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SKELETONKEY/CVES.md
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leviathan 43e290b224 Phase 7: Pwnkit (CVE-2021-4034) detect-only module 
First USERSPACE LPE in IAMROOT (every prior module is kernel). Same
iamroot_module interface — the difference is the affected-version
check is package-version-based rather than kernel-version-based.

- modules/pwnkit_cve_2021_4034/:
  - iamroot_modules.{c,h}: detect() locates setuid pkexec (one of
    /usr/bin/pkexec, /usr/sbin/pkexec, /bin/pkexec, /sbin/pkexec,
    /usr/local/bin/pkexec) and parses 'pkexec --version' output.
    Handles BOTH version-string formats: legacy '0.105'/'0.120'
    (older polkit) AND modern bare-integer '121'/'126' (post-0.121
    rename to single-number scheme). Reports VULNERABLE on parse
    failure (conservative).
  - exploit() returns IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL with a 'not yet
    implemented' message; full Qualys-PoC follow-up is the next
    commit. ~200 lines including embedded .so generator.
  - MODULE.md documents the bug, affected ranges, distro backport
    landscape (RHEL 7/8, Ubuntu focal/impish, Debian buster/bullseye
    each have their own backported polkit version).
  - Embedded auditd + sigma detection rules:
    auditd: pkexec watch + execve audit
    sigma:  pkexec invocation + suspicious env (GCONV_PATH, CHARSET)

- core/registry.h adds iamroot_register_pwnkit() declaration.
- iamroot.c main() registers pwnkit.
- Makefile gains the pwnkit family as a separate object set.

Verified end-to-end on kctf-mgr (modern polkit 126):
  iamroot --list  → 8 modules
  iamroot --scan  → pwnkit reports 'version 126 ≥ 0.121 (fixed)'
  iamroot --detect-rules --format=auditd | grep pwnkit → emits
2026-05-16 20:07:40 -04:00

