Adds tests/test_detect.c — a standalone harness that constructs
synthetic struct skeletonkey_host fingerprints (vulnerable / patched /
specific-gate-closed) and asserts each migrated module's detect()
returns the expected verdict. First real test coverage for the corpus;
catches regressions in the host-fingerprint-consuming logic.
Initial coverage — 8 deterministic cases across the 4 modules that
already consume ctx->host:
- dirtydecrypt: 3 cases verifying 'kernel < 7.0 -> predates the bug'
short-circuit on synthetic 6.12 / 6.14 / 6.8 hosts.
- fragnesia: unprivileged_userns_allowed=false -> PRECOND_FAIL.
- pack2theroot: is_debian_family=false -> PRECOND_FAIL.
- pack2theroot: has_dbus_system=false -> PRECOND_FAIL.
- overlayfs: distro=debian / distro=fedora -> 'not Ubuntu' -> OK.
Coverage grows automatically as more modules migrate to ctx->host
(task #12 below adds them). Each new module that consults the host
fingerprint can have its precondition gates tested with a one-line
EXPECT_DETECT call against a pre-built fingerprint.
Wiring:
- Makefile: new MODULE_OBJS var consolidates the module .o list so
both the main binary and the test binary can share it without
duplication. New TEST_BIN := skeletonkey-test target. 'make test'
builds and runs the suite.
- .github/workflows/build.yml: install libglib2.0-dev + pkg-config so
pack2theroot builds with GLib in CI (was previously stub-compiling).
New 'tests — detect() unit suite' step runs 'make test' as a
non-root user so modules' 'already root' gates don't short-circuit
before the synthetic host checks fire.
- Test harness compiles cross-platform but assertions are #ifdef
__linux__ guarded (on non-Linux all module detect() bodies stub-out
to PRECOND_FAIL, making assertions tautological); macOS dev build
reports 'skipped'.
Module change:
- pack2theroot p2tr_detect now consults ctx->host->is_root (with a
geteuid() fallback when ctx->host is null) instead of calling
geteuid() directly. Production behaviour is identical
(host->is_root is populated from geteuid() at startup); tests can
now construct non-root fingerprints regardless of the test
process's actual euid. Exposed a real consistency issue worth
fixing.
Verified in docker as non-root: 8/8 pass on Linux. macOS reports
'skipped' as designed.
Two reliability improvements that make --auto survive any misbehaving
module: a 15s timeout on detect() so a hung probe can't stall the
scan, and fork-isolation around exploit/mitigate/cleanup so a
crashing callback doesn't take down --auto's fallback path.
Detect timeout:
- New SKELETONKEY_DETECT_TIMEOUT_SECS = 15.
- run_detect_isolated() forked child now calls alarm(15); if detect()
hangs, SIGALRM kills the child. Parent observes WIFSIGNALED with
signal SIGALRM and reports 'detect() timed out (signal 14)' in the
verdict table.
- cmd_auto distinguishes timeout vs other crash in the scan-summary
callout: separate n_timeout counter and dedicated [!] line.
Exploit fork-isolation:
- New run_callback_isolated() wraps exploit() / mitigate() / cleanup()
in a forked child. Two crash-safety properties:
* A SIGSEGV/SIGILL in the callback is contained; --auto continues
to the next-safest candidate via its existing fallback list.
* The dispatcher itself can't be killed by a misbehaving exploit.
- Result-code communication is via a one-byte pipe with FD_CLOEXEC on
the write end:
* Callback returns normally -> child writes result byte, _exit;
parent reads it; trusted result.
* Callback execve()s a target -> FD_CLOEXEC closes the write end
during the exec transition;
parent's read() gets EOF; we treat
exec-then-exit as EXPLOIT_OK
regardless of the shell's exit
code (we DID land code execution).
* Callback crashes -> WIFSIGNALED true; report the
signal and propagate EXPLOIT_FAIL.
- cmd_auto: exploit() crash now logged distinctly ('[!] X exploit
crashed (signal N) — dispatcher recovered'). Exec-path is
surfaced too ('[*] X exploit transferred to spawned target — ...').
- cmd_one: same wrapping, same crash/exec reporting for the
--exploit/--mitigate/--cleanup single-module paths.
Both platforms build clean. Verified containment behavior on Linux
in docker: entrybleed's prefetchnta SIGILL still reports cleanly as
'detect() crashed (signal 4) — continuing' and the scan finishes
through all 31 modules to the summary + pick step.
Adds core/host.{h,c} — a single struct skeletonkey_host populated once
at startup and handed to every module callback via ctx->host. Replaces
the per-detect uname / /etc/os-release / sysctl / userns-fork-probe
calls scattered across the corpus with O(1) cached lookups, and gives
the dispatcher one consistent view of the host.
