leviathan
ac557b67d0
Three-agent rigorous review of the dirtydecrypt + fragnesia ports plus
repo-wide doc consistency, followed by a full Linux build verification.
dirtydecrypt (NOTICE + detection rules):
- NOTICE.md: removed an unsupported "Zellic co-founder" detail and a
fabricated disclosure-date narrative; tightened phrasing of the
Zellic + V12 credit; noted that upstream poc.c carries no
author/license header of its own.
- Embedded auditd + sigma rules and detect/sigma.yml broadened to
cover every binary in dd_targets[] (added /usr/bin/mount,
/usr/bin/passwd, /usr/bin/chsh) and added the b32 splice rule, so
the embedded ruleset matches the on-disk reference and the carrier
list the exploit actually targets.
- Exploit primitive verified byte-for-byte against the V12 PoC
(tiny_elf[] identical, all rxgk/XDR/fire/pagecache_write logic
token-identical). docker gcc:latest compile of the Linux path:
COMPILE_OK, zero warnings.
fragnesia: review found no defects. Exploit primitive byte-identical
to the V12 PoC (shell_elf[] 192 bytes identical, AF_ALG GCM keystream
table + userns/netns/XFRM + receiver/sender/run_trigger_pair all
faithful). The deliberate omissions (ANSI TUI, CLI arg parsing) drop
nothing exploit-critical. docker gcc:latest compile: COMPILE_OK; full
project build links into a working skeletonkey ELF and --list shows
the module registered correctly.
Repo docs (README.md / CVES.md / ROADMAP.md):
- Chose to keep "28 verified" as the headline; the two ported
modules are represented as a separate clearly-labelled tier
("ported-but-unverified") that is explicitly excluded from the
28-module verified counts. README + CVES.md + ROADMAP.md now tell
one consistent story.
- Filled a pre-existing documentation gap: sudo_samedit, sequoia,
sudoedit_editor, vmwgfx were registered + built but absent from
CVES.md's inventory + operations tables. Added rows synthesized
from each module's .cve / .summary / .kernel_range fields.
- ROADMAP Phase 8 "7 🟡 PRIMITIVE modules" → "14"; added a "Landed
since v0.1.0" group; moved vmwgfx out of the stale carry-overs.
docs site (docs/index.html):
- Stat box "28 / total modules" → "28 / verified modules" (the 14+14
breakdown now sums to the headline consistently).
- Terminal example "scanning 28 modules" → "scanning 30 modules"
(was factually wrong — the binary literally prints module_count()
which is 30).
- Status line: updated to mention the 2 ported-but-unverified
modules and mirror the README phrasing.
- docs/LAUNCH.md left as a dated v0.5.0 launch snapshot.
Build verification: `docker run gcc:latest make clean && make` —
links into a 30-module skeletonkey ELF on Linux. macOS dev box still
hits the pre-existing dirty_pipe header gap; unchanged.
.gitignore: added /skeletonkey to exclude the top-level build
artifact (the existing modules/*/skeletonkey only covered per-module
binaries; the root one was getting picked up by `git add -A`).
236 lines
12 KiB
Markdown
236 lines
12 KiB
Markdown
# Roadmap
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What's coming next, in priority order. Dates are aspirational, not
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commitments.
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## Phase 0 — Bootstrap (DONE as of 2026-05-16)
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- [x] Repo structure (modules/, core/, docs/, tools/, tests/)
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- [x] Absorbed DIRTYFAIL as the first module
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(`modules/copy_fail_family/`)
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- [x] Top-level README, CVES.md, ROADMAP.md, docs/ARCHITECTURE.md,
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docs/ETHICS.md
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- [x] LICENSE (MIT)
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- [x] Private GitHub repo
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## Phase 1 — Make the bundling real (DONE 2026-05-16)
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- [x] Top-level `skeletonkey` dispatcher CLI (`skeletonkey.c`) — module
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registry, route to module's detect/exploit
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- [x] Module interface header (`core/module.h`) — standard
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`skeletonkey_module` struct + `skeletonkey_result_t` (numerically
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aligned with copy_fail_family's `df_result_t` for zero-cost
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bridging)
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- [x] `core/registry.{c,h}` — flat-array registry with `find_by_name`
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- [x] `modules/copy_fail_family/skeletonkey_modules.{c,h}` — bridge layer
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exposing 5 modules
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- [x] Top-level `Makefile` that builds all modules into one binary
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- [x] Smoke test: `skeletonkey --scan --json` produces ingest-ready JSON;
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`skeletonkey --list` prints the module inventory
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- [ ] **Deferred to Phase 1.5**: extract `apparmor_bypass.c`,
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`exploit_su.c`, `common.c`, `fcrypt.c` into `core/` (shared
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across families). Phase 1 keeps them inside copy_fail_family/src/
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because there's only one family today; the extraction is
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mechanical and lands when a second family arrives.