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# CVE inventory
The curated list of CVEs IAMROOT exploits, with patch status and
module status. Updated as new modules land or as upstream patches
ship.
Status legend:
- 🟢 **WORKING** — module verified to land root on a vulnerable host
- 🟡 **PARTIAL** — module detects + exploits on some distros, not all
- 🔵 **DETECT-ONLY** — module fingerprints presence/absence but no
exploit (yet). Useful for blue teams.
- ⚪ **PLANNED** — stub exists, work not started
- 🔴 **DEPRECATED** — fully patched everywhere relevant; kept for
historical reference only
## Inventory
| CVE | Name | Class | First patched | IAMROOT module | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-31431 | Copy Fail (algif_aead `authencesn` page-cache write) | LPE (page-cache write → /etc/passwd) | mainline 2026-04-22 | `copy_fail` | 🟢 | Verified on Ubuntu 26.04, Alma 9, Debian 13. Full AppArmor bypass. |
| CVE-2026-43284 (v4) | Dirty Frag — IPv4 xfrm-ESP page-cache write | LPE (same primitive shape as Copy Fail, different trigger) | mainline 2026-05-XX | `dirty_frag_esp` | 🟢 | Full PoC + active-probe scan |
| CVE-2026-43284 (v6) | Dirty Frag — IPv6 xfrm-ESP (`esp6`) | LPE | mainline 2026-05-XX | `dirty_frag_esp6` | 🟢 | V6 STORE shift auto-calibrated per kernel build |
| CVE-2026-43500 | Dirty Frag — RxRPC page-cache write | LPE | mainline 2026-05-XX | `dirty_frag_rxrpc` | 🟢 | |
| (variant, no CVE) | Copy Fail GCM variant — xfrm-ESP `rfc4106(gcm(aes))` page-cache write | LPE | n/a | `copy_fail_gcm` | 🟢 | Sibling primitive, same fix |
| CVE-2022-0847 | Dirty Pipe — pipe `PIPE_BUF_FLAG_CAN_MERGE` write | LPE (arbitrary file write into page cache) | mainline 5.17 (2022-02-23) | `dirty_pipe` | 🟢 | Full detect + exploit + cleanup. Detect: branch-backport ranges (5.10.102 / 5.15.25 / 5.16.11 / 5.17+). Exploit: page-cache write into /etc/passwd UID field followed by `su` to drop a root shell. Auto-refuses on patched kernels. Cleanup: drop_caches + POSIX_FADV_DONTNEED. CI-validation against a vulnerable kernel (e.g. Ubuntu 20.04 with stock 5.13) is Phase 4 work. |
| CVE-2023-0458 | EntryBleed — KPTI prefetchnta KASLR bypass | INFO-LEAK (kbase) | mainline (partial mitigations only) | `entrybleed` | 🟢 | Stage-1 leak brick. Working on lts-6.12.86 (verified 2026-05-16 via `iamroot --exploit entrybleed --i-know`). Default `entry_SYSCALL_64` slot offset matches lts-6.12.x; override via `IAMROOT_ENTRYBLEED_OFFSET=0x...`. Other modules can call `entrybleed_leak_kbase_lib()` as a library. x86_64 only. |
| CVE-2026-31402 | NFS replay-cache heap overflow | LPE (NFS server) | mainline 2026-04-03 | — | ⚪ | Candidate. Different audience (NFS servers) — TBD whether in-scope. |
| CVE-2021-4034 | Pwnkit — pkexec argv[0]=NULL → env-injection | LPE (userspace setuid binary) | polkit 0.121 (2022-01-25) | `pwnkit` | 🔵 | Detect-only as of 2026-05-16. Locates setuid pkexec, parses `pkexec --version`, compares against 0.121 threshold. **First userspace LPE in IAMROOT** (rest is kernel). Full Qualys-PoC exploit follows in Phase 7 follow-up. Ships auditd + sigma rules. |
| CVE-TBD | Fragnesia (ESP shared-frag in-place encrypt) | LPE (page-cache write) | mainline TBD | `_stubs/fragnesia_TBD` | ⚪ | Stub. Per `findings/audit_leak_write_modprobe_backups_2026-05-16.md`, requires CAP_NET_ADMIN in userns netns — may or may not be in-scope depending on target environment. |
## Operations supported per module
Symbols: ✓ = supported, — = not applicable / no automated path.
| Module | --scan (detect) | --exploit | --mitigate | --cleanup | --detect-rules |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| copy_fail | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ (blacklist algif_aead + AA sysctl) | ✓ (revert mit or evict page cache) | ✓ (auditd + sigma) |
| copy_fail_gcm | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ (same family-wide) | ✓ | ✓ |
| dirty_frag_esp | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ (same family-wide) | ✓ | ✓ |
| dirty_frag_esp6 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ (same family-wide) | ✓ | ✓ |
| dirty_frag_rxrpc | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ (same family-wide) | ✓ | ✓ |
| dirty_pipe | ✓ | ✓ | — (only fix is upgrade kernel) | ✓ (evict page cache) | ✓ (auditd + sigma) |
| entrybleed | ✓ | ✓ (leak kbase) | — (no canonical patch) | — | ✓ (sigma informational) |
## Pipeline for additions
1. Bug must be **patched in upstream mainline** (we don't bundle
0-days)
2. Either **CVE-assigned** or has clear advisory/patch reference
3. Affects a kernel version range with realistic deployment footprint
(we don't bundle exploits for kernels nobody runs)
4. PoC works on at least one distro+kernel in our CI matrix
5. Detection signature(s) shipped alongside the exploit
## Patch-status tracking
Each module's `kernel-range.json` (planned) declares the affected
range. CI verifies the exploit fails on the first-patched version
and succeeds below it. When a distro backports the fix into a kernel
version below the original first-patched, the matrix updates and
the relevant distro drops out of the "WORKING" list for that module.
## Why we exclude some things
- **0-days the maintainer found themselves**: those go through
responsible disclosure first, then enter IAMROOT after upstream patch
- **kCTF VRP submissions in flight**: same as above; disclosure
before bundling
- **Hardware-specific side channels** (Spectre/Meltdown variants):
out of scope; not page-cache or process-isolation primitives
- **Container-escape only**: unless it cleanly chains to host-root,
out of scope (separate tool space)
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