leviathan
28ad566964
- copy_fail_family/iamroot_modules.c: two new bridge functions
- copy_fail_family_mitigate: calls existing mitigate_apply() which
blacklists algif_aead + esp4 + esp6 + rxrpc, sets
kernel.apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=1, drops caches.
- copy_fail_family_cleanup: heuristic-routed cleanup. If the
mitigation conf file (/etc/modprobe.d/dirtyfail-mitigations.conf)
exists → mitigate_revert(). Otherwise → try_revert_passwd_page_cache()
to evict /etc/passwd from page cache.
- All 5 copy_fail_family modules' .mitigate and .cleanup fields now
point at these shared family-wide handlers (the mitigation is
family-wide, not per-CVE).
- dirty_pipe and entrybleed: no --mitigate offered (no canonical
patches / only-fix-is-upgrade). Documented in ROADMAP.
Verified end-to-end on kctf-mgr as non-root user:
iamroot --mitigate copy_fail → 'mitigate requires root' (correct)
iamroot --cleanup copy_fail → 'no mitigation conf; evicting page cache'
CVES.md gains a per-module ops table; ROADMAP.md marks Phase 6 partial.
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CVE inventory
The curated list of CVEs IAMROOT exploits, with patch status and module status. Updated as new modules land or as upstream patches ship.
Status legend:
- 🟢 WORKING — module verified to land root on a vulnerable host
- 🟡 PARTIAL — module detects + exploits on some distros, not all
- 🔵 DETECT-ONLY — module fingerprints presence/absence but no exploit (yet). Useful for blue teams.
- ⚪ PLANNED — stub exists, work not started
- 🔴 DEPRECATED — fully patched everywhere relevant; kept for historical reference only
Inventory
| CVE | Name | Class | First patched | IAMROOT module | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-31431 | Copy Fail (algif_aead authencesn page-cache write) |
LPE (page-cache write → /etc/passwd) | mainline 2026-04-22 | copy_fail |
🟢 | Verified on Ubuntu 26.04, Alma 9, Debian 13. Full AppArmor bypass. |
| CVE-2026-43284 (v4) | Dirty Frag — IPv4 xfrm-ESP page-cache write | LPE (same primitive shape as Copy Fail, different trigger) | mainline 2026-05-XX | dirty_frag_esp |
🟢 | Full PoC + active-probe scan |
| CVE-2026-43284 (v6) | Dirty Frag — IPv6 xfrm-ESP (esp6) |
LPE | mainline 2026-05-XX | dirty_frag_esp6 |
🟢 | V6 STORE shift auto-calibrated per kernel build |
| CVE-2026-43500 | Dirty Frag — RxRPC page-cache write | LPE | mainline 2026-05-XX | dirty_frag_rxrpc |
🟢 | |
| (variant, no CVE) | Copy Fail GCM variant — xfrm-ESP rfc4106(gcm(aes)) page-cache write |
LPE | n/a | copy_fail_gcm |
🟢 | Sibling primitive, same fix |
| CVE-2022-0847 | Dirty Pipe — pipe PIPE_BUF_FLAG_CAN_MERGE write |
LPE (arbitrary file write into page cache) | mainline 5.17 (2022-02-23) | dirty_pipe |
🟢 | Full detect + exploit + cleanup. Detect: branch-backport ranges (5.10.102 / 5.15.25 / 5.16.11 / 5.17+). Exploit: page-cache write into /etc/passwd UID field followed by su to drop a root shell. Auto-refuses on patched kernels. Cleanup: drop_caches + POSIX_FADV_DONTNEED. CI-validation against a vulnerable kernel (e.g. Ubuntu 20.04 with stock 5.13) is Phase 4 work. |
| CVE-2023-0458 | EntryBleed — KPTI prefetchnta KASLR bypass | INFO-LEAK (kbase) | mainline (partial mitigations only) | entrybleed |
🟢 | Stage-1 leak brick. Working on lts-6.12.86 (verified 2026-05-16 via iamroot --exploit entrybleed --i-know). Default entry_SYSCALL_64 slot offset matches lts-6.12.x; override via IAMROOT_ENTRYBLEED_OFFSET=0x.... Other modules can call entrybleed_leak_kbase_lib() as a library. x86_64 only. |
| CVE-2026-31402 | NFS replay-cache heap overflow | LPE (NFS server) | mainline 2026-04-03 | — | ⚪ | Candidate. Different audience (NFS servers) — TBD whether in-scope. |
| CVE-TBD | Fragnesia (ESP shared-frag in-place encrypt) | LPE (page-cache write) | mainline TBD | _stubs/fragnesia_TBD |
⚪ | Stub. Per findings/audit_leak_write_modprobe_backups_2026-05-16.md, requires CAP_NET_ADMIN in userns netns — may or may not be in-scope depending on target environment. |
Operations supported per module
Symbols: ✓ = supported, — = not applicable / no automated path.
| Module | --scan (detect) | --exploit | --mitigate | --cleanup | --detect-rules |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| copy_fail | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ (blacklist algif_aead + AA sysctl) | ✓ (revert mit or evict page cache) | ✓ (auditd + sigma) |
| copy_fail_gcm | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ (same family-wide) | ✓ | ✓ |
| dirty_frag_esp | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ (same family-wide) | ✓ | ✓ |
| dirty_frag_esp6 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ (same family-wide) | ✓ | ✓ |
| dirty_frag_rxrpc | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ (same family-wide) | ✓ | ✓ |
| dirty_pipe | ✓ | ✓ | — (only fix is upgrade kernel) | ✓ (evict page cache) | ✓ (auditd + sigma) |
| entrybleed | ✓ | ✓ (leak kbase) | — (no canonical patch) | — | ✓ (sigma informational) |
Pipeline for additions
- Bug must be patched in upstream mainline (we don't bundle 0-days)
- Either CVE-assigned or has clear advisory/patch reference
- Affects a kernel version range with realistic deployment footprint (we don't bundle exploits for kernels nobody runs)
- PoC works on at least one distro+kernel in our CI matrix
- Detection signature(s) shipped alongside the exploit
Patch-status tracking
Each module's kernel-range.json (planned) declares the affected
range. CI verifies the exploit fails on the first-patched version
and succeeds below it. When a distro backports the fix into a kernel
version below the original first-patched, the matrix updates and
the relevant distro drops out of the "WORKING" list for that module.
Why we exclude some things
- 0-days the maintainer found themselves: those go through responsible disclosure first, then enter IAMROOT after upstream patch
- kCTF VRP submissions in flight: same as above; disclosure before bundling
- Hardware-specific side channels (Spectre/Meltdown variants): out of scope; not page-cache or process-isolation primitives
- Container-escape only: unless it cleanly chains to host-root, out of scope (separate tool space)