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## Phase 2 — Add Dirty Pipe (CVE-2022-0847) — PARTIAL (DETECT done 2026-05-16)
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Public PoC, well-understood, useful for completeness — SKELETONKEY
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without Dirty Pipe is incomplete as a "historical bundle." Affects
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kernels ≤5.16.11/≤5.15.25/≤5.10.102 so coverage is older
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deployments (worth bundling — many production boxes still run
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these).
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- [x] `modules/dirty_pipe_cve_2022_0847/` directory promoted out of
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`_stubs/`
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- [x] `core/kernel_range.{c,h}` — branch-aware patched-version
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comparison (reusable by every future module)
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- [x] `dirty_pipe_detect()` — kernel version check against
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branch-backport thresholds (5.10.102 / 5.15.25 / 5.16.11 / 5.17+)
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- [x] Detection rules: `auditd.rules` (splice() syscall + passwd/shadow
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watches) and `sigma.yml` (non-root modification of sensitive files)
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- [x] Registered in `skeletonkey --list` / `--scan` output. Verified on
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kernel 6.12.86 → correctly reports OK (patched).
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- [x] **Phase 2 complete (2026-05-16)**: full exploit landed. Inline
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passwd-UID and page-cache-revert helpers in the module (~80 lines).
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Extraction into `core/host` is Phase 1.5 work — deferred until a
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third module needs the same helpers. (Two-of-two duplication is
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acceptable; three-of-three triggers extraction.)
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- [x] Exploit refuses to fire when detect() reports patched (verified
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end-to-end on kernel 6.12.86 — refuses cleanly).
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- [x] Cleanup function (`dirty_pipe --cleanup`) added: evicts
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/etc/passwd via POSIX_FADV_DONTNEED + drop_caches.
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- [ ] CI matrix: Ubuntu 20.04 with kernel 5.13 (vulnerable),
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Debian 11 with 5.10.0-8 (vulnerable), Debian 13 with 6.12.x
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(patched — should detect as OK). Phase 4 work.
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## Phase 3 — EntryBleed (CVE-2023-0458) as stage-1 leak brick (DONE 2026-05-16)
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EntryBleed is **not a standalone LPE**. It's a **kbase leak
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primitive** that other modules can chain. Bundled because:
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- Stage-1 of any future "build-your-own LPE" workflow
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- Detection rules for KPTI side-channel attempts are useful for
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defenders
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- Already works empirically on lts-6.12.88 (verified 2026-05-16)
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- [x] `modules/entrybleed_cve_2023_0458/` — leak primitive + detect
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- [x] Exposed as a library helper: other modules can call
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`entrybleed_leak_kbase_lib()` (declared in skeletonkey_modules.h)
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- [x] Wired into skeletonkey.c registry; `skeletonkey --exploit entrybleed
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--i-know` produces a kbase leak. Verified on kctf-mgr:
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leaked `0xffffffff8d800000` with KASLR slide `0xc800000`.
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- [x] `entry_SYSCALL_64` slot offset configurable via
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`SKELETONKEY_ENTRYBLEED_OFFSET` env var (default matches lts-6.12.x).
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Future enhancement: auto-detect via /boot/System.map or
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/proc/kallsyms if accessible.
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## Phase 4 — CI matrix (PARTIAL — build-check landed 2026-05-16)
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- [x] `.github/workflows/build.yml`: matrix of {gcc, clang} ×
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{default, debug} builds on every push and PR. Includes smoke
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tests: `--version`, `--list`, `--scan`, `--detect-rules` in
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both auditd and sigma formats. Build failure breaks the merge
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gate. Static-build job runs continue-on-error (glibc + NSS
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issue; revisit with musl-gcc).
