Two additions on top of v0.7.0:
1. skeletonkey-arm64-static is now published alongside the existing
x86_64-static binary. Built native-arm64 in Alpine via GitHub's
ubuntu-24.04-arm runner pool (free for public repos as of 2024).
install.sh auto-picks it based on 'uname -m'; SKELETONKEY_DYNAMIC=1
fetches the dynamic build instead. Works on Raspberry Pi 4+, Apple
Silicon Linux VMs, AWS Graviton, Oracle Ampere, Hetzner ARM, etc.
.github/workflows/release.yml refactor: the previous single
build-static-x86_64 job becomes a build-static matrix with two
entries (x86_64-static on ubuntu-latest, arm64-static on
ubuntu-24.04-arm). Both share the same Alpine container + build
recipe.
2. .arch_support field on struct skeletonkey_module — honest per-module
labeling of which architectures the exploit() body has been verified
on. Three categories:
'any' (4 modules): pwnkit, sudo_samedit, sudoedit_editor,
pack2theroot. Purely userspace; arch-independent.
'x86_64' (1 module): entrybleed. KPTI prefetchnta side-channel;
x86-only by physics. Already source-gated (returns
PRECOND_FAIL on non-x86_64).
'x86_64+unverified-arm64' (26 modules): kernel exploitation
code. The bug class is generic but the exploit primitives
(msg_msg sprays, finisher chain, struct offsets) haven't been
confirmed on arm64. detect() still works (just reads ctx->host);
only the --exploit path is in question.
--list now has an ARCH column (any / x64 / x64?) and the footer
prints 'N arch-independent (any)'.
--module-info prints 'arch support: <value>'.
--scan --json adds 'arch_support' to each module record.
This is the honest 'arm64 works for detection on every module +
exploitation on 4 of them today; the rest await empirical arm64
sweep' framing — not pretending the kernel exploits already work
there, but not blocking the arm64 binary on that either. arm64
users get the full triage workflow + a handful of userspace exploits
out of the box, plus a clear roadmap for the rest.
Future work to promote modules from 'x86_64+unverified-arm64' to
'any': add an arm64 Vagrant box (generic/debian12-arm64 etc.) to
tools/verify-vm/ and run a verification sweep on Apple Silicon /
ARM Linux hardware.
SKELETONKEY
One curated binary. 31 Linux LPE modules covering 26 CVEs from 2016 → 2026. 22 confirmed end-to-end against real Linux VMs via
tools/verify-vm/. Detection rules in the box. One command picks the safest one and runs it.
curl -sSL https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/releases/latest/download/install.sh | sh \
&& skeletonkey --auto --i-know
⚠️ Authorized testing only. SKELETONKEY runs real exploits. By using it you assert you have explicit authorization to test the target system. See
docs/ETHICS.md.
Why use this
Most Linux privesc tooling is broken in one of three ways:
linux-exploit-suggester/linpeas— tell you what might work, run nothingauto-root-exploit/kernelpop— bundle exploits but ship no detection signatures and went stale years ago- Per-CVE PoC repos — one author, one distro, abandoned within months
SKELETONKEY is one binary, actively maintained, with detection rules for every CVE in the bundle — same project for red and blue teams.
Who it's for
| Audience | What you get |
|---|---|
| Red team / pentesters | One tested binary. --auto ranks vulnerable modules by safety and runs the safest. Honest scope reporting — never claims root it didn't actually get. |
| Sysadmins | skeletonkey --scan (no sudo needed) tells you which boxes still need patching. Fleet-scan tool included. JSON output for CI gates (schema). |
| Blue team / SOC | Auditd + sigma + yara + falco rules for every CVE. --detect-rules --format=auditd | sudo tee … ships SIEM coverage in one command. |
| CTF / training | Reproducible LPE environment with public CVEs across a 10-year timeline. Each module documents the bug, the trigger, and the fix. |
Corpus at a glance
31 modules covering 26 distinct CVEs across the 2016 → 2026 LPE
timeline. 22 of the 26 CVEs have been empirically verified in real
Linux VMs via tools/verify-vm/; the 4 still-pending entries are
blocked by their target environment, not by missing code.
