Files
SKELETONKEY/README.md
T
leviathan 6e0f811a2c README + site + binary: surface 22-of-26 VM-verified count
Updates the visible 'how trustworthy is this' signal across all three
touchpoints after the verifier sweep landed 22 modules confirmed in
real Linux VMs:

README.md
  - Badge: '28 verified + 3 ported' → '22 VM-verified / 26'.
  - Headline tagline: emphasizes the 22-of-26 empirical confirmation.
  - 'Corpus at a glance' restructured: tier counts unchanged, but the
    stale '3 ported-but-unverified' subsection is replaced by a new
    'Empirical verification' table breaking the 22 records down by
    distro/kernel.
  - 'Status' section refreshed for v0.6.0 reality: 88 tests + 22
    verifications + mainline kernel fetch + --explain + KEV/CWE/ATT&CK
    metadata + 119 detection rules. The four still-unverified entries
    (vmwgfx, dirty_cow, dirtydecrypt, fragnesia) are listed with their
    blocking reasons.

docs/index.html
  - Hero stats row gets a new '22 ✓ VM-verified' chip (emerald-styled
    via new .stat-vfy CSS class), keeping modules/KEV/rules siblings.
  - Hero tagline calls out '22 of 26 CVEs empirically verified'.
  - Meta description + og:description updated.
  - Bento card 'Verifier ready' rewritten as '22 modules empirically
    verified' with concrete distro/kernel breakdown; styled with new
    .bento-vfy class for emerald accent (matches the stat chip).
  - Timeline 'shipped' column adds the verifier wins; 'in flight'
    swapped to current open items (drift fixes, packagekit provisioner,
    custom <=4.4 box for dirty_cow).

docs/og.svg + docs/og.png
  - 4-chip stats row instead of 3: 31 modules · 22 ✓ VM-verified · 10
    ★ in CISA KEV · 119 detection rules. Tagline now '22 of 26 CVEs
    verified in real Linux VMs.' Re-rendered to PNG via rsvg-convert.

skeletonkey.c (binary)
  - --list footer now prints '31 modules registered · 10 in CISA KEV
    (★) · 22 empirically verified in real VMs (✓)'. Counts computed
    from the registry + cve_metadata + verifications tables at runtime
    (so it stays accurate as more verifications land — the JSONL
    refresh propagates automatically).

No code logic changed; only surfacing.
2026-05-23 18:03:38 -04:00

12 KiB
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SKELETONKEY

Latest release License: MIT Modules Platform: Linux

One curated binary. 31 Linux LPE modules covering 26 CVEs from 2016 → 2026. 22 confirmed end-to-end against real Linux VMs via tools/verify-vm/. Detection rules in the box. One command picks the safest one and runs it.

curl -sSL https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/releases/latest/download/install.sh | sh \
  && skeletonkey --auto --i-know

⚠️ Authorized testing only. SKELETONKEY runs real exploits. By using it you assert you have explicit authorization to test the target system. See docs/ETHICS.md.

Why use this

Most Linux privesc tooling is broken in one of three ways:

  • linux-exploit-suggester / linpeas — tell you what might work, run nothing
  • auto-root-exploit / kernelpop — bundle exploits but ship no detection signatures and went stale years ago
  • Per-CVE PoC repos — one author, one distro, abandoned within months

SKELETONKEY is one binary, actively maintained, with detection rules for every CVE in the bundle — same project for red and blue teams.

Who it's for

Audience What you get
Red team / pentesters One tested binary. --auto ranks vulnerable modules by safety and runs the safest. Honest scope reporting — never claims root it didn't actually get.
Sysadmins skeletonkey --scan (no sudo needed) tells you which boxes still need patching. Fleet-scan tool included. JSON output for CI gates (schema).
Blue team / SOC Auditd + sigma + yara + falco rules for every CVE. --detect-rules --format=auditd | sudo tee … ships SIEM coverage in one command.
CTF / training Reproducible LPE environment with public CVEs across a 10-year timeline. Each module documents the bug, the trigger, and the fix.

Corpus at a glance

31 modules covering 26 distinct CVEs across the 2016 → 2026 LPE timeline. 22 of the 26 CVEs have been empirically verified in real Linux VMs via tools/verify-vm/; the 4 still-pending entries are blocked by their target environment, not by missing code.

Tier Count What it means
🟢 Full chain 14 Lands root (or its canonical capability) end-to-end. No per-kernel offsets needed.
🟡 Primitive 14 Fires the kernel primitive + grooms the slab + records a witness. Default returns EXPLOIT_FAIL honestly. Pass --full-chain to engage the shared modprobe_path finisher (needs offsets — see docs/OFFSETS.md).

