1552a3bfcb
- core/kernel_range.{c,h}: branch-aware patched-version comparison.
Every future module needs 'is the host kernel in the affected
range?'; centralized here. Models stable-branch backports
(e.g. 5.10.102, 5.15.25) so a 5.15.20 host correctly reports
VULNERABLE while a 5.15.50 host reports OK.
- modules/dirty_pipe_cve_2022_0847/ (promoted out of _stubs):
- iamroot_modules.{c,h}: dirty_pipe module exposing detect() that
parses /proc/version and compares against the four known patched
branches (5.10.102, 5.15.25, 5.16.11, 5.17+ inherited). Returns
IAMROOT_OK / IAMROOT_VULNERABLE / IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR with stderr
hints in human-readable scan mode.
- exploit() returns IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL with a 'not yet
implemented' message; landing the actual exploit needs Phase 1.5
extraction of passwd/su helpers into core/.
- detect/auditd.rules: splice() syscall + passwd/shadow file watches
- detect/sigma.yml: non-root modification of /etc/passwd|shadow|sudoers
- iamroot.c main() calls iamroot_register_dirty_pipe() alongside
the copy_fail_family registration.
- Makefile gains the dirty_pipe family as a separate object set.
Verified end-to-end on kctf-mgr (kernel 6.12.86): build clean, 6
modules in --list, --scan correctly reports dirty_pipe as patched,
JSON output ingest-ready.
1.4 KiB
1.4 KiB
Dirty Pipe — CVE-2022-0847
⚪ PLANNED module. See
../../ROADMAP.mdPhase 2.
Summary
Pipe-buffer PIPE_BUF_FLAG_CAN_MERGE was incorrectly inherited by
copy_page_to_iter_pipe() and push_pipe() paths, allowing an
unprivileged user to write into the page cache of any file readable
by them.
Affected kernels
- ≤ 5.16.11
- ≤ 5.15.25 LTS
- ≤ 5.10.102 LTS
Upstream patch
9d2231c5d74e13b2a0546fee6737ee4446017903 ("lib/iov_iter: initialize
"flags" in new pipe_buffer")
Why this module is here
Even in 2026, many production deployments still run vulnerable kernels (RHEL 7/8, older Ubuntu LTS, embedded). Bundling Dirty Pipe makes IAMROOT useful as a "historical sweep" tool on long-tail systems.
Implementation plan
- C exploit ported from public PoCs (credit upstream authors in
NOTICE.mdwhen implemented) detect(): kernel version check +/proc/versionparse + test for fixed-version backportsexploit(): writesiamroot::0:0:dirtypipe:/:/bin/bashinto/etc/passwd, thensu iamroot— same shape as copy_fail's backdoor mode- Detection rules: auditd on splice() calls + pipe write patterns,
filesystem audit on
/etc/passwdmodification by non-root
Not started yet
Pick this up after Phase 1 (module-interface refactor of the
copy_fail family) so this module can use the standard
iamroot_module shape from the start.