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- [ ] Distro+kernel VM matrix in GitHub Actions (Ubuntu 20.04 /
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22.04 / 24.04 / 26.04, Debian 11 / 12 / 13, Alma 8 / 9 / 10,
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Fedora 39 / 40 / 41). Needs self-hosted runners or paid VM
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service; placeholder commented in build.yml.
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- [ ] Each module's exploit runs against matched-vulnerable VMs and
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MUST land root; runs against patched VMs and MUST fail at
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detect step
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- [ ] Nightly run; failures open issues automatically
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## Phase 5 — Detection signature export (DONE 2026-05-16)
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- [x] `skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=auditd` — embedded auditd rules
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across all modules (deduped — family-shared rules emit once)
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- [x] `skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=sigma` — embedded Sigma rules
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- [x] `--format=yara` and `--format=falco` flags accepted; per-module
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strings can be added when authors ship them. Currently no module
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ships YARA or Falco rules (skipped cleanly).
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- [x] `struct skeletonkey_module` gained `detect_auditd`, `detect_sigma`,
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`detect_yara`, `detect_falco` fields — each NULL or pointer to
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embedded C string. Self-contained binary, no data-dir install needed.
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- [ ] Sample SOC playbook in `docs/DETECTION_PLAYBOOK.md` — followup
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## Phase 6 — Mitigation mode (PARTIAL — copy_fail_family bridged 2026-05-16)
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- [x] copy_fail_family: `skeletonkey --mitigate copy_fail` (or any family
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member) blacklists algif_aead + esp4 + esp6 + rxrpc, sets
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`kernel.apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=1`, drops page
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cache. Bridged from existing DIRTYFAIL `mitigate_apply()`.
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- [x] copy_fail_family: `skeletonkey --cleanup <name>` routes by visible
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state: if `/etc/modprobe.d/dirtyfail-mitigations.conf` exists →
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`mitigate_revert()`; else evict /etc/passwd page cache. Heuristic
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sufficient for common usage patterns.
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- [x] dirty_pipe: `skeletonkey --cleanup dirty_pipe` evicts /etc/passwd
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(already landed in Phase 2 complete).
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- [ ] dirty_pipe `--mitigate`: only real fix is "upgrade your kernel";
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no automated mitigation possible. Document and skip.
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- [ ] entrybleed `--mitigate`: same — no canonical patch; document.
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- [ ] Idempotent re-run safety: copy_fail_family's apply is already
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idempotent (overwrites conf files). Re-verify per module.
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## Phase 7+ — More modules (started 2026-05-16, v0.1.0 cut 2026-05-16)
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Backfill of historical and recent LPEs as time allows.
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**Landed in v0.1.0:**
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- [x] **CVE-2016-5195** — Dirty COW: 🟢 FULL Phil-Oester-style race.
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- [x] **CVE-2017-7308** — AF_PACKET TPACKET_V3: 🟡 PRIMITIVE
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(overflow + skb spray + cred-race attempt, no portable cred R/W).
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- [x] **CVE-2019-13272** — PTRACE_TRACEME: 🟢 FULL jannh-style chain.
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- [x] **CVE-2020-14386** — AF_PACKET tp_reserve: 🟡 PRIMITIVE-DEMO.
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- [x] **CVE-2021-3493** — Ubuntu overlayfs userns: 🟢 FULL vsh-style.
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- [x] **CVE-2021-4034** — Pwnkit: 🟢 FULL Qualys-style.
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- [x] **CVE-2021-22555** — xt_compat heap-OOB: 🟡 PRIMITIVE (trigger
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+ msg_msg cross-cache groom + MSG_COPY witness, no
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modprobe_path overwrite).
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- [x] **CVE-2022-0185** — fsconfig 4k OOB: 🟡 PRIMITIVE (trigger
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+ cross-cache groom + neighbour-detect, no MSG_COPY arb-read
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finisher).
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- [x] **CVE-2022-0492** — cgroup_release_agent: 🟢 FULL universal
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structural exploit (no offsets, no race).
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- [x] **CVE-2022-2588** — cls_route4 dangling UAF: 🟡 PRIMITIVE
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(tc/ip add+rm + msg_msg spray + classify drive, no cred chain).
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- [x] **CVE-2023-0386** — overlayfs setuid copy-up: 🟢 FULL
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distro-agnostic.