🟢 Modules that land root on a vulnerable host: copy_fail family ×5 · dirty_pipe · dirty_cow · pwnkit · overlayfs (CVE-2021-3493) · overlayfs_setuid (CVE-2023-0386) · cgroup_release_agent · ptrace_traceme · sudoedit_editor · entrybleed (KASLR leak primitive)

🟡 Modules with opt-in --full-chain: af_packet · af_packet2 · af_unix_gc · cls_route4 · fuse_legacy · nf_tables · nft_set_uaf · nft_fwd_dup · nft_payload · netfilter_xtcompat · stackrot · sudo_samedit · sequoia · vmwgfx

Empirical verification (22 of 26 CVEs)

Records in docs/VERIFICATIONS.jsonl prove each verdict against a known-target VM. Coverage:

Distro / kernel Modules verified
Ubuntu 18.04 (4.15.0) af_packet · ptrace_traceme · sudo_samedit
Ubuntu 20.04 (5.4 stock + 5.15 HWE) af_packet2 · cls_route4 · nft_payload · overlayfs · pwnkit · sequoia
Ubuntu 22.04 (5.15 stock + mainline 5.15.5 / 6.1.10) af_unix_gc · dirty_pipe · entrybleed · nf_tables · nft_set_uaf · overlayfs_setuid · stackrot · sudoedit_editor
Debian 11 (5.10 stock) cgroup_release_agent · fuse_legacy · netfilter_xtcompat · nft_fwd_dup
Debian 12 (6.1 stock) pack2theroot

Not yet verified (4): vmwgfx (VMware-guest-only — no public Vagrant box), dirty_cow (needs ≤ 4.4 kernel — older than every supported box), dirtydecrypt & fragnesia (need Linux 7.0 — not shipping as any distro kernel yet). All four are flagged in tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml with rationale.

See CVES.md for per-module CVE, kernel range, and detection status. Run skeletonkey --module-info <name> for the embedded verification records per module.

Quickstart

# Install (x86_64 / arm64; checksum-verified)
curl -sSL https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/releases/latest/download/install.sh | sh

# What's this box vulnerable to?  (no sudo)
skeletonkey --scan

# One-page operator briefing for a single CVE: CWE / MITRE ATT&CK /
# CISA KEV status, live detect() trace, OPSEC footprint, detection
# coverage. Useful for triage tickets and SOC analyst handoffs.
skeletonkey --explain nf_tables

# Pick the safest LPE and run it
skeletonkey --auto --i-know

# Deploy detection rules (needs sudo to write into /etc/audit/rules.d/)
skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=auditd \
  | sudo tee /etc/audit/rules.d/99-skeletonkey.rules

# Fleet scan — many hosts via SSH, aggregated JSON for SIEM
./tools/skeletonkey-fleet-scan.sh --binary skeletonkey \
  --ssh-key ~/.ssh/id_rsa hosts.txt

SKELETONKEY runs as a normal unprivileged user — that's the point. --scan, --audit, --exploit, and --detect-rules all work without sudo. Only --mitigate and rule-file installation write root-owned paths.

Example: unprivileged → root

$ id
uid=1000(kara) gid=1000(kara) groups=1000(kara)

$ skeletonkey --auto --i-know
[*] auto: host=demo distro=ubuntu/24.04 kernel=5.15.0-56-generic arch=x86_64
[*] auto: active probes enabled — brief /tmp file touches and fork-isolated namespace probes
[*] auto: scanning 31 modules for vulnerabilities...
[+] auto: dirty_pipe             VULNERABLE (safety rank 90)
[+] auto: cgroup_release_agent   VULNERABLE (safety rank 98)
[+] auto: pwnkit                 VULNERABLE (safety rank 100)
[ ] auto: copy_fail              patched or not applicable
[ ] auto: nf_tables              precondition not met
...

[*] auto: scan summary — 3 vulnerable, 21 patched/n.a., 7 precondition-fail, 0 indeterminate
[*] auto: 3 vulnerable modules found. Safest is 'pwnkit' (rank 100).
[*] auto: launching --exploit pwnkit...

[+] pwnkit: writing gconv-modules cache + payload.so...
[+] pwnkit: execve(pkexec) with NULL argv + crafted envp...
# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)

The safety ranking goes: structural escapes (no kernel state touched) → page-cache writesuserspace cred-raceskernel primitiveskernel races (least predictable). The goal is to never crash a production box looking for root.