What's in the fingerprint:
- Identity: kernel_version (parsed from uname.release), arch (machine),
nodename, distro_id / distro_version_id / distro_pretty (parsed once
from /etc/os-release).
- Process state: euid, real_uid (defeats userns illusion via
/proc/self/uid_map), egid, username, is_root, is_ssh_session.
- Platform family: is_linux, is_debian_family, is_rpm_family,
is_arch_family, is_suse_family (file-existence checks once).
- Capability gates (Linux): unprivileged_userns_allowed (live
fork+unshare probe), apparmor_restrict_userns,
unprivileged_bpf_disabled, kpti_enabled, kernel_lockdown_active,
selinux_enforcing, yama_ptrace_restricted.
- System services: has_systemd, has_dbus_system.
Wiring:
- core/module.h forward-declares struct skeletonkey_host and adds the
pointer to skeletonkey_ctx. Modules opt-in by including
../../core/host.h.
- core/host.c is fully POD (no heap pointers) — uses a single file-
static instance, returns a stable pointer on every call. Lazily
populated on first skeletonkey_host_get().
- skeletonkey.c calls skeletonkey_host_get() at main() entry, stores
in ctx.host before any register_*() runs.
- cmd_auto's bespoke distro-fingerprint code (was an inline
read_os_release helper) is replaced with skeletonkey_host_print_banner(),
which emits a two-line banner of identity + capability gates.
Migrations:
- dirtydecrypt: kernel_version_current() -> ctx->host->kernel.
- fragnesia: removed local fg_userns_allowed() fork-probe in favour of
ctx->host->unprivileged_userns_allowed (no per-scan fork). Also
pulls kernel from ctx->host. The PRECOND_FAIL message now notes
whether AppArmor restriction is on.
- pack2theroot: access('/etc/debian_version') -> ctx->host->is_debian_family;
also short-circuits when ctx->host->has_dbus_system is false (saves
the GLib g_bus_get_sync attempt on systems without system D-Bus).
- overlayfs: replaced the inline is_ubuntu() /etc/os-release parser
with ctx->host->distro_id comparison. Local helper preserved for
symmetry / standalone builds.
Documentation: docs/ARCHITECTURE.md gains a 'Host fingerprint'
section describing the struct, the opt-in include pattern, and
example detect() usage. ROADMAP --auto accuracy log notes the
landing and flags remaining modules as an incremental follow-up.
Build verification:
- macOS (local): make clean && make -> Mach-O x86_64, 31 modules,
banner prints with distro=?/? (no /etc/os-release).
- Linux (docker gcc:latest + libglib2.0-dev): make clean && make ->
ELF 64-bit, 31 modules. Banner prints with kernel + distro=debian/13
+ 7 capability gates. dirtydecrypt correctly says 'predates the
rxgk code added in 7.0'; fragnesia PRECOND_FAILs with
'(host fingerprint)' annotation; pack2theroot PRECOND_FAILs on
no-DBus; overlayfs reports 'not Ubuntu (distro=debian)'.
Preview-only mode for --auto / --exploit / --mitigate / --cleanup.
Walks the full scan (with active probes, fork isolation, verdict
table — everything the real --auto does) and prints what would be
launched, without ever calling the exploit/mitigate/cleanup callback.
Wiring:
- struct skeletonkey_ctx gains a 'dry_run' field (core/module.h).
- Long option --dry-run, getopt case 10.
- cmd_auto: after picking the safest, if dry_run, print
[*] auto: --dry-run: would launch `--exploit <NAME> --i-know`; not firing.
plus the remaining ranked candidates, then return 0.
- cmd_one (used for --exploit/--mitigate/--cleanup) shorts on dry_run
with [*] <module>: --dry-run: would run --<op>; not firing.
UX: --auto --dry-run does NOT require --i-know (nothing fires). The
refusal message for bare --auto now points to --dry-run for the
preview path:
[-] --auto requires --i-know (or --dry-run for a preview that never fires).
ROADMAP --auto accuracy section updated with the dry-run + the
version-pinned detect work from the previous commit.
Smoke-tested locally on macOS: scanning runs, verdicts print, the
'would launch' line fires, exit 0.
Both modules' detect() was precondition-only because we didn't know the
mainline fix commits at port time. Debian's security tracker now
provides them — pinning here turns detect() into a proper version-
based verdict (still with --active for empirical override).
dirtydecrypt (CVE-2026-31635):
- Fix commit a2567217ade970ecc458144b6be469bc015b23e5 in mainline 7.0
('rxrpc: fix oversized RESPONSE authenticator length check').
- Debian tracker confirms older stable branches (5.10 / 6.1 / 6.12) as
<not-affected, vulnerable code not present>: the rxgk RESPONSE-
handling code was added in 7.0.
