5d48a7b0b55faf254f7826c84d4f9c6a5e7bcf84
9 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 leviathan
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5d48a7b0b5 |
release v0.7.1: arm64-static binary + per-module arch_support
Two additions on top of v0.7.0:
1. skeletonkey-arm64-static is now published alongside the existing
x86_64-static binary. Built native-arm64 in Alpine via GitHub's
ubuntu-24.04-arm runner pool (free for public repos as of 2024).
install.sh auto-picks it based on 'uname -m'; SKELETONKEY_DYNAMIC=1
fetches the dynamic build instead. Works on Raspberry Pi 4+, Apple
Silicon Linux VMs, AWS Graviton, Oracle Ampere, Hetzner ARM, etc.
.github/workflows/release.yml refactor: the previous single
build-static-x86_64 job becomes a build-static matrix with two
entries (x86_64-static on ubuntu-latest, arm64-static on
ubuntu-24.04-arm). Both share the same Alpine container + build
recipe.
2. .arch_support field on struct skeletonkey_module — honest per-module
labeling of which architectures the exploit() body has been verified
on. Three categories:
'any' (4 modules): pwnkit, sudo_samedit, sudoedit_editor,
pack2theroot. Purely userspace; arch-independent.
'x86_64' (1 module): entrybleed. KPTI prefetchnta side-channel;
x86-only by physics. Already source-gated (returns
PRECOND_FAIL on non-x86_64).
'x86_64+unverified-arm64' (26 modules): kernel exploitation
code. The bug class is generic but the exploit primitives
(msg_msg sprays, finisher chain, struct offsets) haven't been
confirmed on arm64. detect() still works (just reads ctx->host);
only the --exploit path is in question.
--list now has an ARCH column (any / x64 / x64?) and the footer
prints 'N arch-independent (any)'.
--module-info prints 'arch support: <value>'.
--scan --json adds 'arch_support' to each module record.
This is the honest 'arm64 works for detection on every module +
exploitation on 4 of them today; the rest await empirical arm64
sweep' framing — not pretending the kernel exploits already work
there, but not blocking the arm64 binary on that either. arm64
users get the full triage workflow + a handful of userspace exploits
out of the box, plus a clear roadmap for the rest.
Future work to promote modules from 'x86_64+unverified-arm64' to
'any': add an arm64 Vagrant box (generic/debian12-arm64 etc.) to
tools/verify-vm/ and run a verification sweep on Apple Silicon /
ARM Linux hardware.
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leviathan
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39ce4dff09 |
modules: per-module OPSEC notes — telemetry footprint per exploit
Adds .opsec_notes to every module's struct skeletonkey_module
(31 entries across 26 module files). One paragraph per exploit
describing the runtime footprint a defender/SOC would see:
- file artifacts created/modified (exact paths from source)
- syscall observables (the unshare / socket / setsockopt /
splice / msgsnd patterns the embedded detection rules look for)
- dmesg signatures (silent on success vs KASAN oops on miss)
- network activity (loopback-only vs none)
- persistence side-effects (/etc/passwd modification, dropped
setuid binaries, backdoors)
- cleanup behaviour (callback present? what it restores?)
Each note is grounded in the module's source code + its existing
auditd/sigma/yara/falco detection rules — the OPSEC notes are
literally the inverse of those rules (the rules describe what to
look for; the notes describe what the exploit triggers).
Three intelligence agents researched the modules in parallel,
reading source + MODULE.md, then their proposals were embedded
verbatim via tools/inject_opsec.py (one-shot script, not retained).
Where surfaced:
- --module-info <name>: '--- opsec notes ---' section between
detect-rules summary and the embedded auditd/sigma rule bodies.
- --module-info / --scan --json: 'opsec_notes' top-level string.
Audience uses:
- Red team: see what footprint each exploit leaves so they pick
chains that match the host's telemetry posture.
- Blue team: the notes mirror the existing detection rules from the
attacker side — easy diff to find gaps in their SIEM coverage.
