leviathan
9593d90385
Breaking change. Tool name, binary name, function/type names,
constant names, env vars, header guards, file paths, and GitHub
repo URL all rebrand IAMROOT → SKELETONKEY.
Changes:
- All "IAMROOT" → "SKELETONKEY" (constants, env vars, enum
values, docs, comments)
- All "iamroot" → "skeletonkey" (functions, types, paths, CLI)
- iamroot.c → skeletonkey.c
- modules/*/iamroot_modules.{c,h} → modules/*/skeletonkey_modules.{c,h}
- tools/iamroot-fleet-scan.sh → tools/skeletonkey-fleet-scan.sh
- Binary "iamroot" → "skeletonkey"
- GitHub URL KaraZajac/IAMROOT → KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY
- .gitignore now expects build output named "skeletonkey"
- /tmp/iamroot-* tmpfiles → /tmp/skeletonkey-*
- Env vars IAMROOT_MODPROBE_PATH etc. → SKELETONKEY_*
New ASCII skeleton-key banner (horizontal key icon + ANSI Shadow
SKELETONKEY block letters) replaces the IAMROOT banner in
skeletonkey.c and README.md.
VERSION: 0.3.1 → 0.4.0 (breaking).
Build clean on Debian 6.12.86. `skeletonkey --version` → 0.4.0.
All 24 modules still register; no functional code changes — pure
rename + banner refresh.
1.9 KiB
EntryBleed — CVE-2023-0458
⚪ PLANNED stub module. See
../../ROADMAP.mdPhase 3.
Summary
KPTI's user-space-mapped entry trampoline is detectable via
prefetchnta timing, leaking the kernel base address (defeats
KASLR). Universal across modern x86_64 kernels with KPTI; only
partial mitigations have shipped upstream.
Why this is here
EntryBleed is not a standalone LPE. It's a stage-1 leak primitive that future LPE modules can call when they need a kbase. Bundling it as a module:
- Lets other modules
#include "core/entrybleed.h"and callentrybleed_leak_kbase()when they need KASLR defeat - Ships defensive detection rules for prefetchnta-timing-attack patterns (useful for hardened environments)
- Documents the technique with a clear writeup so users understand what "stage-1" means in the broader chain
Empirical status on recent kernels
Verified 2026-05-16: works 5/5 on lts-6.12.88 (no anti-EntryBleed
mitigation configured). See
security-research/findings/audit_io_uring_2026-05-16_poc_attempt.md
and the EntryBleed test code at
SKYFALL/bugs/leak_write_modprobe_2026-05-16/exploit.c lines ~73-150.
Upstream patches
There is no single canonical patch. Partial mitigations include:
CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET(per-syscall kernel stack jitter)- Some KPTI hardening discussions on lkml, no merged fix as of lts-6.12.88
- The community position remains that "KASLR is best-effort, not a security boundary"
Implementation plan
- Lift the proven EntryBleed code from
SKYFALL/bugs/leak_write_modprobe_2026-05-16/exploit.cintomodule.chere - Expose as both a CLI mode (
skeletonkey --leak-kbase) and as a library helper (uint64_t entrybleed_leak_kbase(void)) - Detection rules: timing-attack pattern flags, perf-counter anomaly detection (informational — these are hard to make precise without false positives)
Not started yet
Phase 3.