- kernel_range table: { {7, 0, 0} }
- detect() pre-checks 'kernel < 7.0 -> SKELETONKEY_OK (predates)' then
consults the table. With --active, the /tmp sentinel probe overrides
empirically (catches pre-fix 7.0-rc kernels the version check
reports as patched).
fragnesia (CVE-2026-46300):
- Fix in mainline 7.0.9 per Debian tracker ('linux unstable: 7.0.9-1
fixed'). Older Debian-stable branches (bullseye 5.10 / bookworm 6.1
/ trixie 6.12) are still marked vulnerable as of 2026-05-22 - no
backports yet.
- kernel_range table: { {7, 0, 9} }
- detect() keeps the userns + carrier preconditions, then consults
the table: 7.0.9+ -> OK; older branches without an explicit backport
entry -> VULNERABLE (version-only). --active confirms empirically.
- Table is intentionally minimal so distros that DO backport in the
future flow into 'patched' once their branch lands an entry; until
then, the conservative VULNERABLE verdict on unfixed branches is
correct.
Other changes:
- module struct .kernel_range strings updated from 'fix commit not
yet pinned' to the actual pinned-version prose.
- module_safety_rank bumped 86 -> 87 for both modules (version-pinned
detect is now real; still below the verified copy_fail family at
88 so --auto prefers verified modules when both apply).
- Both modules now #include core/kernel_range.h inside their
#ifdef __linux__ block.
- MODULE.md verification-status sections rewritten: detect() is now
version-pinned; only the exploit body remains unverified.
- CVES.md note + inventory rows updated: dropped the 'precondition-
only' language for the pair; all three ported modules now have
pinned fix references.
- README ⚪ tier description + module list aligned to the new state.
Both detect()s smoke-tested in docker gcc:latest on kernel 6.12.76-
linuxkit: dirtydecrypt correctly reports OK ('predates the rxgk code
added in 7.0'); fragnesia + pack2theroot correctly report
PRECOND_FAIL (no userns / no D-Bus in container). Local macOS + Linux
builds both clean.
Every kernel-LPE module that uses Linux-only headers (splice, posix_fadvise,
linux/netlink.h, sys/ptrace.h, etc.) now follows the same #ifdef __linux__
pattern the new modules already used: Linux body in the ifdef, stub
detect/exploit/cleanup returning SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL on non-Linux,
platform-neutral rule strings + module struct + register fn left outside.
14 modules wrapped:
dirty_pipe (already done above), af_packet, af_packet2,
cgroup_release_agent, cls_route4, dirty_cow, fuse_legacy,
netfilter_xtcompat, nf_tables, nft_fwd_dup, nft_payload,
overlayfs, overlayfs_setuid, ptrace_traceme.
Several modules previously had ad-hoc partial stubs (af_packet2 faked
SIOCSIFFLAGS/MAP_LOCKED, netfilter_xtcompat faked sysv-msg syscalls,
the nft_* modules had 3 partial __linux__ islands each, fuse_legacy /
nf_tables had inner-only ifdef blocks) — all replaced with the uniform
outer-wrap shape from dirty_pipe / dirtydecrypt / fragnesia / pack2theroot.
Where a module includes core/kernel_range.h, core/finisher.h, or
core/offsets.h, those are now inside the ifdef block as well — silences
clangd's "unused-includes" LSP warning on macOS while keeping them
present for the real Linux build.
No exploit logic, constant, struct, shellcode byte, or rule string was
modified — only include placement and ifdef markers.
Build verification:
macOS (local): make clean && make → Mach-O x86_64, 31 modules
registered, --scan reports each Linux-only module as
"Linux-only module — not applicable here".
Linux (docker gcc:latest + libglib2.0-dev): make clean && make →
ELF 64-bit, 31 modules. Exploit code paths unchanged.
Adds the third ported module — Pack2TheRoot, a userspace PackageKit
D-Bus TOCTOU LPE — and spends real effort hardening --auto so its
detect step gives an accurate, robust verdict before deploying.
pack2theroot (CVE-2026-41651):
- Ported from the public Vozec PoC
(github.com/Vozec/CVE-2026-41651). Original disclosure by the
Deutsche Telekom security team.
- Two back-to-back InstallFiles D-Bus calls (SIMULATE then NONE)
overwrite the cached transaction flags between polkit auth and
dispatch. GLib priority ordering makes the overwrite deterministic,
not a timing race; postinst of the malicious .deb drops a SUID bash
in /tmp.
- detect() reads PackageKit's VersionMajor/Minor/Micro directly over
D-Bus and compares against the pinned fix release 1.3.5 (commit
76cfb675). This is a high-confidence verdict, not precondition-only.
- Debian-family only (PoC builds its own .deb in pure C; ar/ustar/
gzip-stored inline). Cleanup removes /tmp .debs + best-effort
unlinks /tmp/.suid_bash + sudo -n dpkg -r the staging packages.
- Adds an optional GLib/GIO build dependency. The top-level Makefile
autodetects via `pkg-config gio-2.0`; when absent the module
compiles as a stub returning PRECOND_FAIL.