| Tier | Count | What it means |
|---|---|---|
| 🟢 Full chain | 14 | Lands root (or its canonical capability) end-to-end. No per-kernel offsets needed. |
| 🟡 Primitive | 14 | Fires the kernel primitive + grooms the slab + records a witness. Default returns EXPLOIT_FAIL honestly. Pass --full-chain to engage the shared modprobe_path finisher (needs offsets — see docs/OFFSETS.md). |
🟢 Modules that land root on a vulnerable host: copy_fail family ×5 · dirty_pipe · dirty_cow · pwnkit · overlayfs (CVE-2021-3493) · overlayfs_setuid (CVE-2023-0386) · cgroup_release_agent · ptrace_traceme · sudoedit_editor · entrybleed (KASLR leak primitive)
🟡 Modules with opt-in --full-chain:
af_packet · af_packet2 · af_unix_gc · cls_route4 · fuse_legacy ·
nf_tables · nft_set_uaf · nft_fwd_dup · nft_payload ·
netfilter_xtcompat · stackrot · sudo_samedit · sequoia · vmwgfx
Empirical verification (22 of 26 CVEs)
Records in docs/VERIFICATIONS.jsonl prove
each verdict against a known-target VM. Coverage:
| Distro / kernel | Modules verified |
|---|---|
| Ubuntu 18.04 (4.15.0) | af_packet · ptrace_traceme · sudo_samedit |
| Ubuntu 20.04 (5.4 stock + 5.15 HWE) | af_packet2 · cls_route4 · nft_payload · overlayfs · pwnkit · sequoia |
| Ubuntu 22.04 (5.15 stock + mainline 5.15.5 / 6.1.10) | af_unix_gc · dirty_pipe · entrybleed · nf_tables · nft_set_uaf · overlayfs_setuid · stackrot · sudoedit_editor |
| Debian 11 (5.10 stock) | cgroup_release_agent · fuse_legacy · netfilter_xtcompat · nft_fwd_dup |
| Debian 12 (6.1 stock) | pack2theroot |
Not yet verified (4): vmwgfx (VMware-guest-only — no public
Vagrant box), dirty_cow (needs ≤ 4.4 kernel — older than every
supported box), dirtydecrypt & fragnesia (need Linux 7.0 — not
shipping as any distro kernel yet). All four are flagged in
tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml with
rationale.
See CVES.md for per-module CVE, kernel range, and
detection status. Run skeletonkey --module-info <name> for the
embedded verification records per module.
Quickstart
# Install (x86_64 / arm64; checksum-verified)
curl -sSL https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/releases/latest/download/install.sh | sh
# What's this box vulnerable to? (no sudo)
skeletonkey --scan
# One-page operator briefing for a single CVE: CWE / MITRE ATT&CK /
# CISA KEV status, live detect() trace, OPSEC footprint, detection
# coverage. Useful for triage tickets and SOC analyst handoffs.
skeletonkey --explain nf_tables
# Pick the safest LPE and run it
skeletonkey --auto --i-know
# Deploy detection rules (needs sudo to write into /etc/audit/rules.d/)
skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=auditd \
| sudo tee /etc/audit/rules.d/99-skeletonkey.rules
# Fleet scan — many hosts via SSH, aggregated JSON for SIEM
./tools/skeletonkey-fleet-scan.sh --binary skeletonkey \
--ssh-key ~/.ssh/id_rsa hosts.txt
SKELETONKEY runs as a normal unprivileged user — that's the point.
--scan, --audit, --exploit, and --detect-rules all work without
sudo. Only --mitigate and rule-file installation write root-owned
paths.
Example: unprivileged → root
$ id
uid=1000(kara) gid=1000(kara) groups=1000(kara)
$ skeletonkey --auto --i-know
[*] auto: host=demo distro=ubuntu/24.04 kernel=5.15.0-56-generic arch=x86_64
[*] auto: active probes enabled — brief /tmp file touches and fork-isolated namespace probes
[*] auto: scanning 31 modules for vulnerabilities...
[+] auto: dirty_pipe VULNERABLE (safety rank 90)
[+] auto: cgroup_release_agent VULNERABLE (safety rank 98)
[+] auto: pwnkit VULNERABLE (safety rank 100)
[ ] auto: copy_fail patched or not applicable
[ ] auto: nf_tables precondition not met
...
[*] auto: scan summary — 3 vulnerable, 21 patched/n.a., 7 precondition-fail, 0 indeterminate
[*] auto: 3 vulnerable modules found. Safest is 'pwnkit' (rank 100).
[*] auto: launching --exploit pwnkit...
[+] pwnkit: writing gconv-modules cache + payload.so...
[+] pwnkit: execve(pkexec) with NULL argv + crafted envp...
# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
The safety ranking goes: structural escapes (no kernel state touched) → page-cache writes → userspace cred-races → kernel primitives → kernel races (least predictable). The goal is to never crash a production box looking for root.
