leviathan
5a0aef12d0
- Implements the Dirty Pipe primitive: prepare_pipe() fills+drains a
pipe to plant the stale PIPE_BUF_FLAG_CAN_MERGE flag in every
pipe_buffer slot; dirty_pipe_write() splices 1 byte from the target
file at offset-1 (seeding the slot with the file's page) then write()s
the payload, which the buggy kernel merges back into the page cache.
- find_passwd_uid_field() + revert_passwd_page_cache() inlined in the
module. Two-of-two duplication acceptable; extraction into core/host
triggers when a third module needs the same helpers (Phase 1.5).
- dirty_pipe_exploit() resolves current euid via getpwuid, locates the
user's UID field in /etc/passwd, replaces it with same-length zeros
('0000' for a 4-digit UID), then execlp's su <user> -c /bin/sh.
Auto-refuses if detect() reports patched. --no-shell mode plants the
write and returns. Cleanup mode evicts /etc/passwd from page cache.
- _GNU_SOURCE redefine warning fixed: cmdline -D already passes it.
Verified end-to-end on kernel 6.12.86 (patched):
iamroot --scan → dirty_pipe reports OK (patched)
iamroot --exploit dirty_pipe --i-know → refuses cleanly
CI-validation against vulnerable kernel (Ubuntu 20.04 / 5.13) is Phase 4.
CVES.md: dirty_pipe 🔵 → 🟢. ROADMAP.md: Phase 2 marked complete.
143 lines
6.5 KiB
Markdown
143 lines
6.5 KiB
Markdown
# Roadmap
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What's coming next, in priority order. Dates are aspirational, not
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commitments.
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## Phase 0 — Bootstrap (DONE as of 2026-05-16)
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- [x] Repo structure (modules/, core/, docs/, tools/, tests/)
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- [x] Absorbed DIRTYFAIL as the first module
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(`modules/copy_fail_family/`)
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- [x] Top-level README, CVES.md, ROADMAP.md, docs/ARCHITECTURE.md,
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docs/ETHICS.md
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- [x] LICENSE (MIT)
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- [x] Private GitHub repo
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## Phase 1 — Make the bundling real (DONE 2026-05-16)
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- [x] Top-level `iamroot` dispatcher CLI (`iamroot.c`) — module
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registry, route to module's detect/exploit
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- [x] Module interface header (`core/module.h`) — standard
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`iamroot_module` struct + `iamroot_result_t` (numerically
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aligned with copy_fail_family's `df_result_t` for zero-cost
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bridging)
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- [x] `core/registry.{c,h}` — flat-array registry with `find_by_name`
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- [x] `modules/copy_fail_family/iamroot_modules.{c,h}` — bridge layer
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exposing 5 modules
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- [x] Top-level `Makefile` that builds all modules into one binary
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- [x] Smoke test: `iamroot --scan --json` produces ingest-ready JSON;
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`iamroot --list` prints the module inventory
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- [ ] **Deferred to Phase 1.5**: extract `apparmor_bypass.c`,
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`exploit_su.c`, `common.c`, `fcrypt.c` into `core/` (shared
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across families). Phase 1 keeps them inside copy_fail_family/src/
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because there's only one family today; the extraction is
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mechanical and lands when a second family arrives.
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## Phase 2 — Add Dirty Pipe (CVE-2022-0847) — PARTIAL (DETECT done 2026-05-16)
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Public PoC, well-understood, useful for completeness — IAMROOT
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without Dirty Pipe is incomplete as a "historical bundle." Affects
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kernels ≤5.16.11/≤5.15.25/≤5.10.102 so coverage is older
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deployments (worth bundling — many production boxes still run
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these).
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- [x] `modules/dirty_pipe_cve_2022_0847/` directory promoted out of
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`_stubs/`
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- [x] `core/kernel_range.{c,h}` — branch-aware patched-version
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comparison (reusable by every future module)
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- [x] `dirty_pipe_detect()` — kernel version check against
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branch-backport thresholds (5.10.102 / 5.15.25 / 5.16.11 / 5.17+)
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- [x] Detection rules: `auditd.rules` (splice() syscall + passwd/shadow
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watches) and `sigma.yml` (non-root modification of sensitive files)
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- [x] Registered in `iamroot --list` / `--scan` output. Verified on
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kernel 6.12.86 → correctly reports OK (patched).
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- [x] **Phase 2 complete (2026-05-16)**: full exploit landed. Inline
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passwd-UID and page-cache-revert helpers in the module (~80 lines).
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Extraction into `core/host` is Phase 1.5 work — deferred until a
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third module needs the same helpers. (Two-of-two duplication is
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acceptable; three-of-three triggers extraction.)