- Embedded auditd + sigma rules cover the file-side footprint
(/tmp/.suid_bash, /tmp/.pk-*.deb, non-root dpkg/apt execve).
--auto accuracy improvements:
- Auto-enables --active before the scan. Per-module sentinel probes
(page-cache /tmp files, fork-isolated namespace mounts) turn
version-only checks into definitive verdicts, so silent distro
backports don't fool the scan and --auto won't pick blind on
TEST_ERROR.
- Per-module verdict printing — every module's result is shown
(VULNERABLE / patched / precondition / indeterminate), not just
VULNERABLE rows. Operator sees the full picture.
- Scan-end summary line: "N vulnerable, M patched/n.a., K
precondition-fail, L indeterminate" with a separate callout when
modules crashed.
- Distro fingerprint added to the auto banner (ID + VERSION_ID from
/etc/os-release alongside kernel/arch).
- Fork-isolated detect() — each detector runs in a child process so
a SIGILL/SIGSEGV in one module's probe is contained and the scan
continues. Surfaced live while testing: entrybleed's prefetchnta
KASLR sweep SIGILLs on emulated CPUs (linuxkit on darwin); without
isolation the whole --auto died at module 7 of 31. With isolation
the scan reports "detect() crashed (signal 4) — continuing" and
finishes cleanly.
module_safety_rank additions:
- pack2theroot: 95 (userspace D-Bus TOCTOU; dpkg + /tmp SUID footprint
— clean but heavier than pwnkit's gconv-modules-only path).
- dirtydecrypt / fragnesia: 86 (page-cache writes; one step below the
verified copy_fail/dirty_frag family at 88 to prefer verified
modules when both apply).
Docs:
- README badge / tagline / tier table / ⚪ block / example output /
v0.5.0 status — all updated to "28 verified + 3 ported".
- CVES.md counts line, the ported-modules note (now calling out
pack2theroot's high-confidence detect vs. precondition-only for
the page-cache pair), inventory row, operations table row.
- ROADMAP Phase 7+: pack2theroot moved out of carry-overs into the
"landed (ported, pending VM verification)" group; added a new
"--auto accuracy work" subsection documenting the dispatcher
hardening landed in this commit.
- docs/index.html: scanning-count example bumped to 31, status line
updated to mention 3 ported modules.
Build verification: full `make clean && make` in `docker gcc:latest`
with libglib2.0-dev installed: links into a 31-module skeletonkey
ELF (413KB), `--list` shows all modules including pack2theroot,
`--detect-rules --format=auditd` emits the new pack2theroot section,
`--auto --i-know --no-shell` exercises the new banner + active
probes + verdict table + fork isolation + scan summary end-to-end.
Only build warning is the pre-existing
`-Wunterminated-string-initialization` in dirty_pipe (not introduced
here).
Three-agent rigorous review of the dirtydecrypt + fragnesia ports plus
repo-wide doc consistency, followed by a full Linux build verification.
dirtydecrypt (NOTICE + detection rules):
- NOTICE.md: removed an unsupported "Zellic co-founder" detail and a
fabricated disclosure-date narrative; tightened phrasing of the
Zellic + V12 credit; noted that upstream poc.c carries no
author/license header of its own.
- Embedded auditd + sigma rules and detect/sigma.yml broadened to
cover every binary in dd_targets[] (added /usr/bin/mount,
/usr/bin/passwd, /usr/bin/chsh) and added the b32 splice rule, so
the embedded ruleset matches the on-disk reference and the carrier
list the exploit actually targets.
- Exploit primitive verified byte-for-byte against the V12 PoC
(tiny_elf[] identical, all rxgk/XDR/fire/pagecache_write logic
token-identical). docker gcc:latest compile of the Linux path:
COMPILE_OK, zero warnings.
fragnesia: review found no defects. Exploit primitive byte-identical
to the V12 PoC (shell_elf[] 192 bytes identical, AF_ALG GCM keystream
table + userns/netns/XFRM + receiver/sender/run_trigger_pair all
faithful). The deliberate omissions (ANSI TUI, CLI arg parsing) drop
nothing exploit-critical. docker gcc:latest compile: COMPILE_OK; full
project build links into a working skeletonkey ELF and --list shows
the module registered correctly.
Repo docs (README.md / CVES.md / ROADMAP.md):
- Chose to keep "28 verified" as the headline; the two ported
modules are represented as a separate clearly-labelled tier
("ported-but-unverified") that is explicitly excluded from the
28-module verified counts. README + CVES.md + ROADMAP.md now tell
one consistent story.
- Filled a pre-existing documentation gap: sudo_samedit, sequoia,
sudoedit_editor, vmwgfx were registered + built but absent from
CVES.md's inventory + operations tables. Added rows synthesized
from each module's .cve / .summary / .kernel_range fields.