- Researchers: per-exploit footprint catalog for technique analysis.
copy_fail_family gets one shared note across all 5 register entries
(copy_fail, copy_fail_gcm, dirty_frag_esp, dirty_frag_esp6,
dirty_frag_rxrpc) since they share exploit infrastructure.
Verification:
- macOS local: clean build, --module-info nf_tables shows full
opsec section + CWE + ATT&CK + KEV row from previous commit.
- Linux (docker gcc:latest): 33 + 54 = 87 passes, 0 fails.
Next: --explain mode (uses these notes + the triage metadata to
render a single 'why is this verdict, what would patch fix it, and
what would the SOC see' page per module).
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leviathan
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8938a74d04 |
detection rules: YARA + Falco for the 6 highest-rank modules + playbook
Closes the 'rules in the box' gap — the README has claimed YARA + Falco coverage but detect_yara and detect_falco were NULL on every module. This commit lights up both formats for the 6 highest-value modules (covering 10 of 31 registered modules via family-shared rules), and the existing operational playbook gains the format-specific deployment recipes + the cross-format correlation table. YARA rules (8 rules, 9 module-headers, 152 lines): - copy_fail_family — etc_passwd_uid_flip + etc_passwd_root_no_password (shared across copy_fail / copy_fail_gcm / dirty_frag_esp / dirty_frag_esp6 / dirty_frag_rxrpc) - dirty_pipe — passwd UID flip pattern, dirty-pipe-specific tag - dirtydecrypt — 28-byte ELF prefix match on tiny_elf[] + setuid+execve shellcode tail, detects the page-cache overlay landing - fragnesia — 28-byte ELF prefix on shell_elf[] + setuid+setgid+seteuid cascade, detects the 192-byte page-cache overlay - pwnkit — gconv-modules cache file format (small text file with module UTF-8// X// /tmp/...) - pack2theroot — malicious .deb (ar archive + SUID-bash postinst) + /tmp/.suid_bash artifact scan Falco rules (13 rules, 9 module-headers, 219 lines): - pwnkit — pkexec with empty argv + GCONV_PATH/CHARSET env from non-root - copy_fail_family — AF_ALG socket from non-root + NETLINK_XFRM from unprivileged userns + /etc/passwd modified by non-root - dirty_pipe — splice() of setuid/credential file by non-root - dirtydecrypt — AF_RXRPC socket + add_key(rxrpc) by non-root - fragnesia — TCP_ULP=espintcp from non-root + splice of setuid binary - pack2theroot — SUID bit set on /tmp/.suid_bash + dpkg invoked by packagekitd with /tmp/.pk-*.deb + 2x InstallFiles on same transaction Wiring: each module's .detect_yara and .detect_falco struct fields now point at the embedded string. The dispatcher dedups by pointer, so family-shared rules emit once across the 5 sub-modules. docs/DETECTION_PLAYBOOK.md augmented (302 -> 456 lines): - New 'YARA artifact scanning' subsection under SIEM integration with scheduled-scan cron pattern + per-rule trigger table - New 'Falco runtime detection' subsection with deploy + per-rule trigger table - New 'Per-module detection coverage' table — 4-format matrix - New 'Correlation across formats' section — multi-format incident signature per exploit (the 3-of-4 signal pattern) - New 'Worked example: catching DirtyDecrypt end-to-end' walkthrough from Falco page through yara confirmation, recovery, hunt + patch The existing operational lifecycle / SIEM patterns / FP tuning content is preserved unchanged — this commit only adds. Final stats: - auditd: 109 rule statements across 27 modules - sigma: 16 sigma rules across 19 modules - yara: 8 yara rules across 9 module headers (5 family + 4 distinct) - falco: 13 falco rules across 9 module headers The remaining 21 modules can gain YARA / Falco coverage incrementally by populating their detect_yara / detect_falco struct fields. |
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leviathan
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150f16bc97 |
pwnkit + sudoedit_editor: ctx->host migration + 4 more tests (39 total)
