leviathan
3eeee01f06
10th module. Ubuntu-specific userns + overlayfs LPE that injects file
capabilities cross-namespace.
- modules/overlayfs_cve_2021_3493/iamroot_modules.{c,h}:
- is_ubuntu() — parses /etc/os-release for ID=ubuntu or
ID_LIKE=ubuntu. Non-Ubuntu hosts get IAMROOT_OK immediately (the
bug is specific to Ubuntu's modified overlayfs).
- unprivileged_userns_clone gate — sysctl=0 → PRECOND_FAIL
- Active probe (--active): forks a child that enters userns +
mountns and attempts the overlayfs mount inside /tmp. Mount
success on Ubuntu = VULNERABLE. Mount denied = patched / AppArmor
block. Child-isolated so parent's namespace state is untouched.
- Version fallback: kernel < 5.13 = vulnerable-by-inference for
Ubuntu kernels; recommend --active for confirmation.
- Exploit: detect-only stub. Reference vsh's exploit-cve-2021-3493
for full version (mount overlayfs in userns, drop binary with
cap_setuid+ep into upper layer, re-exec outside ns).
- Embedded auditd rules: mount(overlay) syscall + security.capability
xattr writes (the exploit's two-step footprint).
Verified end-to-end on kctf-mgr (Debian):
iamroot --scan → 'not Ubuntu — bug is Ubuntu-specific' → IAMROOT_OK
Module count: 10. Active-probe pattern now applies to dirty_pipe,
entrybleed, and overlayfs (and copy_fail_family via existing
dirtyfail_active_probes global). Detect quality across the corpus
materially improved this session.
76 lines
6.6 KiB
Markdown
76 lines
6.6 KiB
Markdown
# CVE inventory
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The curated list of CVEs IAMROOT exploits, with patch status and
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module status. Updated as new modules land or as upstream patches
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ship.
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Status legend:
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- 🟢 **WORKING** — module verified to land root on a vulnerable host
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- 🟡 **PARTIAL** — module detects + exploits on some distros, not all
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- 🔵 **DETECT-ONLY** — module fingerprints presence/absence but no
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exploit (yet). Useful for blue teams.
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- ⚪ **PLANNED** — stub exists, work not started
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- 🔴 **DEPRECATED** — fully patched everywhere relevant; kept for
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historical reference only
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## Inventory
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| CVE | Name | Class | First patched | IAMROOT module | Status | Notes |
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| CVE-2026-31431 | Copy Fail (algif_aead `authencesn` page-cache write) | LPE (page-cache write → /etc/passwd) | mainline 2026-04-22 | `copy_fail` | 🟢 | Verified on Ubuntu 26.04, Alma 9, Debian 13. Full AppArmor bypass. |
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| CVE-2026-43284 (v4) | Dirty Frag — IPv4 xfrm-ESP page-cache write | LPE (same primitive shape as Copy Fail, different trigger) | mainline 2026-05-XX | `dirty_frag_esp` | 🟢 | Full PoC + active-probe scan |
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| CVE-2026-43284 (v6) | Dirty Frag — IPv6 xfrm-ESP (`esp6`) | LPE | mainline 2026-05-XX | `dirty_frag_esp6` | 🟢 | V6 STORE shift auto-calibrated per kernel build |
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| CVE-2026-43500 | Dirty Frag — RxRPC page-cache write | LPE | mainline 2026-05-XX | `dirty_frag_rxrpc` | 🟢 | |
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| (variant, no CVE) | Copy Fail GCM variant — xfrm-ESP `rfc4106(gcm(aes))` page-cache write | LPE | n/a | `copy_fail_gcm` | 🟢 | Sibling primitive, same fix |
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| CVE-2022-0847 | Dirty Pipe — pipe `PIPE_BUF_FLAG_CAN_MERGE` write | LPE (arbitrary file write into page cache) | mainline 5.17 (2022-02-23) | `dirty_pipe` | 🟢 | Full detect + exploit + cleanup. Detect: branch-backport ranges + **active sentinel probe** (`--active` fires the primitive against a /tmp probe file and verifies the page cache poisoning lands — catches silent distro backports the version check misses). Exploit: page-cache write into /etc/passwd UID field followed by `su` to drop a root shell. Auto-refuses on patched kernels. Cleanup: drop_caches + POSIX_FADV_DONTNEED. |
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| CVE-2023-0458 | EntryBleed — KPTI prefetchnta KASLR bypass | INFO-LEAK (kbase) | mainline (partial mitigations only) | `entrybleed` | 🟢 | Stage-1 leak brick. Working on lts-6.12.86 (verified 2026-05-16 via `iamroot --exploit entrybleed --i-know`). Default `entry_SYSCALL_64` slot offset matches lts-6.12.x; override via `IAMROOT_ENTRYBLEED_OFFSET=0x...`. Other modules can call `entrybleed_leak_kbase_lib()` as a library. x86_64 only. |
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| CVE-2026-31402 | NFS replay-cache heap overflow | LPE (NFS server) | mainline 2026-04-03 | — | ⚪ | Candidate. Different audience (NFS servers) — TBD whether in-scope. |
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| CVE-2021-4034 | Pwnkit — pkexec argv[0]=NULL → env-injection | LPE (userspace setuid binary) | polkit 0.121 (2022-01-25) | `pwnkit` | 🟢 | Full detect + exploit (canonical Qualys-style: gconv-modules + execve NULL-argv). Detect handles both polkit version formats (legacy "0.105" + modern "126"). Exploit compiles payload via target's gcc → falls back gracefully if no cc available. Cleanup nukes /tmp/iamroot-pwnkit-* workdirs. **First userspace LPE in IAMROOT**. Ships auditd + sigma rules. |