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- [x] **CVE-2023-3269** — StackRot: 🟡 PRIMITIVE/RACE (driver +
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groom; ~<1% race-win per run, honest in module header).
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- [x] **CVE-2024-1086** — nf_tables verdict UAF: 🟡 PRIMITIVE
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(hand-rolled nfnetlink, NFT_GOTO+DROP malformed verdict,
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msg_msg kmalloc-cg-96 groom, no pipapo R/W chain).
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**Landed since v0.1.0 (in the 28-module verified corpus):**
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- [x] **CVE-2021-3156** — sudo Baron Samedit: 🟡 PRIMITIVE
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(`sudoedit -s` heap overflow; heap-tuned, may crash sudo).
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- [x] **CVE-2021-33909** — Sequoia: 🟡 PRIMITIVE (`seq_file` size_t
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overflow → kernel stack OOB; trigger + witness, no cred chain).
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- [x] **CVE-2023-22809** — sudoedit EDITOR/VISUAL argv escape: 🟢 FULL
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structural argv-injection (no kernel state, no offsets).
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- [x] **CVE-2023-2008** — vmwgfx DRM bo size-validation OOB: 🟡
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PRIMITIVE (kmalloc-512 OOB + slab witness, no cred chain).
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**Landed (ported from public PoC, pending VM verification — NOT part
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of the 28-module verified corpus):**
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- [x] **CVE-2026-46300** — Fragnesia: 🟡 XFRM ESP-in-TCP page-cache
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write. Ported from the V12 PoC; the old `_stubs/fragnesia_TBD`
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stub is retired. The stub's open question ("is the
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unprivileged-userns-netns scenario in scope?") is resolved —
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the module ships and reports `PRECOND_FAIL` when the userns gate
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is closed.
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- [x] **CVE-2026-31635** — DirtyDecrypt: 🟡 rxgk missing-COW in-place
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decrypt page-cache write. Ported from the V12 PoC.
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- [ ] **Verify both on a vulnerable-kernel VM**, pin the CVE fix
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commits, add `kernel_range` tables, and promote 🟡 → 🟢. Until
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then `detect()` is precondition-only (no version verdict) and
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`--auto` will not fire them blind.
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**Carry-overs:**
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- [ ] **CVE-2026-41651** — Pack2TheRoot (PackageKit daemon userspace
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LPE; cross-distro). Candidate — userspace LPE in the pwnkit vein.
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- [ ] Anything we ourselves disclose — bundled AFTER upstream patch
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ships (responsible-disclosure-first)
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## Phase 8 — Full-chain promotions (post v0.1.0)
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The 14 🟡 PRIMITIVE modules each stop one or two steps short of full
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cred-overwrite. Promotion to 🟢 means landing the leak → R/W →
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modprobe_path-or-cred-rewrite stage on at least one tracked kernel.
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None requires fresh research — each has a public reference exploit;
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the work is porting the per-kernel offset dance into a portable
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shape compatible with SKELETONKEY's "no-fabricated-offsets" rule (most
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likely as an env-var override table per distro+kernel, with offset
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auto-resolve via System.map / kallsyms when accessible).
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Priority order: nf_tables (Notselwyn pipapo R/W), netfilter_xtcompat
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(Andy Nguyen modprobe_path), af_packet (xairy sk_buff cred chase).
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The remainder are lower priority — fuse_legacy and cls_route4 have
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narrower distro reach; af_packet2 piggybacks on af_packet; stackrot's
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race window makes it inherently low-yield; the nft_* family and
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vmwgfx need their per-kernel offset tables built out.
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The 2 ported-but-unverified modules (`dirtydecrypt`, `fragnesia`) are
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**not** part of this Phase 8 promotion set — they need VM verification
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and pinned fix commits first (tracked under Phase 7+ above) before any
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full-chain work is meaningful.
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## Non-goals
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- **No 0-day shipment.** Everything in SKELETONKEY is post-patch.
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- **No automated mass-targeting.** No host-list mode. No automatic
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pivoting.
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- **No persistence beyond `--exploit-backdoor`'s
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`/etc/passwd` overwrite**, which is overt and easily detected by
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any auditd rule we ship ourselves. Persistence-as-evasion is out
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of scope.
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- **No container-runtime escapes** unless they cleanly chain to
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host-root.
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- **No Windows / macOS / non-Linux targets.** Focus is the moat.
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