pwnkit: migrate detect() to consult ctx->host->polkit_version with the same graceful-fallback pattern as the sudo modules. The version is populated once at startup by core/host.c (via pkexec --version); detect() skips the per-scan popen when the host fingerprint has the version. Falls back to the inline popen path when ctx->host is missing the version (degenerate test contexts). sudoedit_editor: already migrated; this commit adds direct test coverage. tests/test_detect.c expansion (35 → 39): - pwnkit: polkit_version='0.105' -> VULNERABLE (pre-0.121 fix) - pwnkit: polkit_version='0.121' -> OK (fix release) - sudoedit_editor: vuln sudo + no sudoers grant -> PRECOND_FAIL (documented behaviour: vulnerable version, but the dispatcher has no usable sudoedit grant on the host) - sudoedit_editor: fixed sudo (1.9.13p1) -> OK The sudoedit_editor 'vuln + no grant' case is the first test to exercise the second-level precondition gate AFTER the version check passes — proves the version-pinned detect logic AND the sudo -ln target-discovery short-circuit both work as intended. The h_vuln_sudo / h_fixed_sudo synthetic fingerprints gained the .polkit_version field alongside .sudo_version so a single fingerprint exercises both pwnkit and the sudo modules. Verification: 39/39 pass on Linux (docker gcc:latest + libglib2.0-dev + sudo, non-root user skeletonkeyci). macOS dev box still reports 'skipped — Linux-only' as designed. |
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leviathan
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36814f272d |
modules: migrate remaining 22 modules to ctx->host fingerprint
Completes the host-fingerprint refactor that started in
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leviathan
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9593d90385 |
rename: IAMROOT → SKELETONKEY across the entire project
Breaking change. Tool name, binary name, function/type names,
constant names, env vars, header guards, file paths, and GitHub
repo URL all rebrand IAMROOT → SKELETONKEY.
Changes:
- All "IAMROOT" → "SKELETONKEY" (constants, env vars, enum
values, docs, comments)
- All "iamroot" → "skeletonkey" (functions, types, paths, CLI)
- iamroot.c → skeletonkey.c
- modules/*/iamroot_modules.{c,h} → modules/*/skeletonkey_modules.{c,h}
- tools/iamroot-fleet-scan.sh → tools/skeletonkey-fleet-scan.sh
- Binary "iamroot" → "skeletonkey"
- GitHub URL KaraZajac/IAMROOT → KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY
- .gitignore now expects build output named "skeletonkey"
- /tmp/iamroot-* tmpfiles → /tmp/skeletonkey-*
- Env vars IAMROOT_MODPROBE_PATH etc. → SKELETONKEY_*
New ASCII skeleton-key banner (horizontal key icon + ANSI Shadow
SKELETONKEY block letters) replaces the IAMROOT banner in
skeletonkey.c and README.md.
VERSION: 0.3.1 → 0.4.0 (breaking).
Build clean on Debian 6.12.86. `skeletonkey --version` → 0.4.0.
All 24 modules still register; no functional code changes — pure
rename + banner refresh.
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leviathan
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9d88b475c1 |
v0.3.1: --dump-offsets tool + NOTICE.md per module
The README has been claiming "each module credits the original CVE
reporter and PoC author in its NOTICE.md" since v0.1.0, but only
copy_fail_family actually shipped one. Fixed.
modules/<name>/NOTICE.md (×19 new + 1 existing): per-module
research credit covering CVE ID, discoverer, original advisory
URL where public, upstream fix commit, IAMROOT's role.
iamroot.c: new --dump-offsets subcommand. Resolves kernel offsets
via the existing core/offsets.c four-source chain (env →
/proc/kallsyms → /boot/System.map → embedded table), then emits
a ready-to-paste C struct entry for kernel_table[]. Run once
as root on a target kernel build; upstream via PR. Eliminates
fabricating offsets — every shipped entry traces back to a
`iamroot --dump-offsets` invocation on a real kernel.
docs/OFFSETS.md: documents the --dump-offsets workflow.