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| CVE-2024-1086 | nf_tables — `nft_verdict_init` cross-cache UAF | LPE (kernel arbitrary R/W via slab UAF) | mainline 6.8-rc1 (Jan 2024) | `nf_tables` | 🔵 | Detect-only. Branch-backport ranges checked (6.7.2 / 6.6.13 / 6.1.74 / 5.15.149 / 5.10.210 / 5.4.269). Also checks unprivileged user_ns clone availability (the exploit's trigger gate) — reports PRECOND_FAIL if userns is locked down even when the kernel is vulnerable. Full Notselwyn-style exploit is the next nf_tables commit. |
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| CVE-2021-3493 | Ubuntu overlayfs userns file-capability injection | LPE (host root via file caps in userns-mounted overlayfs) | Ubuntu USN-4915-1 (Apr 2021) | `overlayfs` | 🔵 | Detect-only. **Ubuntu-specific** (vanilla upstream didn't enable userns-overlayfs-mount until 5.11). Detect: parses /etc/os-release for ID=ubuntu, checks unprivileged_userns_clone sysctl, AND with `--active` actually attempts the userns+overlayfs mount as a fork-isolated probe. Reports OK on non-Ubuntu, PRECOND_FAIL if userns locked down. Ships auditd rules covering mount(overlay) + setxattr(security.capability). |
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| CVE-TBD | Fragnesia (ESP shared-frag in-place encrypt) | LPE (page-cache write) | mainline TBD | `_stubs/fragnesia_TBD` | ⚪ | Stub. Per `findings/audit_leak_write_modprobe_backups_2026-05-16.md`, requires CAP_NET_ADMIN in userns netns — may or may not be in-scope depending on target environment. |
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## Operations supported per module
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Symbols: ✓ = supported, — = not applicable / no automated path.
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| Module | --scan (detect) | --exploit | --mitigate | --cleanup | --detect-rules |
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| copy_fail | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ (blacklist algif_aead + AA sysctl) | ✓ (revert mit or evict page cache) | ✓ (auditd + sigma) |
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| copy_fail_gcm | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ (same family-wide) | ✓ | ✓ |
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| dirty_frag_esp | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ (same family-wide) | ✓ | ✓ |
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| dirty_frag_esp6 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ (same family-wide) | ✓ | ✓ |
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| dirty_frag_rxrpc | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ (same family-wide) | ✓ | ✓ |
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| dirty_pipe | ✓ | ✓ | — (only fix is upgrade kernel) | ✓ (evict page cache) | ✓ (auditd + sigma) |
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| entrybleed | ✓ | ✓ (leak kbase) | — (no canonical patch) | — | ✓ (sigma informational) |
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## Pipeline for additions
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1. Bug must be **patched in upstream mainline** (we don't bundle
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0-days)
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2. Either **CVE-assigned** or has clear advisory/patch reference
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3. Affects a kernel version range with realistic deployment footprint
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(we don't bundle exploits for kernels nobody runs)
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4. PoC works on at least one distro+kernel in our CI matrix
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5. Detection signature(s) shipped alongside the exploit
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## Patch-status tracking
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Each module's `kernel-range.json` (planned) declares the affected
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range. CI verifies the exploit fails on the first-patched version
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and succeeds below it. When a distro backports the fix into a kernel
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version below the original first-patched, the matrix updates and
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the relevant distro drops out of the "WORKING" list for that module.
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## Why we exclude some things
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- **0-days the maintainer found themselves**: those go through
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responsible disclosure first, then enter IAMROOT after upstream patch
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- **kCTF VRP submissions in flight**: same as above; disclosure
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before bundling
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- **Hardware-specific side channels** (Spectre/Meltdown variants):
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out of scope; not page-cache or process-isolation primitives
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- **Container-escape only**: unless it cleanly chains to host-root,
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out of scope (separate tool space)
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