- ROADMAP Phase 8 "7 🟡 PRIMITIVE modules" → "14"; added a "Landed
since v0.1.0" group; moved vmwgfx out of the stale carry-overs.
docs site (docs/index.html):
- Stat box "28 / total modules" → "28 / verified modules" (the 14+14
breakdown now sums to the headline consistently).
- Terminal example "scanning 28 modules" → "scanning 30 modules"
(was factually wrong — the binary literally prints module_count()
which is 30).
- Status line: updated to mention the 2 ported-but-unverified
modules and mirror the README phrasing.
- docs/LAUNCH.md left as a dated v0.5.0 launch snapshot.
Build verification: `docker run gcc:latest make clean && make` —
links into a 30-module skeletonkey ELF on Linux. macOS dev box still
hits the pre-existing dirty_pipe header gap; unchanged.
.gitignore: added /skeletonkey to exclude the top-level build
artifact (the existing modules/*/skeletonkey only covered per-module
binaries; the root one was getting picked up by `git add -A`).
Two new page-cache-write LPE modules, both ported from the public V12
security PoCs (github.com/v12-security/pocs):
- dirtydecrypt (CVE-2026-31635): rxgk missing-COW in-place decrypt.
rxgk_decrypt_skb() decrypts spliced page-cache pages before the HMAC
check, corrupting the page cache of a read-only file. Sibling of
Copy Fail / Dirty Frag in the rxrpc subsystem.
- fragnesia (CVE-2026-46300): XFRM ESP-in-TCP skb_try_coalesce() loses
the SHARED_FRAG marker, so the ESP-in-TCP receive path decrypts
page-cache pages in place. A latent bug exposed by the Dirty Frag
fix (f4c50a4034e6). Retires the old _stubs/fragnesia_TBD stub.
Both wrap the PoC exploit primitive in the skeletonkey_module
interface: detect/exploit/cleanup, an --active /tmp sentinel probe,
--no-shell support, and embedded auditd + sigma rules. The exploit
body runs in a forked child so the PoC's exit()/die() paths cannot
tear down the dispatcher. The fragnesia port drops the upstream PoC's
ANSI TUI (incompatible with a shared dispatcher); the exploit
mechanism is reproduced faithfully. Linux-only code is guarded with
#ifdef __linux__ so the modules still compile on non-Linux dev boxes.
VERIFICATION: ported, NOT yet validated end-to-end on a
vulnerable-kernel VM. The CVE fix commits are not pinned, so detect()
is precondition-only (PRECOND_FAIL / TEST_ERROR, never a blind
VULNERABLE) and --auto will not fire them unless --active confirms.
macOS stub-path compiles verified locally; the Linux exploit-path
build is covered by CI (build.yml, ubuntu) only. See each MODULE.md.
Wiring: core/registry.h, skeletonkey.c, Makefile, CVES.md, ROADMAP.md.
The vendored DIRTYFAIL exploits call typed_confirm("DIRTYFAIL"), which
reads stdin interactively. SKELETONKEY already gates --exploit/--auto
behind --i-know, so the prompt is redundant and deadlocks non-interactive
runs like `skeletonkey --auto --i-know`.
Add a dirtyfail_assume_yes flag, forwarded from skeletonkey_ctx.authorized
by the bridge layer's apply_ctx(). When set, typed_confirm() auto-satisfies
its gate and logs that it did so.
The YES_BREAK_SSH self-lockout guard is exempt — it protects the
operator's own access rather than gating authorization, so it still
requires an interactive answer.
Standalone DIRTYFAIL builds are unchanged: the flag defaults false.
The sortable table was denser but lost the visual scan-ability of
the color-coded pill grid. Restoring the pill view: two grouped
sections (🟢 / 🟡) each showing every module name as a pill.
Drops the table-sort JS (~25 lines) and the .cve-table CSS block.
Single-page static site under /docs/, served by GitHub Pages from
the main branch /docs source.
docs/index.html: hero with one-liner + copy button, why-this-exists,
corpus stats + module pills (14 🟢 + 14 🟡), audience cards
(red/blue/sysadmin/CTF), terminal-shape worked example,
verified-vs-claimed bar, quickstart commands, status, footer.
docs/style.css: dark theme matching GitHub's color palette
(#0d1117 bg, #c9d1d9 text). System sans for prose, ui-monospace
for code. Mobile-responsive with grid breakpoints. No JS framework,
no external fonts, no analytics.
docs/.nojekyll: disable Jekyll so the static HTML is served
verbatim and the existing /docs/*.md files stay as raw markdown
(viewable via GitHub UI, not the Pages site).
Module counts were stale: 13 🟢 + 11 🟡 → corrected to 14 🟢 + 14 🟡
(sudoedit_editor is new 🟢; sudo_samedit + sequoia + vmwgfx are
new 🟡 from the v0.5.0 batch).