How it works
Each CVE (or tightly-related family) is a module under modules/.
Modules export a standard interface (detect / exploit / mitigate / cleanup) plus metadata (kernel range, detection rule text). The
top-level binary dispatches per command:
--scanwalks every module'sdetect()against the running host--exploit <name> --i-knowruns the named module's exploit (the--i-knowflag is the authorization gate)--auto --i-knowdoes the scan, ranks by safety, runs the safest--detect-rules --format=<auditd|sigma|yara|falco>emits the embedded rule corpus--mitigate <name>/--cleanup <name>apply / undo temporary mitigations (module-dependent — most kernel modules say "upgrade")--dump-offsetsreads/proc/kallsyms+/boot/System.mapand emits a ready-to-paste C entry for the--full-chainoffset table
See docs/ARCHITECTURE.md for the
module-loader design.
The verified-vs-claimed bar
Most public PoC repos hardcode offsets for one kernel build and
silently break elsewhere. SKELETONKEY refuses to ship fabricated
offsets. The shared --full-chain finisher only returns
EXPLOIT_OK after a setuid bash sentinel file actually appears;
otherwise modules return EXPLOIT_FAIL with a diagnostic. Operators
populate the offset table once per target kernel via
skeletonkey --dump-offsets and either set env vars or upstream the
entry via PR (CONTRIBUTING.md).
Build from source
git clone https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY.git
cd SKELETONKEY
make
./skeletonkey --version
Builds clean with gcc or clang on any modern Linux. macOS dev builds also compile (modules with Linux-only headers stub out gracefully).
Status
v0.6.0 cut 2026-05-23. 31 modules across 26 CVEs, 22 empirically verified against real Linux VMs (Ubuntu 18.04 / 20.04 / 22.04 + Debian 11 / 12 + mainline kernels 5.15.5 / 6.1.10 from kernel.ubuntu.com). 88-test unit harness on every push.
Reliability + accuracy work in v0.6.0:
- Shared host fingerprint (
core/host.{h,c}) populated once at startup — kernel/distro/userns gates/sudo+polkit versions — exposed to every module viactx->host. - Test harness (
tests/,make test) — 88 tests: 33 kernel_range unit tests + 55 detect() integration tests over mocked host fingerprints. Runs in CI on every push. - VM verifier (
tools/verify-vm/) — Vagrant + Parallels scaffold that boots known-vulnerable kernels (stock distro + mainline via kernel.ubuntu.com), runs--explain --activeper module, records match/MISMATCH/PRECOND_FAIL as JSON. 22 modules confirmed end-to-end. --explain <module>— single-page operator briefing: CVE / CWE / MITRE ATT&CK / CISA KEV status, host fingerprint, live detect() trace, OPSEC footprint, detection-rule coverage, verified-on records. Paste-into-ticket ready.- CVE metadata pipeline (
tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py) — fetches CISA KEV catalog + NVD CWE; 10 of 26 modules cover KEV-listed CVEs. - 119 detection rules across auditd / sigma / yara / falco; one command exports the corpus to your SIEM.
--autoupgrades: per-detect 15s timeout, fork-isolated detect + exploit, structured verdict table, scan summary,--dry-run.
Not yet verified (4 of 26 CVEs): vmwgfx (VMware-guest only),
dirty_cow (needs ≤ 4.4 kernel), dirtydecrypt + fragnesia (need
Linux 7.0 — not shipping yet). Rationale in
tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml.
See ROADMAP.md for the next planned modules and
infrastructure work.
Contributing
PRs welcome for: kernel offsets (run --dump-offsets on a target
kernel, paste into core/offsets.c), new modules, detection rules,
and CVE-status corrections. See CONTRIBUTING.md.
Keeping kernel_range tables current. tools/refresh-kernel-ranges.py
polls Debian's security tracker and reports drift between each
module's hardcoded kernel_patched_from thresholds and the
fixed-versions Debian actually ships. Run periodically (or in CI)
to catch new backports that need to land in the corpus:
tools/refresh-kernel-ranges.py # human report
tools/refresh-kernel-ranges.py --json # machine-readable
tools/refresh-kernel-ranges.py --patch # proposed C-source edits
Acknowledgments
Each module credits the original CVE reporter and PoC author in its
NOTICE.md. SKELETONKEY is the bundling and bookkeeping layer;
the research credit belongs to the people who found the bugs.
License
MIT — see LICENSE.