leviathan
1552a3bfcb
- core/kernel_range.{c,h}: branch-aware patched-version comparison.
Every future module needs 'is the host kernel in the affected
range?'; centralized here. Models stable-branch backports
(e.g. 5.10.102, 5.15.25) so a 5.15.20 host correctly reports
VULNERABLE while a 5.15.50 host reports OK.
- modules/dirty_pipe_cve_2022_0847/ (promoted out of _stubs):
- iamroot_modules.{c,h}: dirty_pipe module exposing detect() that
parses /proc/version and compares against the four known patched
branches (5.10.102, 5.15.25, 5.16.11, 5.17+ inherited). Returns
IAMROOT_OK / IAMROOT_VULNERABLE / IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR with stderr
hints in human-readable scan mode.
- exploit() returns IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL with a 'not yet
implemented' message; landing the actual exploit needs Phase 1.5
extraction of passwd/su helpers into core/.
- detect/auditd.rules: splice() syscall + passwd/shadow file watches
- detect/sigma.yml: non-root modification of /etc/passwd|shadow|sudoers
- iamroot.c main() calls iamroot_register_dirty_pipe() alongside
the copy_fail_family registration.
- Makefile gains the dirty_pipe family as a separate object set.
Verified end-to-end on kctf-mgr (kernel 6.12.86): build clean, 6
modules in --list, --scan correctly reports dirty_pipe as patched,
JSON output ingest-ready.
59 lines
3.9 KiB
Markdown
59 lines
3.9 KiB
Markdown
# CVE inventory
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The curated list of CVEs IAMROOT exploits, with patch status and
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module status. Updated as new modules land or as upstream patches
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ship.
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Status legend:
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- 🟢 **WORKING** — module verified to land root on a vulnerable host
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- 🟡 **PARTIAL** — module detects + exploits on some distros, not all
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- 🔵 **DETECT-ONLY** — module fingerprints presence/absence but no
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exploit (yet). Useful for blue teams.
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- ⚪ **PLANNED** — stub exists, work not started
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- 🔴 **DEPRECATED** — fully patched everywhere relevant; kept for
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historical reference only
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## Inventory
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| CVE | Name | Class | First patched | IAMROOT module | Status | Notes |
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| CVE-2026-31431 | Copy Fail (algif_aead `authencesn` page-cache write) | LPE (page-cache write → /etc/passwd) | mainline 2026-04-22 | `copy_fail` | 🟢 | Verified on Ubuntu 26.04, Alma 9, Debian 13. Full AppArmor bypass. |
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| CVE-2026-43284 (v4) | Dirty Frag — IPv4 xfrm-ESP page-cache write | LPE (same primitive shape as Copy Fail, different trigger) | mainline 2026-05-XX | `dirty_frag_esp` | 🟢 | Full PoC + active-probe scan |
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| CVE-2026-43284 (v6) | Dirty Frag — IPv6 xfrm-ESP (`esp6`) | LPE | mainline 2026-05-XX | `dirty_frag_esp6` | 🟢 | V6 STORE shift auto-calibrated per kernel build |
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| CVE-2026-43500 | Dirty Frag — RxRPC page-cache write | LPE | mainline 2026-05-XX | `dirty_frag_rxrpc` | 🟢 | |
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| (variant, no CVE) | Copy Fail GCM variant — xfrm-ESP `rfc4106(gcm(aes))` page-cache write | LPE | n/a | `copy_fail_gcm` | 🟢 | Sibling primitive, same fix |
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| CVE-2022-0847 | Dirty Pipe — pipe `PIPE_BUF_FLAG_CAN_MERGE` write | LPE (arbitrary file write into page cache) | mainline 5.17 (2022-02-23) | `dirty_pipe` | 🔵 | Detect-only as of 2026-05-16. Verifies kernel version + branch-backport ranges: 5.10.102 / 5.15.25 / 5.16.11 / 5.17+. Exploit deferred to Phase 1.5 (needs shared passwd/su helpers in `core/`). Ships auditd + sigma detection rules. |
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| CVE-2023-0458 | EntryBleed — KPTI prefetchnta KASLR bypass | INFO-LEAK (kbase) | mainline (partial mitigations only) | `_stubs/entrybleed_cve_2023_0458` | ⚪ | Stub. Used as STAGE-1 leak brick, not a standalone LPE. Works on lts-6.12.88 (empirical 5/5). |
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| CVE-2026-31402 | NFS replay-cache heap overflow | LPE (NFS server) | mainline 2026-04-03 | — | ⚪ | Candidate. Different audience (NFS servers) — TBD whether in-scope. |
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| CVE-TBD | Fragnesia (ESP shared-frag in-place encrypt) | LPE (page-cache write) | mainline TBD | `_stubs/fragnesia_TBD` | ⚪ | Stub. Per `findings/audit_leak_write_modprobe_backups_2026-05-16.md`, requires CAP_NET_ADMIN in userns netns — may or may not be in-scope depending on target environment. |
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## Pipeline for additions
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1. Bug must be **patched in upstream mainline** (we don't bundle
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0-days)
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2. Either **CVE-assigned** or has clear advisory/patch reference
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3. Affects a kernel version range with realistic deployment footprint
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(we don't bundle exploits for kernels nobody runs)
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4. PoC works on at least one distro+kernel in our CI matrix
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5. Detection signature(s) shipped alongside the exploit
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## Patch-status tracking
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Each module's `kernel-range.json` (planned) declares the affected
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range. CI verifies the exploit fails on the first-patched version
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and succeeds below it. When a distro backports the fix into a kernel
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version below the original first-patched, the matrix updates and
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the relevant distro drops out of the "WORKING" list for that module.
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## Why we exclude some things
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- **0-days the maintainer found themselves**: those go through
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responsible disclosure first, then enter IAMROOT after upstream patch
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- **kCTF VRP submissions in flight**: same as above; disclosure
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before bundling
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- **Hardware-specific side channels** (Spectre/Meltdown variants):
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out of scope; not page-cache or process-isolation primitives
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- **Container-escape only**: unless it cleanly chains to host-root,
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out of scope (separate tool space)
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