Added 'Who it's for' table — red team / sysadmin / blue team / CTF
each get a row.
Added 'Corpus at a glance' section with explicit module lists per
tier, replacing the prose paragraph that buried the names.
Tightened Quickstart — removed duplicate one-liner block, single
canonical command set.
Worked example switched from fictional dirty_pipe to the actual
--auto output shape (pwnkit pick on a vulnerable Ubuntu 5.15).
Honest 'Status' framing — acknowledges no empirical end-to-end
validation yet, calls it the next roadmap item. Replaces the
aspirational 'CI-tested across a distro matrix' claim.
Added 'How it works' (was 'Architecture' + 'Build & run' merged
into a clearer flow) and 'The verified-vs-claimed bar' section
explaining why most modules ship without per-kernel offsets.
README.md: badges (release / license / module-count / platform),
sharpened hero stating value prop in one sentence, audience
framing for red team / sysadmin / blue team.
CONTRIBUTING.md (new): what we accept (offsets, modules, detection
rules, bug reports) and what we don't (untested EXPLOIT_OK,
fabricated offsets, 0days, undisclosed CVEs).
docs/LAUNCH.md (new): ~600-word HN/blog launch post. Copy-paste
ready. Explains the verified-vs-claimed bar + --auto + the
operator-populated offset table approach.
GitHub repo description + 11 topics set via gh repo edit so the
repo is discoverable in topic searches (linux-security,
privilege-escalation, cve, redteam, blueteam, etc.).
Previous staircase pattern was just trailing decoration — not real
key teeth. Redesigned the bit as a hanging rectangle with two
clearly-projecting notch-teeth on its right edge (the part that
engages a lock's wards). Switched to box-drawing chars for the bit
since they make sharper notches than 8/b/d glyphs; bow stays
ornate-ASCII style.
Bump 0.4.3 → 0.4.4.
Previous banner had a SKELETONKEY block-letter art that competed
with the skeleton-key drawing for visual attention. Simplified:
the key art is now the focal point, and SKELETONKEY is rendered
as plain spaced text below the drawing.
Slight refinement to the key art: bow is a bit larger (888 instead
of 88) to feel more substantial. Bit/teeth pattern unchanged.
Bump 0.4.2 → 0.4.3.
The v0.4.1 box-drawing key was minimalist — round bow, line shaft,
small bit. Replaced with a more detailed ornate skeleton-key
silhouette in the classic ASCII-art-of-keys tradition:
- Round bow with internal "hole" rendered via stylized 8/b/d/'
pattern (suggests the decorative loop you'd grip)
- Long shaft running right across the banner
- Bit at the end with a staircase notch pattern (the iconic
"key-tooth" descent showing the wards that engage the lock)
Same height as the previous banner. SKELETONKEY block letters
below unchanged.
Bump 0.4.1 → 0.4.2.
Replace the previous "circle + shaft + curl" silhouette (which read
more like a magnifying glass) with a proper skeleton-key anatomy:
- BOW: round decorative loop with center hole (the part you hold)
- SHAFT: long horizontal rod (= the body of the key)
- BIT: notched tooth hanging down from the shaft end (the part
that engages the lock — the iconic key-tooth profile)
Same change in skeletonkey.c BANNER and README.md.
Bump 0.4.0 → 0.4.1.
The README has been claiming "each module credits the original CVE
reporter and PoC author in its NOTICE.md" since v0.1.0, but only
copy_fail_family actually shipped one. Fixed.
modules/<name>/NOTICE.md (×19 new + 1 existing): per-module
research credit covering CVE ID, discoverer, original advisory
URL where public, upstream fix commit, IAMROOT's role.
iamroot.c: new --dump-offsets subcommand. Resolves kernel offsets
via the existing core/offsets.c four-source chain (env →
/proc/kallsyms → /boot/System.map → embedded table), then emits
a ready-to-paste C struct entry for kernel_table[]. Run once
as root on a target kernel build; upstream via PR. Eliminates
fabricating offsets — every shipped entry traces back to a
`iamroot --dump-offsets` invocation on a real kernel.
docs/OFFSETS.md: documents the --dump-offsets workflow.
CVES.md: notes the NOTICE.md convention + offset dump tool.
iamroot.c: bump IAMROOT_VERSION 0.3.0 → 0.3.1.
Pre-scaffolding for the next batch (CVE-2023-32233, CVE-2023-4622,
CVE-2022-25636, CVE-2023-0179). Each module ships as a 21-line
stub returning PRECOND_FAIL; parallel agents fill in the real
detect/exploit/--full-chain implementations.
This commit keeps registry.h / iamroot.c / Makefile in one place
so the 4 parallel agents don't collide on shared-file edits — they
each own a single iamroot_modules.c.
Build clean on Debian 6.12.86; --list shows all 24 modules
including the 4 new stubs.
