rename: IAMROOT → SKELETONKEY across the entire project
Breaking change. Tool name, binary name, function/type names,
constant names, env vars, header guards, file paths, and GitHub
repo URL all rebrand IAMROOT → SKELETONKEY.
Changes:
- All "IAMROOT" → "SKELETONKEY" (constants, env vars, enum
values, docs, comments)
- All "iamroot" → "skeletonkey" (functions, types, paths, CLI)
- iamroot.c → skeletonkey.c
- modules/*/iamroot_modules.{c,h} → modules/*/skeletonkey_modules.{c,h}
- tools/iamroot-fleet-scan.sh → tools/skeletonkey-fleet-scan.sh
- Binary "iamroot" → "skeletonkey"
- GitHub URL KaraZajac/IAMROOT → KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY
- .gitignore now expects build output named "skeletonkey"
- /tmp/iamroot-* tmpfiles → /tmp/skeletonkey-*
- Env vars IAMROOT_MODPROBE_PATH etc. → SKELETONKEY_*
New ASCII skeleton-key banner (horizontal key icon + ANSI Shadow
SKELETONKEY block letters) replaces the IAMROOT banner in
skeletonkey.c and README.md.
VERSION: 0.3.1 → 0.4.0 (breaking).
Build clean on Debian 6.12.86. `skeletonkey --version` → 0.4.0.
All 24 modules still register; no functional code changes — pure
rename + banner refresh.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@
|
||||
# Watch /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, /etc/sudoers, /etc/sudoers.d/* for
|
||||
# any modification by non-root — the Dirty Pipe payload typically
|
||||
# overwrites these to gain root.
|
||||
-w /etc/passwd -p wa -k iamroot-dirty-pipe
|
||||
-w /etc/shadow -p wa -k iamroot-dirty-pipe
|
||||
-w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k iamroot-dirty-pipe
|
||||
-w /etc/sudoers.d -p wa -k iamroot-dirty-pipe
|
||||
-w /etc/passwd -p wa -k skeletonkey-dirty-pipe
|
||||
-w /etc/shadow -p wa -k skeletonkey-dirty-pipe
|
||||
-w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k skeletonkey-dirty-pipe
|
||||
-w /etc/sudoers.d -p wa -k skeletonkey-dirty-pipe
|
||||
|
||||
# Watch every splice() syscall — combined with the file watches above
|
||||
# this catches the canonical exploit shape. (High volume on servers
|
||||
# using nginx/HAProxy; consider scoping with -F gid!=33 -F gid!=99 to
|
||||
# exclude web servers.)
|
||||
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S splice -k iamroot-dirty-pipe-splice
|
||||
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S splice -k iamroot-dirty-pipe-splice
|
||||
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S splice -k skeletonkey-dirty-pipe-splice
|
||||
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S splice -k skeletonkey-dirty-pipe-splice
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
||||
title: Possible Dirty Pipe exploitation (CVE-2022-0847)
|
||||
id: f6b13c08-iamroot-dirty-pipe
|
||||
id: f6b13c08-skeletonkey-dirty-pipe
|
||||
status: experimental
|
||||
description: |
|
||||
Detects file modifications to /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, /etc/sudoers,
|
||||
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ description: |
|
||||
references:
|
||||
- https://dirtypipe.cm4all.com/
|
||||
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0847
|
||||
author: IAMROOT
|
||||
author: SKELETONKEY
|
||||
date: 2026/05/16
|
||||
logsource:
|
||||
product: linux
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user