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Ethics, scope, and acceptable use
Acceptable use
IAMROOT is intended for:
- Authorized red-team / pentest engagements. You have a written scope, signed by someone who can authorize testing on the target systems.
- Defensive teams testing detection coverage. You're using IAMROOT in a lab to verify your auditd/sigma/falco rules fire as expected.
- Security researchers studying historical LPEs. You're reading the code, running it in your own VMs, learning how the primitives actually work end-to-end.
- Build engineers verifying patch coverage. You're running
iamroot --scanagainst your fleet's golden images to confirm each known CVE shows up as patched.
Not-acceptable use
IAMROOT should not be used:
- On systems you do not own and have not been authorized to test
- As part of unauthorized access to any system
- To exfiltrate data or maintain persistence on a system after a testing engagement is complete
- To build a worm, scanner, or any tool that automatically targets systems at scale without per-target authorization
By using IAMROOT you assert that your use falls into the acceptable-use cases above.
Why this is publishable
Every CVE bundled in IAMROOT is:
- Already patched in upstream mainline kernel
- Already published in NVD or distro security trackers
- Already covered by existing public PoCs
IAMROOT does not introduce new offensive capability. It bundles, documents, and CI-tests what is already public — and ships the detection signatures defenders need to spot it.
The bundling itself raises the baseline competence required to benefit from this code: a script kiddie can already find and run single-CVE PoCs on GitHub. Bundling improves quality and CI coverage without meaningfully changing offensive capability, while providing real defensive value through the detection-rule exports.
Disclosure
If you find a bug in IAMROOT itself (incorrect detection, broken exploit on a kernel where it should work, missing a backport in the range metadata): file a public GitHub issue.
If you find a new 0-day kernel LPE while inspired by reading
IAMROOT code: please disclose it responsibly to the kernel
security team (security@kernel.org) and the affected distros
before writing a public PoC. Once upstream patch ships and a CVE
is assigned, IAMROOT will gladly accept the module.
Persistence and stealth are out of scope
--exploit-backdoor in the copy_fail module overwrites a
/etc/passwd line with a uid=0 shell account. This is overt:
- The username is
iamroot(wasdirtyfail) — instantly identifiable - It's covered by the auditd rules IAMROOT ships
--cleanup-backdoorrestores the original line
If you're looking for evasion, persistence, or stealth: not here. Use a real C2 framework if you have authorization to do so. IAMROOT stops at "demonstrate that the bug works."