exploit: attempted but did not land
*
* Implementation note: copy_fail_family's df_result_t shares these
* numeric values intentionally so the family code can return its
* existing constants without translation.
*/
typedef enum {
SKELETONKEY_OK = 0,
SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR = 1,
SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE = 2,
SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL = 3,
SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL = 4,
SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK = 5,
} skeletonkey_result_t;
/* Per-invocation context passed to module callbacks. The host
* fingerprint (kernel / distro / capability gates / service presence)
* is populated once at startup by core/host.c and handed to every
* module callback here — see core/host.h. */
struct skeletonkey_host; /* forward decl; full def in core/host.h */
struct skeletonkey_ctx {
bool no_color; /* --no-color */
bool json; /* --json (machine-readable output) */
bool active_probe; /* --active (do invasive probes in detect) */
bool no_shell; /* --no-shell (exploit prep but don't pop) */
bool authorized; /* user typed --i-know on exploit */
bool full_chain; /* --full-chain (attempt root-pop after primitive) */
bool dry_run; /* --dry-run (preview only; never call exploit/mitigate/cleanup) */
/* Host fingerprint — see core/host.h. Stable pointer, populated
* once by main() before any module callback runs. Modules that
* want to consult it #include "../../core/host.h". May be NULL
* only in degenerate test contexts; main() always sets it. */
const struct skeletonkey_host *host;
};
struct skeletonkey_module {
/* Short id used on the command line: `skeletonkey --exploit copy_fail`. */
const char *name;
/* CVE identifier (or "VARIANT" if no CVE assigned). */
const char *cve;
/* One-line human description. */
const char *summary;
/* Family this module belongs to (e.g. "copy_fail_family"). Modules
* with shared infrastructure live in the same family. */
const char *family;
/* Affected kernel range, prose. Machine-readable range goes in
* the module's kernel-range.json (consumed by CI). */
const char *kernel_range;
/* Probe the host. Should be side-effect-free unless ctx->active_probe
* is true. Return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE if confirmed,
* SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL if not applicable here, SKELETONKEY_OK if patched
* or otherwise immune, SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR on probe error. */
skeletonkey_result_t (*detect)(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx);
/* Run the exploit. Caller has already passed the --i-know gate. */
skeletonkey_result_t (*exploit)(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx);
/* Apply a temporary mitigation. NULL if none offered. */
skeletonkey_result_t (*mitigate)(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx);
/* Undo --exploit (e.g. evict from page cache) or --mitigate side
* effects. NULL if no cleanup applies. */
skeletonkey_result_t (*cleanup)(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx);
/* Detection rule corpus — embedded so the binary is self-
* contained. Each may be NULL if this module ships no rules for
* that format. Strings are NUL-terminated; concatenated in the
* order modules register. */
const char *detect_auditd; /* auditd .rules content */
const char *detect_sigma; /* sigma YAML content */
const char *detect_yara; /* yara rules content */
const char *detect_falco; /* falco rules content */
/* Operational-security notes — telemetry footprint THIS specific
* exploit leaves behind. The inverse of detect_auditd/yara/falco
* above (the rules catch what these notes describe). Free-form
* prose, conventionally listing: dmesg lines triggered, auditd
* events, file artifacts created/modified, persistence side-
* effects, recommended cleanup. Per-module (not per-CVE) because
* different exploits for the same bug can leave different
* footprints. NULL if no analysis written yet.
*
* NB: ATT&CK / CWE / KEV metadata is properties of the CVE itself
* (independent of exploit technique) and lives in
* core/cve_metadata.{h,c} — looked up by CVE id, refreshed via
* tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py. */
const char *opsec_notes;
};
#endif /* SKELETONKEY_MODULE_H */