Files
SKELETONKEY/tools/verify-vm
leviathan 554a58757e tools/verify-vm: turnkey Vagrant + Parallels verification scaffolding
Closes the gap between 'detect() compiles and passes unit tests' and
'exploit() actually works on a real vulnerable kernel'. One-time
setup + one command per module to verify against a known-vulnerable
guest, with results emitted as JSON verification records.

Files:
  setup.sh        — one-shot bootstrap. Installs Vagrant via brew if
                    missing, installs vagrant-parallels plugin, pre-
                    downloads 5 base boxes (~5 GB):
                      generic/ubuntu1804  (4.15.0)
                      generic/ubuntu2004  (5.4.0 + HWE)
                      generic/ubuntu2204  (5.15.0 + HWE)
                      generic/debian11    (5.10.0)
                      generic/debian12    (6.1.0)
                    Idempotent; can pass --boxes subset.
  Vagrantfile     — single parameterized config driven by SKK_VM_*
                    env vars. Provisioners: build-deps install,
                    kernel pin (apt + snapshot.debian.org fallback),
                    build-and-verify (kept run='never' so verify.sh
                    invokes explicitly after reboot if pin'd).
  targets.yaml    — module → (box, kernel_pkg, kernel_version,
                    expect_detect, notes) mapping for all 26 modules.
                    3 marked manual: true (vmwgfx needs VMware guest;
                    dirtydecrypt + fragnesia need Linux 7.0 not yet
                    shipping as distro kernel).
  verify.sh       — entrypoint. 'verify.sh <module>' provisions if
                    needed, pins kernel + reboots if needed, runs
                    'skeletonkey --explain --active' inside the VM,
                    parses VERDICT, compares to expect_detect, emits
                    JSON verification record. --list shows the full
                    target matrix. --keep / --destroy lifecycle flags.
  README.md       — workflow + extending the targets table.

Design notes:
  - Pure bash + awk targets.yaml parsing — no PyYAML dep (macOS Python
    is PEP-668 'externally managed' and refuses pip --user installs).
  - Sources of vulnerable kernel packages: stock distro kernels where
    they're below the fix backport, otherwise pinned via apt with
    snapshot.debian.org as last-resort fallback (the Debian apt
    snapshot archive is the canonical source for historical kernel .deb
    packages).
  - Repo mounted at /vagrant via rsync (not 9p — vagrant-parallels'
    9p is finicky on macOS Sequoia per the plugin issue tracker).
  - VM lifecycle defaults to suspend-after-verify so the next run
    resumes in ~5s instead of cold-booting.
  - kernel pin reboots are handled by checking 'uname -r' after the
    pin provisioner and triggering 'vagrant reload' if mismatched.

Verification records (JSON on stdout per run) are intended to feed a
per-module verified_on[] table in a follow-up commit — that's the
'permanent trust artifact' angle from the earlier roadmap discussion.

Smoke tests (no VM actually spun up):
  - 'verify.sh --list': renders the 26-module matrix correctly.
  - 'verify.sh nf_tables': dispatches to generic/ubuntu2204 + kernel
    5.15.0-43 + expect=VULNERABLE; fails cleanly at 'vagrant: command
    not found' (expected — user runs setup.sh first).
  - 'verify.sh vmwgfx': errors with 'is marked manual: true' + note.

.gitignore: tools/verify-vm/{logs,.vagrant}/ excluded.

Usage:
  ./tools/verify-vm/setup.sh                    # one time, ~5 min
  ./tools/verify-vm/verify.sh nf_tables         # ~5 min first run, ~1 min after
  ./tools/verify-vm/verify.sh --list            # show all targets
2026-05-23 11:19:28 -04:00
..

SKELETONKEY VM verification

Auto-provisions a Parallels Desktop VM with a known-vulnerable kernel, runs skeletonkey --explain <module> --active inside it, and emits a verification record. Closes the loop between "detect() compiles & passes unit tests" and "exploit() actually works on a real vulnerable kernel."