Each module now exposes an opt-in full-chain root-pop via --full-chain:
default --exploit behavior is unchanged (primitive-only, returns
EXPLOIT_FAIL). With --full-chain, after primitive lands, modules call
iamroot_finisher_modprobe_path() via a module-specific arb_write_fn
that re-uses the same trigger + slab groom to write a userspace
payload path into modprobe_path[], then exec a setuid bash dropped
by the kernel-invoked modprobe.
netfilter_xtcompat (+239): msg_msg m_list_next stride-seed FALLBACK
af_packet (+316): sk_buff data-pointer stride-seed FALLBACK
af_packet2 (+156): tp_reserve underflow + skb spray, LAST RESORT
nf_tables (+275): forged pipapo_elem with kaddr value-ptr
(Notselwyn offset 0x10), FALLBACK
cls_route4 (+251): msg_msg refill of UAF'd filter, FALLBACK
fuse_legacy (+291): m_ts overflow + MSG_COPY sanity gate,
FALLBACK (one of two modules with a real
post-write sanity check)
stackrot (+233): race-driver budget extended 3s → 30s when
--full-chain; honest <1% race-win/run
All seven honor verified-vs-claimed: arb_write_fn returns 0 for
"trigger structurally fired"; the shared finisher's setuid-bash
sentinel poll is the empirical arbiter. EXPLOIT_OK only when the
sentinel materializes within 3s of the modprobe_path trigger.
Build clean on Debian 6.12.86 (kctf-mgr); all 7 modules refuse
cleanly on both default and --full-chain paths via the existing
patched-kernel detect gate (short-circuits before the new branch).
Adds the infrastructure the 7 🟡 PRIMITIVE modules can wire into for
full-chain root pops.
core/offsets.{c,h}: four-source kernel-symbol resolution chain
1. env vars (IAMROOT_MODPROBE_PATH, IAMROOT_INIT_TASK, …)
2. /proc/kallsyms (only useful when kptr_restrict=0 or root)
3. /boot/System.map-$(uname -r) (world-readable on some distros)
4. embedded table keyed by uname-r glob (entries are
relative-to-_text, applied on top of an EntryBleed kbase leak;
seeded empty in v0.2.0 — schema-only — to honor the
no-fabricated-offsets rule).
core/finisher.{c,h}: shared root-pop helpers given a module's
arb-write primitive.
Pattern A (modprobe_path):
write payload script /tmp/iamroot-mp-<pid>.sh, arb-write
modprobe_path ← that path, execve unknown-format trigger,
wait for /tmp/iamroot-pwn-<pid> sentinel + setuid bash copy,
spawn root shell.
Pattern B (cred uid): stub — needs arb-READ too; modules use
Pattern A unless they have read+write.
On offset-resolution failure: prints a verbose how-to-populate
diagnostic and returns EXPLOIT_FAIL honestly.
core/module.h: + bool full_chain in iamroot_ctx
iamroot.c: + --full-chain flag (longopt 7, sets ctx.full_chain)
+ help text describing primitive-only-by-default + the
opt-in to attempt the full chain.
Makefile: add core/offsets.o + core/finisher.o to CORE_SRCS.
Build clean on Debian 6.12.86; --help renders the new flag.
The whole point of an LPE tool is going from unprivileged to root,
but the Quickstart was leading with `sudo iamroot --scan`. Fix:
- Drop sudo from --scan / --audit / --exploit / --detect-rules.
These work without root (--scan reads /proc + /etc; --audit
walks the FS via stat; --exploit IS the privilege escalation;
--detect-rules emits to stdout).
- Keep sudo only where it's actually needed: --mitigate (writes
/etc/modprobe.d + sysctl) and tee'ing rule files into
/etc/audit/rules.d/.
- Add a worked example showing `id` as uid=1000, then
`iamroot --exploit dirty_pipe --i-know`, then `id` as uid=0.
- Fix the Build & run section's `sudo ./iamroot` too.
The v0.1.0 tag's arm64 job failed with
fatal error: bits/wordsize.h: No such file or directory
because gcc-aarch64-linux-gnu alone doesn't pull in the cross libc
headers on Ubuntu 24.04 runners. Add libc6-dev-arm64-cross +
linux-libc-dev-arm64-cross so the cross-toolchain has its sysroot.
iamroot.c: bump IAMROOT_VERSION from 0.1.0-phase1 → 0.1.0
README.md: replace "bootstrap phase" status with v0.1.0 corpus
breakdown (13🟢 / 7🟡 across 2016→2026 timeline)
CVES.md: redefine 🟡 to mean "primitive fires + groom + witness,
stops short of cred-overwrite chain — refuses to claim
root unless empirically demonstrated"; flip 7 entries
from 🔵 → 🟡; add the two missing 🟢 entries
(cgroup_release_agent, overlayfs_setuid); extend the
operations matrix from 7 → 20 rows.
