leviathan
28ad566964
- copy_fail_family/iamroot_modules.c: two new bridge functions
- copy_fail_family_mitigate: calls existing mitigate_apply() which
blacklists algif_aead + esp4 + esp6 + rxrpc, sets
kernel.apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=1, drops caches.
- copy_fail_family_cleanup: heuristic-routed cleanup. If the
mitigation conf file (/etc/modprobe.d/dirtyfail-mitigations.conf)
exists → mitigate_revert(). Otherwise → try_revert_passwd_page_cache()
to evict /etc/passwd from page cache.
- All 5 copy_fail_family modules' .mitigate and .cleanup fields now
point at these shared family-wide handlers (the mitigation is
family-wide, not per-CVE).
- dirty_pipe and entrybleed: no --mitigate offered (no canonical
patches / only-fix-is-upgrade). Documented in ROADMAP.
Verified end-to-end on kctf-mgr as non-root user:
iamroot --mitigate copy_fail → 'mitigate requires root' (correct)
iamroot --cleanup copy_fail → 'no mitigation conf; evicting page cache'
CVES.md gains a per-module ops table; ROADMAP.md marks Phase 6 partial.
73 lines
5.0 KiB
Markdown
73 lines
5.0 KiB
Markdown
# CVE inventory
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The curated list of CVEs IAMROOT exploits, with patch status and
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module status. Updated as new modules land or as upstream patches
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ship.
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Status legend:
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- 🟢 **WORKING** — module verified to land root on a vulnerable host
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- 🟡 **PARTIAL** — module detects + exploits on some distros, not all
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- 🔵 **DETECT-ONLY** — module fingerprints presence/absence but no
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exploit (yet). Useful for blue teams.
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- ⚪ **PLANNED** — stub exists, work not started
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- 🔴 **DEPRECATED** — fully patched everywhere relevant; kept for
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historical reference only
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## Inventory
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| CVE | Name | Class | First patched | IAMROOT module | Status | Notes |
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| CVE-2026-31431 | Copy Fail (algif_aead `authencesn` page-cache write) | LPE (page-cache write → /etc/passwd) | mainline 2026-04-22 | `copy_fail` | 🟢 | Verified on Ubuntu 26.04, Alma 9, Debian 13. Full AppArmor bypass. |
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| CVE-2026-43284 (v4) | Dirty Frag — IPv4 xfrm-ESP page-cache write | LPE (same primitive shape as Copy Fail, different trigger) | mainline 2026-05-XX | `dirty_frag_esp` | 🟢 | Full PoC + active-probe scan |
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| CVE-2026-43284 (v6) | Dirty Frag — IPv6 xfrm-ESP (`esp6`) | LPE | mainline 2026-05-XX | `dirty_frag_esp6` | 🟢 | V6 STORE shift auto-calibrated per kernel build |
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| CVE-2026-43500 | Dirty Frag — RxRPC page-cache write | LPE | mainline 2026-05-XX | `dirty_frag_rxrpc` | 🟢 | |
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| (variant, no CVE) | Copy Fail GCM variant — xfrm-ESP `rfc4106(gcm(aes))` page-cache write | LPE | n/a | `copy_fail_gcm` | 🟢 | Sibling primitive, same fix |
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| CVE-2022-0847 | Dirty Pipe — pipe `PIPE_BUF_FLAG_CAN_MERGE` write | LPE (arbitrary file write into page cache) | mainline 5.17 (2022-02-23) | `dirty_pipe` | 🟢 | Full detect + exploit + cleanup. Detect: branch-backport ranges (5.10.102 / 5.15.25 / 5.16.11 / 5.17+). Exploit: page-cache write into /etc/passwd UID field followed by `su` to drop a root shell. Auto-refuses on patched kernels. Cleanup: drop_caches + POSIX_FADV_DONTNEED. CI-validation against a vulnerable kernel (e.g. Ubuntu 20.04 with stock 5.13) is Phase 4 work. |
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| CVE-2023-0458 | EntryBleed — KPTI prefetchnta KASLR bypass | INFO-LEAK (kbase) | mainline (partial mitigations only) | `entrybleed` | 🟢 | Stage-1 leak brick. Working on lts-6.12.86 (verified 2026-05-16 via `iamroot --exploit entrybleed --i-know`). Default `entry_SYSCALL_64` slot offset matches lts-6.12.x; override via `IAMROOT_ENTRYBLEED_OFFSET=0x...`. Other modules can call `entrybleed_leak_kbase_lib()` as a library. x86_64 only. |
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| CVE-2026-31402 | NFS replay-cache heap overflow | LPE (NFS server) | mainline 2026-04-03 | — | ⚪ | Candidate. Different audience (NFS servers) — TBD whether in-scope. |
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| CVE-TBD | Fragnesia (ESP shared-frag in-place encrypt) | LPE (page-cache write) | mainline TBD | `_stubs/fragnesia_TBD` | ⚪ | Stub. Per `findings/audit_leak_write_modprobe_backups_2026-05-16.md`, requires CAP_NET_ADMIN in userns netns — may or may not be in-scope depending on target environment. |
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## Operations supported per module
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Symbols: ✓ = supported, — = not applicable / no automated path.
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| Module | --scan (detect) | --exploit | --mitigate | --cleanup | --detect-rules |
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| copy_fail | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ (blacklist algif_aead + AA sysctl) | ✓ (revert mit or evict page cache) | ✓ (auditd + sigma) |
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| copy_fail_gcm | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ (same family-wide) | ✓ | ✓ |
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| dirty_frag_esp | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ (same family-wide) | ✓ | ✓ |
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| dirty_frag_esp6 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ (same family-wide) | ✓ | ✓ |
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| dirty_frag_rxrpc | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ (same family-wide) | ✓ | ✓ |
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| dirty_pipe | ✓ | ✓ | — (only fix is upgrade kernel) | ✓ (evict page cache) | ✓ (auditd + sigma) |
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| entrybleed | ✓ | ✓ (leak kbase) | — (no canonical patch) | — | ✓ (sigma informational) |
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## Pipeline for additions
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1. Bug must be **patched in upstream mainline** (we don't bundle
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0-days)
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2. Either **CVE-assigned** or has clear advisory/patch reference
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3. Affects a kernel version range with realistic deployment footprint
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(we don't bundle exploits for kernels nobody runs)
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4. PoC works on at least one distro+kernel in our CI matrix
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5. Detection signature(s) shipped alongside the exploit
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## Patch-status tracking
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Each module's `kernel-range.json` (planned) declares the affected
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range. CI verifies the exploit fails on the first-patched version
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and succeeds below it. When a distro backports the fix into a kernel
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version below the original first-patched, the matrix updates and
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the relevant distro drops out of the "WORKING" list for that module.
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## Why we exclude some things
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- **0-days the maintainer found themselves**: those go through
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responsible disclosure first, then enter IAMROOT after upstream patch
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- **kCTF VRP submissions in flight**: same as above; disclosure
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before bundling
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- **Hardware-specific side channels** (Spectre/Meltdown variants):
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out of scope; not page-cache or process-isolation primitives
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- **Container-escape only**: unless it cleanly chains to host-root,
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out of scope (separate tool space)
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