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- [x] Exploit refuses to fire when detect() reports patched (verified
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end-to-end on kernel 6.12.86 — refuses cleanly).
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- [x] Cleanup function (`dirty_pipe --cleanup`) added: evicts
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/etc/passwd via POSIX_FADV_DONTNEED + drop_caches.
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- [ ] CI matrix: Ubuntu 20.04 with kernel 5.13 (vulnerable),
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Debian 11 with 5.10.0-8 (vulnerable), Debian 13 with 6.12.x
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(patched — should detect as OK). Phase 4 work.
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## Phase 3 — EntryBleed (CVE-2023-0458) as stage-1 leak brick (DONE 2026-05-16)
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EntryBleed is **not a standalone LPE**. It's a **kbase leak
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primitive** that other modules can chain. Bundled because:
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- Stage-1 of any future "build-your-own LPE" workflow
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- Detection rules for KPTI side-channel attempts are useful for
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defenders
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- Already works empirically on lts-6.12.88 (verified 2026-05-16)
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- [x] `modules/entrybleed_cve_2023_0458/` — leak primitive + detect
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- [x] Exposed as a library helper: other modules can call
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`entrybleed_leak_kbase_lib()` (declared in iamroot_modules.h)
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- [x] Wired into iamroot.c registry; `iamroot --exploit entrybleed
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--i-know` produces a kbase leak. Verified on kctf-mgr:
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leaked `0xffffffff8d800000` with KASLR slide `0xc800000`.
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- [x] `entry_SYSCALL_64` slot offset configurable via
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`IAMROOT_ENTRYBLEED_OFFSET` env var (default matches lts-6.12.x).
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Future enhancement: auto-detect via /boot/System.map or
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/proc/kallsyms if accessible.
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## Phase 4 — CI matrix
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- [ ] Distro+kernel VM matrix in GitHub Actions (Ubuntu 20.04 /
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22.04 / 24.04 / 26.04, Debian 11 / 12 / 13, Alma 8 / 9 / 10,
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Fedora 39 / 40 / 41)
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- [ ] Each module's exploit runs against matched-vulnerable VMs and
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MUST land root; runs against patched VMs and MUST fail at
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detect step
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- [ ] Nightly run; failures open issues automatically
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## Phase 5 — Detection signature export (DONE 2026-05-16)
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- [x] `iamroot --detect-rules --format=auditd` — embedded auditd rules
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across all modules (deduped — family-shared rules emit once)
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- [x] `iamroot --detect-rules --format=sigma` — embedded Sigma rules
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- [x] `--format=yara` and `--format=falco` flags accepted; per-module
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strings can be added when authors ship them. Currently no module
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ships YARA or Falco rules (skipped cleanly).
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- [x] `struct iamroot_module` gained `detect_auditd`, `detect_sigma`,
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`detect_yara`, `detect_falco` fields — each NULL or pointer to
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embedded C string. Self-contained binary, no data-dir install needed.
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- [ ] Sample SOC playbook in `docs/DETECTION_PLAYBOOK.md` — followup
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## Phase 6 — Mitigation mode
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- [ ] `iamroot --mitigate` walks the host's vulnerabilities, applies
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temporary sysctl / module-blacklist / LSM workarounds
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- [ ] Per-CVE rollback procedure if the mitigation breaks something
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- [ ] Idempotent: running twice is safe
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## Phase 7+ — More modules
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Backfill of historical and recent LPEs as time allows:
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- [ ] **CVE-2021-3493** — overlayfs nested-userns LPE
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- [ ] **CVE-2021-4034** — Pwnkit (pkexec env handling)
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- [ ] **CVE-2022-2588** — net/sched route4 dead UAF
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- [ ] **CVE-2023-2008** — vmwgfx OOB write
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- [ ] **CVE-2024-1086** — netfilter nf_tables UAF
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- [ ] Fragnesia (if it lands as a CVE)
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- [ ] Anything we ourselves disclose — bundled AFTER upstream patch
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ships (responsible-disclosure-first)
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## Non-goals
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- **No 0-day shipment.** Everything in IAMROOT is post-patch.
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- **No automated mass-targeting.** No host-list mode. No automatic
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pivoting.
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- **No persistence beyond `--exploit-backdoor`'s
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`/etc/passwd` overwrite**, which is overt and easily detected by
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any auditd rule we ship ourselves. Persistence-as-evasion is out
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of scope.
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- **No container-runtime escapes** unless they cleanly chain to
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host-root.
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- **No Windows / macOS / non-Linux targets.** Focus is the moat.
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