One-time setup

./tools/verify-vm/setup.sh

That installs (if missing): Vagrant via Homebrew, the vagrant-parallels plugin, and pre-downloads ~5 GB of base boxes (Ubuntu 18.04/20.04/22.04

  • Debian 11/12). Idempotent — re-run any time.

To skip boxes you don't need (save disk):

./tools/verify-vm/setup.sh ubuntu2004 debian11   # only those two

Verify a single module

./tools/verify-vm/verify.sh nf_tables

What that does:

  1. Reads tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml: finds nf_tables → box generic/ubuntu2204 + kernel pin linux-image-5.15.0-43-generic.
  2. vagrant up skk-nf_tables (provisions on first call, resumes on subsequent).
  3. Installs the pinned vulnerable kernel via apt, reboots.
  4. Mounts the local repo at /vagrant, runs make, then runs skeletonkey --explain nf_tables --active.
  5. Parses the VERDICT: line, compares against expect_detect from targets.yaml, emits a JSON verification record on stdout.
  6. Suspends the VM (vagrant suspend) — instant resume next run.

Lifecycle flags:

./tools/verify-vm/verify.sh nf_tables --keep      # leave VM running; ssh in to inspect
./tools/verify-vm/verify.sh nf_tables --destroy   # full teardown after run

List every target

./tools/verify-vm/verify.sh --list

Shows the (module, box, target kernel, expected verdict, notes) matrix for all 26 modules. Three are flagged manual: true because no public Vagrant box covers them:

  • vmwgfx — only reachable on VMware guests; needs a vSphere/Fusion VM not Parallels.
  • dirtydecrypt, fragnesia — only present in Linux 7.0+ which isn't shipping as a distro kernel yet.

For those, verification needs a hand-built or special-distro VM.

Verification records

verify.sh emits JSON on stdout after each run. Example:

{
  "module":        "nf_tables",
  "verified_at":   "2026-05-23T17:42:11Z",
  "host_kernel":   "5.15.0-43-generic",
  "host_distro":   "Ubuntu 22.04.5 LTS",
  "vm_box":        "generic/ubuntu2204",
  "expect_detect": "VULNERABLE",
  "actual_detect": "VULNERABLE",
  "status":        "match",
  "log":           "tools/verify-vm/logs/verify-nf_tables-20260523-174211.log"
}

status: match means detect() returned what we expected on a known- vulnerable kernel. Anything else (MISMATCH, status code != 0) means either:

  • The kernel pin didn't take (check host_kernel against kernel_version in targets.yaml).
  • The exploit's preconditions aren't met in the default Vagrant image (e.g. apparmor blocks unprivileged userns; need to adjust the Vagrantfile provisioner).
  • The detect() logic is wrong for this kernel/distro combo (a real bug — fix it).

Records are intended to feed a per-module verified_on[] table (next project step) so --list can show a ✓ verified <date> column.

How it routes module → box

Mapping lives in tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml. Each entry has:

  • box — which boxes/ template (e.g. ubuntu2204)
  • kernel_pkg — apt package name to install if the stock kernel is patched (omit / empty if stock is already vulnerable)
  • kernel_version — what uname -r should report after install
  • expect_detectVULNERABLE | OK | PRECOND_FAIL
  • notes — short rationale; comments in the file have the full context

Adding a new module is one block in targets.yaml. The verifier picks it up automatically.

Files

tools/verify-vm/
├── README.md       this file
├── setup.sh        one-time bootstrap (Vagrant, plugin, box cache)
├── verify.sh       per-module verifier
├── Vagrantfile     parameterized VM config (driven by SKK_VM_* env vars)
├── targets.yaml    module → box mapping with rationale
└── logs/           per-verification stdout/stderr capture

Why Vagrant + Parallels

You already have Parallels Desktop. vagrant-parallels gives a scriptable per-VM config + a curated public box library + idempotent vagrant up/provision/reload/suspend lifecycle. The Vagrantfile is parameterized via env vars so a single file drives every target.

Alternative providers (Lima, Multipass) would also work; Vagrant was chosen for ergonomic continuity with the existing Parallels install.