How it works

Each CVE (or tightly-related family) is a module under modules/. Modules export a standard interface (detect / exploit / mitigate / cleanup) plus metadata (kernel range, detection rule text). The top-level binary dispatches per command:

  • --scan walks every module's detect() against the running host
  • --exploit <name> --i-know runs the named module's exploit (the --i-know flag is the authorization gate)
  • --auto --i-know does the scan, ranks by safety, runs the safest
  • --detect-rules --format=<auditd|sigma|yara|falco> emits the embedded rule corpus
  • --mitigate <name> / --cleanup <name> apply / undo temporary mitigations (module-dependent — most kernel modules say "upgrade")
  • --dump-offsets reads /proc/kallsyms + /boot/System.map and emits a ready-to-paste C entry for the --full-chain offset table

See docs/ARCHITECTURE.md for the module-loader design.

The verified-vs-claimed bar

Most public PoC repos hardcode offsets for one kernel build and silently break elsewhere. SKELETONKEY refuses to ship fabricated offsets. The shared --full-chain finisher only returns EXPLOIT_OK after a setuid bash sentinel file actually appears; otherwise modules return EXPLOIT_FAIL with a diagnostic. Operators populate the offset table once per target kernel via skeletonkey --dump-offsets and either set env vars or upstream the entry via PR (CONTRIBUTING.md).

Build from source

git clone https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY.git
cd SKELETONKEY
make
./skeletonkey --version

Builds clean with gcc or clang on any modern Linux. macOS dev builds also compile (modules with Linux-only headers stub out gracefully).

Status

v0.6.0 cut 2026-05-23. 31 modules across 26 CVEs, 22 empirically verified against real Linux VMs (Ubuntu 18.04 / 20.04 / 22.04 + Debian 11 / 12 + mainline kernels 5.15.5 / 6.1.10 from kernel.ubuntu.com). 88-test unit harness on every push.

Reliability + accuracy work in v0.6.0:

  • Shared host fingerprint (core/host.{h,c}) populated once at startup — kernel/distro/userns gates/sudo+polkit versions — exposed to every module via ctx->host.
  • Test harness (tests/, make test) — 88 tests: 33 kernel_range unit tests + 55 detect() integration tests over mocked host fingerprints. Runs in CI on every push.
  • VM verifier (tools/verify-vm/) — Vagrant + Parallels scaffold that boots known-vulnerable kernels (stock distro + mainline via kernel.ubuntu.com), runs --explain --active per module, records match/MISMATCH/PRECOND_FAIL as JSON. 22 modules confirmed end-to-end.
  • --explain <module> — single-page operator briefing: CVE / CWE / MITRE ATT&CK / CISA KEV status, host fingerprint, live detect() trace, OPSEC footprint, detection-rule coverage, verified-on records. Paste-into-ticket ready.
  • CVE metadata pipeline (tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py) — fetches CISA KEV catalog + NVD CWE; 10 of 26 modules cover KEV-listed CVEs.
  • 119 detection rules across auditd / sigma / yara / falco; one command exports the corpus to your SIEM.
  • --auto upgrades: per-detect 15s timeout, fork-isolated detect + exploit, structured verdict table, scan summary, --dry-run.

Not yet verified (4 of 26 CVEs): vmwgfx (VMware-guest only), dirty_cow (needs ≤ 4.4 kernel), dirtydecrypt + fragnesia (need Linux 7.0 — not shipping yet). Rationale in tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml.

See ROADMAP.md for the next planned modules and infrastructure work.

Contributing

PRs welcome for: kernel offsets (run --dump-offsets on a target kernel, paste into core/offsets.c), new modules, detection rules, and CVE-status corrections. See CONTRIBUTING.md.

Keeping kernel_range tables current. tools/refresh-kernel-ranges.py polls Debian's security tracker and reports drift between each module's hardcoded kernel_patched_from thresholds and the fixed-versions Debian actually ships. Run periodically (or in CI) to catch new backports that need to land in the corpus:

tools/refresh-kernel-ranges.py            # human report
tools/refresh-kernel-ranges.py --json     # machine-readable
tools/refresh-kernel-ranges.py --patch    # proposed C-source edits

Acknowledgments

Each module credits the original CVE reporter and PoC author in its NOTICE.md. SKELETONKEY is the bundling and bookkeeping layer; the research credit belongs to the people who found the bugs.

License

MIT — see LICENSE.