ROADMAP.md: mark all Phase-7 items landed; add Phase 8 covering
full-chain promotions (nf_tables / xtcompat / af_packet
prioritized — each has a public reference exploit;
IAMROOT's no-fabricated-offsets rule means each needs
an env-var offset table or System.map auto-resolve).
Build clean on Debian 6.12.86; iamroot --version reports 0.1.0.
netfilter_xtcompat (CVE-2021-22555): +597 LoC — Option B
Andy Nguyen's IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE 4-byte OOB write trigger;
msg_msg kmalloc-2k spray + sk_buff sidecar; MSG_COPY witness
+ slabinfo delta. No leak→modprobe_path chain (per-kernel
offsets refused), honest EXPLOIT_FAIL with continuation
roadmap.
stackrot (CVE-2023-3269): +619 LoC — Option C
Two-thread race driver (MAP_GROWSDOWN + mremap rotation vs
fork+fault) with cpu pinning + 3s budget; kmalloc-192 spray
for anon_vma/anon_vma_chain; race-iteration + signal
breadcrumb to /tmp/iamroot-stackrot.log. Honest reliability
note in module header: <1% race-win/run on a vulnerable
kernel — the public PoC averages minutes-to-hours and needs
a much wider VMA staging matrix to be reliable.
Both refuse cleanly on Debian 6.12.86 (kctf-mgr); build clean.
This closes out the detect-only → LPE port across the corpus.
All 22 registered modules now either fire a real primitive or
refuse honestly per the verified-vs-claimed bar.
For 'people should say just use iamroot' framing, the install gate is
the single biggest discoverability bottleneck. This commit makes it:
curl -sSL https://github.com/KaraZajac/IAMROOT/releases/latest/download/install.sh | sh
.github/workflows/release.yml:
- Triggers on semver tag push (v*.*.*) + manual dispatch.
- Matrix build for x86_64 (gcc) and arm64 (aarch64-linux-gnu-gcc cross).
- Per-arch sha256sum alongside the binary.
- Auto-generates release notes pointing at CVES.md / ROADMAP.md and
including the install one-liner with the version-specific URL.
- Publishes via softprops/action-gh-release@v2.
install.sh (also uploaded as a release artifact, so the curl|sh
above is stable):
- Detects arch (x86_64 / aarch64 → arm64).
- Pulls iamroot-<arch> + iamroot-<arch>.sha256 from the requested
version (default: latest).
- Verifies sha256 via sha256sum or shasum -a 256.
- Installs to /usr/local/bin/iamroot (or $IAMROOT_PREFIX). Uses sudo
iff /usr/local/bin isn't already writable.
- Prints quickstart hints + ethics pointer at the end.
- Env knobs: IAMROOT_VERSION, IAMROOT_PREFIX, IAMROOT_REPO.
README.md gains a 'Quickstart' section at the top with the four
canonical commands: install, --scan, --audit, --detect-rules,
fleet-scan. Lands the 'curl|bash and go' UX as the first thing
visitors see.
Convert overlayfs from 🔵 → 🟢: full vsh-style userns + overlayfs +
file-capability injection exploit.
Sequence:
1. mkdtemp workdir; gcc-compile a minimal payload that
setresuid(0,0,0) + execle(/bin/sh, -p)
2. fork child; child unshares(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNS),
writes /proc/self/{setgroups,uid_map,gid_map} mapping outer uid
to userns-root
3. child mounts overlayfs with lower/upper/work layout
4. child copies payload binary into merged/payload — this writes
to host's upper/payload via the overlay
5. child writes security.capability xattr with VFS_CAP_REVISION_2
blob granting cap_setuid+ep on merged/payload — the BUG persists
this xattr to the host fs entry
6. child exits; parent verifies xattr via getxattr on upper/payload
7. parent execve's upper/payload from outside userns → has
cap_setuid effective → setuid(0) → /bin/sh -p with uid=0
- libcap-less setcap: build VFS_CAP_REVISION_2 blob in-place
(cap_setuid bit 7, cap_setgid bit 6, effective flag set in
magic_etc), write via setxattr(security.capability).
- which_gcc() fallback to /usr/bin/cc, /bin/gcc, etc.; tries
-static first, falls back to dynamic link if static unavailable.
- Re-runs detect() to refuse on patched / non-Ubuntu hosts.
- Cleanup on failure: rmdir/unlink the workdir tree.
- Removed unused write_uid_gid_map() helper (logic now inline in
child since we self-write the maps post-unshare).
Verified end-to-end on Debian kctf-mgr:
iamroot --exploit overlayfs --i-know
→ 'not Ubuntu — bug is Ubuntu-specific' → 'refusing'. Correct.
Path buffers oversized vs. mkdtemp template to silence GCC
-Wformat-truncation noise.
CVES.md: overlayfs 🔵 → 🟢.
leviathan