CVES.md: notes the NOTICE.md convention + offset dump tool.
iamroot.c: bump IAMROOT_VERSION 0.3.0 → 0.3.1.
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leviathan
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f1bd896ca8 |
Phase 7: Pwnkit FULL exploit (Qualys-style PoC) + DEFENDERS.md
Pwnkit: 🔵 → 🟢 - Implements the canonical Qualys-style PoC end-to-end: 1. Locate setuid pkexec 2. mkdtemp working directory under /tmp 3. Detect target's gcc/cc (fail-soft if absent) 4. Write payload.c (gconv constructor: unsetenv hostile vars, setuid(0), execle /bin/sh -p with clean PATH) 5. gcc -shared -fPIC payload.c -o pwnkit/PWNKIT.so 6. Write gconv-modules cache pointing UTF-8// → PWNKIT// 7. execve(pkexec, NULL_argv, envp{GCONV_PATH=workdir/pwnkit, PATH=GCONV_PATH=., CHARSET=PWNKIT, SHELL=pwnkit}) → argc=0 triggers argv-overflow-into-envp; pkexec re-execs with PATH set to our tmpdir; libc's iconv loads PWNKIT.so as root; constructor pops /bin/sh with uid=0. - Cleanup: removes /tmp/iamroot-pwnkit-* workdirs. - Auto-refuses on patched hosts (re-runs detect() first). - GCC -Wformat-truncation warnings fixed by sizing path buffers generously (1024/2048 bytes — way more than needed in practice). Verified end-to-end on kctf-mgr (polkit 126 = patched): iamroot --exploit pwnkit --i-know → detect() says fixed → refuses cleanly. Correct behavior. Vulnerable-kernel validation is Phase 4 CI matrix work. docs/DEFENDERS.md — blue-team deployment guide: - TL;DR: scan, deploy rules, mitigate, watch - Operations cheat sheet (--list, --scan, --detect-rules, --mitigate) - Audit-key table mapping rule keys to modules to caught behavior - Fleet-scanning recipe (ssh + jq aggregation) - Known false-positive shapes per rule with tuning hints CVES.md: pwnkit row updated 🔵 → 🟢. ROADMAP.md: Phase 7 Pwnkit checkbox marked complete. |
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leviathan
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43e290b224 |
Phase 7: Pwnkit (CVE-2021-4034) detect-only module
First USERSPACE LPE in IAMROOT (every prior module is kernel). Same
iamroot_module interface — the difference is the affected-version
check is package-version-based rather than kernel-version-based.
- modules/pwnkit_cve_2021_4034/:
- iamroot_modules.{c,h}: detect() locates setuid pkexec (one of
/usr/bin/pkexec, /usr/sbin/pkexec, /bin/pkexec, /sbin/pkexec,
/usr/local/bin/pkexec) and parses 'pkexec --version' output.
Handles BOTH version-string formats: legacy '0.105'/'0.120'
(older polkit) AND modern bare-integer '121'/'126' (post-0.121
rename to single-number scheme). Reports VULNERABLE on parse
failure (conservative).
- exploit() returns IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL with a 'not yet
implemented' message; full Qualys-PoC follow-up is the next
commit. ~200 lines including embedded .so generator.
- MODULE.md documents the bug, affected ranges, distro backport
landscape (RHEL 7/8, Ubuntu focal/impish, Debian buster/bullseye
each have their own backported polkit version).
- Embedded auditd + sigma detection rules:
auditd: pkexec watch + execve audit
sigma: pkexec invocation + suspicious env (GCONV_PATH, CHARSET)
- core/registry.h adds iamroot_register_pwnkit() declaration.
- iamroot.c main() registers pwnkit.
- Makefile gains the pwnkit family as a separate object set.
Verified end-to-end on kctf-mgr (modern polkit 126):
iamroot --list → 8 modules
iamroot --scan → pwnkit reports 'version 126 ≥ 0.121 (fixed)'
iamroot --detect-rules --format=auditd | grep pwnkit → emits
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